The experimental procedures of physics assign values to physical quantities; we measure the temperature of a gas, the luminosity of a light source, the momentum of a particle. Any pair, q = (A, Δ), with A an observable quantity, Δ a Borel subset of the reals, we will call an experimental question, though some prefer the term proposition. For example, in lowering my big toe into the bath, I address the experimental question (T,Δ) to the system consisting of my bathwater, where T is the temperature measured in °F, and Δ is (approximately) the interval (110,120). Theory tells us what answers we may expect, given certain initial conditions. A determinist theory like classical mechanics tells us that, under specified conditions, the measurement of a quantity will yield a particular result with certainty, whereas a statistical theory like quantum mechanics tells us what probability attaches to various possible outcomes of a measurement.
The experimental procedures of physics assign values to physical quantities; we measure the temperature of a gas, the luminosity of a light source, the momentum of a particle. Any pair, q = (A, Δ), with A an observable quantity, Δ a Borel subset of the reals, we will call an experimental question, though some prefer the term proposition. For example, in lowering my big toe into the bath, I address the experimental question (T,Δ) to the system consisting of my bathwater, where T is the temperature measured in °F, and Δ is (approximately) the interval (110,120). Theory tells us what answers we may expect, given certain initial conditions. A determinist theory like classical mechanics tells us that, under specified conditions, the measurement of a quantity will yield a particular result with certainty, whereas a statistical theory like quantum mechanics tells us what probability attaches to various possible outcomes of a measurement.
In classical mechanics, the state of a physical object is determined by quantities such as mass, momentum, and angular momentum. According to Newton’s laws, for a given initial state, the evolution of the system is deterministic—that is, the state of the object (i.e., its parameters) can be precisely predicted at any future time. In quantum mechanics, however, based on the theory of matter waves, the state of a system is described by a probability wave function. Given an initial state, the time evolution of the system is governed by the Schrödinger equation, which determines the probability distribution of the particle’s position (or other observables) in space over time. The probabilistic nature of the quantum state implies that prior to measurement, the system may exist in a superposition of possible states, each associated with a certain probability amplitude. In physics, measurement refers to the experimental determination of mechanical quantities such as position, momentum, energy, and angular momentum. In classical mechanics, the act of measurement does not influence the physical state of the object; the system remains unaffected by the observation. In contrast, quantum measurement fundamentally alters the state: once a definite value of an observable is measured, the wave function collapses to the corresponding eigenstate. This signifies that the probabilistic description of the system with respect to that observable becomes a definite state—the system’s wave function is projected accordingly. Thus, the state of a quantum system is inherently measurement-dependent, and by measuring a mechanical quantity, one effectively determines the corresponding probability distribution, or wave function, associated with that observable. Therefore, the relationship between observables (mechanical quantities) and state wave functions, as well as the mathematical structure connecting them, constitutes one of the central concerns of quantum theory. As previously discussed, the Schrödinger equation involves expressions for energy and momentum that act on wave functions in the form of operators. Accordingly, we now proceed to explore the formalism of quantum mechanics based on the concept of operators.
This chapter presents the measurement problem from the point of view of the thermal interpretation of quantum physics. Everything physicists measure is measured in a thermal environment, for which statistical thermodynamics is relevant. The thermal interpretation agrees with how one interprets measurements in thermodynamics, the macroscopic part of quantum physics, derived via statistical mechanics. By its very construction, the thermal interpretation naturally matches the classical properties of our quantum world: The thermal interpretation assigns states-and a realistic interpretation for them-to individual quantum systems, in a way that large quantum systems are naturally described by classical observables. Since measurement devices are large quantum systems, this is the key to solving the measurement problem. We discuss the role played by macroscopic systems and the weak law of large numbers in getting readings with small uncertainty. Since quantum physics makes many deterministic predictions, for example regarding observed spectra, but also assertions about probabilities, we distinguish deterministic and statistical measurements. To clarify the meaning of the concept of measurement, we postulate (in Section 11.1) a measurement principle that defines what it means in the thermal interpretation to measure a quantity with a specified uncertainty. This turns the measurement problem from a philosophical riddle into a scientific problem in the domain of quantum statistical mechanics, namely how the quantum dynamics correlates macroscopic readings from an instrument with properties of the state of a measured microscopic system. The essence of scientific practice is the reproducibility of measurements, discussed in Section 