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Bell System Technical Journal

Some Contemporary Advances in Physics-VIII The Atom-Model, First Part1

Karl K. Darrow

Published Jul 1, 1925• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

MORE than any other word of the language, the word atom is implicated with the history of human speculations concerning the nature uf things. It is introduced when people cease to content themselves with observing, and begin to philosophize. There are many of the fundamental and essential writings of the literature of physics in which it does not appear, or appears without warrant. These are the descriptions of things observed, the accounts of experiments, the records of measurements, on which the edifice of theoretical physics is founded. There are many articles of what is commonly called the “theoretical” sort in which it does not occur. Such are the papers on the motions of planets, on the vibrations of elastic solids, on the currents in electrical networks, on the courses of light-rays through optical systems-papers which are essentially descriptions, although they give the impression of being something greater and deeper because they relate to idealized cases, and are phrased in the laconic language of mathematics. When the word atom appears justifiably in a discourse, it means that the author has departed from the safe routine of describing observed and observable events, however selectively, however skilfully, however intelligently. It signifies that he has gone beyond the limits of observation, and has entered upon the audacious adventure of constructing by the side of the real universe an ideal one, which shall act as the real one does, and be intelligible through and through.

DOI
10.1002/j.1538-7305.1925.tb00474.x

Related papers

Some Contemporary Advances in Physics IX The Atom-Model, Second Part1

Karl K. Darrow

EVERY atom-model that is worthy of notice was designed in view of a certain limited group of facts. That is to say, every valuable atom-model is the invention of somebody who, being acquainted with certain of the ways in which matter behaves, set himself to the devising of atoms of which an assemblage should behave like matter in those ways. Of course, it would be a most wonderful achievement to conceive atoms, of which assemblages should behave like matter in all ways; but this is too exalted an ambition for this day and generation, no man of science bothers with it. Each atom-model of the present is partially valid, not universally; and nobody can rightly appreciate any one of them, unless he knows the facts for which it was designed. I might add that he should also know the relative importance, in the world and in life, of the facts for which it was designed. But this also is too exalted an ambition; we do not know much, if anything, about the relative importance of facts sub specie aternitatis, and can hardly refrain from regarding with an especial favour the facts which happen to have been successfully explained. At all events it is clear that every account of an atom-model should be preceded by an independent account of the things it is meant to explain. For the favorite atom of these days, the atom of Rutherford and Bohr, I have provided this preliminary account of the facts in the First Part of the article. Let me give a brief outline of the most important among them, before entering upon the task of constructing an atom-model to reproduce them.

Bell System Technical Journal•Oct 1, 1925•0 citations

Logic and Probability in Physics

C. G. DARWIN

ENERAL philosophy claims to be the critical subject which lays down for all of us what we may be allowed to think, and yet it has played no part whatever in the great revolutions of human thought of the present century-those connected with relativity and the quantum theory. It might have been expected that the scientists would have been constantly consulting the philosophers as to the legitimacy of their various speculations, but nothing of the kind has happened. Since no one can dispense with some sort of metaphysic, each scientist has made one for himself, and no doubt they contain many crudities, but it would seem that a deep interest in metaphysic is a disadvantage rather than an advantage to the physicist-at least I have the impression that those of my friends who are most inclined to speculate on the ultimate things appear to be the ones whose scientific work is most hampered by doing so. Now I propose to risk a similar indiscretion. I want to embody in it the practical philosophy of a physicist, and I do not mean it as an attack on the pure philosophers, who are very reasonable people, only chargeable with the minor offence of not having made me want to read their books! I had better begin by stating shortly the ideas I intend to discuss. There is a notable contrast between the way we think about things and the way we think we ought to think about them.

Science•Aug 19, 1938•2 citations

Mind, Matter and Quantum Mechanics (2nd edition)

