Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Oxford University Press eBooks

Interpreting the quantum

David Wallace

Published Apr 22, 2021• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Abstract This chapter surveys various proposals to interpret—that is, make sense of—quantum mechanics. We could attempt to think of quantum mechanics in purely instrumentalist terms, as an algorithm to predict observed experimental results. But this fits badly with scientific practice and is probably not viable. We could attempt to modify quantum mechanics itself to resolve the paradoxes, and there are some simple models that attempt to do that: some are ‘hidden-variable’ theories that add extra properties to the theory, some are ‘dynamical-collapse’ theories that modify the theory’s equations. But none of these models succeed in reproducing quantum theory’s predictions outside a relatively narrow range of applications. Or we could try to take the apparent indefiniteness of quantum mechanics literally, and interpret it as a theory of many parallel worlds. The correct interpretation of quantum mechanics remains controversial, but the search for understanding and interpretation of the theory has led to very substantial scientific results and is likely to lead to more.

DOI
10.1093/actrade/9780198814320.003.0007

Related papers

Demystifying Quantum Mechanics

Ana Elisa D. Barioni, Felipe Boechat Mazzi, Elsa Bifano Pimenta +2 more

Why does such a successful theory like Quantum Mechanics have so many mysteries? The history of this theory is replete with dubious interpretations and controversies, and yet a knowledge of its predictions, however, contributed to the amazing technological revolution of the last hundred years. In its very beginning Einstein pointed out that there was something missing, due to contradictions with the relativity theory. So, even though Quantum Mechanics explains all the nanoscale physical phenomena, there were many attempts to find a way to “complete” it, e.g. hidden-variable theories. In this paper, we discuss some of those enigmas, with special attention to the concepts of physical reality imposed by quantum mechanics, the role of the observer, prediction limits, a definition of collapse, and how to deal with correlated states (the basic strategy for quantum computers and quantum teleportation). That discussion is carried out within the framework of accepting that there is in fact nothing important missing, rather we are just restricted by the limitations imposed by quantum mechanics. The mysteries are thus explained by a proper interpretation of those limitations, which is achieved by introducing two interpretation rules within the Copenhagen paradigm.

arXiv:2106.02161•Revista Brasileira de Ensino de Física•Jan 1, 2022•4 citations

On the multifarious relations between experiments and interpretations in quantum mechanics

Osvaldo Pessoa

This paper explores how experiments influence the reception of interpretations of quantum mechanics, and also other relations between experiments and interpretations in that field. We start by surveying the struggle of different schools of philosophy of science in the 19th and early 20th centuries to adapt to the scientific advances, and then give a brief overview of realist and antirealist interpretations in quantum mechanics. Eight different types of relations between interpretations and experiments are then examined, with case studies from the history of quantum mechanics. (1) Many interpretations agree with all of the predictions of the instrumentalist interpretation, which is a good strategy for survival. (2) Some interpretations make different predictions that are not testable. (3) Other interpretations constitute ‘a different theory’ and are testable, although sometimes this is not anticipated by the interpretation. (4) Some interpretations have generated many variations, by adjustment of parameters or hypotheses, and part of these variations have been tested and ruled out by experiment. (5) At times experiments reinforce an interpretation. (6) Some experiments lead to a refinement of the interpretation. (7) There are experiments that suggest the creation of an interpretation. (8) And there are cases in which experiments are suggested by an interpretation, while not affecting its rivals.

The Philosophical Magazine A Journal of Theoretical Experimental and Applied Physics•Jul 1, 2026•0 citations

A Prolegomenon to the Ontology of the Everett Interpretation*

David Wallace

According to the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics, the apparent paradoxes of quantum theory require no change either in our philosophical attitude toward scientific theories or in the formalism of quantum mechanics itself. Rather, the unaltered theory can be understood as a literal description of physical reality. But the physical reality thus described is one of many noninteracting, approximately classical worlds. These worlds enter the theory not at the fundamental level—they are nowhere to be found in the basic formalism—but at a higher, emergent level; in this sense they are (ontologically speaking) on a par with the ontology of the special sciences.

