In recent notes by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen and by Bohr, attention has been called to the fact that certain results of quantum mechanics are not to be reconciled with the assumption that a system has independently real properties as soon as it is free from mechanical interference. We here investigate in general, and in abstract terms, the extent of this disagreement. When suitably formulated, such an assumption gives to certain types of questions the same answers as does quantum mechanics; this is true of the formulas usually given in discussions of the theory of measurement. There exists, however, a general class of cases in which contradictions occur. That such contradictions are not restricted to the abstract mathematical theory, but can be realized in the commonest physical terms, is shown by the working out of an example..
In recent notes by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen and by Bohr, attention has been called to the fact that certain results of quantum mechanics are not to be reconciled with the assumption that a system has independently real properties as soon as it is free from mechanical interference. We here investigate in general, and in abstract terms, the extent of this disagreement. When suitably formulated, such an assumption gives to certain types of questions the same answers as does quantum mechanics; this is true of the formulas usually given in discussions of the theory of measurement. There exists, however, a general class of cases in which contradictions occur. That such contradictions are not restricted to the abstract mathematical theory, but can be realized in the commonest physical terms, is shown by the working out of an example..
In this paper, we shall show how the theory of measurements is to be understood from the point of view of a physical interpretation of the quantum theory in terms of "hidden" variables, developed in a previous paper. We find that in principle, these "hidden" variables determine the precise results of each individual measurement process. In practice, however, in measurements that we now know how to carry out, the observing apparatus disturbs the observed system in an unpredictable and uncontrollable way, so that the uncertainty principle is obtained as a practical limitation on the possible precision of measurements. This limitation is not, however, inherent in the conceptual structure of our interpretation. We shall see, for example, that simultaneous measurements of position and momentum having unlimited precision would in principle be possible if, as suggested in the previous paper, the mathematical formulation of the quantum theory needs to be modified at very short distances in certain ways that are consistent with our interpretation but not with the usual interpretation.We give a simple explanation of the origin of quantum-mechanical correlations of distant objects in the hypothetical experiment of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen, which was suggested by these authors as a criticism of the usual interpretation.Finally, we show that von Neumann's proof that quantum theory is not consistent with hidden variables does not apply to our interpretation, because the hidden variables contemplated here depend both on the state of the measuring apparatus and the observed system and therefore go beyond certain of von Neumann's assumptions.In two appendixes, we treat the problem of the electromagnetic field in our interpretation and answer certain additional objections which have arisen in the attempt to give a precise description for an individual system at the quantum level.
According to orthodox quantum mechanics, state vectors change in two incompatible ways: “deterministically” in accordance with Schr0̈dinger's time-dependent equation, and probabilistically if and only if a measurement is made. It is argued here that the problem of measurement arises because the precise, mutually exclusive conditions for these two types of transitions to occur are not specified within orthodox quantum mechanics. Fundamentally, this is due to an inevitable ambiguity in the notion of “measurement” itself. Hence, if the problem of measurement is to be resolved, a new, fully objective version of quantum mechanics needs to be developed which does not incorporate the notion of measurement in its basic postulates at all.
Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (EPR) have designed a gedanken experiment that suggested a theory that was more complete than quantum mechanics. The EPR design was later realized in various forms, with experimental results close to the quantum mechanical prediction. The experimental results by themselves have no bearing on the EPR claim that quantum mechanics must be incomplete nor on the existence of hidden parameters. However, the well known inequalities of Bell are based on the assumption that local hidden parameters exist and, when combined with conflicting experimental results, do appear to prove that local hidden parameters cannot exist. This fact leaves only instantaneous actions at a distance (called "spooky" by Einstein) to explain the experiments. The Bell inequalities are based on a mathematical model of the EPR experiments. They have no experimental confirmation, because they contradict the results of all EPR experiments. In addition to the assumption that hidden parameters exist, Bell tacitly makes a variety of other assumptions; for instance, he assumes that the hidden parameters are governed by a single probability measure independent of the analyzer settings. We argue that the mathematical model of Bell excludes a large set of local hidden variables and a large variety of probability densities. Our set of local hidden variables includes time-like correlated parameters and a generalized probability density. We prove that our extended space of local hidden variables does permit derivation of the quantum result and is consistent with all known experiments.
Since the establishment of quantum mechanics in the 20s of this century, the controversial discussions 1 have ever continued about its basis, that is the measurement problem of quantum mechanics. Strangely those discussions are prevailed mainly in the circle of theoretical group, while the experimental physicists who are directly concerned with the measurement, indifferently to the discussion have performed their study works, showing firmly the validity of quantum theory. This curious affair seems to be stemmed from the situation that the discussions overlooked by basing on what quantum theoretic ground the experimental equipments are installed, its sure operations are examined and the obtained results are explained, etc. In this talk 2 we shall aim to make clear the relation between the experiment and the structure of quantum mechanics, and to present some epistemological considerations on the quantum mechanics.
The standard theory of measurements in quantum mechanics is reviewed with special emphasis on the conceptual and epistemological implications. It is concluded that the standard theory remains the only one which is compatible with present quantum mechanics. Hence, if one wants to avoid the conclusion that quantum mechanics only gives probability connections between subsequent observations, the quantum-mechanical equations would have to be modified. Particular attention is paid to the case that the measuring apparatus is macroscopic and its state vector not accurately known before the measurement.