G. Mahler

Quantum mechanics is usually defined in terms of some loosely connected axioms and rules. Such a foundation is far from the beauty of, e.g., the `principles' underlying classical mechanics. Motivated, in addition, by notorious interpretation problems, there have been numerous attempts to modify or `complete' quantum mechanics. A first attempt was based on so-called hidden variables; its proponents essentially tried to expel the non-classical nature of quantum mechanics. More recent proposals intend to complete quantum mechanics not within mechanics proper but on a `higher (synthetic) level'; by means of a combination with gravitation theory (R Penrose), with quantum information theory (C M Caves, C A Fuchs) or with psychology and brain science (H P Stapp). I think it is fair to say that in each case the combination is with a subject that, per se , suffers from a very limited understanding that is even more severe than that of quantum mechanics. This was acceptable, though, if it could convincingly be argued that scientific progress desperately needs to join forces. Quantum mechanics of a closed system was a beautiful and well understood theory with its respective state being presented as a point on a deterministic trajectory in Liouville space---not unlike the motion of a classical N -particle system in its 6N -dimensional phase-space. Unfortunately, we need an inside and an outside view, we need an external reference frame, we need an observer. This unavoidable partition is the origin of most of the troubles we have with quantum mechanics. A pragmatic solution is introduced in the form of so-called measurement postulates: one of the various incompatible properties of the system under consideration is supposed to be realized (i.e. to become a fact, to be defined without fundamental dispersion) based on `instantaneous' projections within some externally selected measurement basis. As a result, the theory becomes essentially statistical rather than deterministic; furthermore there is an asymmetry between the observed and the observing. This is the point where consciousness may come in. Complemented by an introduction and several appendices, Henry Stapp's book consists essentially of three parts: theory, implications, and new developments. The theory part gives a very readable account of the Copenhagen interpretation, some aspects of a psychophysical theory, and, eventually, hints towards a quantum foundation of the brain--mind connection. The next part, `implications', summarizes some previous attempts to bridge the gap between the working rules of quantum mechanics and their possible consequences for our understanding of this world (Pauli, Everett, Bohm, Heisenberg). The last section, `new developments', dwells on some ideas about the conscious brain and its possible foundation on quantum mechanics. The book is an interesting and, in part, fascinating contribution to a field that continues to be a companion to `practical' quantum mechanics since its very beginning. It is doubtful whether such types of `quantum ontologies' will ever become (empirically) testable; right now one can hardly expect more than to be offered some consistent `grand picture', which the reader may find more or less acceptable or even rewarding. Many practicing quantum physicists, though, will remain unimpressed. The shift from synthetic ontology to analytic ontology is the foundation of the present work. This means that fundamental wholes are being partitioned into their ontologically subordinate components by means of `events'. The actual event, in turn, is an abrupt change in the Heisenberg state describing the quantum universe. The new state then defines the tendencies associated with the next actual event. To avoid infinite regression in terms of going from one state of tendencies to the next, consciousness is there to give these events a special `feel', to provide a status of `intrinsic actuality'. The brain of an alert human observer is similar in an important way to a quantum detection device: it can amplify small signals to large macroscopic effects. On the other hand, actual events are not postulated to occur exclusively in brains. They are more generally associated with the formation of records. Records are necessarily part of the total state of the universe: it is obvious that the state of the universe cannot undergo a Schrödinger dynamics and at the same time record its own history. `The full universe consists therefore of an exceedingly thin veneer of relatively sluggish, directly observable properties resting on a vast ocean or rapidly fluctuating unobservable ones.' The present ideas also bear on how the world should be seen to develop. While conventional cosmology encounters problems as to how to define the intial conditions, which would enter the governing equations of motion, here `the boundary conditions are set not at some initial time, but gradually by a sequence of acts that imposes a sequence of constraints. After any sequence of acts there remains a collection of possible worlds, some of which will be eliminated by the next act.' Connected with those acts is `meaning': there has always been some speculation about the special significance of local properties in our understanding of the world. One could argue that correlations (even the quantum correlations found, e.g., in the EPR-experiments) were as real as anything else. But also Stapp stresses the special role of locality: the `local observable properties, or properties similar to them are the natural, and perhaps exclusive, carriers of meaning in the quantum universe. From this point of view the quantum universe tends to create meaning.' This sounds like an absolute concept: meaning not with respect to something else, but defined intrinsically---not easy to digest. The role of consciousness in the developing quantum universe requires more attention. `The causal irrelevance of our thoughts within classical physics constitutes a serious deficiency of that theory, construed as a description of reality.' This is taken to be entirely different within quantum mechanics. `The core idea of quantum mechanics is to describe our activities as knowledge-seeking and knowledge-using agents.' `21st century science does not reduce human beings to mechanical automata. Rather it elevates human beings to agents whose free choices can, according to the known laws, actually influence their behaviour.' An example with respect to perception is discussed: `Why, when we look at a triangle, do we experience three lines joined at three points and not some pattern of neuron firings?' The brain `does not convert an actual whole triangle into some jumbled set of particle motions; rather it converts a concatenation of separate external events into the actualization of some single integrated pattern of neural activity that is congruent to the perceived whole triangle.' How convincing is this proposal? It is hard to tell. I think Henry Stapp did a good job, but there are tight limitations to any such endeavour. Quantum mechanics is often strange indeed, but it also gives rise to our classical world around us. For the emergence of classicality jumps and measurement projections (the basic phenomena connected with those fundamental events of choice) are not needed. Therefore, I doubt whether the explanation of the evolution of our world really allows (or requires) that much free choice. On the other hand, most scientist will agree that empirical science was not possible without free will: we could not ask independent questions if this asking was part of a deterministic trajectory. The fact that the result of a quantum measurement is indeterminate (within given probabilities) does certainly not explain free will. How about the type of measurment? The experimentalist will have to assume that he can select the pertinent observable within some limits. But given a certain design the so-called pointer basis (producing stable measurement results) is no longer a matter of free choice. `The main theme of classical physics is that we live in a clocklike universe.' Today it is often assumed that the universe was a big (quantum-) computer or a cellular automaton. Many would be all too happy to leave that rather restrictive picture behind. But where to go? Stapp suggests giving consciousness a prominent role: `The most profound alteration of the fundamental principles was to bring consciousness of human beings into the basic structure of the physical theory.' How far we are able to go in this direction will depend on the amount of concrete research results becoming available to support this view.

