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Cambridge University Press eBooks

Coins and counterfactuals

Robert B. Griffiths

Published Nov 29, 2001• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Quantum paradoxes The next few chapters are devoted to resolving a number of quantum paradoxes in the sense of giving a reasonable explanation of a seemingly paradoxical result in terms of the principles of quantum theory discussed earlier in this book. None of these paradoxes indicates a defect in quantum theory. Instead, when they have been properly understood, they show us that the quantum world is rather different from the world of our everyday experience and of classical physics, in a way somewhat analogous to that in which relativity theory has shown us that the laws appropriate for describing the behavior of objects moving at high speed differ in significant ways from those of pre-relativistic physics. An inadequate theory of quantum measurements is at the root of several quantum paradoxes. In particular, the notion that wave function collapse is a physical effect produced by a measurement, rather than a method of calculation, see Sec. 18.2, has given rise to a certain amount of confusion. Smuggling rules for classical reasoning into the quantum domain where they do not belong and where they give rise to logical inconsistencies is another common source of confusion. In particular, many paradoxes involve mixing the results from incompatible quantum frameworks. Certain quantum paradoxes have given rise to the idea that the quantum world is permeated by mysterious influences that propagate faster than the speed of light, in conflict with the theory of relativity. They are mysterious in that they cannot be used to transmit signals, which means that they are, at least in any direct sense, experimentally unobservable.

DOI
10.1017/cbo9780511606052.020

Related papers

Quantum mechanics

Stephen W. McKnight, Christos Zahopoulos

The behavior of classical macroscopic particles – from baseballs to planets – is governed by Newtonian mechanics as we have described in the first chapters of this book. The behavior of very small particles, on the other hand, is governed by an entirely different collection of equations and rules that go under the name of “quantum mechanics” and these particles are referred to as quantum particles. These rules have analogies to classical mechanics, but are fundamentally different and somewhat mysterious as we discussed in Chapter 8. The fundamental principles of quantum mechanics cannot be proven to be correct. They were developed based on the results of experimental observation, by analogy with classical mechanics, and through the consideration of logical implications of the formalisms used. There is no way to derive the fundamental elements of quantum mechanics, any more than one could predict from first principles that Newtonian forces should add as vectors. On the other hand, quantum mechanics is among the most rigorously tested theories in science, and the predictions of quantum mechanics have, so far, always been in agreement with experiment. In this chapter, we will present quantum mechanics as a series of postulates and examine their implications in application to simple one-dimensional systems. In the next chapter we will examine quantum effects in real systems including atoms, molecules, crystals, and artificially engineered nano-structures.

Cambridge University Press eBooks•Aug 10, 2015•0 citations

A paradox in quantum measurement theory

Andrew Holster

This paper outlines a ‘paradox’ in quantum measurement theory, illustrated with two different types of systems. If this paradox cannot be resolved in ordinary quantum mechanics (as I currently think), it is alarming. If it can be resolved, it can be added to a long list of examples that show the internal consistency of quantum mechanics, and in this case I hope the correct analysis will be an interesting example for students. The immediate paradox involves a failure of Lorentz invariance for measurements on certain types of single particle systems. It seems to show that an absolute frame of reference is required to describe wave function collapse. But if the argument is correct, quantum measurement theory is not merely dependant on the frame of collapse - it is inconsistent, and experimental tests would have to be done to verify whether the apparent non-local effects predicted are real.

•Mar 1, 2004•0 citations

Introduction

David Wallace

The basic thesis of this book is that there is no quantum measurement problem. I do not mean by this that the apparent paradoxes of quantum mechanics arise because we fail to recognize ‘that quantum theory does not describe physical reality’ (Fuchs and Peres 2000a). Quantum theory describes reality just fine, like any other scientific theory worth taking seriously: describing (and explaining) reality is what the scientific enterprise is about. Nor do I mean that we have found solutions to the problem, ways to modify or supplement quantum mechanics so that the paradoxes are removed. I don’t actually think that we have found any very satisfactory solutions in this sense (at least not in the relativistic domain) but that isn’t my theme: even if we did have these modifications, they would be ways of changing from quantum physics, which supposedly does have a measurement problem, to some other theory, which supposedly doesn’t.

