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Philosophy of Science

From Classical to Quantum Indeterminacy, and Back

Patrick Thomas Fraser, Michael E. Miller

Published Sep 4, 2025• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Abstract Del Santo and Gisin have recently argued that classical mechanics exhibits indeterminacy and that by treating the observables of classical mechanics with real number precision we introduce hidden variables that restore determinacy. In this article we introduce the conceptual machinery required to critically evaluate these claims. We present a characterization of indeterminacy which can capture both quantum indeterminacy and the classical indeterminacy Del Santo and Gisin propose. This allows us to show that there is an important difference between the two: their classical indeterminacy can be resolved with hidden variables in a manner which is not possible for quantum indeterminacy.

DOI
10.1017/psa.2025.10113

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Abstract Del Santo and Gisin have recently argued that classical mechanics exhibits indeterminacy and that by treating the observables of classical mechanics with real number precision we introduce hidden variables that restore determinacy. In this article we introduce the conceptual machinery required to critically evaluate these claims. We present a characterization of indeterminacy which can capture both quantum indeterminacy and the classical indeterminacy Del Santo and Gisin propose. This allows us to show that there is an important difference between the two: their classical indeterminacy can be resolved with hidden variables in a manner which is not possible for quantum indeterminacy.
Abstract It is often claimed that quantum mechanics entails that there is indeterminacy in the world, in the sense that physical systems can lack a precise value for a property. Indeed, a radical form of indeterminacy, in which systems have almost none of the properties we normally attribute to them, can be shown to follow from a particular interpretation of quantum mechanics—the bare theory. However, the bare theory is shown to be incoherent. Still, a more limited form of indeterminacy can be located in spontaneous collapse, hidden variables, and many-worlds theories. This indeterminacy is unlike that which arises classically, having nothing to do with ordinary forms of vagueness or the composition of large objects out of smaller parts. Indeterminacy in quantum mechanics can perhaps be avoided, but there seems little reason to do so.
Gisin and Del Santo have argued, in a series of influential papers (2019–2023), that real numbers are the “hidden variables of classical mechanics,” on the grounds that a typical real number contains an infinite amount of information that a finite volume of space cannot store. We show that this argument rests on a fundamental confusion between a physical quantity and the number that results from its numerization. The infinite sequence of decimals of a real number is not a property of the world but the structural product of the measurement procedure: the iterated application of a standard to an independent magnitude. The generic incommensurability of any two magnitudes of the same kind suffices to generate this infinite sequence. We identify and name three nested confusions: the word–thing confusion (the word “magnitude” taken for the real quantity), the quantity–number confusion (the real quantity taken for its numerical value), and their product, the numerization confusion, through which the real disappears from both sides at once. We show that these confusions symmetrically vitiate both classical determinism and Gisin’s informational indeterminism, and sketch the consequences for the determinism/indeterminism debate.
Abstract Do scientific theories limit human knowledge? In other words, are there physical variables hidden by essence forever? We argue for negative answers and illustrate our point on chaotic classical dynamical systems. We emphasize parallels with quantum theory and conclude that the common real numbers are, de facto, the hidden variables of classical physics. Consequently, real numbers should not be considered as “physically real” and classical mechanics, like quantum physics, is indeterministic.
Abstract Of the many ways of getting at the core of the weirdnesses in quantum mechanics, there’s one which traces back to Schrödinger’s seminal 1935 paper, and has to do with the apparent fuzzy nature of the reality described by the formalism through the wavefunction ψ\psiψ ψ . This issue, which I will be calling the Determinacy Problem, is distinct from the standard measurement problem of quantum mechanics, despite Schrödinger himself ends up conflating the two. I will argue that the Determinacy Problem is an exquisitely philosophical problem, for as it is standard when facing any phenomenon which appears to have indeterminate or fuzzy characteristics, the solutions available are to either blame the deficiencies of our language, or our lack of knowledge, or to blame the world itself. These three attitudes can already be found in the literature on quantum mechanics, either explicitly or implicitly, and they appear to motivate three very distinct research programs: high-dimensional realism, primitive ontology, and quantum indeterminacy.
Quantum mechanics (QM) is an extremely successful theory; however, there is still no consensus regarding its interpretation. Among the controversies, the quantum classical transitions are the outstanding questions. In this paper, starting from measurement theory, we discuss the role that the precision limit for observation plays in QM and attempt to lubricate the relationship between the precision limit and some unique characters and nature of QM. By reviewing Bohmian mechanics, one of the nonlocal hidden variable theories, we discuss the possibility of restoring determinism in QM. We conclude that it is the existence of the precision limit that makes it impossible to restore determinism in QM, and it is the root that makes QM different from classical physics. Finally, the boundary between the so-called classical and quantum worlds is discussed. We hope these philosophical arguments can provide a kind of epistemic understanding for QM.
The circumstances of measurement have more direct significance in quantum than in classical physics, where they can be neglected for well-performed measurements. In quantum mechanics, the dispositions of the measuring apparatus-plus-environment of the system measured for a property are a non-trivial part of its formalization as the quantum observable. A straightforward formalization of context, via equivalence classes of measurements corresponding to sets of sharp target observables, was recently given for sharp quantum observables. Here, we show that quantum contextuality, the dependence of measurement outcomes on circumstances external to the measured quantum system, can be manifested not only as the strict exclusivity of different measurements of sharp observables or valuations but via quantitative differences in the property statistics across simultaneous measurements of generalized quantum observables, by formalizing quantum context via coexistent generalized observables rather than only its subset of compatible sharp observables. Here, the question of whether such quantum contextuality follows from basic quantum principles is then addressed, and it is shown that the Principle of Indeterminacy is sufficient for at least one form of non-trivial contextuality. Contextuality is thus seen to be a natural feature of quantum mechanics rather than something arising only from the consideration of impossible measurements, abstract philosophical issues, hidden-variables theories, or other alternative, classical models of quantum behavior.