I have claimed that it is profitable to distinguish three key questions about causation. The first question, what are causal processes and interactions? , was addressed in Chapter 5. The second question, what is the connection between causes and effects? , was addressed in Chapter 7.The third question, what makes a cause different from an effect? , has not been addressed, and it is to that task that we turn in the present chapter. The question of the directionality and asymmetry of causation has long been an important ingredient in philosophical discussions of causation, although perhaps Reichenbach (1991) was the first to truly appreciate the significance of the question. It is certainly an aspect of folk intuitions. Many philosophers have held that an adequate analysis of causality should provide an explanation or account of causal asymmetry. On the other hand, it is precisely this aspect of causation that is the most common target for elimination from empirical accounts. This chapter looks at the ability of 'process' theories of causality to provide such an account, granting certain constraints. The major constraint, or premise, in the following analysis is the assumption that quantum mechanics reveals the presence of backwards-in-time causation. Thus, in the first instance, the argument presented here will not convince those who hold that there can be no backwards causation. However, I derive an empirical prediction, which, if confirmed, would give those sceptical about backwards causation reason to think again. The chapter begins with an analysis of some of the formal properties of causation. This is followed by a nontechnical presentation of the famous difficulties associated with Bell phenomena in quantum mechanics, and the backwards-in-time solution to those difficulties.
I have claimed that it is profitable to distinguish three key questions about causation. The first question, what are causal processes and interactions? , was addressed in Chapter 5. The second question, what is the connection between causes and effects? , was addressed in Chapter 7.The third question, what makes a cause different from an effect? , has not been addressed, and it is to that task that we turn in the present chapter. The question of the directionality and asymmetry of causation has long been an important ingredient in philosophical discussions of causation, although perhaps Reichenbach (1991) was the first to truly appreciate the significance of the question. It is certainly an aspect of folk intuitions. Many philosophers have held that an adequate analysis of causality should provide an explanation or account of causal asymmetry. On the other hand, it is precisely this aspect of causation that is the most common target for elimination from empirical accounts. This chapter looks at the ability of 'process' theories of causality to provide such an account, granting certain constraints. The major constraint, or premise, in the following analysis is the assumption that quantum mechanics reveals the presence of backwards-in-time causation. Thus, in the first instance, the argument presented here will not convince those who hold that there can be no backwards causation. However, I derive an empirical prediction, which, if confirmed, would give those sceptical about backwards causation reason to think again. The chapter begins with an analysis of some of the formal properties of causation. This is followed by a nontechnical presentation of the famous difficulties associated with Bell phenomena in quantum mechanics, and the backwards-in-time solution to those difficulties.
It has been claimed that quantum mechanics is a non-local theory, i.e., that the predictions of quantum mechanics are at odds with a conception of the world where all the interactions are mediated by local mechanisms. The cited reason is the violation of the Bell inequality in cases where measurements are performed on quantum systems of particles that have interacted in the past. Quantum mechanics predicts that the state of the particles in such a system are correlated, a result obtained from considering a thought-experiment often known as EPR. In this thesis, I will argue that the violation of the Bell inequality in EPR forces us to either accept that causes sometimes act both backwards and forwards in time, or give up some widely-held assumptions about causal relations or the role of causal explanations. First, I will present three principles regarding causality that I take be widely accepted. I will then present the background for the claim the quantum mechanics is a non-local theory, and discuss the implications of non-local causal influences in light of the Special Theory of Relativity. One argument against a causal explanation of the EPR-correlations will be discussed, and different models for the causal structure of EPR will be assessed. I will argue that a retrocausal model – models that include instances of retrocausation, where the direction of causation is the opposite of the direction of time – is the only viable option if we want to uphold the three principles presented in chapter 1. I will discuss the plausibility of rejecting one of these principles, and argue that at least one of the can be restricted in a way that still accounts for our commitment to it. Finally, I will assess the non-local models against the retrocausal models, and argue that a retrocausal model offers interpretational advantages over the non-local alternatives.
In this chapter we introduce the postulate of causality, and derive the mathematical structure of a causal OPT. We show how the present definition of causality is equivalent to the Einsteinian one, and argue that it is the only possible notion once it is stripped from its spurious deterministic connotation. In addition, the notion of causality used here is compliant with the historical philosophical concept since David Hume, and with the idea used in common reasoning, inference, and modeling in human sciences. In brief, the present notion of causality can be stated as the requirement of no signaling from the future . This is also the only requisite for an OPT in order to satisfy the principle of no signaling without interaction . In mathematical terms in an OPT the causality postulate is equivalent to the uniqueness of the deterministic effect, which in turn is equivalent to the ability to normalize states. The notion of causality is so naturally embedded in our understanding of reality that it often remains unconsciously implicit in foundational research, even in recent axiomatizations. Causality: From Cinderella to Principle Causality has been the object of a very extensive literature encompassing hundreds of books and technical articles in a wide spectrum of disciplines, ranging from pure philosophy to economics, law, natural sciences, and obviously, physics. Also due to its involvement in such heterogeneous blend of disciplines, causality has long been a vexed notion. Perhaps the most natural connection between concepts of causality in different branches of knowledge is the one at the borderline between physics and philosophy, since the early work of Aristotle, up to the cornerstone of Renée Descartes, who broke the ground for the modern view of David Hume and Immanuel Kant, through to contemporary works on physical causation. Causality has always remained in the realm of philosophy, staying only in the background of physics, without the status of a “law” or the rank of a “principle.” Most of the time causality creeps into physical theories in the form of ad hoc assumptions based on empirical evidences, as when we discard advanced potentials in electrodynamics or when we motivate the Kramers–Kronig relations. In other cases, causality is embodied in the “interpretation” of the theory, as for the Special Relativity of Einstein.
