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Substrate-Flexible Informational Quantum Mechanics: QBism, RQM, and the Question of Non-Human Epistemic Systems

Ian Staley

Published May 8, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The QBist and Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM) informational readings of quantum theory have been developed across two decades without a clear position on what kind of physical system qualifies as an "agent" or "observer" for the formalism. Fuchs, Mermin, and Schack write as if the agent is a human physicist or a generic Bayesian; Rovelli writes as if any physical system can play the relational-observer role; Healey deflates the agent into an abstract Bayesian without specifying its substrate; the recent Khrennikov-Schack-Zwirn intersubjectivity exchange sharpens the question without resolving it. This paper argues that the QBism/RQM informational reading is substrate-flexible: any physical system whose input-output statistics admit characterization through quantum-probability structure with non-trivial Contextuality-by-Default (CbD) signatures resistant to simplex-embeddable ontological models is a candidate epistemic agent for the formalism. Substrate flexibility is the most coherent reading of the shared formal commitments of QBism and RQM once the agent role is separated from historically human-centered examples; the non-triviality requirement is necessary but not sufficient for agency, which additionally requires an input-output architecture capable of state-sensitive updating across measurement contexts. The thesis preserves the QBist objection to view-from-nowhere framings while removing the requirement that agents be human or conscious; it disciplines Rovelli's "any physical system" claim by indexing it to the non-triviality requirement; and it specifies what would count as evidence for or against. Engineered cortical wetware preparations (Cortical Labs CL1, DishBrain) provide a non-human, non-conscious-in-any-unambiguous-sense, controllable testbed on which the question can be empirically pursued; nothing in the argument requires attributing phenomenal consciousness or quantum-coherent biological dynamics to such systems. The paper distinguishes substrate flexibility from Pienaar's prior extension of the QBist agent (which extends the agent's senses, not its substrate), engages the neo-Everettian opposition (Wallace 2012, 2023) directly, and rejects the recent attempts (Edwards 2024, 2025) to fold classical large language models into a QBism-grounded formalism. Classical AI architectures admit simplex-embeddable models for their token-generation processes and therefore fail the non-triviality requirement; substrate flexibility is narrower, not wider, than such proposals.

DOI
10.20944/preprints202605.0531.v1

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Substrate-Flexible Informational Quantum Mechanics: QBism, RQM, and the Question of Non-Human Epistemic Systems

Ian Staley

The QBist and Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM) informational readings of quantum theory have long lacked a clear account of what kind of physical system qualifies as an “agent” or “observer.” Fuchs, Mermin, and Schack often treat the agent as a human physicist or Bayesian decision-maker; Rovelli suggests that any physical system may serve as a relational observer; Healey abstracts the agent into a Bayesian role without specifying its substrate; and the Khrennikov-Schack-Zwirn exchange sharpens, but does not resolve, the intersubjectivity problem. This paper argues that the QBism/RQM informational reading is best understood as substrate-flexible: any physical system whose input-output statistics exhibit quantum-probability structure, including non-trivial Contextuality-by-Default (CbD) signatures resistant to simplex-embeddable ontological models, is a candidate epistemic agent. This condition is necessary but not sufficient: agency also requires state-sensitive updating across measurement contexts. The argument preserves QBism’s rejection of view-from-nowhere objectivity while removing the assumption that agents must be human or conscious, and disciplines Rovelli’s “any physical system” claim by tying observerhood to measurable non-triviality. Engineered cortical wetware systems such as CL1 and DishBrain offer controllable, non-human, and not clearly conscious testbeds for evaluating this claim, without requiring phenomenal consciousness or quantum-coherent biological dynamics. The paper distinguishes substrate flexibility from Pienaar’s extension of the QBist agent, which expands the agent’s senses rather than its substrate; engages neo-Everettian objections; and rejects Edwards’s attempts to fold classical large language models into QBist formalism. Classical AI token-generation systems remain simplex-embeddable and therefore fail the non-triviality requirement. Substrate flexibility is thus narrower than proposals that include current AI systems.

