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Bilecik Şeyh Edebali Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi

Some Remarks on Hume, Reichenbach, and Einstein’s views on Temporal and Causal Priority in Causation with Objections from Quantum Realm

Özge Dural Özer

Published Sep 4, 2023• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Stunning new observations and theories deepen the concept of causation. Quantum theory is one of the most striking discovery of contemporary physics, and it challenges many facets of older theories, even though it lies on many assumptions that could not be empirically experimented. In this paper, I will recall the views of Hume, Reichenbach and Einstein about the issue of causation, whereas I will focus on causal priority and temporal priority criteria in causation. Nevertheless, one task that I perform is the interpretation of these ideas by arguing them within the quantum scope. That is, trying to manifest Hume, Reichenbach and Einstein views of causation that I think as close, but I shall avoid putting straight cuts on where they differ. Direction of causal processes is dependent on the direction of time in Hume’s sense while Reichenbach explained the direction of time with irreversible processes, even if he follows the temporal priority criteria of Hume. It is stated that there is nothing faster than light by Einstein, as a result, a cause could not pass the upper limit of light. Crudely put, their thoughts all differ from the principles of quantum, because causation (causation might denote a different meaning in quantum realm) may be able to travel faster than light and the common cause principle between events is rejected in quantum realm.

DOI
10.33905/bseusbed.1259213

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Stunning new observations and theories deepen the concept of causation. Quantum theory is one of the most striking discovery of contemporary physics, and it challenges many facets of older theories, even though it lies on many assumptions that could not be empirically experimented. In this paper, I will recall the views of Hume, Reichenbach and Einstein about the issue of causation, whereas I will focus on causal priority and temporal priority criteria in causation. Nevertheless, one task that I perform is the interpretation of these ideas by arguing them within the quantum scope. That is, trying to manifest Hume, Reichenbach and Einstein views of causation that I think as close, but I shall avoid putting straight cuts on where they differ. Direction of causal processes is dependent on the direction of time in Hume’s sense while Reichenbach explained the direction of time with irreversible processes, even if he follows the temporal priority criteria of Hume. It is stated that there is nothing faster than light by Einstein, as a result, a cause could not pass the upper limit of light. Crudely put, their thoughts all differ from the principles of quantum, because causation (causation might denote a different meaning in quantum realm) may be able to travel faster than light and the common cause principle between events is rejected in quantum realm.
I have claimed that it is profitable to distinguish three key questions about causation. The first question, what are causal processes and interactions? , was addressed in Chapter 5. The second question, what is the connection between causes and effects? , was addressed in Chapter 7.The third question, what makes a cause different from an effect? , has not been addressed, and it is to that task that we turn in the present chapter. The question of the directionality and asymmetry of causation has long been an important ingredient in philosophical discussions of causation, although perhaps Reichenbach (1991) was the first to truly appreciate the significance of the question. It is certainly an aspect of folk intuitions. Many philosophers have held that an adequate analysis of causality should provide an explanation or account of causal asymmetry. On the other hand, it is precisely this aspect of causation that is the most common target for elimination from empirical accounts. This chapter looks at the ability of 'process' theories of causality to provide such an account, granting certain constraints. The major constraint, or premise, in the following analysis is the assumption that quantum mechanics reveals the presence of backwards-in-time causation. Thus, in the first instance, the argument presented here will not convince those who hold that there can be no backwards causation. However, I derive an empirical prediction, which, if confirmed, would give those sceptical about backwards causation reason to think again. The chapter begins with an analysis of some of the formal properties of causation. This is followed by a nontechnical presentation of the famous difficulties associated with Bell phenomena in quantum mechanics, and the backwards-in-time solution to those difficulties.
Abstract There is widespread agreement that quantum mechanics has something radical to teach us about causation. But opinions differ on what this is. Physicists have often taken the central lesson to be that many physical events occur spontaneously, so that a principle of causality is violated whenever an atom emits light, or a uranium nucleus decays, even though nothing that happened beforehand made this inevitable. Feynman urged philosophers to acknowledge that this implication of quantum mechanics undermines the view that causal determinism forms a precondition of scientific inquiry. But while some physicists have denied the implication, most philosophers since Reichenbach have accepted it with alacrity, and sought to develop accounts of causation equally applicable in an indeterministic or a deterministic world.
This Ph.D. thesis is about causality in Quantum Mechanics, namely about the possibility to provide a causal explanation for quantum Einstein – Podolsky – Rosen (EPR) correlations.The well-known interpretation of the Bell’s Theorem by Bastian Van Fraassen, who inferred that quantum correlations cannot be embedded in any causal model, compels us to suppose that microscopic nature cannot have a causal structure and that causality is an anthropological concept.However, this interpretation is not commonly accepted and this doctoral thesis is the first general overview of some recent works about causal explanation for EPR correlations. Particularly, it analyses the possible causal explanations for the EPR/Bohm experiments by means of the Hans Reichenbach’s model, by means of backward causation models, and by means of models that imply a direct causal link. In order to do it, it pays particular attention to the Relativistic space-time features and it considers the studies in the History of Philosophy about the link between causal arrow and temporal arrow. Moreover, this work aims to endorse the idea that the best way to explain EPR/Bohm correlations causally is to adopt an indeterministic non-Reichenbachian common cause model, particularly Cartwright’sgeneral forksmodel.My conclusion is that causal models for quantum correlations remain viable, and that there is no contrast between genuinely indeterministic interpretation of Quantum Theory and causal explanation, with the philosophical implication that the Causal Realism is still acceptable.