Journal of Physics A Mathematical and General•Jun 17, 2004•4 citations

From David Bohm's Implicate Order to the Ben-Yehudah Investigation of SOURCE CONSCIOUSNESS: Reality Beyond Measurable Form and the Emergence of Physical Experience

Yeshayahu Ben-Yehudah

From David Bohm's Implicate Order to the Ben-Yehudah Investigation of SOURCE CONSCIOUSNESS: Reality Beyond Measurable Form and the Emergence of Physical Experience This scientific, philosophical, theoretical, and comparative research manuscript examines David Bohm's investigations of wholeness, implicate order, explicate order, and the holomovement alongside Yeshayahu Ben-Yehudah's independent investigation of SOURCE CONSCIOUSNESS, biological reception, the interpretive MIND, and the relationship between consciousness and physical experience. The investigation begins with Bohm's proposition that observable physical reality may represent relatively unfolded expressions of a deeper, interconnected order. His framework challenges the assumption that reality can be fully understood by treating measurable objects and processes as fundamentally independent components. Particular attention is given to Bohm's Wholeness and the Implicate Order (1980), his 1952 hidden-variable interpretation of quantum mechanics, and his subsequent work with Basil J. Hiley in The Undivided Universe: An Ontological Interpretation of Quantum Theory (1993). The manuscript distinguishes Bohm's mathematically developed interpretation of quantum mechanics from his broader philosophical investigation of the implicate order. It examines enfoldment, unfoldment, undivided wholeness, active information, quantum nonlocality, and the relationship between observable physical phenomena and the underlying organization of reality. These concepts are compared with the Ben-Yehudah Transducer Model, which identifies SOURCE CONSCIOUSNESS as foundational, proposes that the biological brain functions principally as a receiver, and distinguishes the interpretive activity of the MIND from the SOURCE of consciousness. The central inquiry examines whether measurable physical experience constitutes the totality of reality or represents an appearance within a deeper foundation that cannot be fully understood through physical measurement alone. The author's reported continuous STILLNESS, RECEPTION, ZERO INTENT, and SUBJECT–WITNESS–OBSERVER experience provide the phenomenological context for the independent Ben-Yehudah investigation. Contemporary scientific findings concerning quantum theory, nonlocality, physical measurement, biological neural activity, and conscious experience are examined to distinguish established scientific relationships from philosophical and theoretical interpretations. The manuscript identifies conceptual convergence between Bohm's account of underlying wholeness and the Ben-Yehudah investigation of SOURCE CONSCIOUSNESS while preserving their different explanatory foundations, scientific limitations, and distinct understandings of physical experience. Central Finding “Consciousness is the source of ALL” ~ YBY The central finding is that David Bohm's implicate-order framework and the Ben-Yehudah investigation of SOURCE CONSCIOUSNESS converge in questioning whether observable physical phenomena constitute a complete description of reality. Bohm proposes that the relatively separate objects and events encountered through ordinary observation belong to an explicate order, while deeper relationships may be understood through the implicate order and the continuous holomovement. His framework challenges the assumption that the apparent separation of physical objects necessarily reflects the ultimate organization of existence. The Ben-Yehudah investigation approaches a related philosophical question through SOURCE CONSCIOUSNESS, the proposed receiving function of the biological brain, and interpretation by the MIND. The author's philosophical understanding is further expressed through the statements: “I AM Consciousness experiencing Human Form” ~ YBY “All things perceived in the physical realm is DOWNSTREAM of consciousness” ~ YBY These statements identify the author's independent philosophical position concerning consciousness and perceived physical form. They are not presented as experimentally established scientific laws. The investigation establishes that Bohm's implicate order and Ben-Yehudah's SOURCE CONSCIOUSNESS are not interchangeable theoretical concepts. Bohm's implicate order concerns underlying organization, enfoldment, unfoldment, and the relationship between observable phenomena and deeper physical order. The Ben-Yehudah framework identifies SOURCE CONSCIOUSNESS as foundational while distinguishing biological reception from the interpretive MIND. The author's investigation further incorporates continuous STILLNESS, RECEPTION, ZERO INTENT, and the SUBJECT–WITNESS–OBSERVER relationship, alongside the established Six-Pillar Discipline: STILLNESS → AWARENESS → OBSERVATION → DISCERNMENT → INTEGRATION → TRANSMISSION SOURCE CONSCIOUSNESS remains foundational and is not designated as a seventh pillar. The central scholarly contribution is the identification of conceptual convergence concerning reality beyond measurable form while preserving the theoretical independence of Bohm's physical and philosophical investigations and the Ben-Yehudah framework. The investigation does not impose a definitive answer concerning the ultimate relationship between measurable physical experience and foundational reality. Scope of the Investigation This manuscript is an independent historical, philosophical, theoretical, phenomenological, and comparative scientific investigation. It does not report original controlled experiments. The study examines David Bohm's published investigations concerning quantum mechanics, hidden variables, wholeness, implicate order, explicate order, enfoldment, unfoldment, holomovement, active information, and nonlocality. Its foundational sources include Quantum Theory (1951), A Suggested Interpretation of the Quantum Theory in Terms of "Hidden" Variables (1952), Wholeness and the Implicate Order (1980), and Bohm and Basil J. Hiley's The Undivided Universe: An Ontological Interpretation of Quantum Theory (1993). These works are compared with the author's previously published investigations, including the Ben-Yehudah Field Theory, the Ben-Yehudah Transducer Model, The Mind as an Active Engine, and subsequent research concerning SOURCE CONSCIOUSNESS, biological reception, observational fidelity, and consciousness experiencing human form. The manuscript examines established findings concerning quantum correlations, physical measurement, and neural relationships with conscious experience. Bell's theorem and the experimental investigation of quantum nonlocality provide scientific context for distinguishing mathematical and experimental results from broader ontological interpretations. The author's continuous STILLNESS, RECEPTION, ZERO INTENT, and SUBJECT–WITNESS–OBSERVER experience are preserved as first-person phenomenological observations within his independent scholarly framework. The study distinguishes Bohm's mathematically specified interpretation of quantum mechanics from his broader philosophical account of implicate order and undivided wholeness. The investigation does not establish that quantum nonlocality demonstrates the existence of SOURCE CONSCIOUSNESS or that Bohm's implicate order constitutes an experimentally verified consciousness field. It does not demonstrate that the holomovement and the author's continuous STILLNESS describe equivalent phenomena. Nor does it establish an experimentally verified mechanism through which the biological brain receives SOURCE CONSCIOUSNESS. The manuscript further distinguishes the emergence of physical experience from the origin of physical matter and preserves the difference between scientific measurement, philosophical interpretation, and first-person observation. The unresolved questions concern the relationship between measurable physical appearances and foundational reality, the role of consciousness in human experience, and the possibility of developing independently testable distinctions among competing theoretical explanations. The investigation contributes to interdisciplinary scholarship without claiming experimental validation of Bohm's broader implicate-order ontology or the Ben-Yehudah Transducer Model. Artificial Intelligence Disclosure Artificial intelligence was used to assist with historical research, comparative philosophical and scientific analysis, manuscript organization, drafting, language refinement, bibliographic development, reference identification, and editorial preparation. The foundational philosophical concepts, theoretical propositions, lived experiences, original observations, attributed quotations, the Ben-Yehudah Transducer Model, the SUBJECT–WITNESS–OBSERVER framework, and the Ben-Yehudah Six-Pillar Discipline are attributed to Yeshayahu Ben-Yehudah. The comparison between David Bohm's implicate-order framework and the Ben-Yehudah investigation of SOURCE CONSCIOUSNESS was developed through human–AI scholarly inquiry. Bohm's documented scientific and philosophical propositions are distinguished from the author's independent theoretical framework and reported lived experience. The manuscript does not report original controlled experiments in quantum physics or neuroscience, nor does it present independently verified evidence establishing that consciousness exists outside the biological brain. Its discussion of implicate order, explicate order, holomovement, quantum nonlocality, and reality beyond measurable form concerns published scientific research and philosophical interpretation rather than experimental confirmation of the Ben-Yehudah Transducer Model. Historical, mathematical, philosophical, scientific, and bibliographic claims remain subject to source verification and independent scholarly evaluation. The author retains responsibility for determining whether the manuscript accurately preserves his philosophical positions, observations, theoretical distinctions, and scholarly conclusions. Author: Yesh

