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Quantum State Analysis : Probability theory as logic in Quantum mechanics

Anders Månsson

Published Jan 1, 2007• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

Quantum mechanics is basically a mathematical recipe on how to construct physical models. Historically its origin and main domain of application has been in the microscopic regime, although it strictly seen constitutes a general mathematical framework not limited to this regime. Since it is a statistical theory, the meaning and role of probabilities in it need to be defined and understood in order to gain an understanding of the predictions and validity of quantum mechanics. The interpretational problems of quantum mechanics are also connected with the interpretation of the concept of probability. In this thesis the use of probability theory as extended logic, in particular in the way it was presented by E. T. Jaynes, will be central. With this interpretation of probabilities they become a subjective notion, always dependent on one's state of knowledge or the context in which they are assigned, which has consequences on how things are to be viewed, understood and tackled in quantum mechanics. For instance, the statistical operator or density operator, is usually defined in terms of probabilities and therefore also needs to be updated when the probabilities are updated by acquisition of additional data. Furthermore, it is a context dependent notion, meaning, e.g., that two observers will in general assign different statistical operators to the same phenomenon, which is demonstrated in the papers of the thesis. It is also presented an alternative and conceptually clear approach to the problematic notion of "probabilities of probabilities", which is related to such things as probability distributions on statistical operators. In connection to this, we consider concrete numerical applications of Bayesian quantum state assignment methods to a three-level quantum system, where prior knowledge and various kinds of measurement data are encoded into a statistical operator, which can then be used for deriving probabilities of other measurements. The thesis also offers examples of an alternative quantum state assignment technique, using maximum entropy methods, which in some cases are compared with the Bayesian quantum state assignment methods. Finally, the interesting and important problem whether the statistical operator, or more generally quantum mechanics, gives a complete description of "objective physical reality" is considered. A related concern is here the possibility of finding a "local hidden-variable theory" underlying the quantum mechanical description. There have been attempts to prove that such a theory cannot be constructed, where the most well-known impossibility proof claiming to show this was given by J. S. Bell. In connection to this, the thesis presents an idea for an interpretation or alternative approach to quantum mechanics based on the concept of space-time.

Related papers

Quantum state reconstruction and optimal manipulations with quantum information (1996 IOC Prize Winner)

Vladimír Bužek

The concept of a quantum state represents one of the most fundamental pillars of the paradigm of quantum theory.'3 Contrary to its mathematical elegance and convenience in calculations, the physical interpretation of a quantum state is not so transparent. The problem is that the quantum state (described either by a state vector, or density operator or a phase-space probability density distribution) does not have a well defined objective status, i.e. a state vector is not an objective property of a particle. According to Peres (see,1 p. 374): "There is no physical evidence whatsoever that every physical system has at every instant a well defined state. .. In strict interpretation of quantum theory these mathematical symbols [i.e., state vectorsi represent statistical information enabling us to compute the probabilities of occurrence of specific events." Once this point of view is adopted then it becomes clear that any "measurement" or a reconstruction of a density operator (or its mathematical equivalent) can be understood exclusively as an expression of our knowledge about the quantum mechanical state based on a certain set of measured data. To be more specific, any quantum-mechanical reconstruction scheme is nothing more than an a posteriori estimation of the density operator of a quantum-mechanical (microscopic) system based on data obtained with the help of a macroscopic measurement apparatus.3 The quality of the reconstruction depends on the "quality" of the measured data and the efficiency of the reconstruction procedure with the help of which the data analysis is performed. In particular, we can specify three different situations. Firstly, when all system observables are precisely measured. In this case the complete reconstruction of an initially unknown state can be performed (we will call this the reconstruction on the complete observation level) . Secondly, when just part of the system observables is precisely measured then one cannot perform a complete reconstruction of the measured state. Nevertheless, the reconstructed density operator still uniquely determines mean values of the measured observables (we will denote this scheme as reconstruction on incomplete observation levels) . Finally, when measurement does not provide us with sufficient information to specify the exact mean values (or probability distributions) but only the frequencies of appearances of eigenstates of the measured observables, then one can perform an estimation (e.g. reconstruction based on quantum Bayesian inference) which is the "best" with respect to the given measured data and the a priori knowledge about the state of the measured system.