Oxford University Press eBooks•Apr 8, 2013•23 citations

THE REALIST-INSTRUMENTALIST CONTROVERSY IN QUANTUM MECHANICS

Vincent A. Lazara

My aim in this dissertation is to defend a realist interpretation of quantum mechanics.Firstly, I present considerations based on certain general features of theories in the natural sciences which indicate that realism affords a better account of those theories than instrumentalism.In particular, I consider certain issues surrounding the cognitive status of theories, including the role of models, the status of scientific explanation, and the referential character of theoretical terms.Secondly, I develop a detailed realist theory of measurement based on the notion of quantity terms as designators of objective properties of, and relations among, existing entities.I contrast this with the leading instrumentalist theories of measurement, and I argue that the realist theory is the better account of both the logic and practice of scientific measurement.Finally, I consider a number of objections to realism that arise because of certain theoretical features peculiar to quantum mechanics.In the course of this discussion, I consider crucial experimental evidence for the "dual" nature of microentities, various criteria of reality proposed by philosophers of science, the peculiar features of quantum mechanical measurement, and the status of causality in quantum mechanics.I argue that while certain realist viii ix interpretations of the quantum theory, namely the wave and wavicle interpretations, are unsatisfactory, an interpreta tion which construes micro-entities as existing particles is a tenable account.CHAPTER I ignored the considerations which arise at those more general levels of inquiry, but one can not adequately assess the status of quantum mechanics with respect to both realism and instrumentalism apart from those considerations.In the second two chapters of the dissertation, I shall argue that realist interpretations of quantitative theories in the natural sciences are preferable to instrumentalist interpretations.Then in the remainder of the dissertation, I shall go on to argue that realism is tenable at the quantum mechanical level despite the features peculiar to that theory.CHAPTER II THE COGNITIVE STATUS OF THEORIES transitions from one set of experiential statements to another.This view is in marked contrast to that of the realist who regards such terms as referential.This divergence in opinion between realists and instrumentalists about the referential character of theoretical terms leads to a related dispute over the role of models in the inter pretation of scientific theories.Before contrasting the various philosophical positions on this issue, it will be necessary to sort out different senses of the term "model."Upon inspecting the literature surrounding this dispute, it seems that much of the controversy about the role of models stems from a failure to make such distinctions.I will begin this task by distinguishing between 13 model-structures and model-objects.A model-structure is a definitely specifiable schema of mathematical-logical relationships which is exhibited by and can be abstracted from a set of objects.Any set of objects which exhibits a model-structure constitutes a set of model-objects.With respect to any particular scientific theory, there may be a variety of model-objects that scientists employ for various purposes.For example, in the kinetic theory of gases, one can distinguish the following.Firstly, there is the set of molecules themselves, the theoretical entities which we shall 13.For further detail in this regard, see Henry C. Byerly, "Model-Structures and Model-Objects," British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.Vol. 20, 1969, pp.135-144.i In fact, if one were to make that claim, I do not see how it could be supported without again falling prey to Maxwell's criticism cited above.And if one is simply troubled by the "ontological risk" involved in asserting the existence of theoretical entities because of the tentativeness of the corresponding theories, it should be noted that the risk of being wrong is a small price to pay for the potentially deeper understanding of nature that scientific theories afford us in the light of realist commitments.

•Jan 1, 1973•0 citations

Theories and Interpretations

Olímpia Lombardi

Abstract The purpose of this book is to present an interpretation of quantum mechanics. But what are we talking about when we speak of “quantum mechanics?” Are we talking about a single theory or about many related theories? And what do we mean by “interpretation” here? In this chapter, I will address these questions in an introductory way. Of course, I do not intend to take part in the extensive discussions about what a scientific theory is, what is meant by interpreting a theory, in what situation we encounter equivalent theories, and many other questions related to or derived from these. My aim here is to present some preliminary ideas in a way that I hope will be sufficient to avoid misunderstandings in the following chapters. But, above all, I will state my position as to why, after so many years and so much literature on the subject, the interpretation of quantum mechanics deserves further discussion.

