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How Bayesian Probability Might Help Provide a Realist Interpretation of the Quantum Formalism

John Hemp

Published Aug 1, 2019• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

We offer a realist interpretation of non-relativistic quantum mechanics in which dynamical properties are properly possessed by the system in question, and are supposed to have definite values at any time. Like the QBists, we employ Bayesian probability, but we adopt something closer to the Bayesian statistics of E. T. Jaynes than to the subjective Bayesian statistics of B. de Fenetti employed by the QBists. Accordingly, we view calculated Bayesian probabilities as rational degrees of expectation of dynamical property values rather than as personal degrees of expectation of future (measurement) experiences. Probabilities are, for us, based on knowledge of the value of some dynamical property of the system, not on knowledge of previous experiences unassociated with system dynamical properties. As some Bayesians might, we take a probability equal to 1 not generally to indicate certainty but only (full) expectation; and we disallow probabilities of conjunctions of propositions claiming incompatible properties. Then, by reinterpreting and adding a little to the quantum formalism, we argue that we can maintain the advantages of the QBist interpretation. So, for us (as for the QBists), there is no unexplained collapse of the wave function, no need for ‘spooky action at a distance’, and no problem raised by the double slit experiment, the Kochen-Specker paradox or Bell type theorems. By holding on to a realist perspective, modelling (of ideal measurements, of system preparation processes etc.) is possible, and we can claim certain dynamical laws of quantum mechanics without leading to contradiction.

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Changing the Logic of Science. a Bayesian Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics

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Abstract In the 1950s and 1960s it was causing interest among physicists that in the formalism of quantum mechanics (complex-valued) ‘probability amplitudes’ obeyed laws similar to the laws obeyed by probabilities in the ordinary probability calculus. But this did not then lead decisively to the claim that probabilities should be represented by complex numbers. It became fashionable instead to regard probability amplitudes as an abstract concept from which actual probabilities could be derived by taking the squared moduli of the amplitudes. In this monograph, however, we make another attempt to show how probability amplitudes might after all be identified with actual probabilities. To do this, probability itself is interpreted in a rational Bayesian manner (i.e. as an extension of logic) and a new (complex-valued) probability theory is formulated that incorporates the uncertainty principle (i.e. that takes account of the fact that acquisition of knowledge of a quantum mechanical process generally interferes with it). Taking this probability theory as the new logic of science, and assuming certain physical laws and properties of matter, an interpretation of non-relativistic quantum mechanics is built up. It is consistent with the usual quantum mechanical formalism but allows a clear distinction to be made between the physical world and our knowledge of it.

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Why I am not a QBist

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Quantum Bayesianism, or QBism, is a recent development of the epistemic view of quantum states, according to which the state vector represents knowledge about a quantum system, rather than the true state of the system. QBism explicitly adopts the subjective view of probability, wherein probability assignments express an agent’s personal degrees of belief about an event. QBists claim that most if not all conceptual problems of quantum mechanics vanish if we simply take a proper epistemic and probabilistic perspective. Although this judgement is largely subjective and logically consistent, I explain why I do not share it.

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Quantum Probabilities Are Objective Degrees of Epistemic Justification

Philipp Berghofer

QBism is currently one of the most widely discussed 'subjective' interpretations of quantum mechanics. Its key move is to say that quantum probabilities are personalist Bayesian probabilities and that the quantum state represents subjective degrees of belief. Even probability-one predictions are considered subjective assignments expressing the agent's highest possible degree of certainty about what they will experience next. For most philosophers and physicists this means that QBism is simply too subjective. Even those who agree with QBism that the wave function should not be reified and that we should look for alternatives to standard Psi-ontic interpretations often argue that QBism must be abandoned because it detaches science from objectivity. The problem is that from the QBist perspective it is hard to see how objectivity could enter science. In this paper, I introduce and motivate an interpretation of quantum mechanics that takes QBism as a starting point, is consistent with all its virtues, but allows objectivity to enter from the get-go. This is the view that quantum probabilities should be understood as objective degrees of epistemic justification.

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I consider the "Quantum Bayesian" view of quantum theory as expounded in a 2006 paper of Caves, Fuchs, and Schack. I argue that one can accept a generally personalist, decision-theoretic view of probability, including probability as manifested in quantum physics, while nevertheless accepting that in some situations, including some in quantum physics, probabilities may in a useful sense be thought of as objectively correct. This includes situations in which the ascription of a quantum state should be thought of as objectively correct. I argue that this does not cause any prima facie objectionable sort of action at a distance, though it may involve adopting the attitude that certain dispositional properties of things are not "localized" at those things. Whether this insouciant view of nonlocality and objectivity can survive more detailed analysis is a matter for further investigation.

