The Service-Based Architecture (SBA) of the fifth generation (5G) of cellular networks introduced great advancements in flexibility, efficiency, and performance of modern networks, thanks to the distribution and softwarization of core network entities called Network Functions (NFs). Due to the distributed nature of 5G systems, these NFs are usually located in different sites to provide better Quality of Service (QoS) or specific services, which poses a great challenge regarding security. However, even though the 3GPP standard identifies security requirements by leveraging Transport Layer Security (TLS) authentication and OAuth2.0 authorization, current experimental and commercial deployments often disregard these aspects for the sake of simplicity and performance. In fact, even though data and communication protection is crucial, the implementation of security protocols and mechanisms complicates the deployments and may reduce the efficiency of 5G systems. This paper presents a novel solution that implements TLS for authentication and encryption leveraging entanglement-based Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), ensuring that all the communications between NFs in the 5G core network are secured by QKD keys, and are therefore quantum-safe. Additionally, this paper presents a QKD key repository using the Network Repository Function (NRF), which stores and relays TLS session keys to authenticated consumer NFs to access producer NFs in a fast but quantum-safe process. The solution was validated in a real hardware environment, and obtained results demonstrate that the proposed solution enhances the security of the SBA communications in an efficient way, reducing an 85% the service request time compared to the traditional TLS-based procedure, as well as 29.96% fewer bytes transmitted throughout the process.
The Service-Based Architecture (SBA) of the fifth generation (5G) of cellular networks introduced great advancements in flexibility, efficiency, and performance of modern networks, thanks to the distribution and softwarization of core network entities called Network Functions (NFs). Due to the distributed nature of 5G systems, these NFs are usually located in different sites to provide better Quality of Service (QoS) or specific services, which poses a great challenge regarding security. However, even though the 3GPP standard identifies security requirements by leveraging Transport Layer Security (TLS) authentication and OAuth2.0 authorization, current experimental and commercial deployments often disregard these aspects for the sake of simplicity and performance. In fact, even though data and communication protection is crucial, the implementation of security protocols and mechanisms complicates the deployments and may reduce the efficiency of 5G systems. This paper presents a novel solution that implements TLS for authentication and encryption leveraging entanglement-based Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), ensuring that all the communications between NFs in the 5G core network are secured by QKD keys, and are therefore quantum-safe. Additionally, this paper presents a QKD key repository using the Network Repository Function (NRF), which stores and relays TLS session keys to authenticated consumer NFs to access producer NFs in a fast but quantum-safe process. The solution was validated in a real hardware environment, and obtained results demonstrate that the proposed solution enhances the security of the SBA communications in an efficient way, reducing an 85% the service request time compared to the traditional TLS-based procedure, as well as 29.96% fewer bytes transmitted throughout the process.
The advent of quantum computing will pose great challenges to the current communication systems, requiring essential changes in the establishment of security associations in traditional architectures. In this context, the multi-technological and heterogeneous nature of 5G networks makes it a challenging scenario for the introduction of quantum communications. Specifically, 5G networks support the unification of non-3GPP access technologies (i.e. Wi-Fi), which are secured through the IPsec protocol suite and the Non-3GPP Interworking Function (N3IWF) entity. These mechanisms leverage traditional public key cryptography and Diffie-Hellman key exchange mechanisms, which should be updated to quantum-safe standards. Therefore, in this paper we present the design and development of a Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) based non-3GPP access mechanism for 5G networks, integrating QKD keys with IPsec tunnel establishment. Besides, we also demonstrate the feasibility of the system by experimental validation in a testbed with commercial QKD equipment and an open-source 5G core implementation. Results show that the time required to complete the authentication and IPsec security association establishment is 4.62% faster than traditional cryptography PSK-based systems and 5.17% faster than the certificate-based system, while ensuring Information-Theoretic Security (ITS) of the QKD systems.
With the advent of quantum computing, the traditional security mechanisms employed in 5G communications might become vulnerable. Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) stands as a promising approach to secure communications and build 5G networks for ensuring long-term security and safeguarding against emerging quantum threats. In our previous work, a system to integrate QKD in multi-site 5G core networks to secure inter-Network Function (NF) communications was proposed and validated. This paper extends that approach by exploring additional segments of 5G networks prone to quantum vulnerabilities, particularly in the segment between the Radio Access Network (RAN) and the 5G core for both 3GPP and Non-3GPP access. This paper describes the proposed quantum-safe 5G network architecture and discusses the benefits and challenges of deploying QKD-enabled security in these segments.
