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Oxford University Press eBooks

Mysteries of the quantum

David Wallace

Published Apr 22, 2021• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Abstract This chapter introduces the central mysteries of quantum mechanics. Quantum mechanics is an enormously successful theory that lies at the heart of modern physics, but there is no agreement on how to understand it. Simple experiments with light demonstrate why: in understanding those experiments, we have to shift inconsistently back and forth between thinking of the theory as assigning indefinite, delocalized, but known properties to a system, and assigning definite, localized, but unknown properties (this is called the ‘problem of measurement’). Furthermore, when we break a system into subsystems, the state of the system is not determined by the states of the subsystem (this is called ‘entanglement’), and simple arguments seem to tell us that the physical properties of entangled subsystems can influence one another non-locally—faster than light. These three mysteries—measurement, entanglement, non-locality—need to be addressed by any attempt to make sense of quantum theory.

DOI
10.1093/actrade/9780198814320.003.0006

Related papers

Interpreting the quantum

David Wallace

Abstract This chapter surveys various proposals to interpret—that is, make sense of—quantum mechanics. We could attempt to think of quantum mechanics in purely instrumentalist terms, as an algorithm to predict observed experimental results. But this fits badly with scientific practice and is probably not viable. We could attempt to modify quantum mechanics itself to resolve the paradoxes, and there are some simple models that attempt to do that: some are ‘hidden-variable’ theories that add extra properties to the theory, some are ‘dynamical-collapse’ theories that modify the theory’s equations. But none of these models succeed in reproducing quantum theory’s predictions outside a relatively narrow range of applications. Or we could try to take the apparent indefiniteness of quantum mechanics literally, and interpret it as a theory of many parallel worlds. The correct interpretation of quantum mechanics remains controversial, but the search for understanding and interpretation of the theory has led to very substantial scientific results and is likely to lead to more.

Oxford University Press eBooks•Apr 22, 2021•0 citations

The quantum mystery: reality, knowledge, and the limits of science

Ecaterina Lozovanu

For over nine decades, quantum mechanics has profoundly shaped our understanding of nature, offering explanations for the stability of atoms, the formation of mole cules, the properties of materials, and phenomena such as light or radioactivity. It is essential to modern technologies—from microchips to lasers—and underpins the physics of elementary particles. Yet, despite its successes, it remains a deeply mysterious theory, confronting a central enigma: why does the quantum world behave so differently from everyday reality? Elements such as superposition and quantum entanglement—which allow particles to exist simultaneously in multiple states or remain interconnected regardless of distance—contradict classical world intuitions. This gap between microscopic and macroscopic behavior has given rise to what is known as the “measurement problem,” raising fundamental questions about the nature of reality. Diverging interpretations have led to two major schools of thought: anti-realism, promoted by Niels Bohr, which holds that reality depends on the observer and their interaction with measurement instruments; and realism, supported by Albert Einstein, which argues that quantum mechanics is incomplete and that eality exists independently of observation. Bohr’s complementary philosophy and Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle were central to the formulation of the “Copenhagen interpretation,” which became dominant in the 20th century. However, the persistent opposition of scientists like Einstein and Schrödinger inspired generations of physicists to seek a unification between quantum mechanics and relativity, culminating in new theories such as loop quantum gravity and string theory. Thus, the debate between realism and anti-realism remains alive, and philosophy continues to play a crucial role in exploring the new foundations of physics.

Integrarea europeană a Republicii Moldova: aspecte politico-juridice şi social-economice•Feb 1, 2026•0 citations

The Mystery of the Quantum World

Euan J. Squires

Preface to the 2nd edition. Preface. Acknowledgements. Reality in the quantum world: The quantum revolutions External reality The potential barrier and the breakdown of determinism The experimental challenge to reality Summary of chapter one. Quantum theory: The description of a particle in quantum theory The wavefunction The potential barrier according to quantum mechanics Interference Other applications of quantum theory Summary of chapter two. Quantum theory and external reality: Review of the problem The ensemble interpretation of quantum mechanics The wavefunction as a measure of our knowledge The wavefunction as part of external reality Measurement in quantum theory Interference and macroscopic objects Can quantum mechanics be changed so that it will reduce wavefunctions? Summary of chapter three. Consciousness: The relevance of conscious observers: What is a conscious observer? Does wavefunction reduction require conscious observers? God as the conscious observer The many-worlds interpretation Summary of chapter four. Hidden variables and non-locality: Review of hidden-variable theories The pilot wave The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen thought experiment Bell's theorem Experimental verification of the non-local predictions of quantum theory Can signals travel faster than light Summary of chapter five. The mysteries of the quantum world: Where are we now? Quantum theory and relativity Where do we go next? Early history and the Copenhagen interpretation A bibliography and some recent opinions A final plea for reality A last look at the wavefunction Conclusions. Recent developments: Models with explicit collapse The Bohm model Many worlds Time and quantum theory A peculiarly quantum measurement Locality. Appendices. Index.

