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Revue d histoire des sciences

Einstein et la complémentarité au sens de Bohr : du retrait dans le tumulte aux arguments d'incomplétude

Michel Paty

Published Jan 1, 1985• 4 citations
Publisher

Abstract

SUMMARY. — In this article, I examine Einstein's objections to quantum mechanics, with the formalism's interpretation in terms of complementarity as the historical setting. From 1924 to 1927, the period of development of a formalised quantum theory, Einstein raised certain questions that kept him from joining the throng of ardent supporters. Against the theory and its interpretation of 1927, he at first advanced arguments with the idea of eventually finding a flaw in quantum mechanics, and casting doubts upon its pretensions of completeness. Finally acknowledging, in 1931, the theory's coherence and accuracy at describing phenomena, he then tried to put forth objections to the theory's interpretation, which aimed at demonstrating the theory's incompleteness. These arguments culminated in the « Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen » article of 1935, and Einstein repeated them continually until his death. The analysis here calls, of course, for assessments of both the import of Einstein's arguments in relation to physics today, as well as to Einstein's own conceptions where theoretical physics is concerned, but these go beyond the aims of the present article.

DOI
10.3406/rhs.1985.4010

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SUMMARY. — This paper emphasizes the evolution of complementarity, in Niels Bohr's successive formulations of this idea, from 1927 to 1939, despite little, if any change in the definition of the concept with time. In the Como lecture, in 1927, Bohr introduced the idea of « complementary descriptions » in a problematic, polemical way. Against Schrödinger' s interpretation, he stressed the « irrationality » inherent in the quantum postulate. In 1935, Bohr again used complementarity polemically, in his reply to Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen. But far from intending it to convey irrationality this time, he meant to use it instead to prove that quantum mechanics is a complete theory. Finally, I will take up Bohr's attempts to apply complementarity to fundamental problems in biology, psychology, sociology, and so forth. I will argue that the introduction of complementarity outside physics was not motivated by an imperialist ambition of the Copenhagen School, but rather inspired by Bohr's own personal philosophy.

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Einstein, Bohr, and Bell

The final form of quantum physics, in the particular case of wave mechanics, was established in the years 1925–1927 by Heisenberg, Schrödinger, Born and others, but the synthesis was the work of Bohr who gave an epistemological interpretation of all the technicalities built up over those years; this interpretation will be examined briefly in Chapter 10. Although Einstein acknowledged the success of quantum mechanics in atomic, molecular and solid state physics, he disagreed deeply with Bohr’s interpretation. For many years, he tried to find flaws in the formulation of quantum theory as it had been more or less accepted by a large majority of physicists, but his objections were brushed away by Bohr. However, in an article published in 1935 with Podolsky and Rosen, universally known under the acronym EPR, Einstein thought he had identified a difficulty in the by then standard interpretation. Bohr’s obscure, and in part beyond the point, answer showed that Einstein had hit a sensitive target. Nevertheless, until 1964, the so-called Bohr–Einstein debate stayed uniquely on a philosophical level, and it was actually forgotten by most physicists, as the few of them aware of it thought it had no practical implication. In 1964, the Northern Irish physicist John Bell realized that the assumptions contained in the EPR article could be tested experimentally. These assumptions led to inequalities, the Bell inequalities, which were in contradiction with quantum mechanical predictions: as we shall see later on, it is extremely likely that the assumptions of the EPR article are not consistent with experiment, which, on the contrary, vindicates the predictions of quantum physics. In Section 3.2, the origin of Bell’s inequalities will be explained with an intuitive example, then they will be compared with the predictions of quantum theory in Section 3.3, and finally their experimental status will be reviewed in Section 3.4. The debate between Bohr and Einstein goes much beyond a simple controversy, which is after all almost eighty years old and has been settled today. In fact, the concept introduced in this debate, that of entanglement, lies at the heart of many very important developments of modern quantum physics, in particular all those linked to quantum information (Chapter 8). Moreover, we shall see that the phenomenon of non-local correlations compels us to revise in depth our space-time representation of quantum processes. These are the two reasons why a whole chapter is devoted to this debate.