Oxford University Press eBooks•May 24, 2012•4 citations

Consistent resolution of some relativistic quantum paradoxes

Robert B. Griffiths

A relativistic version of the (consistent or decoherent) histories approach to quantum theory is developed on the basis of earlier work by Hartle, and used to discuss relativistic forms of the paradoxes of spherical wave packet collapse, Bohm's formulation of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox, and Hardy's paradox. It is argued that wave function collapse is not needed for introducing probabilities into relativistic quantum mechanics, and in any case should never be thought of as a physical process. Alternative approaches to stochastic time dependence can be used to construct a physical picture of the measurement process that is less misleading than collapse models. In particular, one can employ a coarse-grained but fully quantum-mechanical description in which particles move along trajectories, with behavior under Lorentz transformations the same as in classical relativistic physics, and detectors are triggered by particles reaching them along such trajectories. States entangled between spacelike separate regions are also legitimate quantum descriptions, and can be consistently handled by the formalism presented here. The paradoxes in question arise because of using modes of reasoning which, while correct for classical physics, are inconsistent with the mathematical structure of quantum theory, and are resolved (or tamed) by using a proper quantum analysis. In particular, there is no need to invoke, nor any evidence for, mysterious long-range superluminal influences, and thus no incompatibility, at least from this source, between relativity theory and quantum mechanics.