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Quantum State Analysis : Probability theory as logic in Quantum mechanics

Anders Månsson

Quantum mechanics is basically a mathematical recipe on how to construct physical models. Historically its origin and main domain of application has been in the microscopic regime, although it strictly seen constitutes a general mathematical framework not limited to this regime. Since it is a statistical theory, the meaning and role of probabilities in it need to be defined and understood in order to gain an understanding of the predictions and validity of quantum mechanics. The interpretational problems of quantum mechanics are also connected with the interpretation of the concept of probability. In this thesis the use of probability theory as extended logic, in particular in the way it was presented by E. T. Jaynes, will be central. With this interpretation of probabilities they become a subjective notion, always dependent on one's state of knowledge or the context in which they are assigned, which has consequences on how things are to be viewed, understood and tackled in quantum mechanics. For instance, the statistical operator or density operator, is usually defined in terms of probabilities and therefore also needs to be updated when the probabilities are updated by acquisition of additional data. Furthermore, it is a context dependent notion, meaning, e.g., that two observers will in general assign different statistical operators to the same phenomenon, which is demonstrated in the papers of the thesis. It is also presented an alternative and conceptually clear approach to the problematic notion of "probabilities of probabilities", which is related to such things as probability distributions on statistical operators. In connection to this, we consider concrete numerical applications of Bayesian quantum state assignment methods to a three-level quantum system, where prior knowledge and various kinds of measurement data are encoded into a statistical operator, which can then be used for deriving probabilities of other measurements. The thesis also offers examples of an alternative quantum state assignment technique, using maximum entropy methods, which in some cases are compared with the Bayesian quantum state assignment methods. Finally, the interesting and important problem whether the statistical operator, or more generally quantum mechanics, gives a complete description of "objective physical reality" is considered. A related concern is here the possibility of finding a "local hidden-variable theory" underlying the quantum mechanical description. There have been attempts to prove that such a theory cannot be constructed, where the most well-known impossibility proof claiming to show this was given by J. S. Bell. In connection to this, the thesis presents an idea for an interpretation or alternative approach to quantum mechanics based on the concept of space-time.

•Jan 1, 2007•0 citations

Bayesian Probability in Quantum Mechanics

Rüdiger Schack

Abstract This paper reviews arguments for the claim that all probabilities arising in quantum mechanics are Bayesian degrees of belief. The starting point is the observation that there is a one-to-one map from quantum states to points on the probability simplex. Bayes’s rule remains valid in quantum theory, provided it is kept in mind that the outcomes of quantum measurements have no preassigned values. The probabilities of quantum measurement outcomes depend explicitly on a quantum prior whose general form will be discussed. Similar to the classical case, the quantum de Finetti theorem simplifies the analysis of repeated quantum trials if the prior is exchangeable. The Bayesian approach to quantum theory described here solves the problem of the ‘collapse of the wave function’. It also provides almost trivial explanations of a number of phenomena in quantum information theory, including the no-cloning theorem and quantum teleportation.