Oxford University Press eBooks•Feb 19, 2026•0 citations

Measurement in Quantum Mechanics: Decoherence and the Pointer Basis

Anu Venugopalan

Quantum Mechanics represents one of the greatest triumphs of the scientific enterprise of the twentieth century. The stunning success of quantum theory has led to many revolutionary inventions and its extraordinary concepts describe the heart of several important real world applications like transistors and lasers. The theory makes accurate predictions about a wide range of physical phenomena and has historically withstood the tests and scrutiny of every experimental investigation. However, inspite of the fact that quantum theory is widely regarded by the scientific establishment as the fundamental theory of nature and is immensly successful and useful, its conceptual framework makes many predictions which are difficult to comprehend “classically. The theory is, pardoxically, powerful and confusing at the same time. Quantum theory’s unusual predictions originate from its basic formailsm which involves concepts like probability amplitudes and the linear superposition principle(Dirac, 1947). The quantum view appears abstract and counterintuitive and at odds with classical perceptions. Many of the conceptual problems of quantum mechanics are encompassed in what is known as the quantum measurement problem(Peres, 1986; von Neumann, 1932; Wheeler & Zurek, 1983). Conventionally, the measurement paradox is supposedly ’resolved’ by forcing a notion of a sudden collapse of the state vector of the system being measured. However, the nature of this mechanism is at odds with the basic tenets of quantum mechanics and hence may lie outside its realm thus questioning the validity of the theory it self. Closely related with the problem of measurement in quantum mechanics is the question of its connection with the emergence of classicality and the elusive boundary between quantum and classical worlds. What is the connection between the ‘classical’ and the ‘quantum’ worlds? Is there a definite relationship? Are classical mechanics and quantum mechanics two mutually exclusive incompatible theories or are they two aspects of the same underlying philosophy? Classical objects are eventually composed of elements of the microworld which can be described quantum mechanically. So, how and where can there be a boundary between the two worlds? In the following section we begin by introducing the quantum measurement problem. In the next section we will discuss attempts to understand and explain away the underlying paradoxes in quantum theory as highlighted in the quantum measurement problem and the question of the quantum-classical connection. From among the various explanations that seek a resolution to the conceptual problems of quantum mechanics, we focus on the ‘environment induced decoherence theory’ an approach that employs the methods developed by several authors to analyse the quantum mechanics of Measurement in Quantum Mechanics: Decoherence and the Pointer Basis

