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Routledge eBooks

Quantum information and reality, especially the reality of the past and future

K. Sridhar

Published Jun 23, 2016• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

This chapter demonstrates a similar impasse has again been encountered recently in areas of physics like high-energy physics and cosmology. Carroll is weary of a section of the physics community that deems such theories non-scientific, basing their argument on Popper and falsifiability. Popper is clear about the fact that the demarcation between science and metaphysics that he is seeking is only being done to arrive at a theory of knowledge. Like scientific realism, the constructive empiricism of van Fraasen also accepts a literally account of scientific theories, but only for the observable entities in the theory. Anti-realists refuse to equate the validity of a scientific theory with the existence of the entities it postulates. String theory and, in general, any approach to quantum gravity, can be tested only at energy scales which are so high that they are completely out of the realm of experimental testability.

DOI
10.4324/9781315543352-9

Related papers

The quantum mystery: reality, knowledge, and the limits of science

Ecaterina Lozovanu

For over nine decades, quantum mechanics has profoundly shaped our understanding of nature, offering explanations for the stability of atoms, the formation of mole cules, the properties of materials, and phenomena such as light or radioactivity. It is essential to modern technologies—from microchips to lasers—and underpins the physics of elementary particles. Yet, despite its successes, it remains a deeply mysterious theory, confronting a central enigma: why does the quantum world behave so differently from everyday reality? Elements such as superposition and quantum entanglement—which allow particles to exist simultaneously in multiple states or remain interconnected regardless of distance—contradict classical world intuitions. This gap between microscopic and macroscopic behavior has given rise to what is known as the “measurement problem,” raising fundamental questions about the nature of reality. Diverging interpretations have led to two major schools of thought: anti-realism, promoted by Niels Bohr, which holds that reality depends on the observer and their interaction with measurement instruments; and realism, supported by Albert Einstein, which argues that quantum mechanics is incomplete and that eality exists independently of observation. Bohr’s complementary philosophy and Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle were central to the formulation of the “Copenhagen interpretation,” which became dominant in the 20th century. However, the persistent opposition of scientists like Einstein and Schrödinger inspired generations of physicists to seek a unification between quantum mechanics and relativity, culminating in new theories such as loop quantum gravity and string theory. Thus, the debate between realism and anti-realism remains alive, and philosophy continues to play a crucial role in exploring the new foundations of physics.

Integrarea europeană a Republicii Moldova: aspecte politico-juridice şi social-economice•Feb 1, 2026•0 citations

Epilogue

Sudip Patra, Menas C. Kafatos

We like to take stock of the matter now, after we have presented different aspects of quantum-like reality proposal. We started by observing that the objective realist picture of the world as proposed by Newtonian-Hamiltonian framework, and much endorsed by scientists and philosophers from different domains of knowledge, could not stand the test of time. Particularly since the 1920s, it got clarified that the same picture of reality would be an obvious failure in the microphysical realm, the quantum-physical realm. Since the 1920s, the world witnessed the rise of the Copenhagen framework, with various interpretations over time. Most of these interpretations (whether ontological, non-ontological or epistemological) were in contrast to the classical physics ontology (either waves or particles with definite trajectories). Such varied interpretations have largely generated two ideological camps, realist and anti-realist. The realist camp (including diverse frameworks like Bohmian pilot wave theory, Everettian multiverse theory, to David Albert-led wave function realism [ Albert, 2023 ]) attempted to provide a new ontology of the world, whereas the non-realist camp (particularly the original Copenhagen camp) wanted to challenge the very attempt of whether at all an objective picture of microphysical reality is even possible to imagine.

Routledge eBooks•May 26, 2026•0 citations

Introduction

Michael Redhead

I am very grateful to the Master and Fellows of Trinity College for inviting me to give the Tarner Lectures. What I want to do in this book, stated boldly and baldly, is to consider the relevance of developments in modern theoretical physics to metaphysical questions about the ultimate nature of reality. By metaphysical questions I mean the very general sorts of questions that arise out of a critical examination of the principles, concepts and fundamental presuppositions that lie behind modern physics. How should we interpret the claims that physicists seem to be making about the world? Are they intended to be understood as literally true, for example, and exactly what are those claims, given that the pages of theoretical physics monographs are largely filled with abstract mathematical formalism? In the first chapter, I shall be looking at a range of philosophical points of view in the framework of which such questions can be addressed, and attempt the difficult task of adjudicating between the different approaches. At the end of the day I shall be arguing for a pretty straightforward metaphysical realism, that the external world exists independently of our knowledge of it. In the second chapter I shall look at arguments from various branches of modern physics that are sometimes claimed to bring in an essential role for subjectivity in physics, bringing the observer into a central role, creating his own reality.

Cambridge University Press eBooks•Aug 17, 1995•0 citations

Scientific Realism and Constructive Empiricism: A Methodology of Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics

Alexander A. Pechenkin

Two conceptions of the contemporary philosophy of science are taken under consideration: scientific realism and constructive empiricism. Scientific realism presupposes 1) the conception of truth as the correspondence of knowledge to reality, 2) the real existence of entities postulated by a theory. The constructive empiricism puts forward the idea of empirical adequacy: science aims to give us the theories which are empirically adequate and acceptance of the theory involves as belief only that it is empirically adequate. To compare methodological resources of these two positions in the philosophy of science the problem of the interpretation of quantum mechanics is involved. As a methodological realization of scientific realism the ensemble interpretation of quantum mechanics is taken under consideration. K.Popper’s version

Epistemology & Philosophy of Science•Jan 1, 2020•0 citations

Quantum theory and reality

Roger Penrose

Abstract In the previous chapter, we have been trying to come to terms with the puzzling Z-mysteries of quantum theory. Although not all of these phenomena have been experimentally tested—such as quantum entanglement over distances of several light years—there is already enough experimental support for effects of this kind to tell us that Z-mysteries are indeed things that we must take seriously as true aspects of the behaviour of the constituents of the world in which we live.