Proceedings of SPIE, the International Society for Optical Engineering/Proceedings of SPIE•Jul 19, 1999•0 citations

A Pragmatist Understanding of Quantum Mechanics

Richard Healey

Applications of quantum mechanics have led to many successful predictions and explanations of puzzling phenomena, and we now apply quantum mechanics to gain, process, and communicate information in novel ways. We can understand quantum mechanics by understanding how we have applied it. We should not seek agreement on the nature of the world it represents, because this theory does not itself represent the physical world (though its applications do help us to represent it better). When applied to a quantum state, quantum mechanics yields probabiities for physical events: both state and probability are objective--not because they represent elements of phyiscal reality, but because each exerts norrmative authority over the beliefs of anyone who accepts quantum mechanics and applies it relative to a physical situation they may (but need not) occupy. These events may be described by statements that are meaningful in an appropriate environmental context, and quantum mechanics can help one to say when that is. Measurement creates an appropriate context, so here the Born rule indirectly yields probabilities of measurement outcomes. The quantum state of a system does not "collapse" on measurement: a new state must be assigned relative to a physical situation in which information about the outcome is accessible. Understood this way, there is no measurement problem, and violations of Bell inequalities does not demonstrate "spooky" non-local action. Quantum field theories have no physical ontology of their own: a quantum field is a mathematical object in a model whose application helps us to improve and extend our descriptions of the world in other terms. We cannot realise the scenario of Wigner's friend and its recent extensions: but the data that provide overwhelming evidence for quantum mechanics are objective in the same sense as the relative measurement outcomes described in those scenarios.

quant-pharXiv:2604.02197•Apr 3, 2026•0 citations

Contributions to quantum probability

T. A. Fritz

Chapter 1: On the existence of quantum representations for two dichotomic measurements. Under which conditions do outcome probabilities of measurements possess a quantum-mechanical model? This kind of problem is solved here for the case of two dichotomic von Neumann measurements which can be applied repeatedly to a quantum system with trivial dynamics. The solution uses methods from the theory of operator algebras and the theory of moment problems. The ensuing conditions reveal surprisingly simple relations between certain quantum-mechanical probabilities. It also shown that generally, none of these relations holds in general probabilistic models. This result might facilitate further experimental discrimination between quantum mechanics and other general probabilistic theories. Chapter 2: Possibilistic Physics. I try to outline a framework for fundamental physics where the concept of probability gets replaced by the concept of possibility. Whereas a probabilistic theory assigns a state-dependent probability value to each outcome of each measurement, a possibilistic theory merely assigns one of the state-dependent labels "possible to occur" or "impossible to occur" to each outcome of each measurement. It is argued that Spekkens' combinatorial toy theory of quantum mechanics is inconsistent in a probabilistic framework, but can be regarded as possibilistic. Then, I introduce the concept of possibilistic local hidden variable models and derive a class of possibilistic Bell inequalities which are violated for the possibilistic Popescu-Rohrlich boxes. The chapter ends with a philosophical discussion on possibilistic vs. probabilistic. It can be argued that, due to better falsifiability properties, a possibilistic theory has higher predictive power than a probabilistic one. Chapter 3: The quantum region for von Neumann measurements with postselection. It is determined under which conditions a probability distribution on a finite set can occur as the outcome distribution of a quantum-mechanical von Neumann measurement with hyphenation given that the scalar product between the initial and the final state is known as well as the success probability of the postselection. An intermediate von Neumann measurement can enhance transition probabilities between states such that the error probability shrinks by a factor of up to 2. Chapter 4: A presentation of the category of stochastic matrices. This chapter gives generators and relations for the strict monoidal category of probabilistic maps on finite cardinals (i.e., stochastic matrices). Chapter 5: Convex Spaces: Definition and Examples. We try to promote convex spaces as an abstract concept of convexity which was introduced by Stone as "barycentric calculus''. A convex space is a set where one can take convex combinations in a consistent way. By identifying the corresponding Lawvere theory as the category from chapter 4 and using the results obtained there, we give a different proof of a result of Swirszcz which shows that convex spaces can be identified with algebras of a finitary version of the Giry monad. After giving an extensive list of examples of convex sets as they appear throughout mathematics and theoretical physics, we note that there also exist convex spaces that cannot be embedded into a vector space: semilattices are a class of examples of purely combinatorial type. In an information-theoretic interpretation, convex subsets of vector spaces are probabilistic, while semilattices are possibilistic. Convex spaces unify these two concepts.

