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Substrate-Flexible Informational Quantum Mechanics: QBism, RQM, and the Question of Non-Human Epistemic Systems

Ian Staley

Published Aug 11, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The QBist and Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM) informational readings of quantum theory have long lacked a clear account of what kind of physical system qualifies as an “agent” or “observer.” Fuchs, Mermin, and Schack often treat the agent as a human physicist or Bayesian decision-maker; Rovelli suggests that any physical system may serve as a relational observer; Healey abstracts the agent into a Bayesian role without specifying its substrate; and the Khrennikov-Schack-Zwirn exchange sharpens, but does not resolve, the intersubjectivity problem. This paper argues that the QBism/RQM informational reading is best understood as substrate-flexible: any physical system whose input-output statistics exhibit quantum-probability structure, including non-trivial Contextuality-by-Default (CbD) signatures resistant to simplex-embeddable ontological models, is a candidate epistemic agent. This condition is necessary but not sufficient: agency also requires state-sensitive updating across measurement contexts. The argument preserves QBism’s rejection of view-from-nowhere objectivity while removing the assumption that agents must be human or conscious, and disciplines Rovelli’s “any physical system” claim by tying observerhood to measurable non-triviality. Engineered cortical wetware systems such as CL1 and DishBrain offer controllable, non-human, and not clearly conscious testbeds for evaluating this claim, without requiring phenomenal consciousness or quantum-coherent biological dynamics. The paper distinguishes substrate flexibility from Pienaar’s extension of the QBist agent, which expands the agent’s senses rather than its substrate; engages neo-Everettian objections; and rejects Edwards’s attempts to fold classical large language models into QBist formalism. Classical AI token-generation systems remain simplex-embeddable and therefore fail the non-triviality requirement. Substrate flexibility is thus narrower than proposals that include current AI systems.

