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WORLD SCIENTIFIC eBooks

How to Test Probability

Published Sep 1, 2023• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Testing is a well-established form of control which is typical of the scientific method and consists of a series of experiments done under exact conditions that also rely on feedback procedures (Figure 12.1). A theory is not necessarily right and Popper (1963) emphasizes the importance of controlling any scientific claim. A truly scientific theory must offer the possibility of being falsified on the logical plane and the experimental plane alike. Predictions must be in agreement with observations and for Popper an empirical outcome opposed to the forecasts is sufficient to confute the entire theoretical construction. He concludes that the essential difference between science and pseudoscience is that the second seeks confirmations and the first seeks experimental falsifications. The need for testing is central for the frequentists, while other schools of thought overlook this need. The present theory openly declares following the phenomenological approach (Section 6.2), therefore empirical data must corroborate or disprove the theoretical parameter P. The definitions and theorems illustrated in the previous pages must find a precise correspondence with facts in accordance with the scientific method.

DOI
10.1142/9789811272752_0012

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•Oct 2, 2026•0 citations
Testing is a well-established form of control which is typical of the scientific method and consists of a series of experiments done under exact conditions that also rely on feedback procedures (Figure 12.1). A theory is not necessarily right and Popper (1963) emphasizes the importance of controlling any scientific claim. A truly scientific theory must offer the possibility of being falsified on the logical plane and the experimental plane alike. Predictions must be in agreement with observations and for Popper an empirical outcome opposed to the forecasts is sufficient to confute the entire theoretical construction. He concludes that the essential difference between science and pseudoscience is that the second seeks confirmations and the first seeks experimental falsifications. The need for testing is central for the frequentists, while other schools of thought overlook this need. The present theory openly declares following the phenomenological approach (Section 6.2), therefore empirical data must corroborate or disprove the theoretical parameter P. The definitions and theorems illustrated in the previous pages must find a precise correspondence with facts in accordance with the scientific method.
Claims that the standard procedure for testing scientific theories is inapplicable to Everettian quantum theory, and hence that the theory is untestable, are due to misconceptions about probability and about the logic of experimental testing. Refuting those claims by correcting those misconceptions leads to an improved theory of scientific methodology (based on Popper׳s) and testing, which allows various simplifications, notably the elimination of everything probabilistic from the methodology (‘Bayesian’ credences) and from fundamental physics (stochastic processes). • Everettian quantum theory is testable. • Stochastic theories suffer from a flaw in the logic of their testability. • Popper׳s methodology is needed to understand the testability of quantum theory.
This chapter demonstrates a similar impasse has again been encountered recently in areas of physics like high-energy physics and cosmology. Carroll is weary of a section of the physics community that deems such theories non-scientific, basing their argument on Popper and falsifiability. Popper is clear about the fact that the demarcation between science and metaphysics that he is seeking is only being done to arrive at a theory of knowledge. Like scientific realism, the constructive empiricism of van Fraasen also accepts a literally account of scientific theories, but only for the observable entities in the theory. Anti-realists refuse to equate the validity of a scientific theory with the existence of the entities it postulates. String theory and, in general, any approach to quantum gravity, can be tested only at energy scales which are so high that they are completely out of the realm of experimental testability.
The history of philosophy teaches us that metaphysical claims of sweeping generality are neither verifiable nor conclusively falsifiable. One can only aim at assessing their plausibility on the basis of the best available evidence provided by the sciences – both formal and empirical sciences. This is what has been done in this book in connection with the Principle of the Common Cause. In Chapter 2, Reichenbach's notion of common cause and the related Common Cause Principle was formulated explicitly in terms of classical, Kolmogorovian probability measure spaces. The Definition 2.4 of common cause followed Reichenbach's original definition closely, and insisting on the quite obvious methodological principle that probabilistic concepts and statements (in particular claims about random events being correlated or probabilistically independent) are only meaningful within the context of a fixed probability measure space in terms of which some segment of reality is modeled, we specified the notions of common cause incomplete and common cause complete probability theories: a theory was defined to be common cause complete if it contains a proper common cause of every correlation it predicts, common cause incomplete otherwise. (There is a strong version of common cause completeness as well: a probability space was defined to be strongly common cause closed if it contains common causes of all admissible types – Definition 4.4.) These explicitly defined notions form the basis on which one can start assessing the status of the Common Cause Principle in the spirit of empirical philosophy. Suppose we have an empirically confirmed scientific theory T describing some segment of reality using (possibly among other mathematical structures) a probability measure space ( X, S, p ).