arXiv:quant-ph/0207015•Physical Review A•Dec 5, 2002•18 citations

The Quantum Revolution in Philosophy

Eddy Keming Chen

In this thought-provoking book, Richard Healey proposes a new interpretation of quantum theory inspired by pragmatist philosophy. Healey puts forward the interpretation as an alternative to realist quantum theories on the one hand such as Bohmian mechanics, spontaneous collapse theories, and many-worlds interpretations, which are different proposals for describing what the quantum world is like and what the basic laws of physics are, and nonrealist interpretations on the other hand such as quantum Bayesianism, which proposes to understand quantum theory as describing agents’ subjective epistemic states. The central idea of Healey's proposal is to understand quantum theory as providing not a description of the physical world but a set of authoritative and objectively correct prescriptions about how agents should act. The book provides a detailed development and defense of that idea, and it contains interesting discussions about a wide range of philosophical issues such as representation, probability, explanation, causation, objectivity, meaning, and fundamentality.Healey's project is at the intersection of physics and philosophy. The book is divided into two parts. Part 1 of the book discusses the foundational questions in quantum theory from the perspective of the prescriptive interpretation. In part 2, Healey discusses the philosophical implications of the view. Both parts are written in a way that is largely accessible to nonspecialists. In this brief book review, I will focus on two questions:1. How does Healey's interpretation work?2. What are the costs and benefits of accepting his interpretation?To understand Healey's ideas, we should provide some background for nonspecialists. Quantum theory has been subject to intense scrutiny and philosophical investigations in the last century. There has been enormous progress on several fronts, including the empirical tests about Bell inequalities and the development of several realist interpretations. It has been proposed that what is revolutionary about quantum theory and what sets it apart from classical physics are quantum entanglement and quantum nonlocality. For many realists, it seems that quantum theory describes a different kind of ontology and a different kind of laws of nature. They are introduced briefly below.Quantum entanglement describes the phenomenon that some physical systems have irreducibly holistic properties that are not the logical sums of the properties of the parts. For example, two electrons A and B are entangled when the pair has a quantum state that cannot be reduced to some combination of the state of A and the state of B. Quantum entanglement, a manifestation of quantum nonseparability, is reflected in the way quantum states, which are typically represented by “wave functions,” get assigned to different systems.Quantum nonlocality (also called “spooky action at a distance”) describes the phenomenon that events that are arbitrarily far apart can influence one another and the strength of the influence does not depend on their distance. Quantum nonlocality is a strange feature, and its falsity was assumed in the 1935 argument by Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen for the incompleteness of quantum theory. Remarkably, Bell (1964) proved that if the quantum predictions are accurate, then nature is nonlocal. Subsequent experimental tests since the 1980s have verified the quantum predictions to a high level of precision, reinforcing the conclusion that nature is nonlocal.1Among the realist theories of quantum mechanics, Bohmian mechanics and spontaneous collapse theories are nonlocal. Moreover, all three realist theories, including the many-worlds interpretation, affirm the reality of quantum entanglement. The reality of quantum entanglement follows from the reality of the quantum state. After all, the quantum state is so successful in application. If one wants to be a realist, it seems that the most natural way is to accept the reality of the quantum state and its consequences. But what is represented by the wave function? What is its nature? How does it relate to things in the physical world? Some recent discussions in philosophy of physics concern exactly those questions.2I think the key to understanding Healey's interpretation is to think of it as a proposal for an alternative foundation of quantum theory—a proposal to use normative facts instead of descriptive facts as the foundation and to replace “what there is” with “what we ought to expect” as what is fundamental to physical theory. Healey's approach would sound alien to many people, since it is not realist in any traditional sense. It is common to think that fundamental physics, and in particular quantum theory, is in the business of saying what the world is like (even though it may be difficult to discern what it says). It is true that we can learn useful advice from a correct physical theory, such as:one should avoid falling into a black holeone should place detectors far away from sources of interferenceone should get away from a nuclear explosionone should be almost certain to see this particle decay in 1 monthA correct physical theory may explain the correctness of useful practical advices such as above. Such advices are objectively correct insofar as they are derived from the conjunction of some accurate descriptions of physical reality and some correct theories of human rationality.3 For Healey, that might be a fine interpretation of classical physics, but that is not the correct interpretation of quantum theory. Quantum theory, for Healey, directly offers authoritative advice about what we should believe and expect, and such advice is not derived in any way from some underlying descriptive facts. Still, such advice can be objectively true (unlike the quantum Bayesian's emphasis on subjective epistemic states). The advice has the form “one should assign quantum state ψ to the physical system s,” and “one should have 0.5 confidence in M,” where M is some kind of magnitude claim about the physical system s. On Healey's interpretation, quantum theory is about such advice, not some descriptions about what nature is like. Although the magnitude claims are descriptions of nature, they are not contained in quantum theory. Instead, they are assumed to be the targets of explanation, and they are somewhat prior to the application of quantum theory. However, they will be suitably constrained by quantum theory, and only a subclass of them will be empirically significant.There are many parts to Healey's proposal. To simplify our discussions below, here is a short summary of the key points (mostly from chapter 5):Advice on state assignments: agents should follow the standard practice in quantum physics and assign an appropriate quantum state (e.g., a wave function ψ) to a system relative to their physical situation.Magnitude claims: a canonical magnitude claim has the form “the value of dynamical variable M on physical system s lies in set Δ.” One example would be “the position of the particle is on the left side of the box.” Magnitude claims are assumed in the theory and they are the targets of explanation. (See chap. 5, sec. 2, and chap. 12, sec. 3, for elaborations.)Empirical significance: a magnitude claim is empirically significant if the relevant quantum state the agent should assign to the system has properly experienced decoherence due to interactions with the environment, where decoherence is a mathematical property of the quantum state. (See chap. 5, sec. 2, and appendix C for more discussions on decoherence.)Advice on credences: agents should adopt credences about empirically significant magnitude claims according to the Born rule (setting one's credence about an empirically significant magnitude claim to be the squared modulo of the appropriate wave function).Descriptions of nature: none of the above, except for the magnitude claims, describes anything in nature. However, magnitude claims are not contained or entailed by quantum theory. They are given prior to the theory.Let us walk through a simple example. Suppose