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Foundations of Physics

The Determinacy Problem in Quantum Mechanics

Cristian Mariani

Published Nov 19, 2024• 2 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Abstract Of the many ways of getting at the core of the weirdnesses in quantum mechanics, there’s one which traces back to Schrödinger’s seminal 1935 paper, and has to do with the apparent fuzzy nature of the reality described by the formalism through the wavefunction $$\psi$$ ψ . This issue, which I will be calling the Determinacy Problem, is distinct from the standard measurement problem of quantum mechanics, despite Schrödinger himself ends up conflating the two. I will argue that the Determinacy Problem is an exquisitely philosophical problem, for as it is standard when facing any phenomenon which appears to have indeterminate or fuzzy characteristics, the solutions available are to either blame the deficiencies of our language, or our lack of knowledge, or to blame the world itself. These three attitudes can already be found in the literature on quantum mechanics, either explicitly or implicitly, and they appear to motivate three very distinct research programs: high-dimensional realism, primitive ontology, and quantum indeterminacy.

DOI
10.1007/s10701-024-00808-z

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Abstract Of the many ways of getting at the core of the weirdnesses in quantum mechanics, there’s one which traces back to Schrödinger’s seminal 1935 paper, and has to do with the apparent fuzzy nature of the reality described by the formalism through the wavefunction ψ\psiψ ψ . This issue, which I will be calling the Determinacy Problem, is distinct from the standard measurement problem of quantum mechanics, despite Schrödinger himself ends up conflating the two. I will argue that the Determinacy Problem is an exquisitely philosophical problem, for as it is standard when facing any phenomenon which appears to have indeterminate or fuzzy characteristics, the solutions available are to either blame the deficiencies of our language, or our lack of knowledge, or to blame the world itself. These three attitudes can already be found in the literature on quantum mechanics, either explicitly or implicitly, and they appear to motivate three very distinct research programs: high-dimensional realism, primitive ontology, and quantum indeterminacy.
Abstract Uses a historical approach to explore the extent to which quantum theory mandates indeterminism. Drawing on important examples in the history of physics, it discusses explicitly the crucial distinction – often overlooked in the philosophical literature – between indeterminacy of physical quantities and causal indeterminism. It pursues at a more sophisticated level, issues raised in Ch. 2 concerning determinism and indeterminism in modern science. It concludes that quantum indeterminacy is an objective feature of the world, but that the jury is still out regarding quantum indeterminism.
Quantum mechanics has always presented a problem for scientific realists. For it does not seem to offer a coherent picture of the world. I think it does, and that there is a viable quantum mechanical model of reality. But it cannot be constructed, given the continuity constraints that we usually place on realistic models. To be a quantum mechanical realist, one has to be willing to accept that there are two fundamentally different kinds of processes occurring in nature: continuous, but quantum mechanically indeterminate, energy transfer processes and discontinuous, but spatially extended, changes of state. The unwillingness of philosophers to accept that there is such a distinction has caused many of them to doubt the reality of Schrödinger waves, and the processes of their generation and collapse. I am fully aware that I am treading on well-trodden territory, and that the technical difficulties that must be faced by anyone who is not a specialist in the field are immense. Nevertheless, I think there is a fairly clear metaphysical position on these issues derivable from the kind of essentialist realism outlined in the previous chapter, and I ask readers to bear with me.
Quantum mechanics has always presented a problem for scientific realists.For it does not seem to offer a coherent picture of the world.I think it does, and that there is a viable quantum mechanical model of reality.But it cannot be constructed, given the continuity constraints that we usually place on realistic models.To be a quantum mechanical realist, one has to be willing to accept that there are two fundamentally different kinds of processes occurring in nature: continuous, but quantum mechanically indeterminate, energy transfer processes and discontinuous, but spatially extended, changes of state.The unwillingness of philosophers to accept that there is such a distinction has caused many of them to doubt the reality of Schrodinger waves, and the processes of their generation and collapse.I am fully aware that I am treading on well-trodden territory, and that the technical difficulties that must be faced by anyone who is not a specialist in the field are immense.Nevertheless, I think there is a fairly clear metaphysical position on these issues derivable from the kind of essentialist realism outlined in the previous chapter, and I ask readers to bear with me.First, realism about Schrodinger waves requires the belief that particles are always transmitted as quantum mechanically indeterminate 1.
I present and defend a new ontology for quantum theories (or ``interpretations'' of quantum theory) called Generative Quantum Theory (GQT). GQT postulates different sets of features, and the combination of these different features can help generate different quantum theories. Furthermore, this ontology makes quantum indeterminacy and determinacy play an important explanatory role in accounting for when quantum systems whose values of their properties are indeterminate become determinate. The process via which determinate values arise varies between the different quantum theories. Moreover, quantum states represent quantum properties and structures that give rise to determinacy, and each quantum theory specifies a structure with certain features. I will focus on the following quantum theories: GRW, the Many-Worlds Interpretation, single-world relationalist theories such as Relational Quantum Mechanics, Bohmian Mechanics, hybrid classical-quantum theories, and Environmental Determinacy-based (EnD) Quantum Theory. I will argue that GQT should be taken seriously because it provides a series of important benefits that current widely discussed ontologies lack, namely, wave function realism and primitive ontology, without some of their costs. For instance, it helps generate quantum theories that are compatible with relativistic causality, such as EnD Quantum Theory. Also, GQT has the benefit of providing new ways to compare and evaluate quantum theories, which may lead to philosophical and scientific progress.
Abstract Many features of quantum mechanics (QM) suggest that, at the microscopic level, objects sometimes fail to determinately instantiate their properties. In recent years, many have argued that this phenomenon indicates the existence of an ontological kind of indeterminacy, often called metaphysical indeterminacy , which is supposed to affect the ontology of QM. As insisted by Glick ('Against Quantum Indeterminacy, 2017, Thought), however, once we look at the major realist approaches to QM we learn that the indeterminacy disappears from the description of the world at its most fundamental level. This absence might be taken as a good reason for adopting some form of eliminativism towards quantum mechanical indeterminacy. The aim of this paper is to distinguish three ways of defending eliminativism, and to argue that none of them eventually succeeds. The upshot is that QM does in fact suggest the existence of metaphysical indeterminacy, although only as an emergent phenomenon.
The indeterminacy and stochasticity of quantum mechanics have nurtured an illustrious gathering of critics including Einstein, Schrödinger, Bell, and Penrose. This has been good for quantum mechanics since it has become the most ruggedized and most battle hardened branch of physics. The one criticism that is often alluded to, now days, is ‘the measurement problem.’ First of all, from a pragmatic perspective it can be categorically stated that there is no measurement problem. Quantum mechanics exquisitely agrees with experimental measurements. Secondly, the so called ‘measurement problem’ is often related, by supporters of this concept, to the alleged ‘collapse of the wave function’ which is an unobserved phenomenon. In this chapter, several aspects of this experimentally nonexisting problem are discussed in order to inform the reader on the measurement reality of quantum mechanics.