•Nov 7, 2026•0 citations

Quantum Philosophy: Understanding and Interpreting Contemporary Science

Roland L. Omnes

In this magisterial work, Roland Omnès takes us from the academies of ancient Greece to the laboratories of modern science as he seeks to do no less than rebuild the foundations of the philosophy of knowledge. One of the world's leading quantum physicists, Omnès reviews the history and recent development of mathematics, logic, and the physical sciences to show that current work in quantum theory offers new answers to questions that have puzzled philosophers for centuries: Is the world ultimately intelligible? Are all events caused? Do objects have definitive locations? Omnès addresses these profound questions with vigorous arguments and clear, colorful writing, aiming not just to advance scholarship but to enlighten readers with no background in science or philosophy. The book opens with an insightful and sweeping account of the main developments in science and the philosophy of knowledge from the pre-Socratic era to the nineteenth century. Omnès then traces the emergence in modern thought of a fracture between our intuitive, commonsense views of the world and the abstract and--for most people--incomprehensible world portrayed by advanced physics, math, and logic. He argues that the fracture appeared because the insights of Einstein and Bohr, the logical advances of Frege, Russell, and Gödel, and the necessary mathematics of infinity of Cantor and Hilbert cannot be fully expressed by words or images only. Quantum mechanics played an important role in this development, as it seemed to undermine intuitive notions of intelligibility, locality, and causality. However, Omnès argues that common sense and quantum mechanics are not as incompatible as many have thought. In fact, he makes the provocative argument that the "consistent-histories" approach to quantum mechanics, developed over the past fifteen years, places common sense (slightly reappraised and circumscribed) on a firm scientific and philosophical footing for the first time. In doing so, it provides what philosophers have sought through the ages: a sure foundation for human knowledge. Quantum Philosophy is a profound work of contemporary science and philosophy and an eloquent history of the long struggle to understand the nature of the world and of knowledge itself.

