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Philosophy of Science

The Recently Claimed Observation of Atomic Orbitals and Some Related Philosophical Issues

Eric R. Scerri

Published Jan 1, 2001• 40 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The main thrust of the paper involves a theoretical and philosophical analysis of the claim made in September 1999 that atomic orbitals have been directly imaged for the first time. After a brief account of the recent claims the paper reviews the development of the orbit and later orbital concepts and analyzes the theoretical status of atomic orbitals. The conclusion is that contrary to these claims, atomic orbitals have not in fact been observed. The non-referring nature of modern atomic orbitals is discussed in the context of Laudan's writings on realism, the success of theories, and whether or not scientific terms refer. I conclude that the failure to observe orbitals is a good prima facie case for divorcing the success of theories from the question of whether their central terms refer. The added relevance of this case is that it concerns a current and highly successful theory. Finally, the relevance of this ‘floating model’ to contemporary discussions on scientific models is briefly considered.

DOI
10.1086/392899

Related papers

The Recently Claimed Observation of Atomic Orbitals and Some Related Philosophical Issues

Eric R. Scerri

The main thrust of the paper involves a theoretical and philosophical analysis of the claim made in September 1999 that atomic orbitals have been directly imaged for the first time. After a brief account of the recent claims the paper reviews the development of the orbit and later orbital concepts and analyzes the theoretical status of atomic orbitals. The conclusion is that contrary to these claims, atomic orbitals have not in fact been observed. The non-referring nature of modem atomic orbitals is discussed in the context of Laudan's writings on realism, the success of theories, and whether or not scientific terms refer. I conclude that the failure to observe orbitals is a good prima facie case for divorcing the success of theories from the question of whether their central terms refer. The added relevance of this case is that it concerns a current and highly successful theory. Finally, the relevance of this 'floating model' to contemporary discussions on scientific models is briefly considered.

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Conclusion

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The aim of this book was to investigate the rationale for Pauli's principle, and the conditions under which we are justified in regarding a phenomenological and contingent rule as an important scientific principle. To this purpose, I urged a Kantian perspective. As a conclusion, I want to foreshadow how this perspective relates to contemporary discussions about images of science, and how it bears upon the on-going debate on scientific realism in philosophy of science. I shall barely scratch the surface of this complex topic and its vast literature. The best I can do in these concluding remarks is to suggest a philosophical position that I think deserves to be further explored. What follows should then be read more as an outline for future research, than as a conclusion. I began this book by reconstructing the origins of the exclusion principle as a phenomenological rule arising from the spectroscopic research of the 1920s. I argued that the rule was derived – in conjunction with the concept of the electron's Zweideutigkeit – from spectroscopic phenomena with the help of some theoretical assumptions, in the period of revolutionary transition from the old to the new quantum theory. I defended the prospective intelligibility of this revolutionary transition in the light of the piecemeal process of transformation of the old quantum theory, from which brand new scientific concepts and nomic generalizations followed.

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The Concept of Molecular Structure in Quantum Theory: Interpretation Problems

P. Claverie, Simon Diner

Abstract The classical concept of molecular structure (namely, a set of atoms with a well‐defined geometrical arrangement in space) originated well before the advent of quantum theory, and, contrary to widespread views, these two conceptual schemes (classical molecular structure and quantum theory) are not easy to reconcile. We begin with a preliminary discussion of molecular structure in terms of space and time correlations in the framework of quantum theory. Then we summarize the salient features of some critical views raised‐during recent years (essentially by Woolley) concerning the concept of molecular structure. The essential claim of this viewpoint is that “molecular structure” is not an intrinsic attribute of an isolated molecule, and appears rather as an effect of the environment (other molecules? vacuum electromagnetic field, according to quantum electrodynamics?). Afterwards, we discuss these issues in detail: we show that it is necessary to distinguish between a “quantum” or “potential” structure (which may be deduced in a straightforward way from the quantum treatment of the molecule), and the “classical” molecular structure (according to which the molecule is considered as a set of rotating and vibrating material points, corresponding to the atoms); we briefly discuss some aspects of the Born–Oppenheimer approximation. From our discussion, we deduce that the “classical structure” concept is indeed non‐trivial from a purely quantum‐mechanical point of view; in actual fact, it is related to the problem of the “classical limit” of quantum mechanics, and it appears that, at the present time, none of these classical concepts and behaviours is convincingly derivable from a strict quantum mechanical basis. Finally, we consider these same problems from the point of view of stochastic electrodynamics (SED), which is one of the stochastic models for microphysics proposed so far as a possible alternative or extension of usual quantum theory. In the framework of such a theory, the “classical limit” and, in particular, the “classical molecular structure” no longer poses a problem, but aside from these satisfactory qualitative aspects, several quantitative failures of SED prevent us from accepting it, at least in its present state, as a genuine physical alternative to quantum theory. We therefore conclude that “classical molecular structure”, and classical concepts in general, remain an open problem in the framework of present‐day quantum physics.