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Measured responses to quantum Bayesianism

N. David Mermin

Mermin replies: Robert Griffiths takes my joke about an undergraduate collapsing a wavepacket to be an attempt to solve the measurement problem. The actual QBist solution—versions of which predate QBism (see, for example, reference 11. J. B. Hartle, Am. J. Phys. 36, 704 (1968). https://doi.org/10.1119/1.1975096)—is that a quantum state is not an objective property of the world but a compendium of probabilities constructed by an agent. When an agent updates her state assignment, nothing changes in her external world. The only change is in the agent’s expectations for her subsequent experience of that world, and therefore there is no measurement problem. Consistent historians agree that collapse is not a physical process, but for entirely different reasons.QBism takes the “mysterious whatever-it-is” that Griffiths criticizes in quantum orthodoxy to be the experience induced in an agent by the world. That, and the fact that different agents may have different experiences, drains the swamp, slays the dragon, and quiets the maddening paradoxes.QBists hold that any agent can indeed apply quantum mechanics to her own external world, from quarks to quasars. Only an agent’s personal, directly perceived experience is boxed off from the domain of applicability. That exclusion disagrees with most versions of the many-worlds interpretation, but it does not limit the scope of science: Alice can apply quantum mechanics to the experience of another agent, Bob, as represented through his words, writings, or drawings, all of which do belong to her external world.The way in which Bob’s experience impinges on Alice resonates with Niels Bohr’s emphasis on the need to state results of experiments in ordinary language. It also addresses Ching Hung Woo’s question of how different agents can come to agreement on their state assignments.Griffiths correctly notes that QBism violates the first desideratum he quotes from my 15-year-old “Ithaca interpretation.” Like Barack Obama’s view of marriage, my thinking about quantum foundations has evolved. But Griffiths wrongly claims that QBism rejects the other desideratum he quotes: locality. Actually, QBism insists on it. The absurdity of quantum nonlocality provides an independent argument that quantum states cannot be objective internal properties of the systems they describe, whether or not one regards probabilities as subjective. Griffiths is probably right, however, that John Bell would not have been pleased with how QBists fix his shifty split.I would not call QBism an “antiquated approach.” It is younger than Griffiths’ consistent histories and, as I have remarked upon elsewhere,22. M. Schlosshauer, ed., Elegance and Enigma: The Quantum Interviews, Springer, Berlin (2011), pp. 177, 280. taking reality itself to be relative to what he calls a framework, is vastly more radical than taking quantum state assignments to be relative to an agent.But foreshadowings of QBism can indeed be found in antiquity. Since writing my commentary, I came across another striking anticipation in a 1931 letter from Erwin Schrödinger to Arnold Sommerfeld:33. K. von Meyenn, ed., Eine Entdeckung von ganz außerordentlicher Tragweite: Schrödingers Briefwechsel zur Wellenmechanik und zum Katzenparadoxon, Springer, Berlin (2011), p. 490. “Quantum mechanics forbids statements about what really exists—statements about the object. It deals only with the object–subject relation. Although this holds, after all, for any description of nature, it appears to hold in a much more radical and far-reaching sense in quantum mechanics” (translated by N. D. Mermin and Ruediger Schack).When Bell and Michael Nauenberg wrote their delightful article in 1966, there was indeed much less interest in quantum foundations than there is today. Most textbooks have wisely steered clear of the many contemporary interpretive positions, since none of them are held by more than a fraction of those physicists with an interest in such issues.QBists do not reject the Born rule for calculating probabilities, but they do reject the objective frequentist interpretation of those probabilities presented by Nauenberg and held by most physicists. The frequentist view is notoriously circular. It defines probability using such notions as “equally probable,” “unlikely,” or (with Nauenberg) “identically prepared,” none of which make sense without a prior definition of probability. “Identically prepared” might seem safe from circularity, but two different preparations cannot be strictly identical. It would be more accurate to say they must differ in unimportant ways. Unimportant for what? For the probabilities of the outcomes.When I started to learn about subjective probability, I was surprised to discover that most of the books were not in Cornell University’s physics or mathematics libraries but in the business school library. In our recent election, Americans have been told that business experience is necessary for being president; I would suggest that it may be even more helpful for understanding quantum mechanics.I cannot tell from Nauenberg’s remarks about the Liouville equation whether he agrees with the view of QBists (and many others) that the collapse of the wavefunction is no more than the updating of a collection of probability distributions.Nauenberg’s example of the Rydberg atom does not contradict the QBist resolution of Bell’s shifty split. The Rydberg atom is part of the world external to the agent, and therefore on the quantum side of her split. There are indeed circumstances under which fully quantum mechanical behavior can look very classical.Art Hobson repeats the common view that only mixed states can be associated with subjective probabilities. QBism takes that to be the very mistake that got us lost for so long in the quantum swamp. Hobson also believes that wavefunctions were collapsing before there were physicists. Does he believe that probabilities were updating before there were statisticians?Hobson wrongly claims that Chris Fuchs “might dispute the notion that some kind of physical reality actually exists.” What he and other QBists do deny is that there are properties of the external world—“elements of reality”—that underlie quantum state assignments. (The argument of Matthew Pusey and coauthors that Hobson cites, implying that quantum states are physically real, relies on such hidden variables.) An agent’s state assignment rests entirely on her experience of the external world. It is neither solipsistic nor superstitious to maintain that any agent’s experience comes fully into being only at the moment it is experienced.Hobson’s treatment of Eugene Wigner and his friend relies on decoherence producing an objective mixed state, which both of them must agree on. But since quantum mechanics holds all the way out to infinity (as Griffiths puts it), even from an objective view of quantum states, that switch from superposition to either/or is at best a FAPP solution, to use Bell’s wonderfully sardonic abbreviation of “for all practical purposes.”QBism does not, as Hobson concludes, give up on a realist interpretation of nature. But it does warn us not to confuse nature with the abstractions we have ingeniously constructed to help any agent deal with the very real impact of nature on his or her own internal experience (see my Reference Frame, Physics Today, May 2009, page 8).I’m glad that Blake Stacey has called attention to some of the more applied spinoffs of QBism. I’m also pleased that he mentions Bruno de Finetti, one of the great 20th-century pioneers of subjective probability. Indeed, since there are objective as well as subjective Bayesians, if I had my way, the B in QBism would stand not for Thomas Bayes, but for Bruno de Finetti, who put the crucial point like this: “The abandonment of superstitious beliefs about the existence of Phlogiston, the Cosmic Ether, Absolute Space and Time … , or Fairies and Witches, was an essential step along the road to scientific thinking. Probability, too, if regarded as something endowed with some kind of objective existence, is no less a misleading misconception, an illusory attempt to exteriorize or materialize our [actual (vero)] probabilistic beliefs.”44. B. de Finetti, Theory of Probability, Interscience, New York (1990), preface.REFERENCESSection:ChooseTop of pageREFERENCES <<1. J. B. Hartle, Am. J. Phys. 36, 704 (1968). https://doi.org/10.1119/1.1975096, Google ScholarCrossref2. M. Schlosshauer, ed., Elegance and Enigma: The Quantum Interviews, Springer, Berlin (2011), pp. 177, 280. Google ScholarCrossref3. K. von Meyenn, ed., Eine Entdeckung von ganz außerordentlicher Tragweite: Schrödingers Briefwechsel zur Wellenmechanik und zum Katzenparadoxon, Springer, Berlin (2011), p. 490. Google ScholarCrossref4. B. de Finetti, Theory of Probability, Interscience, New York (1990), preface. Google Scholar© 2012 American Institute of Physics.

