Abstract In rough terms, the quantum measurement problem is the problem of explaining how, when a system in a superposition state is measured, the pointer observable of the measuring apparatus is always found in a definite value. Although quantum mechanics involves several interpretative challenges, the measurement problem has been the main focus of the interest of physicists and philosophers working on the foundations of the theory: most interpretations were designed specifically to solve it. In this chapter, it is shown that the MHI offers a solution to the measurement problem for both ideal and non-ideal measurements, and that, in the non-ideal case, the interpretation distinguishes between reliable and non-reliable measurements. I have also explained how the MHI accounts for consecutive measurements. Finally, it is emphasized that the MHI approach provides a new, more physical understanding of the concept of quantum measurement.
Abstract In rough terms, the quantum measurement problem is the problem of explaining how, when a system in a superposition state is measured, the pointer observable of the measuring apparatus is always found in a definite value. Although quantum mechanics involves several interpretative challenges, the measurement problem has been the main focus of the interest of physicists and philosophers working on the foundations of the theory: most interpretations were designed specifically to solve it. In this chapter, it is shown that the MHI offers a solution to the measurement problem for both ideal and non-ideal measurements, and that, in the non-ideal case, the interpretation distinguishes between reliable and non-reliable measurements. I have also explained how the MHI accounts for consecutive measurements. Finally, it is emphasized that the MHI approach provides a new, more physical understanding of the concept of quantum measurement.
Abstract Chapter 6 was devoted to argue that the MHI offers a solution to the measurement problem for both ideal and non-ideal measurements, and to show how it provides a distinction between reliable and non-reliable measurements in the non-ideal case. However, in the last decades more complex measurement scenarios have been considered, some as old as the so-called Wigner’s friend experiment, and others recently designed to test the theoretical predictions of quantum mechanics. For this reason, in the present chapter, the measurement problem is revisited from the perspective of the challenges that those scenarios pose to interpretation.
Measurements play a specific role in quantum mechanics; only measurements allow us to catch a glimpse of the eluding physical reality. However, there is something deeply unsatisfactory with this specificity—a measurement is itself a physical process! Several varying modes of coping with this dilemma have been proposed and this article tries to describe how a now-century-long discussion has led to new insights about the transition from the quantum to the classical world. Starting from the pioneer’s view of the quantum measurement problem, it follows the development of formalisms, the interest from philosophers for its new aspects on reality and how different interpretations of quantum mechanics have tried to support our classically working brains in understanding quantum phenomena. Decoherence is a main topic and its role in measurement processes exemplified. The question of whether the quantum measurement problem is now solved is left open for the readers’ own judgment.
Quantum mechanics famously posits two distinct evolution rules for the state of a system: a deterministic, unitary time evolution under the Schr¨odinger equation, and a probabilistic “collapse” of the wavefunction upon measurement as dictated by the Born rule. The apparent inconsistency of these two dynamical laws – one continuous and one discontinuous – constitutes the quantum measurement problem. This foundational problem, which underlies the emergence of definite outcomes from quantum superpositions, has persisted since the theory’s inception. In this review, we present a comprehensive and rigorous examination of the measurement problem and survey the leading approaches that seek to resolve or circumvent it. We begin by formulating the measurement problem and its conceptual challenges. We then discuss in detail the major interpretations of quantum mechanics and theoretical frameworks addressing the problem: the Copenhagen interpretation, Everett’s many-worlds interpretation, de Broglie–Bohm pilot-wave theory, objective collapse models, the role of decoherence and environment-induced superselection, and epistemic approaches such as QBism. For each interpretation, we describe the core principles and mathematical formalism, assessing how (and whether) it attempts to solve the measurement problem. We also review modern developments and experiments relevant to quantum measurements, including tests of Bell inequalities, observations of decoherence and macroscopic superpositions, weak measurements and quantum eraser experiments, and thought experiments ‘a la Wigner’s friend. We highlight how these results inform the ongoing debate. Finally, we discuss open problems and challenges that remain in fully resolving the measurement problem.