CRC Press eBooks•Jan 1, 1986•91 citations

Quantum theory and its interpretation

Alexander E. Wendt

Chapter 1 dealt with one of the deepest mysteries in modern science: how to explain consciousness. This Part deals with another mystery: how to make sense of quantum mechanics. Both involve a problem of reconciliation with the classical worldview, which is one hint that the two mysteries might be related. A second is that, unlike classical physics, which makes no reference to or allowance for consciousness, quantum theory raises the issue of consciousness and its relationship to the physical world in a very direct way. These hints do not necessarily mean there is a connection between the two mysteries, but by the end of this Part I hope to have shown why it would be natural to look for one.

Cambridge University Press eBooks•Apr 20, 2015•55 citations

Coins and counterfactuals

Robert B. Griffiths

Quantum paradoxes The next few chapters are devoted to resolving a number of quantum paradoxes in the sense of giving a reasonable explanation of a seemingly paradoxical result in terms of the principles of quantum theory discussed earlier in this book. None of these paradoxes indicates a defect in quantum theory. Instead, when they have been properly understood, they show us that the quantum world is rather different from the world of our everyday experience and of classical physics, in a way somewhat analogous to that in which relativity theory has shown us that the laws appropriate for describing the behavior of objects moving at high speed differ in significant ways from those of pre-relativistic physics. An inadequate theory of quantum measurements is at the root of several quantum paradoxes. In particular, the notion that wave function collapse is a physical effect produced by a measurement, rather than a method of calculation, see Sec. 18.2, has given rise to a certain amount of confusion. Smuggling rules for classical reasoning into the quantum domain where they do not belong and where they give rise to logical inconsistencies is another common source of confusion. In particular, many paradoxes involve mixing the results from incompatible quantum frameworks. Certain quantum paradoxes have given rise to the idea that the quantum world is permeated by mysterious influences that propagate faster than the speed of light, in conflict with the theory of relativity. They are mysterious in that they cannot be used to transmit signals, which means that they are, at least in any direct sense, experimentally unobservable.