•Jan 1, 2010•0 citations

A Pragmatist Understanding of Quantum Mechanics

Richard Healey

Applications of quantum mechanics have led to many successful predictions and explanations of puzzling phenomena, and we now apply quantum mechanics to gain, process, and communicate information in novel ways. We can understand quantum mechanics by understanding how we have applied it. We should not seek agreement on the nature of the world it represents, because this theory does not itself represent the physical world (though its applications do help us to represent it better). When applied to a quantum state, quantum mechanics yields probabilities for physical events: both state and probability are objective—not because they represent elements of physical reality, but because each exerts normative authority over the beliefs of anyone who accepts quantum mechanics and applies it relative to a physical situation they may (but need not) occupy. These events may be described by statements (about values of magnitudes) that are meaningful in an appropriate environmental context, and quantum mechanics can help one to say when that is. Measurement creates an appropriate context, so here the Born rule indirectly yields probabilities of measurement outcomes. The quantum state of a system does not “collapse” on measurement: a new state must be assigned relative to a physical situation in which information about the outcome is accessible. Understood this way, there is no measurement problem, and violation of Bell inequalities does not demonstrate “spooky” non-local action. Quantum field theories have no physical ontology of their own: a quantum field is a mathematical object in a model whose application helps to improve and extend our descriptions of the world in other terms. We cannot realise the scenario of Wigner’s friend and its recent extensions: but the data that provide overwhelming evidence for quantum mechanics are objective in the same sense as the relative measurement outcomes described in those scenarios.

•Dec 1, 2025•0 citations

The Quantum Mechanical Formalism Derived from the Probabilistic Nature of Quantitative Physical Predictions

Hans Rudolf Tschudi

It is a scientific truism nowadays that quantum mechanical predictions are of statistical or rather of probabilistic nature: a quantum theory assigns a probability distribution to each measurable quantity (observable) of a physical system prepared according to a given preparation prescription (state). Such sets of probability distributions represent the most general quantitative predictions of physical theories. The aim of this study is to determine all theoretical frameworks which yield such a kind of output taking the probabilistic nature of quantitative physical predictions as initial hypothesis. Astonishingly, this project succeeds with a minimal number of additional assumptions, which arise quite naturally in the course of the analysis, and which essentially amount to regularity conditions. The result is that there exist only two classes of physical theories providing quantitative probabilistic predictions: classical theories where observables are represented by real functions over a phase space and states are represented by probability measures upon the phase space, and quantum theories where observables are represented by selfadjoint operators acting on a complex Hilbert space and states are represented by state operators. On empirical grounds, classical theories cannot provide the all-encompassing, fundamental frame for the mathematical description of physical systems. Quantum theories remain, and there is no more complete formal frame for quantitative physical theories. As an additional result, it is shown that there exist physical systems which possess a quantum mechanical but no classical description; a prominent example is the spin system of two spin-1/2 particles. The classical hidden variables model, which J. Bell relates to this system in order to prove his theorem, cannot be a true description of it because no such classical model exists, and Bell's theorem loses its foundation.