DOI
10.5281/zenodo.21892880

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The QBist and Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM) informational readings of quantum theory have long lacked a clear account of what kind of physical system qualifies as an “agent” or “observer.” Fuchs, Mermin, and Schack often treat the agent as a human physicist or Bayesian decision-maker; Rovelli suggests that any physical system may serve as a relational observer; Healey abstracts the agent into a Bayesian role without specifying its substrate; and the Khrennikov-Schack-Zwirn exchange sharpens, but does not resolve, the intersubjectivity problem. This paper argues that the QBism/RQM informational reading is best understood as substrate-flexible: any physical system whose input-output statistics exhibit quantum-probability structure, including non-trivial Contextuality-by-Default (CbD) signatures resistant to simplex-embeddable ontological models, is a candidate epistemic agent. This condition is necessary but not sufficient: agency also requires state-sensitive updating across measurement contexts. The argument preserves QBism’s rejection of view-from-nowhere objectivity while removing the assumption that agents must be human or conscious, and disciplines Rovelli’s “any physical system” claim by tying observerhood to measurable non-triviality. Engineered cortical wetware systems such as CL1 and DishBrain offer controllable, non-human, and not clearly conscious testbeds for evaluating this claim, without requiring phenomenal consciousness or quantum-coherent biological dynamics. The paper distinguishes substrate flexibility from Pienaar’s extension of the QBist agent, which expands the agent’s senses rather than its substrate; engages neo-Everettian objections; and rejects Edwards’s attempts to fold classical large language models into QBist formalism. Classical AI token-generation systems remain simplex-embeddable and therefore fail the non-triviality requirement. Substrate flexibility is thus narrower than proposals that include current AI systems.
The QBist and Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM) informational readings of quantum theory have been developed across two decades without a clear position on what kind of physical system qualifies as an "agent" or "observer" for the formalism. Fuchs, Mermin, and Schack write as if the agent is a human physicist or a generic Bayesian; Rovelli writes as if any physical system can play the relational-observer role; Healey deflates the agent into an abstract Bayesian without specifying its substrate; the recent Khrennikov-Schack-Zwirn intersubjectivity exchange sharpens the question without resolving it. This paper argues that the QBism/RQM informational reading is substrate-flexible: any physical system whose input-output statistics admit characterization through quantum-probability structure with non-trivial Contextuality-by-Default (CbD) signatures resistant to simplex-embeddable ontological models is a candidate epistemic agent for the formalism. Substrate flexibility is the most coherent reading of the shared formal commitments of QBism and RQM once the agent role is separated from historically human-centered examples; the non-triviality requirement is necessary but not sufficient for agency, which additionally requires an input-output architecture capable of state-sensitive updating across measurement contexts. The thesis preserves the QBist objection to view-from-nowhere framings while removing the requirement that agents be human or conscious; it disciplines Rovelli's "any physical system" claim by indexing it to the non-triviality requirement; and it specifies what would count as evidence for or against. Engineered cortical wetware preparations (Cortical Labs CL1, DishBrain) provide a non-human, non-conscious-in-any-unambiguous-sense, controllable testbed on which the question can be empirically pursued; nothing in the argument requires attributing phenomenal consciousness or quantum-coherent biological dynamics to such systems. The paper distinguishes substrate flexibility from Pienaar's prior extension of the QBist agent (which extends the agent's senses, not its substrate), engages the neo-Everettian opposition (Wallace 2012, 2023) directly, and rejects the recent attempts (Edwards 2024, 2025) to fold classical large language models into a QBism-grounded formalism. Classical AI architectures admit simplex-embeddable models for their token-generation processes and therefore fail the non-triviality requirement; substrate flexibility is narrower, not wider, than such proposals.
This article explores the relationship between Kantian epistemology and QBism, a modern interpretation of quantum mechanics. QBism reconceives scientific objects not as independent entities but as phenomena synthesized through the observer's active role. It emphasizes the interdependence of knowledge and observation, rejecting the notion of a pre-existent, absolute reality. Much like Immanuel Kant's assertion that the thing-in-itself lies outside human cognition, QBism denies ontological status to the unobservable or unexperienced, grounding objectivity in intersubjectivity: the shared cognitive structures of human agents. Within this Critical framework, I address an objection raised by Carlo Rovelli, who critiques QBism for anchoring reality to the observer, claiming it risks falling into idealism by positioning the subject outside nature. Rovelli defends a relational view, situating the observer within the world as describable by the same physical laws that apply to all objects. In response, I argue that the QBist observer represents a universal human subject, not a single determinate agent and that intersubjective agreement ensures objectivity without collapsing into solipsism.
Abstract This paper develops an agent-centric account of measurement that treats the preferred-basis problem as fundamentally perspectival. On this view, the system–apparatus–environment decomposition and the observables that are apt to become classically robust are determined by the physical constitution and epistemic constraints of an embodied class of agents. Decoherence then stabilises those agent-specified observables, yielding facts that are stable for us without positing an absolute, observer-independent basis. On this picture, ‘measurements’ are public not because they are metaphysically privileged, but because agents like us share the relevant sensorimotor and operational structure. I motivate this account through a discussion of two recent no-go results for relational quantum mechanics (RQM) [1, 2], and a subsequent response [3]: my aim is not to defend RQM per se, but to refine the relational insight with a principled account of basis selection rooted in embodiment. I provide a phenomenological gloss, drawing on body-schema considerations, to argue that quantum mechanics is best understood as an idiosyncratically human description of interactions with the physical world—a structurally constrained, agent-indexed framework within which classicality emerges.
The role of the observer remains a central conceptual challenge in the foundationsof quantum mechanics. This work examines the observer as an agent whoseparticipation is structurally indispensable for the emergence of physical facts. RelationalQuantum Mechanics and QBism—two influential agent-centered interpretations—recast quantum states, measurement outcomes, and objectivity as relationalor personalist rather than observer-independent. By analyzing their conceptualcommitments, we clarify how these frameworks illuminate the problem of subjectivityand the limits of classical realism.The discussion extends beyond physics to the broader question of whether agencyand subjectivity can be eliminated from scientific and technological practices. Drawingon insights from Pauli, Stapp, and d’Espagnat, we argue that attempts tofully operationalize the observer obscure essential features of experience and understanding.Contemporary artificial intelligence systems exemplify this tension: theydemonstrate high functional performance while lacking subjectivity, intentionality,and responsibility.We suggest that the displacement of the subject—from quantum interpretationto algorithmic decision-making—reflects a deeper structural shift in modern knowledge.Treating the observer as an agent is not merely an interpretive option but aconceptual requirement for coherent accounts of measurement, understanding, andresponsible action in an age increasingly shaped by operational intelligence withoutsubjects.
Quantum Bayesianism (QBism), as articulated most prominently by Mermin, Fuchs, and Schack, reframes quantum theory as a user-centered framework in which probabilities represent an agent’s personal degrees of belief about the outcomes of interventions. While QBism successfully dissolves several foundational paradoxes by rejecting the objectivity of the quantum state, it deliberately refrains from positing an underlying ontological substrate. In this work, we propose that a theory of Nonlocal Unification (NU), grounded in a universal informational field and biologically mediated sampling processes, provides a natural completion of QBism. We argue that agents are not abstract entities but physically instantiated samplers whose structureis shaped by genetic and neural constraints. Spacetime itself emerges as a derived construct from the sampling of nonlocal informational correlations. In this sense, NU preserves QBism’s participatory ethos while extending it into a coherent ontological framework.
A realist interpretation of quantum mechanics is proposed - Contextual Quantum Realism (CQR) - according to which there exists a categorical distinction between the ideal (theory, observation instrument) and the real (quantum physical systems, properties), and, consequently, quantum ontology is context-sensitive. CQR is compared with QBism and Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM), both of which also claim to offer realist interpretations. However, both approaches conflate the ideal and the real, thereby introducing an anti-realist dimension. RQM is an objectivist (physicalist) interpretation that naturalizes epistemic concepts, whereas QBism is subjectivist (phenomenological). RQM and QBism share a common presupposition of (post-)Modern philosophy - namely, the reduction of reality to objectivity - which CQR explicitly rejects.