Securing network slices in beyond-5G environments remains an open challenge when quantum-capable adversaries enter the threat model. Classical key agreement protocols were not originally designed to be resistant to algebraic attacks by large-scale quantum processors. In principle, it seems like a simple idea to replace these with lattice-based or hash-based ones. In reality, each extra key exchange byte increases round-trip time, uses battery resources, and consumes baseband processing cycles. This trade-off is even more difficult to make when using slice-specific quality-of-service contracts. The extra cryptographic load is absorbed differently in a delay-tolerant massive machine-type communication slice than in a safety-critical vehicle-to-everything channel with single-digit millisecond bounds. A coordinated cipher suite is provided by PostCrypt to solve this gap. Kyber-768 is responsible for session key negotiation, SPHINCS+ for stateless signature verification and Advanced Encryption Standard-256-Galois/Counter Mode for the data plane. The evaluation uses the OAI-6G Testbed Logs dataset with real gNB and user equipment traces across four network slices. Experimental results show that PostCrypt achieves the best performance with 3.5 ms latency in ultra-reliable low-latency communication, $-0.7 \%$ throughput loss in vehicle-to-everything, $3.9 \%$ central processing unit overhead, and 15.6 mJ energy use. These results show that PostCrypt gives quantum-safe protection with lower operational cost for future fifth-generation and sixth-generation networks.
Securing network slices in beyond-5G environments remains an open challenge when quantum-capable adversaries enter the threat model. Classical key agreement protocols were not originally designed to be resistant to algebraic attacks by large-scale quantum processors. In principle, it seems like a simple idea to replace these with lattice-based or hash-based ones. In reality, each extra key exchange byte increases round-trip time, uses battery resources, and consumes baseband processing cycles. This trade-off is even more difficult to make when using slice-specific quality-of-service contracts. The extra cryptographic load is absorbed differently in a delay-tolerant massive machine-type communication slice than in a safety-critical vehicle-to-everything channel with single-digit millisecond bounds. A coordinated cipher suite is provided by PostCrypt to solve this gap. Kyber-768 is responsible for session key negotiation, SPHINCS+ for stateless signature verification and Advanced Encryption Standard-256-Galois/Counter Mode for the data plane. The evaluation uses the OAI-6G Testbed Logs dataset with real gNB and user equipment traces across four network slices. Experimental results show that PostCrypt achieves the best performance with 3.5 ms latency in ultra-reliable low-latency communication, −0.7% throughput loss in vehicle-to-everything, 3.9% central processing unit overhead, and 15.6 mJ energy use. These results show that PostCrypt gives quantum-safe protection with lower operational cost for future fifth-generation and sixth-generation networks.
The imminent maturity of large-scale quantum computing threatens the confidentiality and authenticity guarantees of the public-key primitives-RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography that currently secure next-generation communication networks, including 5G/6G core and radio-access segments, software-defined edge infrastructures, and massive Internet-of-Things (IoT) deployments. “Harvest-now, decrypt-later” adversaries put long-lived network traffic at risk much before cryptographically relevant quantum machines come into existence. This paper presents QR-SecNet, a Quantum-Resistant Security Framework that combines a lattice-based key-encapsulation mechanism (ML-KEM), a stateless hash-based signature scheme (SLH-DSA) and a classical elliptic-curve exchange within a single hybrid handshake so that the security of a session depends on the hardness of at least one of two mathematically unrelated problems. The framework also includes a crypto-agility controller, which is able to negotiate cipher suites based on device capabilities and network conditions, mitigates downgrade attacks, and supports incremental migration, maintaining interoperability with legacy endpoints. QR-SecNet was evaluated on an emulated 5G/6G network testbed against five representative baselines-RSA-3072, ECDHE-P256, a standalone ML-KEM exchange, a standalone ML-DSA signature scheme, and Classic McEliece using latency, throughput, computational cost, and estimated post-quantum security margin as metrics. Results show that QR-SecNet completes a hybrid handshake in 11.8 ms on average, sustains a throughput of 1,740 connections per second, and preserves at least 128 bits of classical and 192 bits of post-quantum security margin, outperforming standalone post-quantum baselines in latency by 17-46% while remaining within 2.1 ms of the fastest single-primitive scheme.
The impending advent of cryptographically relevant quantum computers threatens classical public-key primitives that underpin 5G and IoT security, including key exchange, authentication, and device onboarding. Ultra-dense networks, constrained endpoints, and long device lifetimes heighten exposure to “harvest-now, decrypt-later” risks. Mobile operators and IoT platform providers need migration ready cryptography that fits radio-access latency budgets, scales to billions of low-power nodes, and integrates cleanly with 3GPP and IETF protocols without degrading quality of service. Many post quantum options impose prohibitive bandwidth and compute costs or lack deployment guidance tuned to network slices and massive machine-type communications. We propose a lattice-based encryption and key-encapsulation framework grounded in Module-LWE/LWR assumptions. The design pairs an IND-CCA-secure KEM for control plane bootstrapping with lightweight AEAD for user-plane data, delivered through a hybrid handshake combining classical ECDH with a post-quantum KEM to ensure continuity during transition. Parameter tiers align with eMBB, URLLC, and mMTC device classes. Implementation emphasizes constant-time polynomial arithmetic, NTT-accelerated convolution, centered-binomial noise sampling, public-key compression, and stateless hash-based signatures for attestation. A gNB-assisted enrollment workflow and session-key rotation via 5G NAS/RRC are specified. Analytical modeling and prototype measurements indicate sub-millisecond encapsulation on ARM Cortex-M33 microcontrollers and ~1.5 ms on RAN baseband paths, while handshake message growth remains within existing NAS and RRC budgets. In ns-3 simulations of dense mMTC topologies, the hybrid handshake achieves >99.99% success under 1% packet loss, and energy profiling shows <5% battery impact for weekly rekeying. Security analysis demonstrates resistance to known lattice attacks at NIST Levels 3–5, forward secrecy via ephemeral KEMs, downgrade resistance through authenticated algorithm negotiation, and post compromise security with frequent rekeying.