•Mar 5, 2026•0 citations

Reviews of quantum foundations

L. E. Ballentine

I enjoyed the February 2019 issue of Physics Today on Reviews of Modern Physics at 90 but was disappointed with the article “Quantum foundations” by David DiVincenzo and Christopher Fuchs (page 50). The most useful part of that article was the reference list, which shows RMP’s diversity of papers on the subject. My 1970 article on the statistical-ensemble interpretation of quantum mechanics (QM),11. L. E. Ballentine, Rev. Mod. Phys. 42, 358 (1970). https://doi.org/10.1103/RevModPhys.42.358 which people tell me has encouraged them to continue research on quantum foundations (QF), was omitted from the list.Unfortunately, DiVincenzo and Fuchs continue to mystify measurement in QM, as if it were some deep philosophical concept that must be treated before QM has even been fully formulated. They assert that “physicists and philosophers are still debating what a ‘measurement’ really means.” What is important for QF is not the meaning of the word but an understanding of the physical process. The authors do not cite any of the published papers that provide such an understanding. And they give too much attention to two marginal interpretations: the many-worlds interpretation (MWI) and quantum Bayesianism (QBism).In QM, a measurement of an observable should yield an eigenvalue of the observable. If the initial state of the measured object is a superposition of eigenstates corresponding to different eigenvalues, then the interaction of the measurement apparatus with the object will lead to a final state of the whole system—measured object plus apparatus—that is a superposition of different measurement results. The squared amplitude of each term yields the probability of obtaining that result in an individual measurement. That statistical prediction, the Born rule, is common to the Copenhagen and statistical-ensemble interpretations. But the MWI takes a radically different turn. It postulates that the universe branches into several parallel worlds, with each term of the superposition corresponding to the unique result of the measurement in one branch world.The usual role of an interpretation of QM is to begin with the established mathematical formalism and provide an intuitively comprehensible idea of the physical process that the math describes. The MWI does not do that. Instead, it adds a mysterious process of world-splitting, a strange new cosmology that is alien to the mathematics of QM and not really an interpretation of QM at all. A typical QM measurement, such as that of a spin component in the Stern–Gerlach experiment, is a local and very low energy event. It is not credible that the measurement could have the huge cosmological effect of bifurcating the universe.When I first heard of the world-splitting assumed in the MWI, I went back to Hugh Everett’s paper22. H. Everett III, Rev. Mod. Phys. 29, 454 (1957). https://doi.org/10.1103/RevModPhys.29.454 to see if he had really said anything so absurd. I found that he had not said so explicitly, but he sometimes used words that could be interpreted in more than one way. The MWI is a possible interpretation of them, but not the most natural one, so I thought. And Everett’s framework still has value even without resorting to the MWI’s world-splitting. His concept of a “relative state” is useful, for instance, and he is correct in rejecting the notion of the quantum state “collapsing” after a measurement.QBism begins with the assumption that all kinds of probability can be regarded as subjective Bayesian probabilities. That assumption can be maintained only by ignoring the literature on interpretations of probability, from which it is clear that several different kinds—or interpretations—of probability exist. DiVincenzo and Fuchs may have ignored the classic philosophical writings on the subject because they were written by philosophers for philosophers and so do not address the needs of physicists.I have published a paper on the foundations of probability theory, written from the point of view of a quantum physicist.33. L. E. Ballentine, Found. Phys. 46, 973 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10701-016-9991-0 I classify the main kinds or interpretations of probability into three groups: inferential probability, of which Bayesian theory is an example; frequency or ensemble probability, commonly used in Gibbsian statistical mechanics and in QM; and propensity theory. Propensity, a degree of causality that is weaker than determinism, is not merely another interpretation of probability. Its mathematical theory must also differ from that of probability theory, as Paul Humphreys showed44. P. Humphreys, Philos. Rev. 94, 557 (1985). https://doi.org/10.2307/2185246 in 1985. Although the axioms of propensity33. L. E. Ballentine, Found. Phys. 46, 973 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10701-016-9991-0 differ from those of probability, the two axiom sets overlap. Both support the law of large numbers, so propensity theory is compatible with the most useful part of the frequency interpretation of probability.In general, QM states do not determine the results of a measurement, only the probabilities of the possible results. That a state’s influence on the results is not deterministic suggests strongly that the quantum probabilities given by the Born rule should be interpreted as propensities. They refer objectively to the physical system and its environment, not to any agent’s knowledge, so they are not naturally interpreted as subjective Bayesian probabilities.Interpretations of probability may differ not only in philosophy but also in substance. As I discuss in reference 33. L. E. Ballentine, Found. Phys. 46, 973 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10701-016-9991-0, John Bell’s theorem illustrates how local hidden-variable theories are incompatible with QM. E. T. Jaynes was a well-known supporter of the Bayesian theory of probability. In 1989 he repeated Bell’s derivation of inequality but carefully treated all instances of probability as Bayesian. He found that the derivation could not be completed without invoking an extra assumption that was not justifiable in the Bayesian theory. Bell’s theorem involves questions about causality, so it is natural to use propensity theory to treat it. That method is successful in deriving Bell’s inequality.33. L. E. Ballentine, Found. Phys. 46, 973 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10701-016-9991-0Not all probabilities occurring in QM can be treated as subjective Bayesian probabilities. That limitation disqualifies QBism, a Bayesian-based theory, as an interpretation of QM that can succeed in quantum foundations. The initial assumption of QBism is not valid.ReferencesSection:ChooseTop of pageReferences <<CITING ARTICLES1. L. E. Ballentine, Rev. Mod. Phys. 42, 358 (1970). https://doi.org/10.1103/RevModPhys.42.358, Google ScholarCrossref2. H. Everett III, Rev. Mod. Phys. 29, 454 (1957). https://doi.org/10.1103/RevModPhys.29.454, Google ScholarCrossref3. L. E. Ballentine, Found. Phys. 46, 973 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10701-016-9991-0, Google ScholarCrossref4. P. Humphreys, Philos. Rev. 94, 557 (1985). https://doi.org/10.2307/2185246, Google ScholarCrossref© 2020 American Institute of Physics.