The fifth-generation (5G) core network adopts a Service-Based Architecture (SBA), in which Network Functions (NFs) communicate over Service-Based Interfaces (SBIs) using HTTP/2 secured with TLS 1.3. Current deployments rely on classical cryptography, which is vulnerable to quantum attacks, particularly under the Harvest-Now, Decrypt-Later (HNDL) threat model. To address this, we propose Quantum-Safe Service-Based Architecture (Q-SBA), a hybrid post-quantum TLS framework that secures SBI communication by integrating Module Lattice-based Key Encapsulation Mechanism (ML-KEM-768) and Module Lattice-based Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA-65) with classical primitives within a TLS 1.3 handshake with mutual authentication. The framework is implemented on a containerized OpenAirInterface (OAI) 5G core and evaluated across N11, N12, N8, and N10 interfaces. Results show that hybrid PQC introduces a controlled performance trade-off: handshake latency reaches 14–15 ms (≈2× classical TLS), while throughput sustains 273–289 connections per second, both within 5G control-plane requirements. Packet-level analysis confirms successful negotiation of hybrid cryptographic groups across all interfaces, demonstrating that quantum-resilient security can be integrated into 5G core networks without affecting protocol correctness or interoperability.
The fifth generation of mobile networks (5G) is among the critical infrastructures whose security and privacy requirements are paramount. Compared to previous generations, 5G leverages a service-based architecture where many Network Functions (NF), i.e., the set of microservices on which is based the architecture, need secure communication means. NFs can communicate using HTTP2, and despite not being required by the standard, they can use Transport Layer Protocol (TLS) to ensure data integrity and authentication across the network. However, with the expected arrival of quantum computers in the near future, traditional cryptographic algorithms are under significant threat. With the recent run for post-quantum standardization, the NIST selected possible candidate algorithms. However, no study evaluates whether such algorithms would be applicable in the 5G core without significant performance degradation. In this paper, we perform the first assessment of the feasibility of using post-quantum secure Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) for the 5G core network. To this aim, we implemented and compared the performances of five algorithms among those selected during the NIST standardization process. We adapted those algorithms to implement them in a standalone 5G core implemented via Open5GS, and tested their performance when performing user registration. Our results show that the KY-BER768 achieves comparable performance to TLS in terms of UE registration time and CPU utilization, thus being a candidate solution to improve the security posture of the 5G core.
The evolving 5G architecture, moving from proprietary monolithic hardware towards the disaggregated and modular Open Radio Access Network (Open RAN), introduces new, critical interfaces requiring robust security. While IPSec is a prevalent solution for securing IP communications, the advent of quantum computing threatens its traditional cryptographic underpinnings; it may be deprecated in the near future. To address this, we propose a quantum-safe Open RAN framework for securing fronthaul (i.e., Radio Unit-Distributed Unit) and backhaul (i.e., Centralized Unit-5G core) interfaces. Our framework employs a hybrid key exchange scheme, combining post-quantum cryptography (PQC) with quantum keys as cryptographic material, designed for seamless integration with TLS, IKEv2/IPSec, and MACSec standards, and compatible with ETSI QKD 004 and 014 APIs. Furthermore, we present a novel key distribution protocol for Quantum Key Distribution Networks (QKDN). This protocol incorporates encapsulation techniques inspired by onion routing, combined with PQC, to ensure confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, and anonymity. It also leverages post-quantum public key encryption to protect shared secrets from intermediate nodes within the QKDN, mitigating intermediary attacks. We have deployed a proof-of-concept of our proposal, experimentally validating both air-based and fiber-based QKD, primarily using ML-KEM and ML-DSA standards for PQC algorithms.
Fifth Generation (5G) cellular networks have been adopted worldwide since the rollout began around 2019. It brought with it many innovations and new services, such as Enhanced Mobile Broadband (eMBB), Ultra Reliable and Low-Latency Communications (URLLC), and Massive Internet of Things (mIoT). Furthermore, 5G introduced a more scalable approach to network operations using fully software-based Virtualized Network Functions (VNF) in Core Networks (CN) rather than the prior hardware-based approach. However, while this shift towards a fully software-based system design provides numerous significant benefits, such as increased interoperability, scalability, and cost-effectiveness, it also brings with it an increased cybersecurity risk. Security is crucial to maintaining trust between vendors, operators, and consumers. Cyberattacks are rapidly increasing in number and sophistication, and we are seeing a shift towards zero-trust approaches. This means that even communications between VNFs inside a 5G core must be scrutinized and hardened against attacks, especially with the advent of quantum computers. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), over the past 10 years, has led efforts to standardize post-quantum cryptography (PQC) to protect against quantum attacks. This paper covers a custom implementation of the open-source free5GC CN, to expand its HTTPS capabilities for VNFs by introducing PQC Key Encapsulation Methods (KEM) for Transport Layer Security (TLS) v1.3. This paper provides the details of this integration with a focus on the latency of different PQC KEMs in initial handshakes between VNFs, on packet size, and the implications in a 5G environment. This work also conducts a security comparison between the PQC-equipped free5GC and other open-source 5G CNs. The presented results indicate a negligible increase in UE connection setup duration and a small increase in connection setup data requirements, strongly indicating that PQC KEM’s benefits far outweigh any downsides when integrated into 5G and 6G core services. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work incorporating PQC into an open-source 5G core. Furthermore, the results from this effort demonstrate that employing PQC ciphers for securing VNF communications results in only a negligible impact on latency and bandwidth usage, thus demonstrating significant benefits to 5G cybersecurity.