In a recent number of Blackfriars (July, 1949) Dr A. W. Gledhill has discussed very competently some aspects of the statistical method as used in modern physics. He has tried to show there ‘that modern physical theory does not contradict the principle of causality’. Having made a study of this subject over quite a number of years, the writer, while agreeing with some of Dr Gledhill’s conclusions, feels nevertheless that there are a few points which have not been covered as adequately as the importance of the subject for modern philosophy seems to warrant. In order to understand the controversy about the validity or non-validity of the principle of causality, which has been initiated by Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, it is necessary to realise, first of all, that when a physicist speaks about causality, he usually does not mean the same thing as a scholastic philosopher. In scholastic philosophy one distinguishes different kinds of causes, such as the material, the efficient, the final, as well as the formal and exemplary causes. The classical physicist, on the other hand, since the time of Galileo, admits only efficient causes. Let us therefore give a brief sketch of the development of this concept of scientific causality and show the reasons for this limitation. The purpose of a scientific theory is the prediction of events among the natural objects which form the field of enquiry of the particular science concerned. Evidently, the more certain the prediction, the better the theory on which it is based.
As the previous chapter made clear, in the present interpretation quantum mechanics gives a rather specific account of EPR-type correlations and what underlies them. In the present chapter I argue that this account is genuinely explanatory (rather than merely an idle overlay on a simple description of the observed correlations), and that this constitutes a significant advantage of the present interpretation over certain rival interpretations, on which quantum mechanics is unable to offer an adequate explanation of the observed correlations. In order to make this argument it will prove necessary to examine the character of causal explanation in theoretical science, and in particular to develop a coherent metaphysics of a kind of holistic, nonseparable, causal explanation. I take the development of such a coherent metaphysics to constitute a significant task independent of the details of the present interpretation of quantum mechanics. Quantum mechanics is a mine of metaphysical insights, and I hope here at least to have exposed a rich seam. The first task is to defend the adequacy of the present account of EPR-type correlations as at least a coherent description of what may underlie the observed correlations. I foresee three main challenges to its descriptive adequacy. The first is to claim that the account is incompatible with the relativistic requirement that there can be no direct causal connection between spacelike-separated events, and must therefore be rejected. A weaker version of this challenge is to claim that although the incompatibility just mentioned may not by itself entail rejection of the account, it does seriously undermine its claim to be genuinely explanatory.
In this dissertation, I will argue that quantum field theory can be interpreted as a description of causal interactions. I will first discuss previous theories of physical causation, and come to the conclusion that they are inapplicable in quantum field theory. As a consequence, I will start to develop a new theory of causation by first analysing the concept ‘causation’ into the most basic and widely shared intuitions, in order to find out later whether these intuitions can be reduced to physics. I will then have a closer look on the intuition that causation is a directed relation, which is commonly regarded as incompatible with the symmetries of physics. I will present a new argument to the effect that causation and quantum field theory are compatible with respect to the directionality of causation. After that, I will analyse the theoretical description of interactions in quantum field theory, and in particular group structure, locality and local conservation laws will crystallise as the central concepts that a causal interpretation might be based on. Subsequently, I will discuss and present replies to what I believe are the most relevant objections to a causal interpretation of physics, namely, Haag’s theorem, the measurement problem and entanglement. In the final chapter of this dissertation, I will conjoin the results of the previous chapters to a new theory of causation for quantum field theory. The main result will be that a causal process is a quantum field theoretical interaction, i.e., the exchange of energy from an initial to a final state via a force.
TWO INTERPRETATIONS OF SPATIO-TEMPORAL COUNTERFACTUALSne general (and straightforward) observation which can be made based on chapters 3 and 4 is that there is more than one way to employ Lewis's semantic framework for counterfactual conditionals in the analysis of quantum entangled states.The main reason is that, as we indicated at the end of chapter 2, there may be various ways to define the similarity relation between possible worlds, and this relation is indispensable for the evaluation of counterfactual statements.To characterize the relation of similarity it is necessary to decide which facts from the actual world are salient with respect to the affinity of possible worlds with it, and which are not.We have already reiterated (and this assessment is unanimously, if mostly tacitly, accepted by all who make use of Lewis's semantics in quantum mechanics) that in the context of the quantummechanical phenomena there is no room for law-breaking possible worlds; therefore Lewis's requirement that the number of unlawful events ("miracles") be minimized cannot act as a criterion of similarity between possible worlds.Only singular, individual and contingent facts can set one possible world apart from another, and only such facts can be taken into account when comparing possible worlds with respect to their affinity with the actual world.But it has already been argued that not all facts taking place in the actual world should count towards similarity.It is imperative, then, to make clear how to tell apart those facts that count from those that do not. "ASYMMETRY BY FIAT" SOLUTION REVIVEDIt seems evident that two dominant intuitions regarding the evaluation of quantum counterfactuals have emerged from the extensive discussion in the two previous chapters.However, it will be much more convenient to describe them in terms of extensions to one of Lewis's alternative approaches to counterfactuals rather than in terms of the similarity relation.As we recall (sec.2.3.3),Lewis indicates that the problem with the temporal asymmetry of counterfactuals can find its solution not only within his O 1 It should be stressed, however, that some authors question the assumed asymmetry of counterfactual dependence.For example H. Price, who defends the idea of backward causation, argues that when evaluating counterfactuals we should hold fixed not the past of the antecedent-event, but rather what is epistemologically accessible to us (see Price 1996, pp.169-170, 178-179).2 It is a matter of choice whether to include or exclude the surface of the light cones in the respective "pasts" of e.We will follow the convention according to which, in the first case, the surface of the forward light cone is excluded from the past, but in the second case the surface of the backward light cone is included in it.