Oxford University Press eBooks•Aug 22, 1996•7 citations

Introduction

Steven French, Juha T. Saatsi

This chapter previews the contributions to this volume and lays out the broader context and motivations for engaging in the scientific realism debate specifically in relation to quantum physics.

Oxford University Press eBooks•Feb 27, 2020•1 citation
This chapter demonstrates a similar impasse has again been encountered recently in areas of physics like high-energy physics and cosmology. Carroll is weary of a section of the physics community that deems such theories non-scientific, basing their argument on Popper and falsifiability. Popper is clear about the fact that the demarcation between science and metaphysics that he is seeking is only being done to arrive at a theory of knowledge. Like scientific realism, the constructive empiricism of van Fraasen also accepts a literally account of scientific theories, but only for the observable entities in the theory. Anti-realists refuse to equate the validity of a scientific theory with the existence of the entities it postulates. String theory and, in general, any approach to quantum gravity, can be tested only at energy scales which are so high that they are completely out of the realm of experimental testability.
For over nine decades, quantum mechanics has profoundly shaped our understanding of nature, offering explanations for the stability of atoms, the formation of mole cules, the properties of materials, and phenomena such as light or radioactivity. It is essential to modern technologies—from microchips to lasers—and underpins the physics of elementary particles. Yet, despite its successes, it remains a deeply mysterious theory, confronting a central enigma: why does the quantum world behave so differently from everyday reality? Elements such as superposition and quantum entanglement—which allow particles to exist simultaneously in multiple states or remain interconnected regardless of distance—contradict classical world intuitions. This gap between microscopic and macroscopic behavior has given rise to what is known as the “measurement problem,” raising fundamental questions about the nature of reality. Diverging interpretations have led to two major schools of thought: anti-realism, promoted by Niels Bohr, which holds that reality depends on the observer and their interaction with measurement instruments; and realism, supported by Albert Einstein, which argues that quantum mechanics is incomplete and that eality exists independently of observation. Bohr’s complementary philosophy and Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle were central to the formulation of the “Copenhagen interpretation,” which became dominant in the 20th century. However, the persistent opposition of scientists like Einstein and Schrödinger inspired generations of physicists to seek a unification between quantum mechanics and relativity, culminating in new theories such as loop quantum gravity and string theory. Thus, the debate between realism and anti-realism remains alive, and philosophy continues to play a crucial role in exploring the new foundations of physics.
We like to take stock of the matter now, after we have presented different aspects of quantum-like reality proposal. We started by observing that the objective realist picture of the world as proposed by Newtonian-Hamiltonian framework, and much endorsed by scientists and philosophers from different domains of knowledge, could not stand the test of time. Particularly since the 1920s, it got clarified that the same picture of reality would be an obvious failure in the microphysical realm, the quantum-physical realm. Since the 1920s, the world witnessed the rise of the Copenhagen framework, with various interpretations over time. Most of these interpretations (whether ontological, non-ontological or epistemological) were in contrast to the classical physics ontology (either waves or particles with definite trajectories). Such varied interpretations have largely generated two ideological camps, realist and anti-realist. The realist camp (including diverse frameworks like Bohmian pilot wave theory, Everettian multiverse theory, to David Albert-led wave function realism [ Albert, 2023 ]) attempted to provide a new ontology of the world, whereas the non-realist camp (particularly the original Copenhagen camp) wanted to challenge the very attempt of whether at all an objective picture of microphysical reality is even possible to imagine.
I am very grateful to the Master and Fellows of Trinity College for inviting me to give the Tarner Lectures. What I want to do in this book, stated boldly and baldly, is to consider the relevance of developments in modern theoretical physics to metaphysical questions about the ultimate nature of reality. By metaphysical questions I mean the very general sorts of questions that arise out of a critical examination of the principles, concepts and fundamental presuppositions that lie behind modern physics. How should we interpret the claims that physicists seem to be making about the world? Are they intended to be understood as literally true, for example, and exactly what are those claims, given that the pages of theoretical physics monographs are largely filled with abstract mathematical formalism? In the first chapter, I shall be looking at a range of philosophical points of view in the framework of which such questions can be addressed, and attempt the difficult task of adjudicating between the different approaches. At the end of the day I shall be arguing for a pretty straightforward metaphysical realism, that the external world exists independently of our knowledge of it. In the second chapter I shall look at arguments from various branches of modern physics that are sometimes claimed to bring in an essential role for subjectivity in physics, bringing the observer into a central role, creating his own reality.
Two conceptions of the contemporary philosophy of science are taken under consideration: scientific realism and constructive empiricism. Scientific realism presupposes 1) the conception of truth as the correspondence of knowledge to reality, 2) the real existence of entities postulated by a theory. The constructive empiricism puts forward the idea of empirical adequacy: science aims to give us the theories which are empirically adequate and acceptance of the theory involves as belief only that it is empirically adequate. To compare methodological resources of these two positions in the philosophy of science the problem of the interpretation of quantum mechanics is involved. As a methodological realization of scientific realism the ensemble interpretation of quantum mechanics is taken under consideration. K.Popper’s version