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arXiv:1909.04514 · Quantum Studies Mathematics and Foundations

Real numbers are the hidden variables of classical mechanics

Nicolas Gisin

Published Oct 31, 2019• 34 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Abstract Do scientific theories limit human knowledge? In other words, are there physical variables hidden by essence forever? We argue for negative answers and illustrate our point on chaotic classical dynamical systems. We emphasize parallels with quantum theory and conclude that the common real numbers are, de facto, the hidden variables of classical physics. Consequently, real numbers should not be considered as “physically real” and classical mechanics, like quantum physics, is indeterministic.

DOI
10.1007/s40509-019-00211-8

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Abstract Do scientific theories limit human knowledge? In other words, are there physical variables hidden by essence forever? We argue for negative answers and illustrate our point on chaotic classical dynamical systems. We emphasize parallels with quantum theory and conclude that the common real numbers are, de facto, the hidden variables of classical physics. Consequently, real numbers should not be considered as “physically real” and classical mechanics, like quantum physics, is indeterministic.
Gisin and Del Santo have argued, in a series of influential papers (2019–2023), that real numbers are the “hidden variables of classical mechanics,” on the grounds that a typical real number contains an infinite amount of information that a finite volume of space cannot store. We show that this argument rests on a fundamental confusion between a physical quantity and the number that results from its numerization. The infinite sequence of decimals of a real number is not a property of the world but the structural product of the measurement procedure: the iterated application of a standard to an independent magnitude. The generic incommensurability of any two magnitudes of the same kind suffices to generate this infinite sequence. We identify and name three nested confusions: the word–thing confusion (the word “magnitude” taken for the real quantity), the quantity–number confusion (the real quantity taken for its numerical value), and their product, the numerization confusion, through which the real disappears from both sides at once. We show that these confusions symmetrically vitiate both classical determinism and Gisin’s informational indeterminism, and sketch the consequences for the determinism/indeterminism debate.
Abstract It is usual to identify initial conditions of classical dynamical systems with mathematical real numbers. However, almost all real numbers contain an infinite amount of information. I argue that a finite volume of space can’t contain more than a finite amount of information, hence that the mathematical real numbers are not physically relevant. Moreover, a better terminology for the so-called real numbers is “random numbers”, as their series of bits are truly random. I propose an alternative classical mechanics, which is empirically equivalent to classical mechanics, but uses only finite-information numbers. This alternative classical mechanics is non-deterministic, despite the use of deterministic equations, in a way similar to quantum theory. Interestingly, both alternative classical mechanics and quantum theories can be supplemented by additional variables in such a way that the supplemented theory is deterministic. Most physicists straightforwardly supplement classical theory with real numbers to which they attribute physical existence, while most physicists reject Bohmian mechanics as supplemented quantum theory, arguing that Bohmian positions have no physical reality.
Abstract Del Santo and Gisin have recently argued that classical mechanics exhibits indeterminacy and that by treating the observables of classical mechanics with real number precision we introduce hidden variables that restore determinacy. In this article we introduce the conceptual machinery required to critically evaluate these claims. We present a characterization of indeterminacy which can capture both quantum indeterminacy and the classical indeterminacy Del Santo and Gisin propose. This allows us to show that there is an important difference between the two: their classical indeterminacy can be resolved with hidden variables in a manner which is not possible for quantum indeterminacy.
Classical physics is generally regarded as deterministic, as opposed to quantum mechanics that is considered the first theory to have introduced genuine indeterminism into physics. We challenge this view by arguing that the alleged determinism of classical physics relies on the tacit, metaphysical assumption that there exists an actual value of every physical quantity, with its infinite predetermined digits (which we name principle of infinite precision). Building on recent information-theoretic arguments showing that the principle of infinite precision (which translates into the attribution of a physical meaning to mathematical real numbers) leads to unphysical consequences, we consider possible alternative indeterministic interpretations of classical physics. We also link those to well-known interpretations of quantum mechanics. In particular, we propose a model of classical indeterminism based on finite information quantities (FIQs). Moreover, we discuss the perspectives that an indeterministic physics could open (such as strong emergence), as well as some potential problematic issues. Finally, we make evident that any indeterministic interpretation of physics would have to deal with the problem of explaining how the indeterminate values become determinate, a problem known in the context of quantum mechanics as (part of) the ``quantum measurement problem.'' We discuss some similarities between the classical and the quantum measurement problems, and propose ideas for possible solutions (e.g., ``collapse models'' and ``top-down causation'').
Every quantum physical system can be considered the ''shadow'' of a special kind of classical system. The system proposed here is classical mainly because each observable function has a well precise value on each state of the system: an hypothetical observer able to prepare the system exactly in an assigned state and able to build a measuring apparatus perfectly corresponding to a required observable gets always the same real value. The same system considered instead by an unexpert observer, affected by the ignorance of a hidden variable, is described by a statistical theory giving exactly and without exception the states, the observables, the dynamics and the probabilities prescribed for the usual quantum system.