our physicist Alice sets up an experiment for the position measurement of a particle s. Alice wants to explain some magnitude claim about the particle's position (say, that it is on the left side of the box). Quantum theory tells her that she ought to assign a particular wave function ψ to the particle. (The magnitude claim about the particle's position will only become empirically significant when the particle has appropriately interacted with the environment such that different parts of the wave function are almost separated into macroscopically distinct regions as described by decoherence.) Her expectation about the (empirically significant) magnitude claim should match the probability given by the Born rule, which is the squared modulo of the wave function at this moment.Many questions arise at this point. For example: What makes a particular quantum state assignment appropriate? It is standard to assume that a state assignment is appropriate or correct in virtue of representational accuracy, that is, the system indeed has the particular quantum state. But Healey disagrees; it is more or less a basic fact, and if we want to explain it we can appeal to the practice within the scientific community, not some metaphysical facts about what nature is like. It seems to me that on Healey's project the correctness of state assignments is a fundamental normative fact, and any further inquiry about it may be a metanormative project. This is certainly hard to swallow for many realists, but it sheds light on how Healey tries to solve (or dissolve) traditional problems in quantum foundation. In the following, we discuss how Healey applies his interpretation to the quantum measurement problem, quantum entanglement, and Bell nonlocality.The quantum measurement problem is often presented as an inconsistency among three propositions: (1) the quantum state is a complete description of nature; (2) the quantum state always changes according to some unitary equation (e.g., the Schrödinger equation); and (3) experiments have determinate (unique) outcomes. Applying this to the above experimental setup involving Alice, we can derive a contradiction. If the quantum state is complete and it changes unitarily, then quantum theory implies there is no determinate outcome of the position measurement of the particle, since it will always be in a superposition of ψleft and ψright, which is inconsistent with (3)—the particle is measured to be either on the left side or the right side of the box. For Healey, (1) and (2) are simply nonstarters, and (3) is obviously true so that the measurement problem is a nonproblem. (See chap. 6 and especially p. 99.) This is because, in Healey's view, quantum theory is prescriptive, and it is a mistake to think that the quantum state describes the world, much less describes it completely. Moreover, in typical measurement contexts, such as in Alice's case, the appropriate quantum state has decohered after measurement, giving Alice permission to apply the Born rule to make probabilistic predictions. There is a determinate outcome of measurement, but it is not entailed or contained in quantum theory. Instead, determinate outcomes are something confirmed by our direct experiences. Furthermore, if the outcome were not determinate, quantum theory would lose its empirical justification. So in order to apply quantum theory, we have to assume that experimental outcomes are unique and determinate (in typical cases). This, again, is difficult to accept as a realist conception of quantum mechanics. It stands in sharp contrast to other single-world theories such as Bohmian mechanics and spontaneous collapse theories that aim to justify (3) from a physical point of view. They seek to derive (3) as a theorem, by applying the precise mathematical equations to the microscopic ontology.For Healey, quantum entanglement is no longer metaphysically revolutionary. State assignments may be entangled and nonseparable in the sense that the complete state of the system does not supervene on the states of its parts. However, it seems that Healey would say that the failure of supervenience has no metaphysical significance but only normative significance. The advice about which state to assign to the whole system does not supervene, in general, on any advice on what to assign to the parts.Healey thinks that Bell nonlocality becomes more digestible on the prescriptive view (chap. 4). Healey does not dispute Bell's proof as a demonstration of the existence of nonlocal correlations, that is, probabilities of events happening in region A may depend on events happening in region B, which can be arbitrarily far away from A. But Healey does not think nonlocal correlations imply nonlocal influences or causation. What Bell's theorem (and the subsequent empirical tests) really shows is that the quantum probability of an event localized in some region must be “relativized to arbitrarily distant places and times” (71). Here it would seem that Healey's suggestion runs contrary to the kind of normal inferences we routinely make in science. It is standard to infer there are some goings-on in the world that account for the nonlocal correlations—some kind of underlying physical mechanism of nonlocal influence. For example, the mechanism is accounted for, in explicit physical details, by the guidance equation in Bohmian mechanics and the collapse mechanism in spontaneous collapse theories. But that is a mistake from Healey's perspective. Quantum theory postulates such nonlocal correlations as reliable prescriptions for agents who want to use quantum theory successfully, and it is a mistake to try to describe in virtue of what such correlations obtain.What are the reasons for accepting Healey's new interpretation of quantum theory? I think the main reason, for Healey, is that it allows us to avoid the surprising metaphysical consequences such as nonlocality and the reality of the quantum state. But at what cost? If Healey is right, then quantum theory is no longer in the business of describing nature. For most people, I think, that would be too costly.What about alternatives to Healey's theory? How do they compare to it? Healey gives reasons for thinking that they are inadequate (chap. 7). He thinks that spontaneous collapse theories are too speculative, and that they do not qualify as “interpretations.” He suggests that many-worlds theories still face the conceptual problems of probability and emergence of macroscopic branches. He notes that Bohmian mechanics faces problems in relativistic contexts. (Interestingly, Healey's objection to Bohmian mechanics is that it would postulate theoretical structure [e.g., preferred foliation of space-time, particle motion, and the universal wave function] that is empirically inaccessible, even though Healey himself postulates fundamental normative facts to be the foundation of quantum theory when normative facts have controversial epistemological and metaphysical standing in metaethics.) Healey does not discuss whether these are more costly than abandoning the descriptive role of quantum theory, but I think he would think they are. It is important to note that all of them are not only candidate descriptions of nature but are also in principle applicable to the universe as a whole, while Healey's interpretation is neither descriptive of nature nor applicable to the universe as a whole, since on his theory, the application of the Born rule is appropriate only when there is environmental decoherence (and the universe as a whole by definition has no external environment to interact with) (227).4As is the case with Healey's previous books, this one contains many interesting and controversial ideas that will generate much debate in the years to come. Above all, Healey should be applauded for writing a clear, accessible, and engaging introduction to the prescriptive interpretation of quantum theory. There are many issues that Healey discusses at length in the book that I do not have space to comment on. Even though we may not agree on the truth of the matter, we can certainly agree that Healey's book will be useful to anyone interested in the intersection of physics and philosophy.