Princeton University Press eBooks•Dec 31, 2002•35 citations

The Structure of Atoms

J. S. Marshall, E. R. Pounder, Robert William Stewart

So far, this book has dealt almost exclusively with classical physics, which is a theoretical structure based on many brilliant and imaginative experiments performed on macroscopic objects, that is on objects of about our size or a few orders of magnitude smaller or larger. Classical physics was found to give good results when extrapolated downward to molecules and upward to planets, stars, and galaxies, and it was seriously suggested ate in the nineteenth century that all the major discoveries in physics had been made — that the physical basis of the universe was understood and that only minor tidying-up remained.

•Jan 1, 1967•0 citations
MORE than any other word of the language, the word atom is implicated with the history of human speculations concerning the nature uf things. It is introduced when people cease to content themselves with observing, and begin to philosophize. There are many of the fundamental and essential writings of the literature of physics in which it does not appear, or appears without warrant. These are the descriptions of things observed, the accounts of experiments, the records of measurements, on which the edifice of theoretical physics is founded. There are many articles of what is commonly called the “theoretical” sort in which it does not occur. Such are the papers on the motions of planets, on the vibrations of elastic solids, on the currents in electrical networks, on the courses of light-rays through optical systems-papers which are essentially descriptions, although they give the impression of being something greater and deeper because they relate to idealized cases, and are phrased in the laconic language of mathematics. When the word atom appears justifiably in a discourse, it means that the author has departed from the safe routine of describing observed and observable events, however selectively, however skilfully, however intelligently. It signifies that he has gone beyond the limits of observation, and has entered upon the audacious adventure of constructing by the side of the real universe an ideal one, which shall act as the real one does, and be intelligible through and through.
EVERY atom-model that is worthy of notice was designed in view of a certain limited group of facts. That is to say, every valuable atom-model is the invention of somebody who, being acquainted with certain of the ways in which matter behaves, set himself to the devising of atoms of which an assemblage should behave like matter in those ways. Of course, it would be a most wonderful achievement to conceive atoms, of which assemblages should behave like matter in all ways; but this is too exalted an ambition for this day and generation, no man of science bothers with it. Each atom-model of the present is partially valid, not universally; and nobody can rightly appreciate any one of them, unless he knows the facts for which it was designed. I might add that he should also know the relative importance, in the world and in life, of the facts for which it was designed. But this also is too exalted an ambition; we do not know much, if anything, about the relative importance of facts sub specie aternitatis, and can hardly refrain from regarding with an especial favour the facts which happen to have been successfully explained. At all events it is clear that every account of an atom-model should be preceded by an independent account of the things it is meant to explain. For the favorite atom of these days, the atom of Rutherford and Bohr, I have provided this preliminary account of the facts in the First Part of the article. Let me give a brief outline of the most important among them, before entering upon the task of constructing an atom-model to reproduce them.
ENERAL philosophy claims to be the critical subject which lays down for all of us what we may be allowed to think, and yet it has played no part whatever in the great revolutions of human thought of the present century-those connected with relativity and the quantum theory. It might have been expected that the scientists would have been constantly consulting the philosophers as to the legitimacy of their various speculations, but nothing of the kind has happened. Since no one can dispense with some sort of metaphysic, each scientist has made one for himself, and no doubt they contain many crudities, but it would seem that a deep interest in metaphysic is a disadvantage rather than an advantage to the physicist-at least I have the impression that those of my friends who are most inclined to speculate on the ultimate things appear to be the ones whose scientific work is most hampered by doing so. Now I propose to risk a similar indiscretion. I want to embody in it the practical philosophy of a physicist, and I do not mean it as an attack on the pure philosophers, who are very reasonable people, only chargeable with the minor offence of not having made me want to read their books! I had better begin by stating shortly the ideas I intend to discuss. There is a notable contrast between the way we think about things and the way we think we ought to think about them.
Quantum mechanics is usually defined in terms of some loosely connected axioms and rules. Such a foundation is far from the beauty of, e.g., the `principles' underlying classical mechanics. Motivated, in addition, by notorious interpretation problems, there have been numerous attempts to modify or `complete' quantum mechanics. A first attempt was based on so-called hidden variables; its proponents essentially tried to expel the non-classical nature of quantum mechanics. More recent proposals intend to complete quantum mechanics not within mechanics proper but on a `higher (synthetic) level'; by means of a combination with gravitation theory (R Penrose), with quantum information theory (C M Caves, C A Fuchs) or with psychology and brain science (H P Stapp). I think it is fair to say that in each case the combination is with a subject that, per se , suffers from a very limited understanding that is even more severe than that of quantum mechanics. This was acceptable, though, if it could convincingly be argued that scientific progress desperately needs to join forces. Quantum mechanics of a closed system was a beautiful and well understood theory with its respective state being presented as a point on a deterministic trajectory in Liouville space---not unlike the motion of a classical N -particle system in its 6N -dimensional phase-space. Unfortunately, we need an inside and an outside view, we need an