During many years since the birth of quantum mechanics, instrumentalist interpretations prevailed: the meaning of the theory was expressed in terms of measurements results. However, in the last decades, several attempts to interpret it from a realist viewpoint have been proposed. Among them, modal interpretations supply a realist non-collapse account, according to which the system always has definite properties and the quantum state represents possibilities, not actualities. But the traditional modal interpretations faced some conceptual problems when addressing imperfect measurements. The modal-Hamiltonian interpretation, on the contrary, proved to be able to supply an adequate account of the measurement problem, both in its ideal and its non-ideal versions. Moreover, in the non-ideal case, it gives a precise criterion to distinguish between reliable and non-reliable measurements. Nevertheless, that criterion depends on the particular state of the measured system, and this might be considered as a shortcoming of the proposal. In fact, one could ask for a criterion of reliability that does not depend on the features of what is measured but only on the properties of the measurement device. The aim of this article is precisely to supply such a criterion: we will adopt an informational perspective for this purpose.During many years since the birth of quantum mechanics, instrumentalistinterpretations prevailed: the meaning of the theory was expressed in terms of measurementsresults. However, in the last decades, several attempts to interpret it from a realist viewpointhave been proposed. Among them, modal interpretations supply a realist non-collapseaccount, according to which the system always has definite properties and the quantum staterepresents possibilities, not actualities. But the traditional modal interpretations faced someconceptual problems when addressing imperfect measurements. The modal-Hamiltonianinterpretation, on the contrary, proved to be able to supply an adequate account of themeasurement problem, both in its ideal and its non-ideal versions. Moreover, in the non-idealcase, it gives a precise criterion to distinguish between reliable and non-reliable measurements.Nevertheless, that criterion depends on the particular state of the measured system, and thismight be considered as a shortcoming of the proposal. In fact, one could ask for a criterionof reliability that does not depend on the features of what is measured but only on theproperties of the measurement device. The aim of this article is precisely to supply such acriterion: we will adopt an informational perspective for this purpose.
The newly revised edition of this well-known book categorizes prevalent views on measurement as described by quantum mechanics, discusses basics agreed to by many who on other issues disagree, and describes some of the problems. Although many paragraphs rest unchanged from the first (1991) edition, results found since 1991 are used to reorganize and sharpen the focus of the book, so that even the old paragraphs are now understood differently and more clearly. One advance in the second edition is a new and more general no-go theorem; another is separation of formal derivations from interpretation. The dozen or so definitions essential to following the book even casually are stated clearly. By this means the authors succeed pretty well in achieving their stated desire to make the book comprehensible to those who do not share their philosophic predispositions. While I differ in philosophy from the authors, attending to their discussion uncovered weaknesses in my own thinking and improved it. The mathematical language of quantum mechanics expresses a system under measurement by states (as rays in a Hilbert space) and a hamiltonian operator, distinct from the apparatus that produces outcomes, which is expressed by a positive operator-valued (POV) measure. In this way quantum language separates state preparation from state measurement. Often the Hilbert space is viewed as a tensor product of subspaces, allowing further conceptual separations. The authors take the stance that quantum mechanics calls for splitting the empirical world into parts, the most essential being (1) objective systems S (to be observed) and (2) apparatus A (preparation and registration devices that produces outcomes (or, as the authors write, definite pointer values) of the observed system). In some interpretations, one or both of an observer and an environment appear as additional parts. What is to be included in the system S versus the apparatus A is not specified by the language, but is open to the theoretician; a probe, for example, can be analysed as either part of the apparatus or as part of the system, as was discussed by von Neumann in work cited by the authors. With what should a theory of measurement be concerned? A broad division of approaches is defined by how one answers the question: should one try to do away with the cut between measuring apparatus and system? The authors phrase this as a choice of REFERENT, a term which in my mind puts them on shaky semantic ground; anyway The Quantum Theory of Measurement is concerned with implications of the `yes'. The book unfolds with the power of a tragedy, in which the logical consequences lead, step-by-step, to the statement and proof of theorem 6.2.1, which, roughly speaking, asserts the non-existence of a solution to the problem of getting definite pointer values from measuring apparatus that exhibits the superposition demanded by its description as a quantum system. Possible responses to this theorem are discussed, among them the many-worlds interpretation and a modification of quantum mechanics that elevates decoherence to a principle. Citations of the literature are thorough, and many points of view are crisply summarized. The book is indispensable to both those who work in the broad direction chosen by the authors and to those who wish to set any other direction in context.
Abstract In this paper we provide a general account of the causal models which attempt to provide a solution to the famous measurement problem of Quantum Mechanics (QM). We will argue that—leaving aside instrumentalism which restricts the physical meaning of QM to the algorithmic prediction of measurement outcomes—the many interpretations which can be found in the literature can be distinguished through the way they model the measurement process, either in terms of theefficient causeor in terms of thefinal cause. We will discuss and analyze why both, ‘final cause’ and ‘efficient cause’ models, face severe difficulties to solve the measurement problem. In contradistinction to these schemes we will present a new model based on theimmanent causewhich, we will argue, provides an intuitive understanding of the measurement process in QM.