I consider the "Quantum Bayesian" view of quantum theory as expounded in a 2006 paper of Caves, Fuchs, and Schack. I argue that one can accept a generally personalist, decision-theoretic view of probability, including probability as manifested in quantum physics, while nevertheless accepting that in some situations, including some in quantum physics, probabilities may in a useful sense be thought of as objectively correct. This includes situations in which the ascription of a quantum state should be thought of as objectively correct. I argue that this does not cause any prima facie objectionable sort of action at a distance, though it may involve adopting the attitude that certain dispositional properties of things are not "localized" at those things. Whether this insouciant view of nonlocality and objectivity can survive more detailed analysis is a matter for further investigation.
I consider the "Quantum Bayesian" view of quantum theory as expounded in a 2006 paper of Caves, Fuchs, and Schack. I argue that one can accept a generally personalist, decision-theoretic view of probability, including probability as manifested in quantum physics, while nevertheless accepting that in some situations, including some in quantum physics, probabilities may in a useful sense be thought of as objectively correct. This includes situations in which the ascription of a quantum state should be thought of as objectively correct. I argue that this does not cause any prima facie objectionable sort of action at a distance, though it may involve adopting the attitude that certain dispositional properties of things are not "localized" at those things. Whether this insouciant view of nonlocality and objectivity can survive more detailed analysis is a matter for further investigation.
The Quantum Bayesian view of Caves, Fuchs and Schack is presented, this being a view according to which quantum state assignments are purely personal and subjective, just as probability assignments are for subjective Bayesians. It is noted that the rationale for the approach derives from an interesting conjunction of a general realism about physics, combined with anti-realism about much of the structure of quantum mechanics. More detail of the position is then provided and the important question of how the approach handles the shifty divide between system and apparatus explained. Finally, the view is defended from three common objections: that it is tacitly solipsistic; that it is overly instrumentalist; and last, that it cannot adequately deal with the data that would be experimentally available in a Wigner’s Friend scenario.
QBism is currently one of the most widely discussed 'subjective' interpretations of quantum mechanics. Its key move is to say that quantum probabilities are personalist Bayesian probabilities and that the quantum state represents subjective degrees of belief. Even probability-one predictions are considered subjective assignments expressing the agent's highest possible degree of certainty about what they will experience next. For most philosophers and physicists this means that QBism is simply too subjective. Even those who agree with QBism that the wave function should not be reified and that we should look for alternatives to standard Psi-ontic interpretations often argue that QBism must be abandoned because it detaches science from objectivity. The problem is that from the QBist perspective it is hard to see how objectivity could enter science. In this paper, I introduce and motivate an interpretation of quantum mechanics that takes QBism as a starting point, is consistent with all its virtues, but allows objectivity to enter from the get-go. This is the view that quantum probabilities should be understood as objective degrees of epistemic justification.
We offer a realist interpretation of non-relativistic quantum mechanics in which dynamical properties are properly possessed by the system in question, and are supposed to have definite values at any time. Like the QBists, we employ Bayesian probability, but we adopt something closer to the Bayesian statistics of E. T. Jaynes than to the subjective Bayesian statistics of B. de Fenetti employed by the QBists. Accordingly, we view calculated Bayesian probabilities as rational degrees of expectation of dynamical property values rather than as personal degrees of expectation of future (measurement) experiences. Probabilities are, for us, based on knowledge of the value of some dynamical property of the system, not on knowledge of previous experiences unassociated with system dynamical properties. As some Bayesians might, we take a probability equal to 1 not generally to indicate certainty but only (full) expectation; and we disallow probabilities of conjunctions of propositions claiming incompatible properties. Then, by reinterpreting and adding a little to the quantum formalism, we argue that we can maintain the advantages of the QBist interpretation. So, for us (as for the QBists), there is no unexplained collapse of the wave function, no need for ‘spooky action at a distance’, and no problem raised by the double slit experiment, the Kochen-Specker paradox or Bell type theorems. By holding on to a realist perspective, modelling (of ideal measurements, of system preparation processes etc.) is possible, and we can claim certain dynamical laws of quantum mechanics without leading to contradiction.
This paper offers a critique of the Bayesian interpretation of quantum mechanics with particular focus on a paper by Caves, Fuchs, and Schack containing a critique of the “objective preparations view ” or OPV. It also aims to carry the discussion beyond the hardened positions of Bayesians and proponents of the OPV. Several claims made by Caves et al. are rebutted, including the claim that different pure states may legitimately be assigned to the same system at the same time, and the claim that the quantum nature of a preparation device cannot legitimately be ignored. Both Bayesians and proponents of the OPV regard the time dependence of a quantum state as the continuous dependence on time of an evolving state of some kind. This leads to a false dilemma: quantum states are either objective states of nature or subjective states of belief. In reality they are neither. The present paper views the aforesaid dependence as a dependence on the time of the measurement to whose possible outcomes