arXiv:2110.12102•The Philosophical Review•Apr 1, 2020•0 citations

Quantum Mechanics: Problems and Paradoxes

L. V. Prokhorov, Alexander Ushakov S., Yury Berdinsky

This book examines a number of problems of quantum mechanics, most of which are not usually discussed. What is the origin of probabilities in the mechanics of the microworld? What is the nature of Planck's constant h? What is the nature of probability amplitudes? What is the wave function? A system of axioms for quantum theory is formulated. A model is studied according to which a classical oscillator in a thermostat can be interpreted as a quantum one. The measurement problem is discussed in detail. For advanced undergraduate students, graduate students, and specialists interested in the foundations of quantum theory.

quant-pharXiv:2605.30067•May 29, 2026•1 citation
Quantum paradoxes The next few chapters are devoted to resolving a number of quantum paradoxes in the sense of giving a reasonable explanation of a seemingly paradoxical result in terms of the principles of quantum theory discussed earlier in this book. None of these paradoxes indicates a defect in quantum theory. Instead, when they have been properly understood, they show us that the quantum world is rather different from the world of our everyday experience and of classical physics, in a way somewhat analogous to that in which relativity theory has shown us that the laws appropriate for describing the behavior of objects moving at high speed differ in significant ways from those of pre-relativistic physics. An inadequate theory of quantum measurements is at the root of several quantum paradoxes. In particular, the notion that wave function collapse is a physical effect produced by a measurement, rather than a method of calculation, see Sec. 18.2, has given rise to a certain amount of confusion. Smuggling rules for classical reasoning into the quantum domain where they do not belong and where they give rise to logical inconsistencies is another common source of confusion. In particular, many paradoxes involve mixing the results from incompatible quantum frameworks. Certain quantum paradoxes have given rise to the idea that the quantum world is permeated by mysterious influences that propagate faster than the speed of light, in conflict with the theory of relativity. They are mysterious in that they cannot be used to transmit signals, which means that they are, at least in any direct sense, experimentally unobservable.
The behavior of classical macroscopic particles – from baseballs to planets – is governed by Newtonian mechanics as we have described in the first chapters of this book. The behavior of very small particles, on the other hand, is governed by an entirely different collection of equations and rules that go under the name of “quantum mechanics” and these particles are referred to as quantum particles. These rules have analogies to classical mechanics, but are fundamentally different and somewhat mysterious as we discussed in Chapter 8. The fundamental principles of quantum mechanics cannot be proven to be correct. They were developed based on the results of experimental observation, by analogy with classical mechanics, and through the consideration of logical implications of the formalisms used. There is no way to derive the fundamental elements of quantum mechanics, any more than one could predict from first principles that Newtonian forces should add as vectors. On the other hand, quantum mechanics is among the most rigorously tested theories in science, and the predictions of quantum mechanics have, so far, always been in agreement with experiment. In this chapter, we will present quantum mechanics as a series of postulates and examine their implications in application to simple one-dimensional systems. In the next chapter we will examine quantum effects in real systems including atoms, molecules, crystals, and artificially engineered nano-structures.
This paper outlines a ‘paradox’ in quantum measurement theory, illustrated with two different types of systems. If this paradox cannot be resolved in ordinary quantum mechanics (as I currently think), it is alarming. If it can be resolved, it can be added to a long list of examples that show the internal consistency of quantum mechanics, and in this case I hope the correct analysis will be an interesting example for students. The immediate paradox involves a failure of Lorentz invariance for measurements on certain types of single particle systems. It seems to show that an absolute frame of reference is required to describe wave function collapse. But if the argument is correct, quantum measurement theory is not merely dependant on the frame of collapse - it is inconsistent, and experimental tests would have to be done to verify whether the apparent non-local effects predicted are real.
The basic thesis of this book is that there is no quantum measurement problem. I do not mean by this that the apparent paradoxes of quantum mechanics arise because we fail to recognize ‘that quantum theory does not describe physical reality’ (Fuchs and Peres 2000a). Quantum theory describes reality just fine, like any other scientific theory worth taking seriously: describing (and explaining) reality is what the scientific enterprise is about. Nor do I mean that we have found solutions to the problem, ways to modify or supplement quantum mechanics so that the paradoxes are removed. I don’t actually think that we have found any very satisfactory solutions in this sense (at least not in the relativistic domain) but that isn’t my theme: even if we did have these modifications, they would be ways of changing from quantum physics, which supposedly does have a measurement problem, to some other theory, which supposedly doesn’t.