external reference frame, we need an observer. This unavoidable partition is the origin of most of the troubles we have with quantum mechanics. A pragmatic solution is introduced in the form of so-called measurement postulates: one of the various incompatible properties of the system under consideration is supposed to be realized (i.e. to become a fact, to be defined without fundamental dispersion) based on `instantaneous' projections within some externally selected measurement basis. As a result, the theory becomes essentially statistical rather than deterministic; furthermore there is an asymmetry between the observed and the observing. This is the point where consciousness may come in. Complemented by an introduction and several appendices, Henry Stapp's book consists essentially of three parts: theory, implications, and new developments. The theory part gives a very readable account of the Copenhagen interpretation, some aspects of a psychophysical theory, and, eventually, hints towards a quantum foundation of the brain--mind connection. The next part, `implications', summarizes some previous attempts to bridge the gap between the working rules of quantum mechanics and their possible consequences for our understanding of this world (Pauli, Everett, Bohm, Heisenberg). The last section, `new developments', dwells on some ideas about the conscious brain and its possible foundation on quantum mechanics. The book is an interesting and, in part, fascinating contribution to a field that continues to be a companion to `practical' quantum mechanics since its very beginning. It is doubtful whether such types of `quantum ontologies' will ever become (empirically) testable; right now one can hardly expect more than to be offered some consistent `grand picture', which the reader may find more or less acceptable or even rewarding. Many practicing quantum physicists, though, will remain unimpressed. The shift from synthetic ontology to analytic ontology is the foundation of the present work. This means that fundamental wholes are being partitioned into their ontologically subordinate components by means of `events'. The actual event, in turn, is an abrupt change in the Heisenberg state describing the quantum universe. The new state then defines the tendencies associated with the next actual event. To avoid infinite regression in terms of going from one state of tendencies to the next, consciousness is there to give these events a special `feel', to provide a status of `intrinsic actuality'. The brain of an alert human observer is similar in an important way to a quantum detection device: it can amplify small signals to large macroscopic effects. On the other hand, actual events are not postulated to occur exclusively in brains. They are more generally associated with the formation of records. Records are necessarily part of the total state of the universe: it is obvious that the state of the universe cannot undergo a Schrödinger dynamics and at the same time record its own history. `The full universe consists therefore of an exceedingly thin veneer of relatively sluggish, directly observable properties resting on a vast ocean or rapidly fluctuating unobservable ones.' The present ideas also bear on how the world should be seen to develop. While conventional cosmology encounters problems as to how to define the intial conditions, which would enter the governing equations of motion, here `the boundary conditions are set not at some initial time, but gradually by a sequence of acts that imposes a sequence of constraints. After any sequence of acts there remains a collection of possible worlds, some of which will be eliminated by the next act.' Connected with those acts is `meaning': there has always been some speculation about the special significance of local properties in our understanding of the world. One could argue that correlations (even the quantum correlations found, e.g., in the EPR-experiments) were as real as anything else. But also Stapp stresses the special role of locality: the `local observable properties, or properties similar to them are the natural, and perhaps exclusive, carriers of meaning in the quantum universe. From this point of view the quantum universe tends to create meaning.' This sounds like an absolute concept: meaning not with respect to something else, but defined intrinsically---not easy to digest. The role of consciousness in the developing quantum universe requires more attention. `The causal irrelevance of our thoughts within classical physics constitutes a serious deficiency of that theory, construed as a description of reality.' This is taken to be entirely different within quantum mechanics. `The core idea of quantum mechanics is to describe our activities as knowledge-seeking and knowledge-using agents.' `21st century science does not reduce human beings to mechanical automata. Rather it elevates human beings to agents whose free choices can, according to the known laws, actually influence their behaviour.' An example with respect to perception is discussed: `Why, when we look at a triangle, do we experience three lines joined at three points and not some pattern of neuron firings?' The brain `does not convert an actual whole triangle into some jumbled set of particle motions; rather it converts a concatenation of separate external events into the actualization of some single integrated pattern of neural activity that is congruent to the perceived whole triangle.' How convincing is this proposal? It is hard to tell. I think Henry Stapp did a good job, but there are tight limitations to any such endeavour. Quantum mechanics is often strange indeed, but it also gives rise to our classical world around us. For the emergence of classicality jumps and measurement projections (the basic phenomena connected with those fundamental events of choice) are not needed. Therefore, I doubt whether the explanation of the evolution of our world really allows (or requires) that much free choice. On the other hand, most scientist will agree that empirical science was not possible without free will: we could not ask independent questions if this asking was part of a deterministic trajectory. The fact that the result of a quantum measurement is indeterminate (within given probabilities) does certainly not explain free will. How about the type of measurment? The experimentalist will have to assume that he can select the pertinent observable within some limits. But given a certain design the so-called pointer basis (producing stable measurement results) is no longer a matter of free choice. `The main theme of classical physics is that we live in a clocklike universe.' Today it is often assumed that the universe was a big (quantum-) computer or a cellular automaton. Many would be all too happy to leave that rather restrictive picture behind. But where to go? Stapp suggests giving consciousness a prominent role: `The most profound alteration of the fundamental principles was to bring consciousness of human beings into the basic structure of the physical theory.' How far we are able to go in this direction will depend on the amount of concrete research results becoming available to support this view.