Physics Today•Nov 30, 2012•6 citations

Is Quantum Mechanics Merely a Theory for us?

Peter W. Evans

Abstract This paper develops an agent-centric account of measurement that treats the preferred-basis problem as fundamentally perspectival. On this view, the system–apparatus–environment decomposition and the observables that are apt to become classically robust are determined by the physical constitution and epistemic constraints of an embodied class of agents. Decoherence then stabilises those agent-specified observables, yielding facts that are stable for us without positing an absolute, observer-independent basis. On this picture, ‘measurements’ are public not because they are metaphysically privileged, but because agents like us share the relevant sensorimotor and operational structure. I motivate this account through a discussion of two recent no-go results for relational quantum mechanics (RQM) [1, 2], and a subsequent response [3]: my aim is not to defend RQM per se, but to refine the relational insight with a principled account of basis selection rooted in embodiment. I provide a phenomenological gloss, drawing on body-schema considerations, to argue that quantum mechanics is best understood as an idiosyncratically human description of interactions with the physical world—a structurally constrained, agent-indexed framework within which classicality emerges.

arXiv:2510.17471•Foundations of Physics•Oct 17, 2025•3 citations

QBism: Integrating Agency and Quantum Mechanics

Hans J. Briegel, Thomas Müller

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Synthese Library/Synthese library•Jan 1, 2025•0 citations