A relativistic version of the (consistent or decoherent) histories approach to quantum theory is developed on the basis of earlier work by Hartle, and used to discuss relativistic forms of the paradoxes of spherical wave packet collapse, Bohm's formulation of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox, and Hardy's paradox. It is argued that wave function collapse is not needed for introducing probabilities into relativistic quantum mechanics, and in any case should never be thought of as a physical process. Alternative approaches to stochastic time dependence can be used to construct a physical picture of the measurement process that is less misleading than collapse models. In particular, one can employ a coarse-grained but fully quantum-mechanical description in which particles move along trajectories, with behavior under Lorentz transformations the same as in classical relativistic physics, and detectors are triggered by particles reaching them along such trajectories. States entangled between spacelike separate regions are also legitimate quantum descriptions, and can be consistently handled by the formalism presented here. The paradoxes in question arise because of using modes of reasoning which, while correct for classical physics, are inconsistent with the mathematical structure of quantum theory, and are resolved (or tamed) by using a proper quantum analysis. In particular, there is no need to invoke, nor any evidence for, mysterious long-range superluminal influences, and thus no incompatibility, at least from this source, between relativity theory and quantum mechanics.
In this thought-provoking book, Richard Healey proposes a new interpretation of quantum theory inspired by pragmatist philosophy. Healey puts forward the interpretation as an alternative to realist quantum theories on the one hand such as Bohmian mechanics, spontaneous collapse theories, and many-worlds interpretations, which are different proposals for describing what the quantum world is like and what the basic laws of physics are, and nonrealist interpretations on the other hand such as quantum Bayesianism, which proposes to understand quantum theory as describing agents’ subjective epistemic states. The central idea of Healey's proposal is to understand quantum theory as providing not a description of the physical world but a set of authoritative and objectively correct prescriptions about how agents should act. The book provides a detailed development and defense of that idea, and it contains interesting discussions about a wide range of philosophical issues such as representation, probability, explanation, causation, objectivity, meaning, and fundamentality.Healey's project is at the intersection of physics and philosophy. The book is divided into two parts. Part 1 of the book discusses the foundational questions in quantum theory from the perspective of the prescriptive interpretation. In part 2, Healey discusses the philosophical implications of the view. Both parts are written in a way that is largely accessible to nonspecialists. In this brief book review, I will focus on two questions:1. How does Healey's interpretation work?2. What are the costs and benefits of accepting his interpretation?To understand Healey's ideas, we should provide some background for nonspecialists. Quantum theory has been subject to intense scrutiny and philosophical investigations in the last century. There has been enormous progress on several fronts, including the empirical tests about Bell inequalities and the development of several realist interpretations. It has been proposed that what is revolutionary about quantum theory and what sets it apart from classical physics are quantum entanglement and quantum nonlocality. For many realists, it seems that quantum theory describes a different kind of ontology and a different kind of laws of nature. They are introduced briefly below.Quantum entanglement describes the phenomenon that some physical systems have irreducibly holistic properties that are not the logical sums of the properties of the parts. For example, two electrons A and B are entangled when the pair has a quantum state that cannot be reduced to some combination of the state of A and the state of B. Quantum entanglement, a manifestation of quantum nonseparability, is reflected in the way quantum states, which are typically represented by “wave functions,” get assigned to different systems.Quantum nonlocality (also called “spooky action at a distance”) describes the phenomenon that events that are arbitrarily far apart can influence one another and the strength of the influence does not depend on their distance. Quantum nonlocality is a strange feature, and its falsity was assumed in the 1935 argument by Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen for the incompleteness of quantum theory. Remarkably, Bell (1964) proved that if the quantum predictions are accurate, then nature is nonlocal. Subsequent experimental tests since the 1980s have verified the quantum predictions to a high level of precision, reinforcing the conclusion that nature is nonlocal.1Among the realist theories of quantum mechanics, Bohmian mechanics and spontaneous collapse theories are nonlocal. Moreover, all three realist theories, including the many-worlds interpretation, affirm the reality of quantum entanglement. The reality of quantum entanglement follows from the reality of the quantum state. After all, the quantum state is so successful in application. If one wants to be a realist, it seems that the most natural way is to accept the reality of the quantum state and its consequences. But what is represented by the wave function? What is its nature? How does it relate to things in the physical world? Some recent discussions in philosophy of physics concern exactly those questions.2I think the key to understanding Healey's interpretation is to think of it as a proposal for an alternative foundation of quantum theory—a proposal to use normative facts instead of descriptive facts as the foundation and to replace “what there is” with “what we ought to expect” as what is fundamental to physical theory. Healey's approach would sound alien to many people, since it is not realist in any traditional sense. It is common to think that fundamental physics, and in particular quantum theory, is in the business of saying what