Cambridge University Press eBooks•Nov 29, 2001•0 citations

The Quantum Revolution in Philosophy

Eddy Keming Chen

In this thought-provoking book, Richard Healey proposes a new interpretation of quantum theory inspired by pragmatist philosophy. Healey puts forward the interpretation as an alternative to realist quantum theories on the one hand such as Bohmian mechanics, spontaneous collapse theories, and many-worlds interpretations, which are different proposals for describing what the quantum world is like and what the basic laws of physics are, and nonrealist interpretations on the other hand such as quantum Bayesianism, which proposes to understand quantum theory as describing agents’ subjective epistemic states. The central idea of Healey's proposal is to understand quantum theory as providing not a description of the physical world but a set of authoritative and objectively correct prescriptions about how agents should act. The book provides a detailed development and defense of that idea, and it contains interesting discussions about a wide range of philosophical issues such as representation, probability, explanation, causation, objectivity, meaning, and fundamentality.Healey's project is at the intersection of physics and philosophy. The book is divided into two parts. Part 1 of the book discusses the foundational questions in quantum theory from the perspective of the prescriptive interpretation. In part 2, Healey discusses the philosophical implications of the view. Both parts are written in a way that is largely accessible to nonspecialists. In this brief book review, I will focus on two questions:1. How does Healey's interpretation work?2. What are the costs and benefits of accepting his interpretation?To understand Healey's ideas, we should provide some background for nonspecialists. Quantum theory has been subject to intense scrutiny and philosophical investigations in the last century. There has been enormous progress on several fronts, including the empirical tests about Bell inequalities and the development of several realist interpretations. It has been proposed that what is revolutionary about quantum theory and what sets it apart from classical physics are quantum entanglement and quantum nonlocality. For many realists, it seems that quantum theory describes a different kind of ontology and a different kind of laws of nature. They are introduced briefly below.Quantum entanglement describes the phenomenon that some physical systems have irreducibly holistic properties that are not the logical sums of the properties of the parts. For example, two electrons A and B are entangled when the pair has a quantum state that cannot be reduced to some combination of the state of A and the state of B. Quantum entanglement, a manifestation of quantum nonseparability, is reflected in the way quantum states, which are typically represented by “wave functions,” get assigned to different systems.Quantum nonlocality (also called “spooky action at a distance”) describes the phenomenon that events that are arbitrarily far apart can influence one another and the strength of the influence does not depend on their distance. Quantum nonlocality is a strange feature, and its falsity was assumed in the 1935 argument by Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen for the incompleteness of quantum theory. Remarkably, Bell (1964) proved that if the quantum predictions are accurate, then nature is nonlocal. Subsequent experimental tests since the 1980s have verified the quantum predictions to a high level of precision, reinforcing the conclusion that nature is nonlocal.1Among the realist theories of quantum mechanics, Bohmian mechanics and spontaneous collapse theories are nonlocal. Moreover, all three realist theories, including the many-worlds interpretation, affirm the reality of quantum entanglement. The reality of quantum entanglement follows from the reality of the quantum state. After all, the quantum state is so successful in application. If one wants to be a realist, it seems that the most natural way is to accept the reality of the quantum state and its consequences. But what is represented by the wave function? What is its nature? How does it relate to things in the physical world? Some recent discussions in philosophy of physics concern exactly those questions.2I think the key to understanding Healey's interpretation is to think of it as a proposal for an alternative foundation of quantum theory—a proposal to use normative facts instead of descriptive facts as the foundation and to replace “what there is” with “what we ought to expect” as what is fundamental to physical theory. Healey's approach would sound alien to many people, since it is not realist in any traditional sense. It is common to think that fundamental physics, and in particular quantum theory, is in the business of saying what the world is like (even though it may be difficult to discern what it says). It is true that we can learn useful advice from a correct physical theory, such as:one should avoid falling into a black holeone should place detectors far away from sources of interferenceone should get away from a nuclear explosionone should be almost certain to see this particle decay in 1 monthA correct physical theory may explain the correctness of useful practical advices such as above. Such advices are objectively correct insofar as they are derived from the conjunction of some accurate descriptions of physical reality and some correct theories of human rationality.3 For Healey, that might be a fine interpretation of classical physics, but that is not the correct interpretation of quantum theory. Quantum theory, for Healey, directly offers authoritative advice about what we should believe and expect, and such advice is not derived in any way from some underlying descriptive facts. Still, such advice can be objectively true (unlike the quantum Bayesian's emphasis on subjective epistemic states). The advice has the form “one should assign quantum state ψ to the physical system s,” and “one should have 0.5 confidence in M,” where M is some kind of magnitude claim about the physical system s. On Healey's interpretation, quantum theory is about such advice, not some descriptions about what nature is like. Although the magnitude claims are descriptions of nature, they are not contained in quantum theory. Instead, they are assumed to be the targets of explanation, and they are somewhat prior to the application of quantum theory. However, they will be suitably constrained by quantum theory, and only a subclass of them will be empirically significant.There are many parts to Healey's proposal. To simplify our discussions below, here is a short summary of the key points (mostly from chapter 5):Advice on state assignments: agents should follow the standard practice in quantum physics and assign an appropriate quantum state (e.g., a wave function ψ) to a system relative to their physical situation.Magnitude claims: a canonical magnitude claim has the form “the value of dynamical variable M on physical system s lies in set Δ.” One example would be “the position of the particle is on the left side of the box.” Magnitude claims are assumed in the theory and they are the targets of explanation. (See chap. 5, sec. 2, and chap. 12, sec. 3, for elaborations.)Empirical significance: a magnitude claim is empirically significant if the relevant quantum state the agent should assign to the system has properly experienced decoherence due to interactions with the environment, where decoherence is a mathematical property of the quantum state. (See chap. 5, sec. 2, and appendix C for more discussions on decoherence.)Advice on credences: agents should adopt credences about empirically significant magnitude claims according to the Born rule (setting one's credence about an empirically significant magnitude claim to be the squared modulo of the appropriate wave function).Descriptions of nature: none of the above, except for the magnitude claims, describes anything in nature. However, magnitude claims are not contained or entailed by quantum theory. They are given prior to the theory.Let us walk through a simple example. Suppose