InTech eBooks•Feb 22, 2012•1 citation
Abstract This chapter surveys various proposals to interpret—that is, make sense of—quantum mechanics. We could attempt to think of quantum mechanics in purely instrumentalist terms, as an algorithm to predict observed experimental results. But this fits badly with scientific practice and is probably not viable. We could attempt to modify quantum mechanics itself to resolve the paradoxes, and there are some simple models that attempt to do that: some are ‘hidden-variable’ theories that add extra properties to the theory, some are ‘dynamical-collapse’ theories that modify the theory’s equations. But none of these models succeed in reproducing quantum theory’s predictions outside a relatively narrow range of applications. Or we could try to take the apparent indefiniteness of quantum mechanics literally, and interpret it as a theory of many parallel worlds. The correct interpretation of quantum mechanics remains controversial, but the search for understanding and interpretation of the theory has led to very substantial scientific results and is likely to lead to more.
Why does such a successful theory like Quantum Mechanics have so many mysteries? The history of this theory is replete with dubious interpretations and controversies, and yet a knowledge of its predictions, however, contributed to the amazing technological revolution of the last hundred years. In its very beginning Einstein pointed out that there was something missing, due to contradictions with the relativity theory. So, even though Quantum Mechanics explains all the nanoscale physical phenomena, there were many attempts to find a way to “complete” it, e.g. hidden-variable theories. In this paper, we discuss some of those enigmas, with special attention to the concepts of physical reality imposed by quantum mechanics, the role of the observer, prediction limits, a definition of collapse, and how to deal with correlated states (the basic strategy for quantum computers and quantum teleportation). That discussion is carried out within the framework of accepting that there is in fact nothing important missing, rather we are just restricted by the limitations imposed by quantum mechanics. The mysteries are thus explained by a proper interpretation of those limitations, which is achieved by introducing two interpretation rules within the Copenhagen paradigm.
This paper explores how experiments influence the reception of interpretations of quantum mechanics, and also other relations between experiments and interpretations in that field. We start by surveying the struggle of different schools of philosophy of science in the 19th and early 20th centuries to adapt to the scientific advances, and then give a brief overview of realist and antirealist interpretations in quantum mechanics. Eight different types of relations between interpretations and experiments are then examined, with case studies from the history of quantum mechanics. (1) Many interpretations agree with all of the predictions of the instrumentalist interpretation, which is a good strategy for survival. (2) Some interpretations make different predictions that are not testable. (3) Other interpretations constitute ‘a different theory’ and are testable, although sometimes this is not anticipated by the interpretation. (4) Some interpretations have generated many variations, by adjustment of parameters or hypotheses, and part of these variations have been tested and ruled out by experiment. (5) At times experiments reinforce an interpretation. (6) Some experiments lead to a refinement of the interpretation. (7) There are experiments that suggest the creation of an interpretation. (8) And there are cases in which experiments are suggested by an interpretation, while not affecting its rivals.
According to the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics, the apparent paradoxes of quantum theory require no change either in our philosophical attitude toward scientific theories or in the formalism of quantum mechanics itself. Rather, the unaltered theory can be understood as a literal description of physical reality. But the physical reality thus described is one of many noninteracting, approximately classical worlds. These worlds enter the theory not at the fundamental level—they are nowhere to be found in the basic formalism—but at a higher, emergent level; in this sense they are (ontologically speaking) on a par with the ontology of the special sciences.
My aim in this dissertation is to defend a realist interpretation of quantum mechanics.Firstly, I present considerations based on certain general features of theories in the natural sciences which indicate that realism affords a better account of those theories than instrumentalism.In particular, I consider certain issues surrounding the cognitive status of theories, including the role of models, the status of scientific explanation, and the referential character of theoretical terms.Secondly, I develop a detailed realist theory of measurement based on the notion of quantity terms as designators of objective properties of, and relations among, existing entities.I contrast this with the leading instrumentalist theories of measurement, and I argue that the realist theory is the better account of both the logic and practice of scientific measurement.Finally, I consider a number of objections to realism that arise because of certain theoretical features peculiar to quantum mechanics.In the course of this discussion, I consider crucial experimental evidence for the "dual" nature of microentities, various criteria of reality proposed by philosophers of science, the peculiar features of quantum mechanical measurement, and the status of causality in quantum mechanics.I argue that while certain realist viii ix interpretations of the quantum theory, namely the wave and wavicle interpretations, are unsatisfactory, an interpreta tion which construes micro-entities as existing particles is a tenable account.CHAPTER I ignored the considerations which arise at those more general levels of inquiry, but one can not adequately assess the status of quantum mechanics with respect to both realism and instrumentalism apart from those