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IMPERIAL COLLEGE PRESS eBooks

The Recently Claimed Observation of Atomic Orbitals and Some Related Philosophical Issues

Eric R. Scerri

Published Jun 1, 2008• 3 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The main thrust of the paper involves a theoretical and philosophical analysis of the claim made in September 1999 that atomic orbitals have been directly imaged for the first time. After a brief account of the recent claims the paper reviews the development of the orbit and later orbital concepts and analyzes the theoretical status of atomic orbitals. The conclusion is that contrary to these claims, atomic orbitals have not in fact been observed. The non-referring nature of modem atomic orbitals is discussed in the context of Laudan's writings on realism, the success of theories, and whether or not scientific terms refer. I conclude that the failure to observe orbitals is a good prima facie case for divorcing the success of theories from the question of whether their central terms refer. The added relevance of this case is that it concerns a current and highly successful theory. Finally, the relevance of this 'floating model' to contemporary discussions on scientific models is briefly considered.

DOI
10.1142/9781848161382_0012

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The Recently Claimed Observation of Atomic Orbitals and Some Related Philosophical Issues

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The main thrust of the paper involves a theoretical and philosophical analysis of the claim made in September 1999 that atomic orbitals have been directly imaged for the first time. After a brief account of the recent claims the paper reviews the development of the orbit and later orbital concepts and analyzes the theoretical status of atomic orbitals. The conclusion is that contrary to these claims, atomic orbitals have not in fact been observed. The non-referring nature of modern atomic orbitals is discussed in the context of Laudan's writings on realism, the success of theories, and whether or not scientific terms refer. I conclude that the failure to observe orbitals is a good prima facie case for divorcing the success of theories from the question of whether their central terms refer. The added relevance of this case is that it concerns a current and highly successful theory. Finally, the relevance of this ‘floating model’ to contemporary discussions on scientific models is briefly considered.