our physicist Alice sets up an experiment for the position measurement of a particle s. Alice wants to explain some magnitude claim about the particle's position (say, that it is on the left side of the box). Quantum theory tells her that she ought to assign a particular wave function ψ to the particle. (The magnitude claim about the particle's position will only become empirically significant when the particle has appropriately interacted with the environment such that different parts of the wave function are almost separated into macroscopically distinct regions as described by decoherence.) Her expectation about the (empirically significant) magnitude claim should match the probability given by the Born rule, which is the squared modulo of the wave function at this moment.Many questions arise at this point. For example: What makes a particular quantum state assignment appropriate? It is standard to assume that a state assignment is appropriate or correct in virtue of representational accuracy, that is, the system indeed has the particular quantum state. But Healey disagrees; it is more or less a basic fact, and if we want to explain it we can appeal to the practice within the scientific community, not some metaphysical facts about what nature is like. It seems to me that on Healey's project the correctness of state assignments is a fundamental normative fact, and any further inquiry about it may be a metanormative project. This is certainly hard to swallow for many realists, but it sheds light on how Healey tries to solve (or dissolve) traditional problems in quantum foundation. In the following, we discuss how Healey applies his interpretation to the quantum measurement problem, quantum entanglement, and Bell nonlocality.The quantum measurement problem is often presented as an inconsistency among three propositions: (1) the quantum state is a complete description of nature; (2) the quantum state always changes according to some unitary equation (e.g., the Schrödinger equation); and (3) experiments have determinate (unique) outcomes. Applying this to the above experimental setup involving Alice, we can derive a contradiction. If the quantum state is complete and it changes unitarily, then quantum theory implies there is no determinate outcome of the position measurement of the particle, since it will always be in a superposition of ψleft and ψright, which is inconsistent with (3)—the particle is measured to be either on the left side or the right side of the box. For Healey, (1) and (2) are simply nonstarters, and (3) is obviously true so that the measurement problem is a nonproblem. (See chap. 6 and especially p. 99.) This is because, in Healey's view, quantum theory is prescriptive, and it is a mistake to think that the quantum state describes the world, much less describes it completely. Moreover, in typical measurement contexts, such as in Alice's case, the appropriate quantum state has decohered after measurement, giving Alice permission to apply the Born rule to make probabilistic predictions. There is a determinate outcome of measurement, but it is not entailed or contained in quantum theory. Instead, determinate outcomes are something confirmed by our direct experiences. Furthermore, if the outcome were not determinate, quantum theory would lose its empirical justification. So in order to apply quantum theory, we have to assume that experimental outcomes are unique and determinate (in typical cases). This, again, is difficult to accept as a realist conception of quantum mechanics. It stands in sharp contrast to other single-world theories such as Bohmian mechanics and spontaneous collapse theories that aim to justify (3) from a physical point of view. They seek to derive (3) as a theorem, by applying the precise mathematical equations to the microscopic ontology.For Healey, quantum entanglement is no longer metaphysically revolutionary. State assignments may be entangled and nonseparable in the sense that the complete state of the system does not supervene on the states of its parts. However, it seems that Healey would say that the failure of supervenience has no metaphysical significance but only normative significance. The advice about which state to assign to the whole system does not supervene, in general, on any advice on what to assign to the parts.Healey thinks that Bell nonlocality becomes more digestible on the prescriptive view (chap. 4). Healey does not dispute Bell's proof as a demonstration of the existence of nonlocal correlations, that is, probabilities of events happening in region A may depend on events happening in region B, which can be arbitrarily far away from A. But Healey does not think nonlocal correlations imply nonlocal influences or causation. What Bell's theorem (and the subsequent empirical tests) really shows is that the quantum probability of an event localized in some region must be “relativized to arbitrarily distant places and times” (71). Here it would seem that Healey's suggestion runs contrary to the kind of normal inferences we routinely make in science. It is standard to infer there are some goings-on in the world that account for the nonlocal correlations—some kind of underlying physical mechanism of nonlocal influence. For example, the mechanism is accounted for, in explicit physical details, by the guidance equation in Bohmian mechanics and the collapse mechanism in spontaneous collapse theories. But that is a mistake from Healey's perspective. Quantum theory postulates such nonlocal correlations as reliable prescriptions for agents who want to use quantum theory successfully, and it is a mistake to try to describe in virtue of what such correlations obtain.What are the reasons for accepting Healey's new interpretation of quantum theory? I think the main reason, for Healey, is that it allows us to avoid the surprising metaphysical consequences such as nonlocality and the reality of the quantum state. But at what cost? If Healey is right, then quantum theory is no longer in the business of describing nature. For most people, I think, that would be too costly.What about alternatives to Healey's theory? How do they compare to it? Healey gives reasons for thinking that they are inadequate (chap. 7). He thinks that spontaneous collapse theories are too speculative, and that they do not qualify as “interpretations.” He suggests that many-worlds theories still face the conceptual problems of probability and emergence of macroscopic branches. He notes that Bohmian mechanics faces problems in relativistic contexts. (Interestingly, Healey's objection to Bohmian mechanics is that it would postulate theoretical structure [e.g., preferred foliation of space-time, particle motion, and the universal wave function] that is empirically inaccessible, even though Healey himself postulates fundamental normative facts to be the foundation of quantum theory when normative facts have controversial epistemological and metaphysical standing in metaethics.) Healey does not discuss whether these are more costly than abandoning the descriptive role of quantum theory, but I think he would think they are. It is important to note that all of them are not only candidate descriptions of nature but are also in principle applicable to the universe as a whole, while Healey's interpretation is neither descriptive of nature nor applicable to the universe as a whole, since on his theory, the application of the Born rule is appropriate only when there is environmental decoherence (and the universe as a whole by definition has no external environment to interact with) (227).4As is the case with Healey's previous books, this one contains many interesting and controversial ideas that will generate much debate in the years to come. Above all, Healey should be applauded for writing a clear, accessible, and engaging introduction to the prescriptive interpretation of quantum theory. There are many issues that Healey discusses at length in the book that I do not have space to comment on. Even though we may not agree on the truth of the matter, we can certainly agree that Healey's book will be useful to anyone interested in the intersection of physics and philosophy.

