Abstract Chapter 6 was devoted to argue that the MHI offers a solution to the measurement problem for both ideal and non-ideal measurements, and to show how it provides a distinction between reliable and non-reliable measurements in the non-ideal case. However, in the last decades more complex measurement scenarios have been considered, some as old as the so-called Wigner’s friend experiment, and others recently designed to test the theoretical predictions of quantum mechanics. For this reason, in the present chapter, the measurement problem is revisited from the perspective of the challenges that those scenarios pose to interpretation.
Abstract Chapter 6 was devoted to argue that the MHI offers a solution to the measurement problem for both ideal and non-ideal measurements, and to show how it provides a distinction between reliable and non-reliable measurements in the non-ideal case. However, in the last decades more complex measurement scenarios have been considered, some as old as the so-called Wigner’s friend experiment, and others recently designed to test the theoretical predictions of quantum mechanics. For this reason, in the present chapter, the measurement problem is revisited from the perspective of the challenges that those scenarios pose to interpretation.
Abstract In rough terms, the quantum measurement problem is the problem of explaining how, when a system in a superposition state is measured, the pointer observable of the measuring apparatus is always found in a definite value. Although quantum mechanics involves several interpretative challenges, the measurement problem has been the main focus of the interest of physicists and philosophers working on the foundations of the theory: most interpretations were designed specifically to solve it. In this chapter, it is shown that the MHI offers a solution to the measurement problem for both ideal and non-ideal measurements, and that, in the non-ideal case, the interpretation distinguishes between reliable and non-reliable measurements. I have also explained how the MHI accounts for consecutive measurements. Finally, it is emphasized that the MHI approach provides a new, more physical understanding of the concept of quantum measurement.
The fourth part handles the first thematic area of the book and probably the most important part of the theory: the measurement problem. • First we examine some basic concepts [ chapter 13 ]. • Then we reconstruct von Neumann's original proposal and its refinements [ chapter 14 ]. Von Neumann was the first to assume a dichotomy between two different types of evolutions: the unitary one and the measurement process. On this matter, different positions have been developed: • there are those who have accepted such a dichotomy and tried to assign a fundamental function to the consciousness (after von Neumann: London, Bauer, Wigner): this is the content of chapter 14 ; • some have tried to eliminate the jump-like features of the measurement by rejecting the projection postulate (Margenau, Ballentine, Everett, deWitt); this is the content of chapter 15 ; • others have tried to explain measurement in terms of intervention of macrosystems: either as a limiting case of a thermodynamical evolution (Green, van Hove and others) or using SSRs for obtaining the required classical behaviour of the pointer: this is the issue in chapter 16 ; • there are those who have tried to find some ad hoc parameters in order to explain the reduction (Ghirardi/Rimini/Weber): this will be treated later in chapter 23 , because the proposal will account more generally for spontaneous transitions to localisation, and hence it is more like a theory of the relation between microphysics and macrophysics; • others have developed a form of non-unitary evolution by using the specific nature of open systems: this is the theory of decoherence (Zurek, Cini, Machida/Namiki, among others), which is treated in chapter 17 . It is quit astonishing that measurement theory has led to so many different positions and that, consequently, for fifty years has been a problematic area of QM. The reasons will be briefly discussed in subsection 14.1.1. The last three chapters of this part are devoted to new developments which partly extend and integrate the theory of decoherence. • The operational approach [ chapter 18 ] represents a formal generalization of the quantum theory of open systems. • Chapter 19 is dedicated to the Quantum Non-demolition Measurement. The last two chapters contain results which are generally valid and neutral with respect to a particular interpretation. Anyway, their importance for QM (and partly also for some interpretational problems) justifies the place they occupy here. • Finally we investigate a new field of research which has very interesting interpretational implications and a lot of technological consequences: the so-called interaction-free measurements [ chapter 20 ]. In the following we shall use the word ‘Measurement’ to mean the measurement process in general, while the word ‘measurement’ always indicates a particular measurement process.
During many years since the birth of quantum mechanics, instrumentalist interpretations prevailed: the meaning of the theory was expressed in terms of measurements results. However, in the last decades, several attempts to interpret it from a realist viewpoint have been proposed. Among them, modal interpretations supply a realist non-collapse account, according to which the system always has definite properties and the quantum state represents possibilities, not actualities. But the traditional modal interpretations faced some conceptual problems when addressing imperfect measurements. The modal-Hamiltonian interpretation, on the contrary, proved to be able to supply an adequate account of the measurement problem, both in its ideal and its non-ideal versions. Moreover, in the non-ideal case, it gives a precise criterion to distinguish between reliable and non-reliable measurements. Nevertheless, that criterion depends on the particular state of the measured system, and this might be considered as a shortcoming of the proposal. In fact, one could ask for a criterion of reliability that does not depend on the features of what is measured but only on the properties of the measurement device. The aim of this article is precisely to supply such a criterion: we will adopt an informational perspective for this purpose.During many years since the birth of quantum mechanics, instrumentalistinterpretations prevailed: the meaning of the theory was expressed in terms of measurementsresults. However, in the last decades, several attempts to interpret it from a realist viewpointhave been proposed. Among them, modal interpretations supply a realist non-collapseaccount, according to which the system always has definite properties and the quantum staterepresents possibilities, not actualities. But the traditional modal interpretations faced someconceptual problems when addressing imperfect measurements. The modal-Hamiltonianinterpretation, on the contrary, proved to be able to supply an adequate account of themeasurement problem, both in its ideal and its non-ideal versions. Moreover, in the non-idealcase, it gives a precise criterion to distinguish between reliable and non-reliable measurements.Nevertheless, that criterion depends on the particular state of the measured system, and thismight be considered as a shortcoming of the proposal. In fact, one could ask for a criterionof reliability that does not depend on the features of what is measured but only on theproperties of the measurement device. The aim of this article is precisely to supply such acriterion: we will adopt an informational perspective for this purpose.
The measurement problem is seen as an ambiguity of quantum mechanics, or, beyond that, as a contradiction within the theory: Quantum mechanics offers two conflicting descriptions of the Wigner's-friend experiment. As we argue in this note there are, however, obstacles from within quantum mechanics and regarding our perspective onto doing physics towards fully describing a measurement. We conclude that the ability to exhaustively describe a measurement is an assumption necessary for the common framing of the measurement problem and ensuing suggested solutions.
Can normal science-in the Kuhnian sense-add something substantial to the discussion about the measurement problem? Does an extended Wigner's-friend Gedankenexperiment illustrate new issues? Or a new quality of known issues? Are we led to new interpretations, new perspectives, or do we iterate the previously known? The recent debate does, as we argue, neither constitute a turning point in the discussion about the measurement problem nor fundamentally challenge the legitimacy of quantum mechanics. Instead, the measurement problem asks for a reflection on fundamental paradigms of doing physics.