considerations.In the second two chapters of the dissertation, I shall argue that realist interpretations of quantitative theories in the natural sciences are preferable to instrumentalist interpretations.Then in the remainder of the dissertation, I shall go on to argue that realism is tenable at the quantum mechanical level despite the features peculiar to that theory.CHAPTER II THE COGNITIVE STATUS OF THEORIES transitions from one set of experiential statements to another.This view is in marked contrast to that of the realist who regards such terms as referential.This divergence in opinion between realists and instrumentalists about the referential character of theoretical terms leads to a related dispute over the role of models in the inter pretation of scientific theories.Before contrasting the various philosophical positions on this issue, it will be necessary to sort out different senses of the term "model."Upon inspecting the literature surrounding this dispute, it seems that much of the controversy about the role of models stems from a failure to make such distinctions.I will begin this task by distinguishing between 13 model-structures and model-objects.A model-structure is a definitely specifiable schema of mathematical-logical relationships which is exhibited by and can be abstracted from a set of objects.Any set of objects which exhibits a model-structure constitutes a set of model-objects.With respect to any particular scientific theory, there may be a variety of model-objects that scientists employ for various purposes.For example, in the kinetic theory of gases, one can distinguish the following.Firstly, there is the set of molecules themselves, the theoretical entities which we shall 13.For further detail in this regard, see Henry C. Byerly, "Model-Structures and Model-Objects," British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.Vol. 20, 1969, pp.135-144.i In fact, if one were to make that claim, I do not see how it could be supported without again falling prey to Maxwell's criticism cited above.And if one is simply troubled by the "ontological risk" involved in asserting the existence of theoretical entities because of the tentativeness of the corresponding theories, it should be noted that the risk of being wrong is a small price to pay for the potentially deeper understanding of nature that scientific theories afford us in the light of realist commitments.
Abstract The purpose of this book is to present an interpretation of quantum mechanics. But what are we talking about when we speak of “quantum mechanics?” Are we talking about a single theory or about many related theories? And what do we mean by “interpretation” here? In this chapter, I will address these questions in an introductory way. Of course, I do not intend to take part in the extensive discussions about what a scientific theory is, what is meant by interpreting a theory, in what situation we encounter equivalent theories, and many other questions related to or derived from these. My aim here is to present some preliminary ideas in a way that I hope will be sufficient to avoid misunderstandings in the following chapters. But, above all, I will state my position as to why, after so many years and so much literature on the subject, the interpretation of quantum mechanics deserves further discussion.
Quantum Mechanics represents one of the greatest triumphs of the scientific enterprise of the twentieth century. The stunning success of quantum theory has led to many revolutionary inventions and its extraordinary concepts describe the heart of several important real world applications like transistors and lasers. The theory makes accurate predictions about a wide range of physical phenomena and has historically withstood the tests and scrutiny of every experimental investigation. However, inspite of the fact that quantum theory is widely regarded by the scientific establishment as the fundamental theory of nature and is immensly successful and useful, its conceptual framework makes many predictions which are difficult to comprehend “classically. The theory is, pardoxically, powerful and confusing at the same time. Quantum theory’s unusual predictions originate from its basic formailsm which involves concepts like probability amplitudes and the linear superposition principle(Dirac, 1947). The quantum view appears abstract and counterintuitive and at odds with classical perceptions. Many of the conceptual problems of quantum mechanics are encompassed in what is known as the quantum measurement problem(Peres, 1986; von Neumann, 1932; Wheeler & Zurek, 1983). Conventionally, the measurement paradox is supposedly ’resolved’ by forcing a notion of a sudden collapse of the state vector of the system being measured. However, the nature of this mechanism is at odds with the basic tenets of quantum mechanics and hence may lie outside its realm thus questioning the validity of the theory it self. Closely related with the problem of measurement in quantum mechanics is the question of its connection with the emergence of classicality and the elusive boundary between quantum and classical worlds. What is the connection between the ‘classical’ and the ‘quantum’ worlds? Is there a definite relationship? Are classical mechanics and quantum mechanics two mutually exclusive incompatible theories or are they two aspects of the same underlying philosophy? Classical objects are eventually composed of elements of the microworld which can be described quantum mechanically. So, how and where can there be a boundary between the two worlds? In the following section we begin by introducing the quantum measurement problem. In the next section we will discuss attempts to understand and explain away the underlying paradoxes in quantum theory as highlighted in the quantum measurement problem and the question of the quantum-classical connection. From among the various explanations that seek a resolution to the conceptual problems of quantum mechanics, we focus on the ‘environment induced decoherence theory’ an approach that employs the methods developed by several authors to analyse the quantum mechanics of Measurement in Quantum Mechanics: Decoherence and the Pointer Basis