arXiv:2110.12102•The Philosophical Review•Apr 1, 2020•0 citations
Abstract This chapter introduces the central mysteries of quantum mechanics. Quantum mechanics is an enormously successful theory that lies at the heart of modern physics, but there is no agreement on how to understand it. Simple experiments with light demonstrate why: in understanding those experiments, we have to shift inconsistently back and forth between thinking of the theory as assigning indefinite, delocalized, but known properties to a system, and assigning definite, localized, but unknown properties (this is called the ‘problem of measurement’). Furthermore, when we break a system into subsystems, the state of the system is not determined by the states of the subsystem (this is called ‘entanglement’), and simple arguments seem to tell us that the physical properties of entangled subsystems can influence one another non-locally—faster than light. These three mysteries—measurement, entanglement, non-locality—need to be addressed by any attempt to make sense of quantum theory.
Abstract This chapter surveys various proposals to interpret—that is, make sense of—quantum mechanics. We could attempt to think of quantum mechanics in purely instrumentalist terms, as an algorithm to predict observed experimental results. But this fits badly with scientific practice and is probably not viable. We could attempt to modify quantum mechanics itself to resolve the paradoxes, and there are some simple models that attempt to do that: some are ‘hidden-variable’ theories that add extra properties to the theory, some are ‘dynamical-collapse’ theories that modify the theory’s equations. But none of these models succeed in reproducing quantum theory’s predictions outside a relatively narrow range of applications. Or we could try to take the apparent indefiniteness of quantum mechanics literally, and interpret it as a theory of many parallel worlds. The correct interpretation of quantum mechanics remains controversial, but the search for understanding and interpretation of the theory has led to very substantial scientific results and is likely to lead to more.
For over nine decades, quantum mechanics has profoundly shaped our understanding of nature, offering explanations for the stability of atoms, the formation of mole cules, the properties of materials, and phenomena such as light or radioactivity. It is essential to modern technologies—from microchips to lasers—and underpins the physics of elementary particles. Yet, despite its successes, it remains a deeply mysterious theory, confronting a central enigma: why does the quantum world behave so differently from everyday reality? Elements such as superposition and quantum entanglement—which allow particles to exist simultaneously in multiple states or remain interconnected regardless of distance—contradict classical world intuitions. This gap between microscopic and macroscopic behavior has given rise to what is known as the “measurement problem,” raising fundamental questions about the nature of reality. Diverging interpretations have led to two major schools of thought: anti-realism, promoted by Niels Bohr, which holds that reality depends on the observer and their interaction with measurement instruments; and realism, supported by Albert Einstein, which argues that quantum mechanics is incomplete and that eality exists independently of observation. Bohr’s complementary philosophy and Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle were central to the formulation of the “Copenhagen interpretation,” which became dominant in the 20th century. However, the persistent opposition of scientists like Einstein and Schrödinger inspired generations of physicists to seek a unification between quantum mechanics and relativity, culminating in new theories such as loop quantum gravity and string theory. Thus, the debate between realism and anti-realism remains alive, and philosophy continues to play a crucial role in exploring the new foundations of physics.
Preface to the 2nd edition. Preface. Acknowledgements. Reality in the quantum world: The quantum revolutions External reality The potential barrier and the breakdown of determinism The experimental challenge to reality Summary of chapter one. Quantum theory: The description of a particle in quantum theory The wavefunction The potential barrier according to quantum mechanics Interference Other applications of quantum theory Summary of chapter two. Quantum theory and external reality: Review of the problem The ensemble interpretation of quantum mechanics The wavefunction as a measure of our knowledge The wavefunction as part of external reality Measurement in quantum theory Interference and macroscopic objects Can quantum mechanics be changed so that it will reduce wavefunctions? Summary of chapter three. Consciousness: The relevance of conscious observers: What is a conscious observer? Does wavefunction reduction require conscious observers? God as the conscious observer The many-worlds interpretation Summary of chapter four. Hidden variables and non-locality: Review of hidden-variable theories The pilot wave The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen thought experiment Bell's theorem Experimental verification of the non-local predictions of quantum theory Can signals travel faster than light Summary of chapter five. The mysteries of the quantum world: Where are we now? Quantum theory and relativity Where do we go next? Early history and the Copenhagen interpretation A bibliography and some recent opinions A final plea for reality A last look at the wavefunction Conclusions. Recent developments: Models with explicit collapse The Bohm model Many worlds Time and quantum theory A peculiarly quantum measurement Locality. Appendices. Index.
