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Quantum Information Processing

Quantum collision attacks on reduced SHA-256.

Bao-Min Zhou, Hong-Wei Sun, Xue Zhang, Ke-Jia Zhang, Long Zhang

Published Dec 23, 2025• 0 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/s11128-025-05024-w

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Quantum computers have the potential to solve a number of hard problems that are believed to be almost impossible to solve by classical computers. This observation has sparked a surge of research to apply quantum algorithms against the cryptographic systems to evaluate its quantum resistance. In assessing the security strength of the cryptographic algorithms against the upcoming quantum threats, it is crucial to precisely estimate the quantum resource requirement (generally in terms of circuit depth and quantum bit count). The National Institute of Standards and Technology by the US government specified five quantum security levels so that the relative quantum strength of a given cipher can be compared to the standard ones. There have been some progress in the NIST-specified quantum security levels for the odd levels (i.e., 1, 3 and 5), following the work of Jaques et al. (Eurocrypt’20). However, levels 2 and 4, which correspond to the quantum collision finding attacks for the SHA-2 and SHA-3 hash functions, quantum attack complexities are arguably not well-studied. This is where our article fits in. In this article, we present novel techniques for optimizing the quantum circuit implementations for SHA-2 and SHA-3 algorithms in all the categories specified by NIST. After that, we evaluate the quantum circuits of target cryptographic hash functions for quantum collision search. Finally, we define the quantum attack complexity for levels 2 and 4, and comment on the security strength of the extended level. We present new concepts to optimize the quantum circuits at the component level and the architecture level.