An LLM as a controllable, fully-inspectable model of measurement: which features of quantum measurement are generic to bounded inference, and which are not

Tomas Pødenphant Lund

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•Jun 16, 2026•0 citations
The QBist and Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM) informational readings of quantum theory have been developed across two decades without a clear position on what kind of physical system qualifies as an "agent" or "observer" for the formalism. Fuchs, Mermin, and Schack write as if the agent is a human physicist or a generic Bayesian; Rovelli writes as if any physical system can play the relational-observer role; Healey deflates the agent into an abstract Bayesian without specifying its substrate; the recent Khrennikov-Schack-Zwirn intersubjectivity exchange sharpens the question without resolving it. This paper argues that the QBism/RQM informational reading is substrate-flexible: any physical system whose input-output statistics admit characterization through quantum-probability structure with non-trivial Contextuality-by-Default (CbD) signatures resistant to simplex-embeddable ontological models is a candidate epistemic agent for the formalism. Substrate flexibility is the most coherent reading of the shared formal commitments of QBism and RQM once the agent role is separated from historically human-centered examples; the non-triviality requirement is necessary but not sufficient for agency, which additionally requires an input-output architecture capable of state-sensitive updating across measurement contexts. The thesis preserves the QBist objection to view-from-nowhere framings while removing the requirement that agents be human or conscious; it disciplines Rovelli's "any physical system" claim by indexing it to the non-triviality requirement; and it specifies what would count as evidence for or against. Engineered cortical wetware preparations (Cortical Labs CL1, DishBrain) provide a non-human, non-conscious-in-any-unambiguous-sense, controllable testbed on which the question can be empirically pursued; nothing in the argument requires attributing phenomenal consciousness or quantum-coherent biological dynamics to such systems. The paper distinguishes substrate flexibility from Pienaar's prior extension of the QBist agent (which extends the agent's senses, not its substrate), engages the neo-Everettian opposition (Wallace 2012, 2023) directly, and rejects the recent attempts (Edwards 2024, 2025) to fold classical large language models into a QBism-grounded formalism. Classical AI architectures admit simplex-embeddable models for their token-generation processes and therefore fail the non-triviality requirement; substrate flexibility is narrower, not wider, than such proposals.
The QBist and Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM) informational readings of quantum theory have long lacked a clear account of what kind of physical system qualifies as an “agent” or “observer.” Fuchs, Mermin, and Schack often treat the agent as a human physicist or Bayesian decision-maker; Rovelli suggests that any physical system may serve as a relational observer; Healey abstracts the agent into a Bayesian role without specifying its substrate; and the Khrennikov-Schack-Zwirn exchange sharpens, but does not resolve, the intersubjectivity problem. This paper argues that the QBism/RQM informational reading is best understood as substrate-flexible: any physical system whose input-output statistics exhibit quantum-probability structure, including non-trivial Contextuality-by-Default (CbD) signatures resistant to simplex-embeddable ontological models, is a candidate epistemic agent. This condition is necessary but not sufficient: agency also requires state-sensitive updating across measurement contexts. The argument preserves QBism’s rejection of view-from-nowhere objectivity while removing the assumption that agents must be human or conscious, and disciplines Rovelli’s “any physical system” claim by tying observerhood to measurable non-triviality. Engineered cortical wetware systems such as CL1 and DishBrain offer controllable, non-human, and not clearly conscious testbeds for evaluating this claim, without requiring phenomenal consciousness or quantum-coherent biological dynamics. The paper distinguishes substrate flexibility from Pienaar’s extension of the QBist agent, which expands the agent’s senses rather than its substrate; engages neo-Everettian objections; and rejects Edwards’s attempts to fold classical large language models into QBist formalism. Classical AI token-generation systems remain simplex-embeddable and therefore fail the non-triviality requirement. Substrate flexibility is thus narrower than proposals that include current AI systems.
