Abstract In this chapter we shall discuss these and related questions. We shall summarize what is well established and what has been clarified in the last several decades concerning these issues, trying to distinguish as clearly as possible different issues which are all called the “measurement problem”, and in each case, making an effort to clarify as sharply as possible the nature of the problem.
Abstract In this chapter we shall discuss these and related questions. We shall summarize what is well established and what has been clarified in the last several decades concerning these issues, trying to distinguish as clearly as possible different issues which are all called the “measurement problem”, and in each case, making an effort to clarify as sharply as possible the nature of the problem.
The fourth part handles the first thematic area of the book and probably the most important part of the theory: the measurement problem. • First we examine some basic concepts [ chapter 13 ]. • Then we reconstruct von Neumann's original proposal and its refinements [ chapter 14 ]. Von Neumann was the first to assume a dichotomy between two different types of evolutions: the unitary one and the measurement process. On this matter, different positions have been developed: • there are those who have accepted such a dichotomy and tried to assign a fundamental function to the consciousness (after von Neumann: London, Bauer, Wigner): this is the content of chapter 14 ; • some have tried to eliminate the jump-like features of the measurement by rejecting the projection postulate (Margenau, Ballentine, Everett, deWitt); this is the content of chapter 15 ; • others have tried to explain measurement in terms of intervention of macrosystems: either as a limiting case of a thermodynamical evolution (Green, van Hove and others) or using SSRs for obtaining the required classical behaviour of the pointer: this is the issue in chapter 16 ; • there are those who have tried to find some ad hoc parameters in order to explain the reduction (Ghirardi/Rimini/Weber): this will be treated later in chapter 23 , because the proposal will account more generally for spontaneous transitions to localisation, and hence it is more like a theory of the relation between microphysics and macrophysics; • others have developed a form of non-unitary evolution by using the specific nature of open systems: this is the theory of decoherence (Zurek, Cini, Machida/Namiki, among others), which is treated in chapter 17 . It is quit astonishing that measurement theory has led to so many different positions and that, consequently, for fifty years has been a problematic area of QM. The reasons will be briefly discussed in subsection 14.1.1. The last three chapters of this part are devoted to new developments which partly extend and integrate the theory of decoherence. • The operational approach [ chapter 18 ] represents a formal generalization of the quantum theory of open systems. • Chapter 19 is dedicated to the Quantum Non-demolition Measurement. The last two chapters contain results which are generally valid and neutral with respect to a particular interpretation. Anyway, their importance for QM (and partly also for some interpretational problems) justifies the place they occupy here. • Finally we investigate a new field of research which has very interesting interpretational implications and a lot of technological consequences: the so-called interaction-free measurements [ chapter 20 ]. In the following we shall use the word ‘Measurement’ to mean the measurement process in general, while the word ‘measurement’ always indicates a particular measurement process.
Abstract Chapter 6 was devoted to argue that the MHI offers a solution to the measurement problem for both ideal and non-ideal measurements, and to show how it provides a distinction between reliable and non-reliable measurements in the non-ideal case. However, in the last decades more complex measurement scenarios have been considered, some as old as the so-called Wigner’s friend experiment, and others recently designed to test the theoretical predictions of quantum mechanics. For this reason, in the present chapter, the measurement problem is revisited from the perspective of the challenges that those scenarios pose to interpretation.
In most textbooks, measurement does not receive the full attention it deserves and sometimes is even not treated at all, apart a brief and cryptic mention of the “reduction of the wave packet.” However, in the last decades, the situation has profoundly changed and it is time to consider measurement a fundamental part of quantum mechanics, even, to a certain extent, an important generalization of the traditional theory (see also Chs. 14–15). This chapter consists of three major parts. In the first block (Secs. 9.1–9.4) we develop the main physical features of the measurement process: the heart of the argument is here represented by the aspects related to the interpretation. In the second part (Secs. 9.5–9.8) we discuss several special (and partly interdependent) topics of measurement: the heart here is represented by experimental aspects. In the third part (Secs. 9.9–9.12) we deal with the measurement process on a more formal plane, making use, in particular, of the generalization represented by the concepts of effect and positive operator valued measure (POVM). As we have said, the measurement problem is one of the most fundamental issues in the conceptual structure of quantum mechanics (as described in Sec. 9.1) and has a long history that will be examined in Sec. 9.2. In this context, the existence of apparently paradoxical quantum states comes about: the so-called Schrödinger cat states (see Sec. 9.3).
The notion of an individual and the related issues on individuation are topics that appear in the philosophical discussion ever since the antiquity. The idea of an individual thing is intuitively clear: an individual is something of a specific kind that is a unity, having its own identity, and being so that it is possible at least in principle to discern it from any other individual, even of similar species. But when we try to leave the intuitive realm and push this idea to a logical analysis, we find a cluster of problems that are difficult to overcome within standard logico-mathematical contexts. In this work, we shall be concerned with some aspects of this intuitive concept of an individual and on some related facts about individuation taken from recent discussions that arose ever since the inception of quantum theory, pushing the discussion to a “logical” view, which in our opinion is still lacking in the usual debates on such issues. In the final part of the paper, we propose a metaphysics where the notion of identity is substituted, for some objects, by a weaker notion of indiscernibility, and we try to justify such a move. In most of the uses of the expression “quantum theory”, we shall not make explicit the distinction between the non-relativistic and the relativistic approaches, although they of course are quite different, for we think that the problems as we shall present them appear in both versions. But, as the text goes, the context will distinguish between them and these questions will become clear to the reader.
As we have said [see p. 2], the two points which we need as preliminary ones for the accomplishment of the task of a global understanding of the theory are a better development of QM's foundations and a first global interpretation . We have already dealt with the historical developments concerning the interpretation [mainly in chapters 7 and 8] and the foundations [mainly in chapter 9]. After a long examination covering different areas and problems, we can now summarize our conclusions by trying to give a general orientation about both issues. • In chapter 45 we discuss the problem of foundations. We try to present a foundational synthesis of a theory whose constituent parts are a logico-probabilistic structure and a theory of open systems. • In chapter 46 we discuss the problem of the interpretation of QM. In the introduction [p. 3] we distinguished between the physical interpretation of the theory and the philosophical interpretation or philosophical aspects of the interpretational problem. Here we try to summarize a consistent physical interpretation and to see some general philosophical consequences. On the other hand, we are not essentially concerned here with specific metatheoretical problems — principles or other assumptions which have been made during the examination.