Chapter 1 dealt with one of the deepest mysteries in modern science: how to explain consciousness. This Part deals with another mystery: how to make sense of quantum mechanics. Both involve a problem of reconciliation with the classical worldview, which is one hint that the two mysteries might be related. A second is that, unlike classical physics, which makes no reference to or allowance for consciousness, quantum theory raises the issue of consciousness and its relationship to the physical world in a very direct way. These hints do not necessarily mean there is a connection between the two mysteries, but by the end of this Part I hope to have shown why it would be natural to look for one.
Quantum paradoxes The next few chapters are devoted to resolving a number of quantum paradoxes in the sense of giving a reasonable explanation of a seemingly paradoxical result in terms of the principles of quantum theory discussed earlier in this book. None of these paradoxes indicates a defect in quantum theory. Instead, when they have been properly understood, they show us that the quantum world is rather different from the world of our everyday experience and of classical physics, in a way somewhat analogous to that in which relativity theory has shown us that the laws appropriate for describing the behavior of objects moving at high speed differ in significant ways from those of pre-relativistic physics. An inadequate theory of quantum measurements is at the root of several quantum paradoxes. In particular, the notion that wave function collapse is a physical effect produced by a measurement, rather than a method of calculation, see Sec. 18.2, has given rise to a certain amount of confusion. Smuggling rules for classical reasoning into the quantum domain where they do not belong and where they give rise to logical inconsistencies is another common source of confusion. In particular, many paradoxes involve mixing the results from incompatible quantum frameworks. Certain quantum paradoxes have given rise to the idea that the quantum world is permeated by mysterious influences that propagate faster than the speed of light, in conflict with the theory of relativity. They are mysterious in that they cannot be used to transmit signals, which means that they are, at least in any direct sense, experimentally unobservable.
In this thought-provoking book, Richard Healey proposes a new interpretation of quantum theory inspired by pragmatist philosophy. Healey puts forward the interpretation as an alternative to realist quantum theories on the one hand such as Bohmian mechanics, spontaneous collapse theories, and many-worlds interpretations, which are different proposals for describing what the quantum world is like and what the basic laws of physics are, and nonrealist interpretations on the other hand such as quantum Bayesianism, which proposes to understand quantum theory as describing agents’ subjective epistemic states. The central idea of Healey's proposal is to understand quantum theory as providing not a description of the physical world but a set of authoritative and objectively correct prescriptions about how agents should act. The book provides a detailed development and defense of that idea, and it contains interesting discussions about a wide range of philosophical issues such as representation, probability, explanation, causation, objectivity, meaning, and fundamentality.Healey's project is at the intersection of physics and philosophy. The book is divided into two parts. Part 1 of the book discusses the foundational questions in quantum theory from the perspective of the prescriptive interpretation. In part 2, Healey discusses the philosophical implications of the view. Both parts are written in a way that is largely accessible to nonspecialists. In this brief book review, I will focus on two questions:1. How does Healey's interpretation work?2. What are the costs and benefits of accepting his interpretation?To understand Healey's ideas, we should provide some background for nonspecialists. Quantum theory has been subject to intense scrutiny and philosophical investigations in the last century. There has been enormous progress on several fronts, including the empirical tests about Bell inequalities and the development of several realist interpretations. It has been proposed that what is revolutionary about quantum theory and what sets it apart from classical physics are quantum entanglement and quantum nonlocality. For many realists, it seems that quantum theory describes a different kind of ontology and a different kind of laws of nature. They are introduced briefly below.Quantum entanglement describes the phenomenon that some physical systems have irreducibly holistic properties that are not the logical sums of the properties of the parts. For example, two electrons A and B are entangled when the pair has a quantum state that cannot be reduced to some combination of the state of A and the state of B. Quantum entanglement, a manifestation of quantum nonseparability, is reflected in the way quantum states, which are typically represented by “wave functions,” get assigned to different systems.Quantum nonlocality (also called “spooky action at a distance”) describes the phenomenon that events that are arbitrarily far apart can influence one another and the strength of the influence does not depend on their distance. Quantum nonlocality is a strange feature, and its falsity was assumed in the 1935 argument by Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen for the incompleteness of quantum theory. Remarkably, Bell (1964) proved that if the quantum predictions are accurate, then nature is nonlocal. Subsequent experimental tests since the 1980s have verified the quantum predictions to a high level of precision, reinforcing the conclusion that nature is nonlocal.1Among the realist theories of quantum mechanics, Bohmian mechanics and spontaneous collapse theories are nonlocal. Moreover, all three realist theories, including the many-worlds interpretation, affirm the reality of quantum entanglement. The reality of quantum entanglement follows from the reality of the quantum state. After all, the quantum state is so successful in application. If one wants to be a realist, it seems that the most natural way is to accept the reality of the quantum state and its consequences. But what is represented by the wave function? What is its