WORLD SCIENTIFIC eBooks•Nov 20, 2013•0 citations
SUMMARY. — In this article, I examine Einstein's objections to quantum mechanics, with the formalism's interpretation in terms of complementarity as the historical setting. From 1924 to 1927, the period of development of a formalised quantum theory, Einstein raised certain questions that kept him from joining the throng of ardent supporters. Against the theory and its interpretation of 1927, he at first advanced arguments with the idea of eventually finding a flaw in quantum mechanics, and casting doubts upon its pretensions of completeness. Finally acknowledging, in 1931, the theory's coherence and accuracy at describing phenomena, he then tried to put forth objections to the theory's interpretation, which aimed at demonstrating the theory's incompleteness. These arguments culminated in the « Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen » article of 1935, and Einstein repeated them continually until his death. The analysis here calls, of course, for assessments of both the import of Einstein's arguments in relation to physics today, as well as to Einstein's own conceptions where theoretical physics is concerned, but these go beyond the aims of the present article.
SUMMARY. — This paper emphasizes the evolution of complementarity, in Niels Bohr's successive formulations of this idea, from 1927 to 1939, despite little, if any change in the definition of the concept with time. In the Como lecture, in 1927, Bohr introduced the idea of « complementary descriptions » in a problematic, polemical way. Against Schrödinger' s interpretation, he stressed the « irrationality » inherent in the quantum postulate. In 1935, Bohr again used complementarity polemically, in his reply to Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen. But far from intending it to convey irrationality this time, he meant to use it instead to prove that quantum mechanics is a complete theory. Finally, I will take up Bohr's attempts to apply complementarity to fundamental problems in biology, psychology, sociology, and so forth. I will argue that the introduction of complementarity outside physics was not motivated by an imperialist ambition of the Copenhagen School, but rather inspired by Bohr's own personal philosophy.
From a phenomenological and experimental viewpoint, quantum mechanics is remarkably successful in explaining effects and processes in the microscopic world. Recently, however, a growing body of literature has revisited the theory's own formal foundations, specifically addressing issues of self-consistency and completeness. As a major historical example of these foundational challenges, the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) argument famously claimed that the theory is incomplete. While many valid criticisms and refutations of the EPR logic exist, they generally rely on a combination of technical results and conceptual objections to EPR's interpretive assumptions, thus transcending the plain quantum framework itself. Motivated by these trends of examining the theory's structural limits, here we revisit the EPR argument. Focusing on elements essential to the EPR reasoning, we first analyze general quantum correlations for EPR states: (i) the fact that their observables are always associated with non-commuting operators, and (ii) the nature of the correlated information obtained through measurement. From these two points alone, and relying strictly on the core rules of quantum mechanics, we demonstrate how to overturn the alleged EPR incompleteness without invoking any extraneous propositions. Consequently, we show that the standard formalism alone suffices to resolve such type of skepticism regarding the theory's physical reach. This offers, at least in a paradigmatic instance, a powerful indication of a structurally well-founded, self-consistent quantum theory.
After the discovery of quantum mechanics by Heisenberg and Schrödinger in 1925, Einstein raised again and again objections to this theory. Obviously, he had the impression that (a) quantum mechanics does not adequately grasp reality, that it is (b) based on probabilistic laws of nature and that it is (c) for this reason incomplete. Einstein must have obtained this impression from many presentations of quantum mechanics in the first decade after its discovery. -- However, technical refutations of Einstein's objections were not possible when these arguments were put forward, since the necessary formal tools were not yet available at this time. Instead, the advocates of quantum mechanics tried to disprove Einstein merely by intuitive and less rigorous arguments. -- In the light of current physics we find that the objections (a) and (b) are irrelevant since, in accordance with Einstein's intentions, quantum mechanics does refer to reality and is not based on probabilistic laws. Only the incompleteness argument is incorrect. However, for technical reasons a convincing refutation of this objection only became possible thirty years after its formulation and ten years after Einstein's death.