Sixth Generation (6 G) networks will support critical, latency-sensitive, and large-scale services, making them attractive targets for quantum-capable adversaries. To address this, the paper proposes a conceptual Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) framework for high-level security protocols in 6G, including Transport Layer Security (TLS) 1.3, Internet Key Exchange version 2 (IKEv2), Secure Shell (SSH), Message Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT), and Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP), using security-by-design principles, hybrid classical-post-quantum migration, and optimization for resourceconstrained and heterogeneous environments. The framework defines key metrics such as handshake latency, computational and memory overhead, energy consumption, interoperability, and resistance to quantum and classical attacks, and analyzes risks introduced by hybrid protocol complexity, side channels, and implementation flaws. The framework is illustrated via a reference hybrid TLS 1.3 design using National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)-standardized Module-LatticeBased Key-Encapsulation Mechanism (ML-KEM) and Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA) and an evaluation methodology based on Open Secure Sockets Layer (OpenSSL)/liboqs, outlining how future prototypes can measure latency, bandwidth, and computational overhead under UltraReliable Low-Latency Communication (URLLC) and Massive Machine-Type Communications (mMTC) constraints. By combining requirements analysis, design patterns, and evaluation methodology, this work supports quantum-safe 6 G infrastructure with scalable, reliable, and long-term secure deployment, providing a blueprint for future empirical validation rather than reporting completed measurements.
The evolution of 6G networks necessitates robust authentication and key agreement (AKA) protocols to counter emerging security challenges, particularly the threat posed by quantum computing. Existing 5G-AKA protocols remain vulnerable to user tracking, replay attacks, and false base station impersonation, while Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) and RSA-based key exchanges face imminent obsolescence due to quantum attacks. This study examines the vulnerabilities of 5G-AKA and explores hybrid post-quantum cryptography (PQC) as a transitional security solution for 6G networks. We evaluate NIST-standardized PQC algorithms, focusing on their computational overhead, key size efficiency, and adaptability to heterogeneous network environments, including IoT and ultra-low latency applications. A comparative analysis of hybrid cryptographic schemes demonstrates that lattice-based (Kyber, Dilithium), hash-based (SPHINCS+), and code-based (BIKE, Classic McEliece) PQC techniques provide varying trade-offs between security, efficiency, and deployment feasibility. Furthermore, we propose a quantum-resistant 6G-AKA framework, integrating hybrid PQC, AI-driven trust mechanisms, and decentralized authentication to ensure scalability and interoperability. Experimental benchmarks highlight potential performance constraints, including latency in PQC-based key exchange and resource limitations in edge computing. Addressing these challenges requires the optimization of lightweight PQC implementations, formal security validation, and global standardization efforts. Our findings provide a roadmap for the secure transition to 6G authentication protocols, ensuring resilience against both classical and quantum threats.
The rapid evolution of 5G and emerging 6G telecom networks introduces new security challenges due to the potential threat posed by quantum computing to conventional cryptographic algorithms. This study proposes a post-quantum cryptographic framework for protecting critical 5G and 6G telecom infrastructure against quantum-enabled attacks. The framework investigates quantum-resistant cryptographic mechanisms for secure key establishment, authentication, data confidentiality, and communication integrity. Performance is evaluated using key size, encryption and decryption time, computational overhead, latency, and throughput. The proposed approach aims to achieve a balance between quantum resistance and network efficiency, providing a scalable and resilient security solution for next-generation wireless communication environments.
In particular, lattice-based post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) schemes are believed to be good candidates for increased resilience in the quantum era (e.g., Shor and Grover). Still, most proposed solutions lack full consideration of the practical constraints imposed by resource-constrained systems (limited processing speed, memory, battery capacity, and the sustainability costs of large-scale cryptographic computation). Motivated by this gap, this paper discusses a use case in the form of a practical post-quantum security framework that combines lightweight lattice-based encryption/decryption and key encapsulation/decapsulation, with an evaluation methodology for performance and sustainability. Methodologically, the framework (i) models a quantum-compatible adversary and establishes security goals for limited networks, (ii) creates and tuneshigh-performance lattice-based cryptographic parameters further influenced by classic Kyber/NTRU applied settings, and (iii) demonstrates protocol-level feasibility through simulated network scenarios realised through Contiki-NG and NS-3. Performance is measured in terms of encryption/decryption latency, energy consumption, and communication overhead, and sustainability is expressed through environmental impact indicators (carbon footprint) mapped to the energy consumption of modelled computation/communication, considering device-dependent coefficients and configurable emission factors. The simulation results indicate that the average encryption and decryption times are approximately 120 ms and 110 ms, respectively, and that the average energy consumption is below four mJ on edge devices. The COMMOPs incurs a communication overhead about 72% higher than that of previous classical schemes, but remains acceptable in these three low-power network settings. In sum, the framework we propose is a comprehensive roadmap for scalable quantum-safe security deployment, with an emphasis on the human and environmental challenges outlined above.