the world is like (even though it may be difficult to discern what it says). It is true that we can learn useful advice from a correct physical theory, such as:one should avoid falling into a black holeone should place detectors far away from sources of interferenceone should get away from a nuclear explosionone should be almost certain to see this particle decay in 1 monthA correct physical theory may explain the correctness of useful practical advices such as above. Such advices are objectively correct insofar as they are derived from the conjunction of some accurate descriptions of physical reality and some correct theories of human rationality.3 For Healey, that might be a fine interpretation of classical physics, but that is not the correct interpretation of quantum theory. Quantum theory, for Healey, directly offers authoritative advice about what we should believe and expect, and such advice is not derived in any way from some underlying descriptive facts. Still, such advice can be objectively true (unlike the quantum Bayesian's emphasis on subjective epistemic states). The advice has the form “one should assign quantum state ψ to the physical system s,” and “one should have 0.5 confidence in M,” where M is some kind of magnitude claim about the physical system s. On Healey's interpretation, quantum theory is about such advice, not some descriptions about what nature is like. Although the magnitude claims are descriptions of nature, they are not contained in quantum theory. Instead, they are assumed to be the targets of explanation, and they are somewhat prior to the application of quantum theory. However, they will be suitably constrained by quantum theory, and only a subclass of them will be empirically significant.There are many parts to Healey's proposal. To simplify our discussions below, here is a short summary of the key points (mostly from chapter 5):Advice on state assignments: agents should follow the standard practice in quantum physics and assign an appropriate quantum state (e.g., a wave function ψ) to a system relative to their physical situation.Magnitude claims: a canonical magnitude claim has the form “the value of dynamical variable M on physical system s lies in set Δ.” One example would be “the position of the particle is on the left side of the box.” Magnitude claims are assumed in the theory and they are the targets of explanation. (See chap. 5, sec. 2, and chap. 12, sec. 3, for elaborations.)Empirical significance: a magnitude claim is empirically significant if the relevant quantum state the agent should assign to the system has properly experienced decoherence due to interactions with the environment, where decoherence is a mathematical property of the quantum state. (See chap. 5, sec. 2, and appendix C for more discussions on decoherence.)Advice on credences: agents should adopt credences about empirically significant magnitude claims according to the Born rule (setting one's credence about an empirically significant magnitude claim to be the squared modulo of the appropriate wave function).Descriptions of nature: none of the above, except for the magnitude claims, describes anything in nature. However, magnitude claims are not contained or entailed by quantum theory. They are given prior to the theory.Let us walk through a simple example. Suppose our physicist Alice sets up an experiment for the position measurement of a particle s. Alice wants to explain some magnitude claim about the particle's position (say, that it is on the left side of the box). Quantum theory tells her that she ought to assign a particular wave function ψ to the particle. (The magnitude claim about the particle's position will only become empirically significant when the particle has appropriately interacted with the environment such that different parts of the wave function are almost separated into macroscopically distinct regions as described by decoherence.) Her expectation about the (empirically significant) magnitude claim should match the probability given by the Born rule, which is the squared modulo of the wave function at this moment.Many questions arise at this point. For example: What makes a particular quantum state assignment appropriate? It is standard to assume that a state assignment is appropriate or correct in virtue of representational accuracy, that is, the system indeed has the particular quantum state. But Healey disagrees; it is more or less a basic fact, and if we want to explain it we can appeal to the practice within the scientific community, not some metaphysical facts about what nature is like. It seems to me that on Healey's project the correctness of state assignments is a fundamental normative fact, and any further inquiry about it may be a metanormative project. This is certainly hard to swallow for many realists, but it sheds light on how Healey tries to solve (or dissolve) traditional problems in quantum foundation. In the following, we discuss how Healey applies his interpretation to the quantum measurement problem, quantum entanglement, and Bell nonlocality.The quantum measurement problem is often presented as an inconsistency among three propositions: (1) the quantum state is a complete description of nature; (2) the quantum state always changes according to some unitary equation (e.g., the Schrödinger equation); and (3) experiments have determinate (unique) outcomes. Applying this to the above experimental setup involving Alice, we can derive a contradiction. If the quantum state is complete and it changes unitarily, then quantum theory implies there is no determinate outcome of the position measurement of the particle, since it will always be in a superposition of ψleft and ψright, which is inconsistent with (3)—the particle is measured to be either on the left side or the right side of the box. For Healey, (1) and (2) are simply nonstarters, and (3) is obviously true so that the measurement problem is a nonproblem. (See chap. 6 and especially p. 99.) This is because, in Healey's view, quantum theory is prescriptive, and it is a mistake