This article explores Bohr's argument, advanced under the heading of 'complementarity,' concerning quantum phenomena and quantum mechanics, and its physical and philosophical implications.In Bohr, the term complementarity designates both a particular concept and an overall interpretation of quantum phenomena and quantum mechanics, in part grounded in this concept.While the argument of this article is primarily philosophical, it will also address, historically, the development and transformations of Bohr's thinking, under the impact of the development of quantum theory and Bohr's confrontation with Einstein, especially their exchange concerning the EPR experiment, proposed by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen in 1935.Bohr's interpretation was progressively characterized by a more radical epistemology, in its ultimate form, which was developed in the 1930s and with which I shall be especially concerned here, defined by his new concepts of phenomenon and atomicity.According to this epistemology, quantum objects are seen as indescribable and possibly even as inconceivable, and as manifesting their existence only in the effects of their interactions with measuring instruments upon those instruments, effects that define phenomena in Bohr's sense.The absence of causality is an automatic consequence of this epistemology.I shall also consider how probability and statistics work under these epistemological conditions.
Abstract In this book the author looks at the continuing debate about the meaning of quantum theory. The historical development of the theory is traced from the turn of the century through to the 1930’s, and the famous debate between Niels Bohr and Albert Einstein. The book examines in detail the arguments that quantum theory is incomplete, as made by Einstein, Boris Podolsky, and Nathan Rosen; the development of Bell's theorem; and crucial experimental tests performed in the early 1980’s. Alternative interpretations - pilot waves, quantum gravity, consciousness, many worlds, and God - are described in the closing chapter. This book is aimed at graduate and senior undergraduate students of physics and chemistry taking quantum chemistry or quantum theory courses, and other scientists interested in the subject.
The final form of quantum physics, in the particular case of wave mechanics, was established in the years 1925–1927 by Heisenberg, Schrödinger, Born and others, but the synthesis was the work of Bohr who gave an epistemological interpretation of all the technicalities built up over those years; this interpretation will be examined briefly in Chapter 10. Although Einstein acknowledged the success of quantum mechanics in atomic, molecular and solid state physics, he disagreed deeply with Bohr’s interpretation. For many years, he tried to find flaws in the formulation of quantum theory as it had been more or less accepted by a large majority of physicists, but his objections were brushed away by Bohr. However, in an article published in 1935 with Podolsky and Rosen, universally known under the acronym EPR, Einstein thought he had identified a difficulty in the by then standard interpretation. Bohr’s obscure, and in part beyond the point, answer showed that Einstein had hit a sensitive target. Nevertheless, until 1964, the so-called Bohr–Einstein debate stayed uniquely on a philosophical level, and it was actually forgotten by most physicists, as the few of them aware of it thought it had no practical implication. In 1964, the Northern Irish physicist John Bell realized that the assumptions contained in the EPR article could be tested experimentally. These assumptions led to inequalities, the Bell inequalities, which were in contradiction with quantum mechanical predictions: as we shall see later on, it is extremely likely that the assumptions of the EPR article are not consistent with experiment, which, on the contrary, vindicates the predictions of quantum physics. In Section 3.2, the origin of Bell’s inequalities will be explained with an intuitive example, then they will be compared with the predictions of quantum theory in Section 3.3, and finally their experimental status will be reviewed in Section 3.4. The debate between Bohr and Einstein goes much beyond a simple controversy, which is after all almost eighty years old and has been settled today. In fact, the concept introduced in this debate, that of entanglement, lies at the heart of many very important developments of modern quantum physics, in particular all those linked to quantum information (Chapter 8). Moreover, we shall see that the phenomenon of non-local correlations compels us to revise in depth our space-time representation of quantum processes. These are the two reasons why a whole chapter is devoted to this debate.