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Lecture notes in computer science

Quantum Collision Attacks on AES-Like Hashing with Low Quantum Random Access Memories

Xiaoyang Dong, Siwei Sun, Danping Shi, Fei Gao, Xiaoyun Wang, Lei Hu

Published Jan 1, 2020• 58 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-030-64834-3_25

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Recently, Hosoyamada and Sasaki (EUROCRYPT 2020), and Xiaoyang Dong et al. (ASIACRYPT 2020) proposed quantum collision attacks against AES-like hashing modes AES-MMO and AES-MP. Their collision attacks are based on the quantum version of the rebound attack technique exploiting the differential trails whose probabilities are too low to be useful in the classical setting but large enough in the quantum setting. In this work, we present dedicated quantum free-start collision attacks on Hirose’s double block length compression function instantiated with AES-256, namely HCF-AES-256. The best publicly known classical attack against HCF-AES-256 covers up to 9 out of 14 rounds. We present a new 10-round differential trail for HCF-AES-256 with probability 2−160, and use it to find collisions with a quantum version of the rebound attack. Our attack succeeds with a time complexity of 285.11 and requires 216 qRAM in the quantum-attack setting, where an attacker can make only classical queries to the oracle and perform offline computations. We also present a quantum free-start collision attack on HCF-AES-256 with a time complexity of 286.07 which outperforms Chailloux, Naya-Plasencia, and Schrottenloher’s generic quantum collision attack (ASIACRYPT 2017) in a model when large qRAM is not available.
With the continuous development of quantum technology, the quantum security of symmetric ciphers has attracted widespread attention. This study focuses on the security of 1K-AES, employing both quantum and classical slide attacks to analyze its security. On the one hand, for the 1K-AES with MixColumns in the last round, using the CNS algorithm achieves a success rate of 74%, an improvement from 63%, under a query complexity of O (22n/5) and classical memory complexity of O (2n/5) without the need for quantum random access memory, where n denotes the block size. When using a quantum random access memory, the universal quantum claw-finding algorithm improves the success rate to 100% with a query complexity of O (2n/3) and quantum random memory complexity of O (2n/3). Additionally, under the chosen plaintext attack, the success rate of the classical slide attack is also increased to 100%. On the other hand, for the 1K-AES with no MixColumns in the last round, the universal quantum claw-finding algorithm is used to perform a quantum slide attack, with both time and memory complexity of O (2n/3). Compared with the classical slide attack, this method achieves sub-exponential acceleration; compared with Grover’s search, the query complexity reduces from O (2n/2) to O (2n/3).