nature? How does it relate to things in the physical world? Some recent discussions in philosophy of physics concern exactly those questions.2I think the key to understanding Healey's interpretation is to think of it as a proposal for an alternative foundation of quantum theory—a proposal to use normative facts instead of descriptive facts as the foundation and to replace “what there is” with “what we ought to expect” as what is fundamental to physical theory. Healey's approach would sound alien to many people, since it is not realist in any traditional sense. It is common to think that fundamental physics, and in particular quantum theory, is in the business of saying what the world is like (even though it may be difficult to discern what it says). It is true that we can learn useful advice from a correct physical theory, such as:one should avoid falling into a black holeone should place detectors far away from sources of interferenceone should get away from a nuclear explosionone should be almost certain to see this particle decay in 1 monthA correct physical theory may explain the correctness of useful practical advices such as above. Such advices are objectively correct insofar as they are derived from the conjunction of some accurate descriptions of physical reality and some correct theories of human rationality.3 For Healey, that might be a fine interpretation of classical physics, but that is not the correct interpretation of quantum theory. Quantum theory, for Healey, directly offers authoritative advice about what we should believe and expect, and such advice is not derived in any way from some underlying descriptive facts. Still, such advice can be objectively true (unlike the quantum Bayesian's emphasis on subjective epistemic states). The advice has the form “one should assign quantum state ψ to the physical system s,” and “one should have 0.5 confidence in M,” where M is some kind of magnitude claim about the physical system s. On Healey's interpretation, quantum theory is about such advice, not some descriptions about what nature is like. Although the magnitude claims are descriptions of nature, they are not contained in quantum theory. Instead, they are assumed to be the targets of explanation, and they are somewhat prior to the application of quantum theory. However, they will be suitably constrained by quantum theory, and only a subclass of them will be empirically significant.There are many parts to Healey's proposal. To simplify our discussions below, here is a short summary of the key points (mostly from chapter 5):Advice on state assignments: agents should follow the standard practice in quantum physics and assign an appropriate quantum state (e.g., a wave function ψ) to a system relative to their physical situation.Magnitude claims: a canonical magnitude claim has the form “the value of dynamical variable M on physical system s lies in set Δ.” One example would be “the position of the particle is on the left side of the box.” Magnitude claims are assumed in the theory and they are the targets of explanation. (See chap. 5, sec. 2, and chap. 12, sec. 3, for elaborations.)Empirical significance: a magnitude claim is empirically significant if the relevant quantum state the agent should assign to the system has properly experienced decoherence due to interactions with the environment, where decoherence is a mathematical property of the quantum state. (See chap. 5, sec. 2, and appendix C for more discussions on decoherence.)Advice on credences: agents should adopt credences about empirically significant magnitude claims according to the Born rule (setting one's credence about an empirically significant magnitude claim to be the squared modulo of the appropriate wave function).Descriptions of nature: none of the above, except for the magnitude claims, describes anything in nature. However, magnitude claims are not contained or entailed by quantum theory. They are given prior to the theory.Let us walk through a simple example. Suppose our physicist Alice sets up an experiment for the position measurement of a particle s. Alice wants to explain some magnitude claim about the particle's position (say, that it is on the left side of the box). Quantum theory tells her that she ought to assign a particular wave function ψ to the particle. (The magnitude claim about the particle's position will only become empirically significant when the particle has appropriately interacted with the environment such that different parts of the wave function are almost separated into macroscopically distinct regions as described by decoherence.) Her expectation about the (empirically significant) magnitude claim should match the probability given by the Born rule, which is the squared modulo of the wave function at this moment.Many questions arise at this point. For example: What makes a particular quantum state assignment appropriate? It is standard to assume that a state assignment is appropriate or correct in virtue of representational accuracy, that is, the system indeed has the particular quantum state. But Healey disagrees; it is more or less a basic fact, and if we want to explain it we can appeal to the practice within the scientific community, not some metaphysical facts about what nature is like. It seems to me that on Healey's project the correctness of state assignments is a fundamental normative fact, and any further inquiry about it may be a metanormative project. This is certainly hard to swallow for many realists, but it sheds light on how Healey tries to solve (or dissolve) traditional problems in quantum foundation. In the following, we discuss how Healey applies his interpretation to the quantum measurement problem, quantum entanglement, and Bell nonlocality.The quantum measurement problem is often presented as an inconsistency among three propositions: (1) the quantum state is a complete description of nature; (2) the quantum state always changes according to some unitary equation (e.g., the Schrödinger equation); and (3) experiments have determinate (unique) outcomes. Applying this to the above