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The main thrust of the paper involves a theoretical and philosophical analysis of the claim made in September 1999 that atomic orbitals have been directly imaged for the first time. After a brief account of the recent claims the paper reviews the development of the orbit and later orbital concepts and analyzes the theoretical status of atomic orbitals. The conclusion is that contrary to these claims, atomic orbitals have not in fact been observed. The non-referring nature of modem atomic orbitals is discussed in the context of Laudan's writings on realism, the success of theories, and whether or not scientific terms refer. I conclude that the failure to observe orbitals is a good prima facie case for divorcing the success of theories from the question of whether their central terms refer. The added relevance of this case is that it concerns a current and highly successful theory. Finally, the relevance of this 'floating model' to contemporary discussions on scientific models is briefly considered.
The main thrust of the paper involves a theoretical and philosophical analysis of the claim made in September 1999 that atomic orbitals have been directly imaged for the first time. After a brief account of the recent claims the paper reviews the development of the orbit and later orbital concepts and analyzes the theoretical status of atomic orbitals. The conclusion is that contrary to these claims, atomic orbitals have not in fact been observed. The non-referring nature of modern atomic orbitals is discussed in the context of Laudan's writings on realism, the success of theories, and whether or not scientific terms refer. I conclude that the failure to observe orbitals is a good prima facie case for divorcing the success of theories from the question of whether their central terms refer. The added relevance of this case is that it concerns a current and highly successful theory. Finally, the relevance of this ‘floating model’ to contemporary discussions on scientific models is briefly considered.
In this paper I discuss the question whether orbitals can be observed or not. I argue that the answer depends on how the terms ‘orbitals’ and ‘observed’ are understood. The fact that different authors take radically different stances on the issue is caused by their employing different uses of either of the two terms. I furthermore discuss a recent argument by Labarca and Lombardi to the effect that the orbital concept in chemistry is discontinuous with that in quantum mechanics. I argue that, quite to the contrary, there is continuity between the two.
MORE than any other word of the language, the word atom is implicated with the history of human speculations concerning the nature uf things. It is introduced when people cease to content themselves with observing, and begin to philosophize. There are many of the fundamental and essential writings of the literature of physics in which it does not appear, or appears without warrant. These are the descriptions of things observed, the accounts of experiments, the records of measurements, on which the edifice of theoretical physics is founded. There are many articles of what is commonly called the “theoretical” sort in which it does not occur. Such are the papers on the motions of planets, on the vibrations of elastic solids, on the currents in electrical networks, on the courses of light-rays through optical systems-papers which are essentially descriptions, although they give the impression of being something greater and deeper because they relate to idealized cases, and are phrased in the laconic language of mathematics. When the word atom appears justifiably in a discourse, it means that the author has departed from the safe routine of describing observed and observable events, however selectively, however skilfully, however intelligently. It signifies that he has gone beyond the limits of observation, and has entered upon the audacious adventure of constructing by the side of the real universe an ideal one, which shall act as the real one does, and be intelligible through and through.
Scientific realism does not view theoretical terms as mere instruments of experimental predictions; it grants referential status to natural kind terms with 'epistemic access' and view scientific theories and terms as corresponding to physical phenomena and entities which exist independently of observation, and as thereby being the source of objective -approximate and not absolute- knowledge of the physical realm. As a result, scientific realism is accused of ontologising the unobservables. Against this charge, scientific realism posits the idea of the dialectical relation between theoretical terms referring to the unobservables and scientific methods. The second argument made by realism is the ‘no miracle’ thesis. These arguments stand challenged by the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. The aim of the paper is to examine the relevance of the two arguments of scientific realism in countering the idea that the existence of quantum states in the microphysical world renders realism obsolete.
Many scientific theories purport to describe empirically inaccessible aspects of the world. The agenda of foundational physics is more ambitious still: to characterize the world at the level of 'primitive ontology'. In this pursuit it often posits new and peculiar physical features, a proclivity aided by the abstract, mathematical way in which foundational theories are framed. But how do we decipher their physical content, and in particular the accounts of primitive ontology they offer, and why think that content is true? This dissertation explores the relationship between these questions -- between the problem of ontological interpretation in foundational physics and the nature of scientific realism. I do not argue for a unified account. Rather, I examine three contexts in which their interactions are particularly interesting and philosophically significant. First, I consider the role scientific methodology plays in a prominent naturalistic defense of scientific realism: the no-miracles argument. The most sophisticated form of this argument rests on the broad claim that successful scientific methodology is irredeemably theory dependent. I examine the nature of this theory dependence within the context of Maxwell's development of electromagnetism, and argue that the presence of competing ontological interpretations undermines the realist's attempt to draw sweeping epistemic conclusions from methodological success. I next consider the concept of theoretical reformulation and how it applies to the claim that Lagrangian dynamics is a reformulation of (part of) Newtonian dynamics. How should this claim be understood in light of the fact that the world is non-classical? What can this tell us about the concept of theory reformulation itself, which plays a central role in arguments against scientific realism? I provide an analysis of theory reformulation in terms of counterfactual interpretative judgments, and then cast doubt on its justification in the classical case by developing a non-Newtonian interpretation of Lagrangian dynamics. Finally, I consider whether competing ontological interpretations raise underdetermination problems for realism about foundational physics. After first re-formulating the underdetermination argument to avoid recent objections that it fails to pose any distinctive threat, I suggest a formulation of realism that vitiates the underdetermination threats posed by competing ontological interpretations.
The concept of atomic and molecular orbitals has been a fundamental pillar in modern chemistry, shedding light on the structures and reactivity of chemical compounds. This article examines the evolution and significance of orbital theory, its applications in chemistry, and the ongoing debate about the existence of orbitals from both physics and chemistry perspectives. Philosophical aspects related to the ontology of orbitals are explored, emphasizing the complex interplay between mathematical abstractions and tangible reality. The multifaceted nature of orbitals, their role in quantum mechanics, and their implications for understanding the quantum realm are discussed. While the debate surrounding the ontological status of orbitals remains ongoing, it highlights the profound nature of inquiries into the fundamental essence of reality. This exploration underscores the significance of continuous research and discourse in advancing our understanding of these fundamental constituents of the quantum world.