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Methodology, Reformulation, and Underdetermination: Essays on Realism and Interpretation in Foundational Physics.

Kevin Coffey

Many scientific theories purport to describe empirically inaccessible aspects of the world. The agenda of foundational physics is more ambitious still: to characterize the world at the level of 'primitive ontology'. In this pursuit it often posits new and peculiar physical features, a proclivity aided by the abstract, mathematical way in which foundational theories are framed. But how do we decipher their physical content, and in particular the accounts of primitive ontology they offer, and why think that content is true? This dissertation explores the relationship between these questions -- between the problem of ontological interpretation in foundational physics and the nature of scientific realism. I do not argue for a unified account. Rather, I examine three contexts in which their interactions are particularly interesting and philosophically significant. First, I consider the role scientific methodology plays in a prominent naturalistic defense of scientific realism: the no-miracles argument. The most sophisticated form of this argument rests on the broad claim that successful scientific methodology is irredeemably theory dependent. I examine the nature of this theory dependence within the context of Maxwell's development of electromagnetism, and argue that the presence of competing ontological interpretations undermines the realist's attempt to draw sweeping epistemic conclusions from methodological success. I next consider the concept of theoretical reformulation and how it applies to the claim that Lagrangian dynamics is a reformulation of (part of) Newtonian dynamics. How should this claim be understood in light of the fact that the world is non-classical? What can this tell us about the concept of theory reformulation itself, which plays a central role in arguments against scientific realism? I provide an analysis of theory reformulation in terms of counterfactual interpretative judgments, and then cast doubt on its justification in the classical case by developing a non-Newtonian interpretation of Lagrangian dynamics. Finally, I consider whether competing ontological interpretations raise underdetermination problems for realism about foundational physics. After first re-formulating the underdetermination argument to avoid recent objections that it fails to pose any distinctive threat, I suggest a formulation of realism that vitiates the underdetermination threats posed by competing ontological interpretations.