From David Bohm's Implicate Order to the Ben-Yehudah Investigation of SOURCE CONSCIOUSNESS: Reality Beyond Measurable Form and the Emergence of Physical Experience This scientific, philosophical, theoretical, and comparative research manuscript examines David Bohm's investigations of wholeness, implicate order, explicate order, and the holomovement alongside Yeshayahu Ben-Yehudah's independent investigation of SOURCE CONSCIOUSNESS, biological reception, the interpretive MIND, and the relationship between consciousness and physical experience. The investigation begins with Bohm's proposition that observable physical reality may represent relatively unfolded expressions of a deeper, interconnected order. His framework challenges the assumption that reality can be fully understood by treating measurable objects and processes as fundamentally independent components. Particular attention is given to Bohm's Wholeness and the Implicate Order (1980), his 1952 hidden-variable interpretation of quantum mechanics, and his subsequent work with Basil J. Hiley in The Undivided Universe: An Ontological Interpretation of Quantum Theory (1993). The manuscript distinguishes Bohm's mathematically developed interpretation of quantum mechanics from his broader philosophical investigation of the implicate order. It examines enfoldment, unfoldment, undivided wholeness, active information, quantum nonlocality, and the relationship between observable physical phenomena and the underlying organization of reality. These concepts are compared with the Ben-Yehudah Transducer Model, which identifies SOURCE CONSCIOUSNESS as foundational, proposes that the biological brain functions principally as a receiver, and distinguishes the interpretive activity of the MIND from the SOURCE of consciousness. The central inquiry examines whether measurable physical experience constitutes the totality of reality or represents an appearance within a deeper foundation that cannot be fully understood through physical measurement alone. The author's reported continuous STILLNESS, RECEPTION, ZERO INTENT, and SUBJECT–WITNESS–OBSERVER experience provide the phenomenological context for the independent Ben-Yehudah investigation. Contemporary scientific findings concerning quantum theory, nonlocality, physical measurement, biological neural activity, and conscious experience are examined to distinguish established scientific relationships from philosophical and theoretical interpretations. The manuscript identifies conceptual convergence between Bohm's account of underlying wholeness and the Ben-Yehudah investigation of SOURCE CONSCIOUSNESS while preserving their different explanatory foundations, scientific limitations, and distinct understandings of physical experience. Central Finding “Consciousness is the source of ALL” ~ YBY The central finding is that David Bohm's implicate-order framework and the Ben-Yehudah investigation of SOURCE CONSCIOUSNESS converge in questioning whether observable physical phenomena constitute a complete description of reality. Bohm proposes that the relatively separate objects and events encountered through ordinary observation belong to an explicate order, while deeper relationships may be understood through the implicate order and the continuous holomovement. His framework challenges the assumption that the apparent separation of physical objects necessarily reflects the ultimate organization of existence. The Ben-Yehudah investigation approaches a related philosophical question through SOURCE CONSCIOUSNESS, the proposed receiving function of the biological brain, and interpretation by the MIND. The author's philosophical understanding is further expressed through the statements: “I AM Consciousness experiencing Human Form” ~ YBY “All things perceived in the physical realm is DOWNSTREAM of consciousness” ~ YBY These statements identify the author's independent philosophical position concerning consciousness and perceived physical form. They are not presented as experimentally established scientific laws. The investigation establishes that Bohm's implicate order and Ben-Yehudah's SOURCE CONSCIOUSNESS are not interchangeable theoretical concepts. Bohm's implicate order concerns underlying organization, enfoldment, unfoldment, and the relationship between observable phenomena and deeper physical order. The Ben-Yehudah framework identifies SOURCE CONSCIOUSNESS as foundational while distinguishing biological reception from the interpretive MIND. The author's investigation further incorporates continuous STILLNESS, RECEPTION, ZERO INTENT, and the SUBJECT–WITNESS–OBSERVER relationship, alongside the established Six-Pillar Discipline: STILLNESS → AWARENESS → OBSERVATION → DISCERNMENT → INTEGRATION → TRANSMISSION SOURCE CONSCIOUSNESS remains foundational and is not designated as a seventh pillar. The central scholarly contribution is the identification of conceptual convergence concerning reality beyond measurable form while preserving the theoretical independence of Bohm's physical and philosophical investigations and the Ben-Yehudah framework. The investigation does not impose a definitive answer concerning the ultimate relationship between measurable physical experience and foundational reality. Scope of the Investigation This manuscript is an independent historical, philosophical, theoretical, phenomenological, and comparative scientific investigation. It does not report original controlled experiments. The study examines David Bohm's published investigations concerning quantum mechanics, hidden variables, wholeness, implicate order, explicate order, enfoldment, unfoldment, holomovement, active information, and nonlocality. Its foundational sources include Quantum Theory (1951), A Suggested Interpretation of the Quantum Theory in Terms of "Hidden" Variables (1952), Wholeness and the Implicate Order (1980), and Bohm and Basil J. Hiley's The Undivided Universe: An Ontological Interpretation of Quantum Theory (1993). These works are compared with the author's previously published investigations, including the Ben-Yehudah Field Theory, the Ben-Yehudah