The aim of this work is, first, to set the basis for a formal model of science, then, it is to show that the laws of physics are its theorems. Necessarily, all theories that are the logical product of science are theorems of our model. As this includes physics, our model is, therefore, its logical foundation. Our model is an axiomatic realization of the participatory universe envisioned by John Archibald Wheeler, in which the observer's practice of science is associated with proving reality. As our model is constructive of the mathematical structure isomorphic to nature, it deprecates Karl Popper's definition of science based on falsifiability. The formal practice of science consists of constructing a message (in the sense of Shannon's theory of information) of experiments (the elements of the message) constrained by the requirement that the elements are verifiable by the statistical priors of the message. In this context, we define the priors as Nature and we qualify the message as scientific. Nature is thus understood as a general proof checker for experiments. We show that the construction of a scientific message bounds nature (the priors) to a cosmology entirely emergent from the entropy of the scientific message. Finally, we conclude that the participatory-universe is emergent from the ideal practice of science.
The experimental procedures of physics assign values to physical quantities; we measure the temperature of a gas, the luminosity of a light source, the momentum of a particle. Any pair, q = (A, Δ), with A an observable quantity, Δ a Borel subset of the reals, we will call an experimental question, though some prefer the term proposition. For example, in lowering my big toe into the bath, I address the experimental question (T,Δ) to the system consisting of my bathwater, where T is the temperature measured in °F, and Δ is (approximately) the interval (110,120). Theory tells us what answers we may expect, given certain initial conditions. A determinist theory like classical mechanics tells us that, under specified conditions, the measurement of a quantity will yield a particular result with certainty, whereas a statistical theory like quantum mechanics tells us what probability attaches to various possible outcomes of a measurement.
Holographic Information Ontological Framework•Revolution (HIOF·Revolution) A Layer-Sensitive Reading of Quantum "Revolution" This is a short, non-technical companion to the 8-paper HIOF·Revolution series. It is written for readers with a background in physics, philosophy of science, or the history of ideas — not for readers already familiar with the author's wider theoretical framework. The core idea, stated plainly The word revolution is often used to describe quantum mechanics as if it rewrote reality itself. This series argues something narrower and, it claims, more defensible: quantum mechanics revolutionised what can be predicted and checked — a cut-plane of testable, referee-confirmed results — without settling deeper questions about what, if anything, is really happening underneath. The claim is not that those deeper questions are unimportant; it is that conflating the two layers is where most popular and even academic confusion about quantum mechanics begins. Why "shut up and calculate" has two very different meanings One version of this phrase is operational discipline: use the formalism to compute checkable predictions, and defer unresolved interpretive questions until the evidence is in. The other version is dismissive closure: treat those same questions as meaningless, not worth asking. This series endorses the first and rejects the second — interpretation is not noise to be silenced, but a separate, legitimate activity that must not be mistaken for physics itself. Why interpretations don't compete like theories do Copenhagen, many-worlds, QBism, and pilot-wave theory all reproduce the same checkable predictions. This series treats interpretation as narrative laid over a closed set of results, not as a second formalism competing on equal empirical footing. A "school" forms around a favoured narrative, but choosing between schools is a different kind of decision than confirming a prediction — and the two should not be scored on the same ledger. Why claims of "unification" need a gate, not just a new cover Merging two frameworks under shared vocabulary feels satisfying, but this series insists that real unification must clear one of two tests: it must generate a falsifiable prediction the separate frameworks could not produce, or it must render a previously viable alternative structurally impossible. Anything short of that is verdict-level harmonisation — easier storytelling, not unification. Why unresolved puzzles don't undo a finished result Superposition's deeper meaning remains genuinely open. But superluminal signalling is a closed, negative result, and classical "total stillness" was excluded decades ago by the uncertainty principle. This series argues that a still-open philosophical corner on one scoreboard does not retroactively cancel a result already confirmed on another. There are, in effect, two championships — one about what can be checked, another about what may be true beneath — and progress on one does not require progress on the other. A live test: the qubit that must not lose its phase The series closes by testing its own framework against an unfinished problem: keeping a quantum bit's phase coherent long enough for fault-tolerant computation. Recent experiments demonstrating error suppression below the fault-tolerance threshold are treated as exactly the kind of cut-plane revolution the series defines — confirmed, checkable, and entirely silent on the deeper questions left open elsewhere. What the full series covers The main papers work through the cut-plane revolution itself, the pedagogical trap of promising a return to classical intuition, the referee-versus-narrator distinction behind competing schools, the two legitimate gates for unification claims, and why a missing philosophical corner does not invalidate the series' title. A glossary locks the five core terms, and a closing paper tests the whole framework against present-day quantum-computing engineering. A note on method The series is explicit about separating three registers: established physics results, original framing proposals, and illustrative metaphor. Readers are encouraged to treat the framing claims as a lens for clearer discussion, testable against how physicists themselves use these words — not as a settled philosophical verdict. Keywords: quantum mechanics, scientific revolution, philosophy of science, interpretation, falsifiability, unification, Bell inequality, quantum error correction, decoherence, epistemologyAuthorWai-Hung Tam (Pan), Independent ResearcherORCID: 0009-0002-7789-8464Email: panxtam@protonmail.com