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NTT technical review

Security of Hash Functions against Attacks Using Quantum Computers

Akinori Hosoyamada

Published Jul 1, 2023• 2 citations
Publisher

Abstract

SHA-2 is a cryptographic hash function used worldwide.The possibility of attacks that exploit quantum computers can no longer be ignored; therefore, it is necessary to verify how the emergence of quantum computers could affect the security of SHA-2.The results of research conducted by my colleague and I indicate-as a world's first-that in a world in which quantum computers are available, the number of breakable steps in a collision attack on SHA-2 will increase.

DOI
10.53829/ntr202307fa4

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SHA-2 is a cryptographic hash function used worldwide.The possibility of attacks that exploit quantum computers can no longer be ignored; therefore, it is necessary to verify how the emergence of quantum computers could affect the security of SHA-2.The results of research conducted by my colleague and I indicate-as a world's first-that in a world in which quantum computers are available, the number of breakable steps in a collision attack on SHA-2 will increase.
The rapid advancement of quantum computing technology presents a significant challenge to the field of cryptography, particularly affecting the security of hash functions that form the foundation of many cryptographic protocols. Hash functions are widely used to ensure data integrity, generate digital signatures, and securely store passwords. However, the emergence of quantum algorithms—such as Grover’s algorithm—threatens to undermine the security assumptions on which these hash functions are based by significantly reducing their effective security levels. This paper aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of the vulnerabilities introduced by quantum computing to traditional hash functions, detailing how these weaknesses can be exploited by quantum adversaries. We explore the fundamental properties of hash functions, including pre-image resistance, second pre-image resistance, and collision resistance, and assess how these properties are affected in a quantum context. Furthermore, we examine the implications of these vulnerabilities for existing cryptographic systems and emphasize the urgent need for the development of post-quantum cryptographic standards. In response to these challenges, we review ongoing research efforts focused on designing hash functions that are resilient to quantum attacks. We evaluate several promising candidates for post-quantum hash functions, considering their security properties, performance metrics, and practical applicability. The findings of this paper highlight the necessity of transitioning to post-quantum cryptographic solutions to safeguard sensitive information in an increasingly quantum-capable world. Ultimately, we advocate for proactive measures within the cryptographic community to adopt and implement these new standards, thereby ensuring robust data security in the age of quantum computing.
Quantum computers have the potential to solve a number of hard problems that are believed to be almost impossible to solve by classical computers. This observation has sparked a surge of research to apply quantum algorithms against the cryptographic systems to evaluate its quantum resistance. In assessing the security strength of the cryptographic algorithms against the upcoming quantum threats, it is crucial to precisely estimate the quantum resource requirement (generally in terms of circuit depth and quantum bit count). The National Institute of Standards and Technology by the US government specified five quantum security levels so that the relative quantum strength of a given cipher can be compared to the standard ones. There have been some progress in the NIST-specified quantum security levels for the odd levels (i.e., 1, 3 and 5), following the work of Jaques et al. (Eurocrypt’20). However, levels 2 and 4, which correspond to the quantum collision finding attacks for the SHA-2 and SHA-3 hash functions, quantum attack complexities are arguably not well-studied. This is where our article fits in. In this article, we present novel techniques for optimizing the quantum circuit implementations for SHA-2 and SHA-3 algorithms in all the categories specified by NIST. After that, we evaluate the quantum circuits of target cryptographic hash functions for quantum collision search. Finally, we define the quantum attack complexity for levels 2 and 4, and comment on the security strength of the extended level. We present new concepts to optimize the quantum circuits at the component level and the architecture level.
The scientific article reviews and analyzes the current stage of cryptography development in the context of the inevitable post-quantum era. It is emphasized that post-quantum cryptography (PQC) is gaining the status of a key priority in the national security strategies of the world's leading developed countries, which are actively preparing for a fundamental transition to quantum-safe cryptographic practices. The consequence of the above is the urgent need for intensive development of the latest cryptographic algorithms, which by their nature will be resistant to attacks from powerful quantum computers. Today, several promising approaches to the creation of such quantum-safe algorithms based on various mathematical concepts and cryptographic primitives are already being actively studied. The article pays special attention to cryptography based on hash functions, which is considered one of the most promising areas in the context of developing reliable quantum-safe cryptographic tools. The potential for cracking cryptographic hash functions using quantum algorithms is analyzed. The article considers an original approach to assessing the quantum stability of hash functions, which consists in encoding the hash function itself in a quantum oracle, rather than its separate solution. A simplified (toy) hash function is used to clearly demonstrate the proposed idea. Based on the results of the experimental study, important conclusions are formulated, which indicate that quantum computers are indeed capable of significantly accelerating the process of inversion of cryptographic hash functions. This, in turn, provides strong grounds for serious concern about the cryptographic stability of various cryptographic primitives based on combinatorial problems. It is worth emphasizing that this problem is not limited to hash functions. This critically important observation means that to maintain a similar level of cryptographic security in the coming quantum era, the size of the input value of hash functions will likely need to be increased by at least half to compensate for the speedup provided by quantum algorithms.
The key cryptographic protocols used to secure the internet and financial transactions of today are all susceptible to attack by the development of a sufficiently large quantum computer. One particular area at risk is cryptocurrencies, a market currently worth over 100 billion USD. We investigate the risk posed to Bitcoin, and other cryptocurrencies, by attacks using quantum computers. We find that the proof-of-work used by Bitcoin is relatively resistant to substantial speedup by quantum computers in the next 10 years, mainly because specialized ASIC miners are extremely fast compared to the estimated clock speed of near-term quantum computers. On the other hand, the elliptic curve signature scheme used by Bitcoin is much more at risk, and could be completely broken by a quantum computer as early as 2027, by the most optimistic estimates. We analyze an alternative proof-of-work called Momentum, based on finding collisions in a hash function, that is even more resistant to speedup by a quantum computer. We also review the available post-quantum signature schemes to see which one would best meet the security and efficiency requirements of blockchain applications.
The advent of quantum computers threatens the security of existing hash functions. In this paper, we confirmed the implementation results of quantum circuits for domestic/international hash functions, LSH, SHA2, SHA3 and SM3, and conducted a comparative analysis. To operate the existing hash function in a quantum computer, it must be implemented as a quantum circuit, and the quantum security strength can be confirmed by estimating the necessary quantum resources. We compared methods of quantum circuit implementation and results of quantum resource estimation in various aspects and discussed ways to meet quantum computer security in the future.