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Oxford University Press eBooks

Causation in Quantum Mechanics

Richard Healey

Published Jan 2, 2010• 15 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Abstract There is widespread agreement that quantum mechanics has something radical to teach us about causation. But opinions differ on what this is. Physicists have often taken the central lesson to be that many physical events occur spontaneously, so that a principle of causality is violated whenever an atom emits light, or a uranium nucleus decays, even though nothing that happened beforehand made this inevitable. Feynman urged philosophers to acknowledge that this implication of quantum mechanics undermines the view that causal determinism forms a precondition of scientific inquiry. But while some physicists have denied the implication, most philosophers since Reichenbach have accepted it with alacrity, and sought to develop accounts of causation equally applicable in an indeterministic or a deterministic world.

DOI
10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199279739.003.0034

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Cambridge University Press eBooks•Jul 3, 2000•0 citations
Abstract There is widespread agreement that quantum mechanics has something radical to teach us about causation. But opinions differ on what this is. Physicists have often taken the central lesson to be that many physical events occur spontaneously, so that a principle of causality is violated whenever an atom emits light, or a uranium nucleus decays, even though nothing that happened beforehand made this inevitable. Feynman urged philosophers to acknowledge that this implication of quantum mechanics undermines the view that causal determinism forms a precondition of scientific inquiry. But while some physicists have denied the implication, most philosophers since Reichenbach have accepted it with alacrity, and sought to develop accounts of causation equally applicable in an indeterministic or a deterministic world.
In the 19th century, determinism was often seen as a presupposition of scientific thinking, although its validity was not universally accepted among scientists and philosophers. There were different conceptions of causality, and the concept of cause was often linked to that of force or energy; but toward the end of the 19th century, the causal conception of forces was increasingly criticised and some argued that the concept of cause should be abandoned altogether. After the development of the modern theory of quantum mechanics in 1925, many physicists and philosophers claimed that this theory implied an overthrow of the classical conception of causality; however, only few authors abandoned causality altogether. The debate of the implications of quantum mechanics for causality soon became muddled because of the many different meanings attached to the term “causality”.
This chapter focuses specifically on the notion of causation. Unless a causal interpretation can be given of quantum mechanics, there is a fundamental discontinuity between the quantum realm and everything else in the world. The quantum-theoretical dualism of waves and particles makes the same entity appear both as matter and as force. There are of course challenges to other basic ontological categories that come from quantum physics, such as to notions of continuity and identity. Both in philosophy and physics, there is a frequent assumption that causation is the provider or vehicle of determinism, via causal necessitation. The indeterminism of quantum physics leaves people with a more practical concern about causation. A feature of causation that makes predictions fallible is that causal processes are extremely sensitive to a change in context. The genuine interaction of multiple factors should therefore be seen as a symptom of causation rather than as something that needs to be analysed away by theoretical abstraction.
We still lack any consensus about what one is actually talking about as one uses quantum mechanics. There is a gap between the abstract terms in which the theory is couched and the phenomena the theory enables each of us to account for so well. Because it has no practical consequences for how we each use quantum mechanics to deal with physical problems, this cognitive dissonance has managed to coexist with the quantum theory from the very beginning. The absence of conceptual clarity for almost a century suggests that the problem might lie in some implicit misconceptions about the nature of scientific explanation that are deeply held by virtually all physicists, but are rarely explicitly acknowledged. I describe here such unvoiced but widely shared assumptions. Rejecting them clarifies and unifies a range of obscure remarks about quantum mechanics made almost from the beginning by some of the giants of physics, many of whom are held to be in deep disagreement. This new view of physics requires physicists to think about science in an unfamiliar way. My primary purpose is to explain the new perspective and urge that it be taken seriously. My secondary aims are to explain why this perspective differs significantly from what Bohr, Heisenberg, and Pauli had been saying from the very beginning, and why it is not solipsism, as some have maintained. To emphasize that this is a general view of science, and not just of quantum mechanics, I apply it to a long-standing puzzle in classical physics: the apparent inability of physics to give any meaning to 'Now'-the present moment.
Two mysteries -loosely connected?The Authors who have suggested a deep connection between the solution of the mind-body problem and the understanding of quantum mechanics are too numerous to list.But what exactly would be the alleged structural fit between these two deeply puzzling theoretical issues?Can a genuine philosophical issue -which by its very nature is conceptual in nature -ultimately be resolved by advances in the empirical sciences?The connection is all too often asserted to lie in the subjects confounding natures, but the mere fact that two problems are of equal impenetrability to the human mind does not imply that there is a profound interdependence between the two.There is however an obvious way in which quantum mechanics might have a bearing on the philosophical mind-body problem: if quantum mechanics implies that for some physical events there is no physical cause, then at least the very strong variants of the so-called "principle of causal closure" of the physical realm lose much of their corroborative underpinning in physics as practiced by real physicists as such, and are thus constrained to the speculative physicalism advanced by metaphysicians.However, unless one assumes a strong version of the principle of sufficient reason, which would exclude chance events in principle, even events supposedly not caused by some physical cause are not immediately thereby caused by some nonphysical cause.Moreover the fact is that not all of the interpretations of quantum mechanics imply indeterministic 'choices' of events: neither the many-worlds interpretation nor a Bohmian hidden variable interpretation assume indeterminism.Even in the most obvious theoretical nexus
Quantum mechanics, even in its early and simple phases, has often been regarded as a non-causal discipline. The argument supporting this view cites the uncertainty principle as prohibiting the ascertainment of complete knowledge concerning physical states upon which causal prediction could be based. Recent developments in atomic physics have added new and puzzling features to the problem of causality insofar as they operate, not only with intrinsically unmeasurable states, but also with time reversals which have been interpreted to mean that the effect can be prior to the cause. Feynman's theory of quantum electrodynamics is particularly rich in unorthodox suggestions which tantalise philosophers. The purpose of the present paper is to exhibit them, appraise their methodological function and see in what manner they violate the rules of causal description. This purpose, it seems, is best achieved by a sequential discussion of three questions: What does causality mean in physics? What is the new method of quantum electrodynamics? Is this new method compatible with the causal doctrine in some satisfactory form?
I have claimed that it is profitable to distinguish three key questions about causation. The first question, what are causal processes and interactions? , was addressed in Chapter 5. The second question, what is the connection between causes and effects? , was addressed in Chapter 7.The third question, what makes a cause different from an effect? , has not been addressed, and it is to that task that we turn in the present chapter. The question of the directionality and asymmetry of causation has long been an important ingredient in philosophical discussions of causation, although perhaps Reichenbach (1991) was the first to truly appreciate the significance of the question. It is certainly an aspect of folk intuitions. Many philosophers have held that an adequate analysis of causality should provide an explanation or account of causal asymmetry. On the other hand, it is precisely this aspect of causation that is the most common target for elimination from empirical accounts. This chapter looks at the ability of 'process' theories of causality to provide such an account, granting certain constraints. The major constraint, or premise, in the following analysis is the assumption that quantum mechanics reveals the presence of backwards-in-time causation. Thus, in the first instance, the argument presented here will not convince those who hold that there can be no backwards causation. However, I derive an empirical prediction, which, if confirmed, would give those sceptical about backwards causation reason to think again. The chapter begins with an analysis of some of the formal properties of causation. This is followed by a nontechnical presentation of the famous difficulties associated with Bell phenomena in quantum mechanics, and the backwards-in-time solution to those difficulties.