•Jan 1, 2010•0 citations
The main thrust of the paper involves a theoretical and philosophical analysis of the claim made in September 1999 that atomic orbitals have been directly imaged for the first time. After a brief account of the recent claims the paper reviews the development of the orbit and later orbital concepts and analyzes the theoretical status of atomic orbitals. The conclusion is that contrary to these claims, atomic orbitals have not in fact been observed. The non-referring nature of modern atomic orbitals is discussed in the context of Laudan's writings on realism, the success of theories, and whether or not scientific terms refer. I conclude that the failure to observe orbitals is a good prima facie case for divorcing the success of theories from the question of whether their central terms refer. The added relevance of this case is that it concerns a current and highly successful theory. Finally, the relevance of this ‘floating model’ to contemporary discussions on scientific models is briefly considered.
The main thrust of the paper involves a theoretical and philosophical analysis of the claim made in September 1999 that atomic orbitals have been directly imaged for the first time. After a brief account of the recent claims the paper reviews the development of the orbit and later orbital concepts and analyzes the theoretical status of atomic orbitals. The conclusion is that contrary to these claims, atomic orbitals have not in fact been observed. The non-referring nature of modem atomic orbitals is discussed in the context of Laudan's writings on realism, the success of theories, and whether or not scientific terms refer. I conclude that the failure to observe orbitals is a good prima facie case for divorcing the success of theories from the question of whether their central terms refer. The added relevance of this case is that it concerns a current and highly successful theory. Finally, the relevance of this 'floating model' to contemporary discussions on scientific models is briefly considered.
In this paper I discuss the question whether orbitals can be observed or not. I argue that the answer depends on how the terms ‘orbitals’ and ‘observed’ are understood. The fact that different authors take radically different stances on the issue is caused by their employing different uses of either of the two terms. I furthermore discuss a recent argument by Labarca and Lombardi to the effect that the orbital concept in chemistry is discontinuous with that in quantum mechanics. I argue that, quite to the contrary, there is continuity between the two.
Scientific realism does not view theoretical terms as mere instruments of experimental predictions; it grants referential status to natural kind terms with 'epistemic access' and view scientific theories and terms as corresponding to physical phenomena and entities which exist independently of observation, and as thereby being the source of objective -approximate and not absolute- knowledge of the physical realm. As a result, scientific realism is accused of ontologising the unobservables. Against this charge, scientific realism posits the idea of the dialectical relation between theoretical terms referring to the unobservables and scientific methods. The second argument made by realism is the ‘no miracle’ thesis. These arguments stand challenged by the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. The aim of the paper is to examine the relevance of the two arguments of scientific realism in countering the idea that the existence of quantum states in the microphysical world renders realism obsolete.
The aim of this book was to investigate the rationale for Pauli's principle, and the conditions under which we are justified in regarding a phenomenological and contingent rule as an important scientific principle. To this purpose, I urged a Kantian perspective. As a conclusion, I want to foreshadow how this perspective relates to contemporary discussions about images of science, and how it bears upon the on-going debate on scientific realism in philosophy of science. I shall barely scratch the surface of this complex topic and its vast literature. The best I can do in these concluding remarks is to suggest a philosophical position that I think deserves to be further explored. What follows should then be read more as an outline for future research, than as a conclusion. I began this book by reconstructing the origins of the exclusion principle as a phenomenological rule arising from the spectroscopic research of the 1920s. I argued that the rule was derived – in conjunction with the concept of the electron's Zweideutigkeit – from spectroscopic phenomena with the help of some theoretical assumptions, in the period of revolutionary transition from the old to the new quantum theory. I defended the prospective intelligibility of this revolutionary transition in the light of the piecemeal process of transformation of the old quantum theory, from which brand new scientific concepts and nomic generalizations followed.
Abstract The classical concept of molecular structure (namely, a set of atoms with a well‐defined geometrical arrangement in space) originated well before the advent of quantum theory, and, contrary to widespread views, these two conceptual schemes (classical molecular structure and quantum theory) are not easy to reconcile. We begin with a preliminary discussion of molecular structure in terms of space and time correlations in the framework of quantum theory. Then we summarize the salient features of some critical views raised‐during recent years (essentially by Woolley) concerning the concept of molecular structure. The essential claim of this viewpoint is that “molecular structure” is not an intrinsic attribute of an isolated molecule, and appears rather as an effect of the environment (other molecules? vacuum electromagnetic field, according to quantum electrodynamics?). Afterwards, we discuss these issues in detail: we show that it is necessary to distinguish between a “quantum” or “potential” structure (which may be deduced in a straightforward way from the quantum treatment of the molecule), and the “classical” molecular structure (according to which the molecule is considered as a set of rotating and vibrating material points, corresponding to the atoms); we briefly discuss some aspects of the Born–Oppenheimer approximation. From our discussion, we deduce that the “classical structure” concept is indeed non‐trivial from a purely quantum‐mechanical point of view; in actual fact, it is related to the problem of the “classical limit” of quantum mechanics, and it appears that, at the present time, none of these classical concepts and behaviours is convincingly derivable from a strict quantum mechanical basis. Finally, we consider these same problems from the point of view of stochastic electrodynamics (SED), which is one of the stochastic models for microphysics proposed so far as a possible alternative or extension of usual quantum theory. In the framework of such a theory, the “classical limit” and, in particular, the “classical molecular structure” no longer poses a problem, but aside from these satisfactory qualitative aspects, several quantitative failures of SED prevent us from accepting it, at least in its present state, as a genuine physical alternative to quantum theory. We therefore conclude that “classical molecular structure”, and classical concepts in general, remain an open problem in the framework of present‐day quantum physics.
Many scientific theories purport to describe empirically inaccessible aspects of the world. The agenda of foundational physics is more ambitious still: to characterize the world at the level of 'primitive ontology'. In this pursuit it often posits new and peculiar physical features, a proclivity aided by the abstract, mathematical way in which foundational theories are framed. But how do we decipher their physical content, and in particular the accounts of primitive ontology they offer, and why think that content is true? This dissertation explores the relationship between these questions -- between the problem of ontological interpretation in foundational physics and the nature of scientific realism. I do not argue for a unified account. Rather, I examine three contexts in which their interactions are particularly interesting and philosophically significant. First, I consider the role scientific methodology plays in a prominent naturalistic defense of scientific realism: the no-miracles argument. The most sophisticated form of this argument rests on the broad claim that successful scientific methodology is irredeemably theory dependent. I examine the nature of this theory dependence within the context of Maxwell's development of electromagnetism, and argue that the presence of competing ontological interpretations undermines the realist's attempt to draw sweeping epistemic conclusions from methodological success. I next consider the concept of theoretical reformulation and how it applies to the claim that Lagrangian dynamics is a reformulation of (part of) Newtonian dynamics. How should this claim be understood in light of the fact that the world is non-classical? What can this tell us about the concept of theory reformulation itself, which plays a central role in arguments against scientific realism? I provide an analysis of theory reformulation in terms of counterfactual interpretative judgments, and then cast doubt on its justification in the classical case by developing a non-Newtonian interpretation of Lagrangian dynamics. Finally, I consider whether competing ontological interpretations raise underdetermination problems for realism about foundational physics. After first re-formulating the underdetermination argument to avoid recent objections that it fails to pose any distinctive threat, I suggest a formulation of realism that vitiates the underdetermination threats posed by competing ontological interpretations.