to think that the quantum state describes the world, much less describes it completely. Moreover, in typical measurement contexts, such as in Alice's case, the appropriate quantum state has decohered after measurement, giving Alice permission to apply the Born rule to make probabilistic predictions. There is a determinate outcome of measurement, but it is not entailed or contained in quantum theory. Instead, determinate outcomes are something confirmed by our direct experiences. Furthermore, if the outcome were not determinate, quantum theory would lose its empirical justification. So in order to apply quantum theory, we have to assume that experimental outcomes are unique and determinate (in typical cases). This, again, is difficult to accept as a realist conception of quantum mechanics. It stands in sharp contrast to other single-world theories such as Bohmian mechanics and spontaneous collapse theories that aim to justify (3) from a physical point of view. They seek to derive (3) as a theorem, by applying the precise mathematical equations to the microscopic ontology.For Healey, quantum entanglement is no longer metaphysically revolutionary. State assignments may be entangled and nonseparable in the sense that the complete state of the system does not supervene on the states of its parts. However, it seems that Healey would say that the failure of supervenience has no metaphysical significance but only normative significance. The advice about which state to assign to the whole system does not supervene, in general, on any advice on what to assign to the parts.Healey thinks that Bell nonlocality becomes more digestible on the prescriptive view (chap. 4). Healey does not dispute Bell's proof as a demonstration of the existence of nonlocal correlations, that is, probabilities of events happening in region A may depend on events happening in region B, which can be arbitrarily far away from A. But Healey does not think nonlocal correlations imply nonlocal influences or causation. What Bell's theorem (and the subsequent empirical tests) really shows is that the quantum probability of an event localized in some region must be “relativized to arbitrarily distant places and times” (71). Here it would seem that Healey's suggestion runs contrary to the kind of normal inferences we routinely make in science. It is standard to infer there are some goings-on in the world that account for the nonlocal correlations—some kind of underlying physical mechanism of nonlocal influence. For example, the mechanism is accounted for, in explicit physical details, by the guidance equation in Bohmian mechanics and the collapse mechanism in spontaneous collapse theories. But that is a mistake from Healey's perspective. Quantum theory postulates such nonlocal correlations as reliable prescriptions for agents who want to use quantum theory successfully, and it is a mistake to try to describe in virtue of what such correlations obtain.What are the reasons for accepting Healey's new interpretation of quantum theory? I think the main reason, for Healey, is that it allows us to avoid the surprising metaphysical consequences such as nonlocality and the reality of the quantum state. But at what cost? If Healey is right, then quantum theory is no longer in the business of describing nature. For most people, I think, that would be too costly.What about alternatives to Healey's theory? How do they compare to it? Healey gives reasons for thinking that they are inadequate (chap. 7). He thinks that spontaneous collapse theories are too speculative, and that they do not qualify as “interpretations.” He suggests that many-worlds theories still face the conceptual problems of probability and emergence of macroscopic branches. He notes that Bohmian mechanics faces problems in relativistic contexts. (Interestingly, Healey's objection to Bohmian mechanics is that it would postulate theoretical structure [e.g., preferred foliation of space-time, particle motion, and the universal wave function] that is empirically inaccessible, even though Healey himself postulates fundamental normative facts to be the foundation of quantum theory when normative facts have controversial epistemological and metaphysical standing in metaethics.) Healey does not discuss whether these are more costly than abandoning the descriptive role of quantum theory, but I think he would think they are. It is important to note that all of them are not only candidate descriptions of nature but are also in principle applicable to the universe as a whole, while Healey's interpretation is neither descriptive of nature nor applicable to the universe as a whole, since on his theory, the application of the Born rule is appropriate only when there is environmental decoherence (and the universe as a whole by definition has no external environment to interact with) (227).4As is the case with Healey's previous books, this one contains many interesting and controversial ideas that will generate much debate in the years to come. Above all, Healey should be applauded for writing a clear, accessible, and engaging introduction to the prescriptive interpretation of quantum theory. There are many issues that Healey discusses at length in the book that I do not have space to comment on. Even though we may not agree on the truth of the matter, we can certainly agree that Healey's book will be useful to anyone interested in the intersection of physics and philosophy.
This book examines a number of problems of quantum mechanics, most of which are not usually discussed. What is the origin of probabilities in the mechanics of the microworld? What is the nature of Planck's constant h? What is the nature of probability amplitudes? What is the wave function? A system of axioms for quantum theory is formulated. A model is studied according to which a classical oscillator in a thermostat can be interpreted as a quantum one. The measurement problem is discussed in detail. For advanced undergraduate students, graduate students, and specialists interested in the foundations of quantum theory.