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Princeton University Press eBooks

Are the Quantum Rules Exact? The Case of the Imperfect Measurements

Bernard d’Espagnat

Published Jul 5, 2017• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Should we doubt the exactness of the predictive quantum rules of calculation? Although this question is sometimes raised in connection with the one on how to physically understand quantum mechanics, these two questions should not be mixed up. It is recalled here that even the first one is stil an object of controversy, and it is shown (a) that in one specific case the arguments put forward in support of such doubts are hardly cogent but (b) that, nevertheless, at least in one specific other context, the question is worth attention. This is the problem of repeated imperfect measurements. Relative to it, a theoretical possibility is shown of discriminating between the thesis that the quantum rules are exact and a powerful theory of which it is proved that it cannot be reconciled with the assumption.

DOI
10.1515/9781400886975-030

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Should we doubt the exactness of the predictive quantum rules of calculation? Although this question is sometimes raised in connection with the one on how to physically understand quantum mechanics, these two questions should not be mixed up. It is recalled here that even the first one is stil an object of controversy, and it is shown (a) that in one specific case the arguments put forward in support of such doubts are hardly cogent but (b) that, nevertheless, at least in one specific other context, the question is worth attention. This is the problem of repeated imperfect measurements. Relative to it, a theoretical possibility is shown of discriminating between the thesis that the quantum rules are exact and a powerful theory of which it is proved that it cannot be reconciled with the assumption.
SUMMARY. — In this article, I examine Einstein's objections to quantum mechanics, with the formalism's interpretation in terms of complementarity as the historical setting. From 1924 to 1927, the period of development of a formalised quantum theory, Einstein raised certain questions that kept him from joining the throng of ardent supporters. Against the theory and its interpretation of 1927, he at first advanced arguments with the idea of eventually finding a flaw in quantum mechanics, and casting doubts upon its pretensions of completeness. Finally acknowledging, in 1931, the theory's coherence and accuracy at describing phenomena, he then tried to put forth objections to the theory's interpretation, which aimed at demonstrating the theory's incompleteness. These arguments culminated in the « Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen » article of 1935, and Einstein repeated them continually until his death. The analysis here calls, of course, for assessments of both the import of Einstein's arguments in relation to physics today, as well as to Einstein's own conceptions where theoretical physics is concerned, but these go beyond the aims of the present article.
Two initially different arguments for indeterminism are often based either upon the Uncertainty Relations or the statistical interpretation of the wave equation of quantum mechanics. Both arguments ultimately involve three factors: (1) the assumption that elementary entities are enough like classical particles for it to make sense to say they are either determined or indetermined, (2) the fact that no exact measurements are possible of quantities supposed to characterize elementary entities, (3) the pragmatic supposition that determinism is false unless exact predictions are theoretically possible. If it is legitimate to use (3) to prove indeterminism, then an equally legitimate argument can be based upon (2) which denies (1). Thus, it is doubtful that quantum mechanics supports indeterminism, though it may show that the concepts of ‘determined’ and ‘indetermined’ are inapplicable to the world.
In recent notes by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen and by Bohr, attention has been called to the fact that certain results of quantum mechanics are not to be reconciled with the assumption that a system has independently real properties as soon as it is free from mechanical interference. We here investigate in general, and in abstract terms, the extent of this disagreement. When suitably formulated, such an assumption gives to certain types of questions the same answers as does quantum mechanics; this is true of the formulas usually given in discussions of the theory of measurement. There exists, however, a general class of cases in which contradictions occur. That such contradictions are not restricted to the abstract mathematical theory, but can be realized in the commonest physical terms, is shown by the working out of an example..
Since the establishment of quantum mechanics in the 20s of this century, the controversial discussions 1 have ever continued about its basis, that is the measurement problem of quantum mechanics. Strangely those discussions are prevailed mainly in the circle of theoretical group, while the experimental physicists who are directly concerned with the measurement, indifferently to the discussion have performed their study works, showing firmly the validity of quantum theory. This curious affair seems to be stemmed from the situation that the discussions overlooked by basing on what quantum theoretic ground the experimental equipments are installed, its sure operations are examined and the obtained results are explained, etc. In this talk 2 we shall aim to make clear the relation between the experiment and the structure of quantum mechanics, and to present some epistemological considerations on the quantum mechanics.
This book examines in detail two of the fundamental questions raised by quantum mechanics. Is the world indeterministic? Are there connections between spatially separated objects? In the first part of the book after outlining the formalism of quantum mechanics and introducing the measurement problem, the author examines several interpretations, focusing on how each proposes to solve the measurement problem and on how each treats probability. In the second part, the author argues that there can be non-trivial relationships between probability (specifically, determinism and indeterminism) and non-locality in an interpretation of quantum mechanics. The author then re-examines some of the interpretations of part one of the book in the light of this argument, and considers how they are with regard to locality and Lorentz invariance. One of the important lessons that comes out of this discussion is that any examination of locality, and of the relationship between quantum mechanics and the theory of relativity, should be undertaken in the context of a detailed interpretation of quantum mechanics. The book will appeal to anyone with an interest in the interpretation of quantum mechanics, including researchers in the philosophy of physics and theoretical physics, as well as graduate students in those fields.