This article explores the relationship between Kantian epistemology and QBism, a modern interpretation of quantum mechanics. QBism reconceives scientific objects not as independent entities but as phenomena synthesized through the observer's active role. It emphasizes the interdependence of knowledge and observation, rejecting the notion of a pre-existent, absolute reality. Much like Immanuel Kant's assertion that the thing-in-itself lies outside human cognition, QBism denies ontological status to the unobservable or unexperienced, grounding objectivity in intersubjectivity: the shared cognitive structures of human agents. Within this Critical framework, I address an objection raised by Carlo Rovelli, who critiques QBism for anchoring reality to the observer, claiming it risks falling into idealism by positioning the subject outside nature. Rovelli defends a relational view, situating the observer within the world as describable by the same physical laws that apply to all objects. In response, I argue that the QBist observer represents a universal human subject, not a single determinate agent and that intersubjective agreement ensures objectivity without collapsing into solipsism.
Mermin replies: Robert Griffiths takes my joke about an undergraduate collapsing a wavepacket to be an attempt to solve the measurement problem. The actual QBist solution—versions of which predate QBism (see, for example, reference 11. J. B. Hartle, Am. J. Phys. 36, 704 (1968). https://doi.org/10.1119/1.1975096)—is that a quantum state is not an objective property of the world but a compendium of probabilities constructed by an agent. When an agent updates her state assignment, nothing changes in her external world. The only change is in the agent’s expectations for her subsequent experience of that world, and therefore there is no measurement problem. Consistent historians agree that collapse is not a physical process, but for entirely different reasons.QBism takes the “mysterious whatever-it-is” that Griffiths criticizes in quantum orthodoxy to be the experience induced in an agent by the world. That, and the fact that different agents may have different experiences, drains the swamp, slays the dragon, and quiets the maddening paradoxes.QBists hold that any agent can indeed apply quantum mechanics to her own external world, from quarks to quasars. Only an agent’s personal, directly perceived experience is boxed off from the domain of applicability. That exclusion disagrees with most versions of the many-worlds interpretation, but it does not limit the scope of science: Alice can apply quantum mechanics to the experience of another agent, Bob, as represented through his words, writings, or drawings, all of which do belong to her external world.The way in which Bob’s experience impinges on Alice resonates with Niels Bohr’s emphasis on the need to state results of experiments in ordinary language. It also addresses Ching Hung Woo’s question of how different agents can come to agreement on their state assignments.Griffiths correctly notes that QBism violates the first desideratum he quotes from my 15-year-old “Ithaca interpretation.” Like Barack Obama’s view of marriage, my thinking about quantum foundations has evolved. But Griffiths wrongly claims that QBism rejects the other desideratum he quotes: locality. Actually, QBism insists on it. The absurdity of quantum nonlocality provides an independent argument that quantum states cannot be objective internal properties of the systems they describe, whether or not one regards probabilities as subjective. Griffiths is probably right, however, that John Bell would not have been pleased with how QBists fix his shifty split.I would not call QBism an “antiquated approach.” It is younger than Griffiths’ consistent histories and, as I have remarked upon elsewhere,22. M. Schlosshauer, ed., Elegance and Enigma: The Quantum Interviews, Springer, Berlin (2011), pp. 177, 280. taking reality itself to be relative to what he calls a framework, is vastly more radical than taking quantum state assignments to be relative to an agent.But foreshadowings of QBism can indeed be found in antiquity. Since writing my commentary, I came across another striking anticipation in a 1931 letter from Erwin Schrödinger to Arnold Sommerfeld:33. K. von Meyenn, ed., Eine Entdeckung von ganz außerordentlicher Tragweite: Schrödingers Briefwechsel zur Wellenmechanik und zum Katzenparadoxon, Springer, Berlin (2011), p. 490. “Quantum mechanics forbids statements about what really exists—statements about the object. It deals only with the object–subject relation. Although this holds, after all, for any description of nature, it appears to hold in a much more radical and far-reaching sense in quantum mechanics” (translated by N. D. Mermin and Ruediger Schack).When Bell and Michael Nauenberg wrote their delightful article in 1966, there was indeed much less interest in quantum foundations than there is today. Most textbooks have wisely steered clear of the many contemporary interpretive positions, since none of them are held by more than a fraction of those physicists with an interest in such issues.QBists do not reject the Born rule for calculating probabilities, but they do reject the objective frequentist interpretation of those probabilities presented by Nauenberg and held by most physicists. The frequentist view is notoriously circular. It defines probability using such notions as “equally probable,” “unlikely,” or (with Nauenberg) “identically prepared,” none of which make sense without a prior definition of probability. “Identically prepared” might seem safe from circularity, but two different preparations cannot be strictly identical. It would be more accurate to say they must differ in unimportant ways. Unimportant for