Reichenbach's Common Cause Principle is the claim that if two events are correlated, then either there is a causal connection between the correlated events that is responsible for the correlation or there is a third event, a so called (Reichenbachian) common cause, which brings about the correlation. The paper reviews some results concerning Reichenbach's notion of common cause, results that are directly relevant to the problem of how one can falsifY Reichenbach's Common Cause Principle. Special emphasis will be put on the question of whether EPR-type correlations can have an explanation in terms of Reichenbachian common causes. Most of the results to be recalled indicate that falsifYing Reichenbach's Common Cause Principle is much more tricky than one may have thought and that, contrary to some claims in the literature, there is no conclusive proof yet that the EPR correlations predicted by ordinary, non-relativistic quantum mechanics cannot have a common cause; furthermore, recent results about possible Reichenbachian common causes of correlations predicted by quantum field states between spacelike separated local observable algebras in algebraic quantum field theory strongly indicate that there may very well exist Reichenbachian common causes of superluminal correlations predicted by quantum field theory.
In this chapter we introduce the postulate of causality, and derive the mathematical structure of a causal OPT. We show how the present definition of causality is equivalent to the Einsteinian one, and argue that it is the only possible notion once it is stripped from its spurious deterministic connotation. In addition, the notion of causality used here is compliant with the historical philosophical concept since David Hume, and with the idea used in common reasoning, inference, and modeling in human sciences. In brief, the present notion of causality can be stated as the requirement of no signaling from the future . This is also the only requisite for an OPT in order to satisfy the principle of no signaling without interaction . In mathematical terms in an OPT the causality postulate is equivalent to the uniqueness of the deterministic effect, which in turn is equivalent to the ability to normalize states. The notion of causality is so naturally embedded in our understanding of reality that it often remains unconsciously implicit in foundational research, even in recent axiomatizations. Causality: From Cinderella to Principle Causality has been the object of a very extensive literature encompassing hundreds of books and technical articles in a wide spectrum of disciplines, ranging from pure philosophy to economics, law, natural sciences, and obviously, physics. Also due to its involvement in such heterogeneous blend of disciplines, causality has long been a vexed notion. Perhaps the most natural connection between concepts of causality in different branches of knowledge is the one at the borderline between physics and philosophy, since the early work of Aristotle, up to the cornerstone of Renée Descartes, who broke the ground for the modern view of David Hume and Immanuel Kant, through to contemporary works on physical causation. Causality has always remained in the realm of philosophy, staying only in the background of physics, without the status of a “law” or the rank of a “principle.” Most of the time causality creeps into physical theories in the form of ad hoc assumptions based on empirical evidences, as when we discard advanced potentials in electrodynamics or when we motivate the Kramers–Kronig relations. In other cases, causality is embodied in the “interpretation” of the theory, as for the Special Relativity of Einstein.
Quantum theory describes our universe incredibly successfully. To our classically-inclined brains, however, it is a bizarre description that requires a reimagining of what fundamental reality, or “ontology”, could look like. This thesis examines different ontological features in light of the success of quantum theory, what it requires, and what it rules out. While these investigations are primarily foundational, they also have relevance to quantum information, quantum communication, and experiments on quantum systems. The way that quantum theory describes the state of a system is one of its most unintuitive features. It is natural, therefore, to ask whether a similarly strange description of states is required on an ontological level. This thesis proves that almost all quantum superposition states for d > 3 dimensions must be real—that is, present in the ontology in a well-defined sense. This is a strong requirement which prevents intuitive explanations of the many quantum phenomena which are based on superpositions. A new theorem is also presented showing that quantum theory is incompatible with macro-realist ontologies, where certain physical quantities must always have definite values. This improves on the Leggett-Garg argument, which also aims to prove incompatibility with macro-realism but contains loopholes. Variations on both of these results that are error-tolerant (and therefore amenable to experimentation) are presented, as well as numerous related theorems showing that the ontology of quantum states must be somewhat similar to the quantum states themselves in various specific ways. Extending these same methods to quantum communication, a simple proof is found showing that an exponential number of classical bits are required to communicate a linear number of qubits. That is, classical systems are exponentially bad at storing quantum data. Causal influences are another part of ontology where quantum theory demands a revision of our classical notions. This follows from the outcomes of Bell experiments, as rigorously shown in recent analyses. Here, the task of constructing a native quantum framework for reasoning about causal influences is tackled. This is done by first analysing the simple example of a common cause, from which a quantum version of Reichenbach’s principle is identified. This quantum principle relies on an identification of quantum conditional independence which can be defined in four ways, each naturally generalising a corresponding definition for classical conditional independence. Not only does this allow one to reason about common causes in a quantum experiments, but it can also be generalised to a full framework of quantum causal models (mirroring how classical causal models generalise Reichenbach’s principle). This new definition of quantum causal models is illustrated by examples and strengthened by it’s foundation on a robust quantum Reichenbach’s principle. An unusual, but surprisingly fruitful, setting for considering quantum ontology is found by considering time travel to the past. This provides a testbed for different ontological concepts in quantum theory and new ways to compare classical and quantum frameworks. It is especially useful for comparing computational properties. In particular, time travel introduces non-linearity to quantum theory, which brings (sometimes implicit) ontological assumptions to the fore while introducing strange new abilities. Here, a model for quantum time travel is presented which arguably has fewer objectionable features than previous attempts, while remaining similarly well-motivated. This model is discussed and compared with previous quantum models, as well as with the classical case. Together, these threads of investigation develop a better understanding of how quantum theory affects possible ontologies and how ontological prejudices influence quantum theory.