Oxford University Press eBooks•Jul 19, 2007•2 citations
We offer a realist interpretation of non-relativistic quantum mechanics in which dynamical properties are properly possessed by the system in question, and are supposed to have definite values at any time. Like the QBists, we employ Bayesian probability, but we adopt something closer to the Bayesian statistics of E. T. Jaynes than to the subjective Bayesian statistics of B. de Fenetti employed by the QBists. Accordingly, we view calculated Bayesian probabilities as rational degrees of expectation of dynamical property values rather than as personal degrees of expectation of future (measurement) experiences. Probabilities are, for us, based on knowledge of the value of some dynamical property of the system, not on knowledge of previous experiences unassociated with system dynamical properties. As some Bayesians might, we take a probability equal to 1 not generally to indicate certainty but only (full) expectation; and we disallow probabilities of conjunctions of propositions claiming incompatible properties. Then, by reinterpreting and adding a little to the quantum formalism, we argue that we can maintain the advantages of the QBist interpretation. So, for us (as for the QBists), there is no unexplained collapse of the wave function, no need for ‘spooky action at a distance’, and no problem raised by the double slit experiment, the Kochen-Specker paradox or Bell type theorems. By holding on to a realist perspective, modelling (of ideal measurements, of system preparation processes etc.) is possible, and we can claim certain dynamical laws of quantum mechanics without leading to contradiction.
Abstract In the 1950s and 1960s it was causing interest among physicists that in the formalism of quantum mechanics (complex-valued) ‘probability amplitudes’ obeyed laws similar to the laws obeyed by probabilities in the ordinary probability calculus. But this did not then lead decisively to the claim that probabilities should be represented by complex numbers. It became fashionable instead to regard probability amplitudes as an abstract concept from which actual probabilities could be derived by taking the squared moduli of the amplitudes. In this monograph, however, we make another attempt to show how probability amplitudes might after all be identified with actual probabilities. To do this, probability itself is interpreted in a rational Bayesian manner (i.e. as an extension of logic) and a new (complex-valued) probability theory is formulated that incorporates the uncertainty principle (i.e. that takes account of the fact that acquisition of knowledge of a quantum mechanical process generally interferes with it). Taking this probability theory as the new logic of science, and assuming certain physical laws and properties of matter, an interpretation of non-relativistic quantum mechanics is built up. It is consistent with the usual quantum mechanical formalism but allows a clear distinction to be made between the physical world and our knowledge of it.
Quantum Bayesianism, or QBism, is a recent development of the epistemic view of quantum states, according to which the state vector represents knowledge about a quantum system, rather than the true state of the system. QBism explicitly adopts the subjective view of probability, wherein probability assignments express an agent’s personal degrees of belief about an event. QBists claim that most if not all conceptual problems of quantum mechanics vanish if we simply take a proper epistemic and probabilistic perspective. Although this judgement is largely subjective and logically consistent, I explain why I do not share it.
QBism is currently one of the most widely discussed 'subjective' interpretations of quantum mechanics. Its key move is to say that quantum probabilities are personalist Bayesian probabilities and that the quantum state represents subjective degrees of belief. Even probability-one predictions are considered subjective assignments expressing the agent's highest possible degree of certainty about what they will experience next. For most philosophers and physicists this means that QBism is simply too subjective. Even those who agree with QBism that the wave function should not be reified and that we should look for alternatives to standard Psi-ontic interpretations often argue that QBism must be abandoned because it detaches science from objectivity. The problem is that from the QBist perspective it is hard to see how objectivity could enter science. In this paper, I introduce and motivate an interpretation of quantum mechanics that takes QBism as a starting point, is consistent with all its virtues, but allows objectivity to enter from the get-go. This is the view that quantum probabilities should be understood as objective degrees of epistemic justification.
I consider the "Quantum Bayesian" view of quantum theory as expounded in a 2006 paper of Caves, Fuchs, and Schack. I argue that one can accept a generally personalist, decision-theoretic view of probability, including probability as manifested in quantum physics, while nevertheless accepting that in some situations, including some in quantum physics, probabilities may in a useful sense be thought of as objectively correct. This includes situations in which the ascription of a quantum state should be thought of as objectively correct. I argue that this does not cause any prima facie objectionable sort of action at a distance, though it may involve adopting the attitude that certain dispositional properties of things are not "localized" at those things. Whether this insouciant view of nonlocality and objectivity can survive more detailed analysis is a matter for further investigation.
Quantum mechanics is basically a mathematical recipe on how to construct physical models. Historically its origin and main domain of application has been in the microscopic regime, although it strictly seen constitutes a general mathematical framework not limited to this regime. Since it is a statistical theory, the meaning and role of probabilities in it need to be defined and understood in order to gain an understanding of the predictions and validity of quantum mechanics. The interpretational problems of quantum mechanics are also connected with the interpretation of the concept of probability. In this thesis the use of probability theory as extended logic, in particular in the way it was presented by E. T. Jaynes, will be central. With this interpretation of probabilities they become a subjective notion, always dependent on one's state of knowledge or the context in which they are assigned, which has consequences on how things are to be viewed, understood and tackled in quantum mechanics. For instance, the statistical operator or density operator, is usually defined in terms of probabilities and therefore also needs to be updated when the probabilities are updated by acquisition of additional data. Furthermore, it is a context dependent notion, meaning, e.g., that two observers will in general assign different statistical operators to the same phenomenon, which is demonstrated in the papers of the thesis. It is also presented an alternative and conceptually clear approach to the problematic notion of "probabilities of probabilities", which is related to such things as probability distributions on statistical operators. In connection to this, we consider concrete numerical applications of Bayesian quantum state assignment methods to a three-level quantum system, where prior knowledge and various kinds of measurement data are encoded into a statistical operator, which can then be used for deriving probabilities of other measurements. The thesis also offers examples of an alternative quantum state assignment technique, using maximum entropy methods, which in some cases are compared with the Bayesian quantum state assignment methods. Finally, the interesting and important problem whether the statistical operator, or more generally quantum mechanics, gives a complete description of "objective physical reality" is considered. A related concern is here the possibility of finding a "local hidden-variable theory" underlying the quantum mechanical description. There have been attempts to prove that such a theory cannot be constructed, where the most well-known impossibility proof claiming to show this was given by J. S. Bell. In connection to this, the thesis presents an idea for an interpretation or alternative approach to quantum mechanics based on the concept of space-time.
Abstract This paper reviews arguments for the claim that all probabilities arising in quantum mechanics are Bayesian degrees of belief. The starting point is the observation that there is a one-to-one map from quantum states to points on the probability simplex. Bayes’s rule remains valid in quantum theory, provided it is kept in mind that the outcomes of quantum measurements have no preassigned values. The probabilities of quantum measurement outcomes depend explicitly on a quantum prior whose general form will be discussed. Similar to the classical case, the quantum de Finetti theorem simplifies the analysis of repeated quantum trials if the prior is exchangeable. The Bayesian approach to quantum theory described here solves the problem of the ‘collapse of the wave function’. It also provides almost trivial explanations of a number of phenomena in quantum information theory, including the no-cloning theorem and quantum teleportation.