what? For the probabilities of the outcomes.When I started to learn about subjective probability, I was surprised to discover that most of the books were not in Cornell University’s physics or mathematics libraries but in the business school library. In our recent election, Americans have been told that business experience is necessary for being president; I would suggest that it may be even more helpful for understanding quantum mechanics.I cannot tell from Nauenberg’s remarks about the Liouville equation whether he agrees with the view of QBists (and many others) that the collapse of the wavefunction is no more than the updating of a collection of probability distributions.Nauenberg’s example of the Rydberg atom does not contradict the QBist resolution of Bell’s shifty split. The Rydberg atom is part of the world external to the agent, and therefore on the quantum side of her split. There are indeed circumstances under which fully quantum mechanical behavior can look very classical.Art Hobson repeats the common view that only mixed states can be associated with subjective probabilities. QBism takes that to be the very mistake that got us lost for so long in the quantum swamp. Hobson also believes that wavefunctions were collapsing before there were physicists. Does he believe that probabilities were updating before there were statisticians?Hobson wrongly claims that Chris Fuchs “might dispute the notion that some kind of physical reality actually exists.” What he and other QBists do deny is that there are properties of the external world—“elements of reality”—that underlie quantum state assignments. (The argument of Matthew Pusey and coauthors that Hobson cites, implying that quantum states are physically real, relies on such hidden variables.) An agent’s state assignment rests entirely on her experience of the external world. It is neither solipsistic nor superstitious to maintain that any agent’s experience comes fully into being only at the moment it is experienced.Hobson’s treatment of Eugene Wigner and his friend relies on decoherence producing an objective mixed state, which both of them must agree on. But since quantum mechanics holds all the way out to infinity (as Griffiths puts it), even from an objective view of quantum states, that switch from superposition to either/or is at best a FAPP solution, to use Bell’s wonderfully sardonic abbreviation of “for all practical purposes.”QBism does not, as Hobson concludes, give up on a realist interpretation of nature. But it does warn us not to confuse nature with the abstractions we have ingeniously constructed to help any agent deal with the very real impact of nature on his or her own internal experience (see my Reference Frame, Physics Today, May 2009, page 8).I’m glad that Blake Stacey has called attention to some of the more applied spinoffs of QBism. I’m also pleased that he mentions Bruno de Finetti, one of the great 20th-century pioneers of subjective probability. Indeed, since there are objective as well as subjective Bayesians, if I had my way, the B in QBism would stand not for Thomas Bayes, but for Bruno de Finetti, who put the crucial point like this: “The abandonment of superstitious beliefs about the existence of Phlogiston, the Cosmic Ether, Absolute Space and Time … , or Fairies and Witches, was an essential step along the road to scientific thinking. Probability, too, if regarded as something endowed with some kind of objective existence, is no less a misleading misconception, an illusory attempt to exteriorize or materialize our [actual (vero)] probabilistic beliefs.”44. B. de Finetti, Theory of Probability, Interscience, New York (1990), preface.REFERENCESSection:ChooseTop of pageREFERENCES <<1. J. B. Hartle, Am. J. Phys. 36, 704 (1968). https://doi.org/10.1119/1.1975096, Google ScholarCrossref2. M. Schlosshauer, ed., Elegance and Enigma: The Quantum Interviews, Springer, Berlin (2011), pp. 177, 280. Google ScholarCrossref3. K. von Meyenn, ed., Eine Entdeckung von ganz außerordentlicher Tragweite: Schrödingers Briefwechsel zur Wellenmechanik und zum Katzenparadoxon, Springer, Berlin (2011), p. 490. Google ScholarCrossref4. B. de Finetti, Theory of Probability, Interscience, New York (1990), preface. Google Scholar© 2012 American Institute of Physics.
Abstract This paper develops an agent-centric account of measurement that treats the preferred-basis problem as fundamentally perspectival. On this view, the system–apparatus–environment decomposition and the observables that are apt to become classically robust are determined by the physical constitution and epistemic constraints of an embodied class of agents. Decoherence then stabilises those agent-specified observables, yielding facts that are stable for us without positing an absolute, observer-independent basis. On this picture, ‘measurements’ are public not because they are metaphysically privileged, but because agents like us share the relevant sensorimotor and operational structure. I motivate this account through a discussion of two recent no-go results for relational quantum mechanics (RQM) [1, 2], and a subsequent response [3]: my aim is not to defend RQM per se, but to refine the relational insight with a principled account of basis selection rooted in embodiment. I provide a phenomenological gloss, drawing on body-schema considerations, to argue that quantum mechanics is best understood as an idiosyncratically human description of interactions with the physical world—a structurally constrained, agent-indexed framework within which classicality emerges.