Transducer Model, The Mind as an Active Engine, and subsequent research concerning SOURCE CONSCIOUSNESS, biological reception, observational fidelity, and consciousness experiencing human form. The manuscript examines established findings concerning quantum correlations, physical measurement, and neural relationships with conscious experience. Bell's theorem and the experimental investigation of quantum nonlocality provide scientific context for distinguishing mathematical and experimental results from broader ontological interpretations. The author's continuous STILLNESS, RECEPTION, ZERO INTENT, and SUBJECT–WITNESS–OBSERVER experience are preserved as first-person phenomenological observations within his independent scholarly framework. The study distinguishes Bohm's mathematically specified interpretation of quantum mechanics from his broader philosophical account of implicate order and undivided wholeness. The investigation does not establish that quantum nonlocality demonstrates the existence of SOURCE CONSCIOUSNESS or that Bohm's implicate order constitutes an experimentally verified consciousness field. It does not demonstrate that the holomovement and the author's continuous STILLNESS describe equivalent phenomena. Nor does it establish an experimentally verified mechanism through which the biological brain receives SOURCE CONSCIOUSNESS. The manuscript further distinguishes the emergence of physical experience from the origin of physical matter and preserves the difference between scientific measurement, philosophical interpretation, and first-person observation. The unresolved questions concern the relationship between measurable physical appearances and foundational reality, the role of consciousness in human experience, and the possibility of developing independently testable distinctions among competing theoretical explanations. The investigation contributes to interdisciplinary scholarship without claiming experimental validation of Bohm's broader implicate-order ontology or the Ben-Yehudah Transducer Model. Artificial Intelligence Disclosure Artificial intelligence was used to assist with historical research, comparative philosophical and scientific analysis, manuscript organization, drafting, language refinement, bibliographic development, reference identification, and editorial preparation. The foundational philosophical concepts, theoretical propositions, lived experiences, original observations, attributed quotations, the Ben-Yehudah Transducer Model, the SUBJECT–WITNESS–OBSERVER framework, and the Ben-Yehudah Six-Pillar Discipline are attributed to Yeshayahu Ben-Yehudah. The comparison between David Bohm's implicate-order framework and the Ben-Yehudah investigation of SOURCE CONSCIOUSNESS was developed through human–AI scholarly inquiry. Bohm's documented scientific and philosophical propositions are distinguished from the author's independent theoretical framework and reported lived experience. The manuscript does not report original controlled experiments in quantum physics or neuroscience, nor does it present independently verified evidence establishing that consciousness exists outside the biological brain. Its discussion of implicate order, explicate order, holomovement, quantum nonlocality, and reality beyond measurable form concerns published scientific research and philosophical interpretation rather than experimental confirmation of the Ben-Yehudah Transducer Model. Historical, mathematical, philosophical, scientific, and bibliographic claims remain subject to source verification and independent scholarly evaluation. The author retains responsibility for determining whether the manuscript accurately preserves his philosophical positions, observations, theoretical distinctions, and scholarly conclusions. Author: Yesh
In this magisterial work, Roland Omnès takes us from the academies of ancient Greece to the laboratories of modern science as he seeks to do no less than rebuild the foundations of the philosophy of knowledge. One of the world's leading quantum physicists, Omnès reviews the history and recent development of mathematics, logic, and the physical sciences to show that current work in quantum theory offers new answers to questions that have puzzled philosophers for centuries: Is the world ultimately intelligible? Are all events caused? Do objects have definitive locations? Omnès addresses these profound questions with vigorous arguments and clear, colorful writing, aiming not just to advance scholarship but to enlighten readers with no background in science or philosophy. The book opens with an insightful and sweeping account of the main developments in science and the philosophy of knowledge from the pre-Socratic era to the nineteenth century. Omnès then traces the emergence in modern thought of a fracture between our intuitive, commonsense views of the world and the abstract and--for most people--incomprehensible world portrayed by advanced physics, math, and logic. He argues that the fracture appeared because the insights of Einstein and Bohr, the logical advances of Frege, Russell, and Gödel, and the necessary mathematics of infinity of Cantor and Hilbert cannot be fully expressed by words or images only. Quantum mechanics played an important role in this development, as it seemed to undermine intuitive notions of intelligibility, locality, and causality. However, Omnès argues that common sense and quantum mechanics are not as incompatible as many have thought. In fact, he makes the provocative argument that the "consistent-histories" approach to quantum mechanics, developed over the past fifteen years, places common sense (slightly reappraised and circumscribed) on a firm scientific and philosophical footing for the first time. In doing so, it provides what philosophers have sought through the ages: a sure foundation for human knowledge. Quantum Philosophy is a profound work of contemporary science and philosophy and an eloquent history of the long struggle to understand the nature of the world and of knowledge itself.
So far, this book has dealt almost exclusively with classical physics, which is a theoretical structure based on many brilliant and imaginative experiments performed on macroscopic objects, that is on objects of about our size or a few orders of magnitude smaller or larger. Classical physics was found to give good results when extrapolated downward to molecules and upward to planets, stars, and galaxies, and it was seriously suggested ate in the nineteenth century that all the major discoveries in physics had been made — that the physical basis of the universe was understood and that only minor tidying-up remained.