experimental setup involving Alice, we can derive a contradiction. If the quantum state is complete and it changes unitarily, then quantum theory implies there is no determinate outcome of the position measurement of the particle, since it will always be in a superposition of ψleft and ψright, which is inconsistent with (3)—the particle is measured to be either on the left side or the right side of the box. For Healey, (1) and (2) are simply nonstarters, and (3) is obviously true so that the measurement problem is a nonproblem. (See chap. 6 and especially p. 99.) This is because, in Healey's view, quantum theory is prescriptive, and it is a mistake to think that the quantum state describes the world, much less describes it completely. Moreover, in typical measurement contexts, such as in Alice's case, the appropriate quantum state has decohered after measurement, giving Alice permission to apply the Born rule to make probabilistic predictions. There is a determinate outcome of measurement, but it is not entailed or contained in quantum theory. Instead, determinate outcomes are something confirmed by our direct experiences. Furthermore, if the outcome were not determinate, quantum theory would lose its empirical justification. So in order to apply quantum theory, we have to assume that experimental outcomes are unique and determinate (in typical cases). This, again, is difficult to accept as a realist conception of quantum mechanics. It stands in sharp contrast to other single-world theories such as Bohmian mechanics and spontaneous collapse theories that aim to justify (3) from a physical point of view. They seek to derive (3) as a theorem, by applying the precise mathematical equations to the microscopic ontology.For Healey, quantum entanglement is no longer metaphysically revolutionary. State assignments may be entangled and nonseparable in the sense that the complete state of the system does not supervene on the states of its parts. However, it seems that Healey would say that the failure of supervenience has no metaphysical significance but only normative significance. The advice about which state to assign to the whole system does not supervene, in general, on any advice on what to assign to the parts.Healey thinks that Bell nonlocality becomes more digestible on the prescriptive view (chap. 4). Healey does not dispute Bell's proof as a demonstration of the existence of nonlocal correlations, that is, probabilities of events happening in region A may depend on events happening in region B, which can be arbitrarily far away from A. But Healey does not think nonlocal correlations imply nonlocal influences or causation. What Bell's theorem (and the subsequent empirical tests) really shows is that the quantum probability of an event localized in some region must be “relativized to arbitrarily distant places and times” (71). Here it would seem that Healey's suggestion runs contrary to the kind of normal inferences we routinely make in science. It is standard to infer there are some goings-on in the world that account for the nonlocal correlations—some kind of underlying physical mechanism of nonlocal influence. For example, the mechanism is accounted for, in explicit physical details, by the guidance equation in Bohmian mechanics and the collapse mechanism in spontaneous collapse theories. But that is a mistake from Healey's perspective. Quantum theory postulates such nonlocal correlations as reliable prescriptions for agents who want to use quantum theory successfully, and it is a mistake to try to describe in virtue of what such correlations obtain.What are the reasons for accepting Healey's new interpretation of quantum theory? I think the main reason, for Healey, is that it allows us to avoid the surprising metaphysical consequences such as nonlocality and the reality of the quantum state. But at what cost? If Healey is right, then quantum theory is no longer in the business of describing nature. For most people, I think, that would be too costly.What about alternatives to Healey's theory? How do they compare to it? Healey gives reasons for thinking that they are inadequate (chap. 7). He thinks that spontaneous collapse theories are too speculative, and that they do not qualify as “interpretations.” He suggests that many-worlds theories still face the conceptual problems of probability and emergence of macroscopic branches. He notes that Bohmian mechanics faces problems in relativistic contexts. (Interestingly, Healey's objection to Bohmian mechanics is that it would postulate theoretical structure [e.g., preferred foliation of space-time, particle motion, and the universal wave function] that is empirically inaccessible, even though Healey himself postulates fundamental normative facts to be the foundation of quantum theory when normative facts have controversial epistemological and metaphysical standing in metaethics.) Healey does not discuss whether these are more costly than abandoning the descriptive role of quantum theory, but I think he would think they are. It is important to note that all of them are not only candidate descriptions of nature but are also in principle applicable to the universe as a whole, while Healey's interpretation is neither descriptive of nature nor applicable to the universe as a whole, since on his theory, the application of the Born rule is appropriate only when there is environmental decoherence (and the universe as a whole by definition has no external environment to interact with) (227).4As is the case with Healey's previous books, this one contains many interesting and controversial ideas that will generate much debate in the years to come. Above all, Healey should be applauded for writing a clear, accessible, and engaging introduction to the prescriptive interpretation of quantum theory. There are many issues that Healey discusses at length in the book that I do not have space to comment on. Even though we may not agree on the truth of the matter, we can certainly agree that Healey's book will be useful to anyone interested in the intersection of physics and philosophy.