Abstract The approach to quantum mechanics that we present in this book aligns fairly well with the QBist position in quantum foundations, which takes quantum mechanics as describing the interaction of an agent with the world: A theory mainly offers a way for the agent to manage her expectations about the outcomes of her interactions, not a picture of what nature is really like. We introduce QBism briefly and situate the framework within a range of options for integrating agency and quantum mechanics. We agree with QBism on many fundamental issues, but we do not subscribe to QBism wholesale. We agree with QBism’s pragmatic outlook that takes scientific theories to be tools for agents to use, and with the QBist goal of developing a participatory realism. But we are critical of the particular idealisations that QBism in its present form subscribes to. Most importantly, we are critical of the structural choice not to resolve the agent nor the world in any detail. In our view, scientific agents learn by modelling. Models are tools that agents can use and develop in dealing with the world. Guided by concrete examples, we describe a scientific modelling framework that allows for loops of three different degrees of difficulty and complexity. These range from quantum state updating, which neatly fits the QBist approach of working within a fixed probability space, via a broader class of updates including so-called Hamiltonian learning, up to the most difficult cases in which true scientific creativity is at play. All three levels of difficulty need to be acknowledged for a full picture of real scientific agency. At the end of the chapter, we describe the project of modelling scientific agency itself, which leads to the topics of Chaps. 5 and 6 .
An autoregressive language model, read at the token-commit step, is a near-fully-inspectable classical bounded-inference substrate: the competing-route distribution over candidate tokens — the live propensity before it resolves into one committed answer — is read directly from the output logits. Used as a measurement model, it lets each structural signature of quantum measurement be tested one by one, and the genuinely-quantum residue isolated by its absence. The substrate reproduces the phenomenology of quantum measurement from classical self-conditioning — back-action, non-commutativity (order effects), entropy-collapse on commitment, a substantial Busemeyer–Wang QQ-structure (order-effect difference q not distinguishable from the parameter-free quantum value 0; pooled across eight de-saturated base models over five vendors and four architectures, N=96, q=-0.003, 95% CI [-0.025, +0.019]), interference, einselection, an Aharonov-style weak-versus-strong asymmetry, and measurement-mode dependence — but not the quantum core: genuine contextuality is robustly absent (an analog Contextuality-by-Default cyclic-4 analysis gives CNT < 0 in every model and scenario), and no phase/coherence is demonstrated. A controllable analog Bell-loophole testbed makes each premise's price visible within one substrate (S_analog ~ 2.00 with all loopholes closed; ~ 2.8 on opening locality or measurement-independence), and a within-substrate timeline reads the propensity resolving across network depth, including a maximally-contested case whose outcome is never created. The order-effect incompatibility is shown to be a measured, correctly-signed classical-complementarity dial that falls as the readout partition refines. Positioning. The contribution is the demarcation itself, with statistics, made possible by an inspectability no veiled (physical or psychological) substrate allows. It instantiates beim Graben & Atmanspacher's classical complementarity and the Busemeyer–Wang / Pothos quantum-cognition program empirically; it makes no claim about physical reality. Companion papers (Friction Theory series): Paper 1 — Friction as the cost of probabilistic computation (10.5281/zenodo.20012654); Paper 10 — Race all the way down/up (10.5281/zenodo.20014567); Paper 21 — LLMs as a measurement model for bounded-decision cognition (10.5281/zenodo.20562416); Paper 28 — Dread without a dreader (10.5281/zenodo.20690747).Paper 18 in the Friction Theory paper-series. Submitted as a careful, honestly-scoped empirical demarcation (target venue: Entropy, Quantum Information / quantum-cognition & foundations-of-measurement). v2 (August 2026) — prior-art revision. The paper describes competition resolving to a commitment and cited none of the tradition that formalised it. Luce (1959) for the choice axiom the softmax implements, Ratcliff (1978) for evidence accumulated to a bound, and Usher and McClelland (2001) for the leaky competing accumulator are now credited at the point where the reading is made, with the limit stated: the estimators here are computed on a language model's output distribution, and the parallel is why the measurement was worth making rather than evidence of a shared mechanism. Editorial pass. Earlier versions remain in the version history.