11.2. Unlike in traditional interpretations, single, nonreproducible observations do not count as measurements, since this would violate the reproducibility of measurements-the essence of scientific practice. As a consequence, the measurement of a Hermitian quantity A is regarded as giving an uncertain value approximating the q-expectation {A} rather than (as tradition wanted to have it) as an exact revelation of an eigenvalue of A. This difference is most conspicuous in the interpretation of single discrete microscopic events. Except in very special circumstances, these are not reproducible. Thus, they have no scientific value in themselves and do not constitute measurement results. Scientific value is, however, in ensembles of such observations, which result in approximate measurements of q-probabilities and q-expectations. Sections 11.3 and 11.4 distinguish deterministic and statistical measurements, depending on whether a single observation is reproducible, and discuss the role played by macroscopic systems and the weak law of large numbers in getting readings with small uncertainty. How to measure the q-probabilities of events, described in terms of POVMs, is discussed in Section 11.5. Section 11.6 poses the measurement problem as a problem of the statistical mechanics of measurement devices, and discuss recent work by Allahverdyan, Balian, and Nieuwenhuizen on its resolution. Section 11.7 discusses the problem how, in the thermal interpretation, discrete events can arise, although qexpectations are by their very nature continuous. This is resolved by pointing to work by Breuer and Petruccione on piecewise deterministic processes (PDP). Section 11.8 sheds additional light on the origin of discrete events by an analysis of the role dissipative bistability plays in obtaining discreteness in classical physics.
Statistical physical theories are frequently formulated in terms of probabilistic structures founded on a ’’logic of experimentally verifiable propositions.’’ It is argued that to each experimentally verifiable proposition there corresponds an experimental procedure which, in general, alters the state of the system, and is completely characterized by a ’’measurement transformation’’ or ’’operation.’’ An analysis of the relations among these experimental procedures leads us to a ’’logic of operations’’ which is quite different from the ’’lattice theoretic logics’’ that are often considered (albeit inadequate empirical justification), as models for the calculus of experimentally verifiable propositions of quantum theory. It is seen that the quantum probability theory based on the logic of operations provides the proper mathematical framework for discussing the statistics of successive observations in quantum theory. We also indicate how a theory of quantum stochastic processes can be formulated in a way similar to the Kolmogorov formulation of the classical theory.
The measurement problem of quantum mechanics was probably born in 1926: ‘Thus Schrödinger’s quantum mechanics gives a very definite answer to the question of the outcome of a collision; however, this does not involve any causal relationship. One obtains no answer to the question “what is the state after the collision,” but only to the question “how probable is a specific outcome of the collision” (in which the quantum-mechanical law of [conservation of] energy must of course be satisfied). This raises the entire problem of determinism. From the standpoint of our quantum mechanics, there is no quantity that could causally establish the outcome of a collision in each individual case; however, so far we are not aware of any experimental clue to the effect that there are internal properties of atoms that enforce some particular outcome. Should we hope to discover such properties that determine individual outcomes later (perhaps phases of the internal atomic motions)? Or should we believe that the agreement between theory and experiment concerning our inability to give conditions for a causal course of events is some pre-established harmony that is based on the non-existence of such conditions? I myself tend to relinquish determinism in the atomic world. But this is [also] a philosophical question, for which physical arguments alone are not decisive.’ (Born, 1926a, p. 866; translation by the author) These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
Light and magnetic and electrical phenomena were assumed to be explainable in mechanical terms. Representation of values possessed in terms of the states of the objects in question in classical physics is straightforward and intuitive: a state is just a ‘list’ of the quantities an object has, and the ‘degree’ which they are possessed, that evolves in accordance with an equation of motion. Dispersion is an attribute of a probability distribution, or more generally of a measure, and it indicates the way in which values spread on either side of the mean or ‘expectation value’. Relativisation to the preferred determinate observable gives rise to a class of n-tuples of relations, which people can think of as intantiations of ‘lawlike’ connections that always involve the preferred observable. Two alternative interpretations of quantum mechanics, the standard and the modal interpretation, were used to support this viewpoint.
How can quantum mechanics be (i) the fundamental theoretical framework of contemporary physics and (ii) a probability calculus that presupposes the events to which, and on the basis of which, it assigns probabilities? The question is answered without invoking knowledge or observers, by interpreting the necessary distinction between two kinds of physical quantities - unconditionally definite quantities and quantities that have values only if they are measured - as a distinction between the manifested world and its manifestation.