Physics Today•Jun 1, 2020•2 citations
Quantum mechanics is basically a mathematical recipe on how to construct physical models. Historically its origin and main domain of application has been in the microscopic regime, although it strictly seen constitutes a general mathematical framework not limited to this regime. Since it is a statistical theory, the meaning and role of probabilities in it need to be defined and understood in order to gain an understanding of the predictions and validity of quantum mechanics. The interpretational problems of quantum mechanics are also connected with the interpretation of the concept of probability. In this thesis the use of probability theory as extended logic, in particular in the way it was presented by E. T. Jaynes, will be central. With this interpretation of probabilities they become a subjective notion, always dependent on one's state of knowledge or the context in which they are assigned, which has consequences on how things are to be viewed, understood and tackled in quantum mechanics. For instance, the statistical operator or density operator, is usually defined in terms of probabilities and therefore also needs to be updated when the probabilities are updated by acquisition of additional data. Furthermore, it is a context dependent notion, meaning, e.g., that two observers will in general assign different statistical operators to the same phenomenon, which is demonstrated in the papers of the thesis. It is also presented an alternative and conceptually clear approach to the problematic notion of "probabilities of probabilities", which is related to such things as probability distributions on statistical operators. In connection to this, we consider concrete numerical applications of Bayesian quantum state assignment methods to a three-level quantum system, where prior knowledge and various kinds of measurement data are encoded into a statistical operator, which can then be used for deriving probabilities of other measurements. The thesis also offers examples of an alternative quantum state assignment technique, using maximum entropy methods, which in some cases are compared with the Bayesian quantum state assignment methods. Finally, the interesting and important problem whether the statistical operator, or more generally quantum mechanics, gives a complete description of "objective physical reality" is considered. A related concern is here the possibility of finding a "local hidden-variable theory" underlying the quantum mechanical description. There have been attempts to prove that such a theory cannot be constructed, where the most well-known impossibility proof claiming to show this was given by J. S. Bell. In connection to this, the thesis presents an idea for an interpretation or alternative approach to quantum mechanics based on the concept of space-time.
The concept of a quantum state represents one of the most fundamental pillars of the paradigm of quantum theory.'3 Contrary to its mathematical elegance and convenience in calculations, the physical interpretation of a quantum state is not so transparent. The problem is that the quantum state (described either by a state vector, or density operator or a phase-space probability density distribution) does not have a well defined objective status, i.e. a state vector is not an objective property of a particle. According to Peres (see,1 p. 374): "There is no physical evidence whatsoever that every physical system has at every instant a well defined state. .. In strict interpretation of quantum theory these mathematical symbols [i.e., state vectorsi represent statistical information enabling us to compute the probabilities of occurrence of specific events." Once this point of view is adopted then it becomes clear that any "measurement" or a reconstruction of a density operator (or its mathematical equivalent) can be understood exclusively as an expression of our knowledge about the quantum mechanical state based on a certain set of measured data. To be more specific, any quantum-mechanical reconstruction scheme is nothing more than an a posteriori estimation of the density operator of a quantum-mechanical (microscopic) system based on data obtained with the help of a macroscopic measurement apparatus.3 The quality of the reconstruction depends on the "quality" of the measured data and the efficiency of the reconstruction procedure with the help of which the data analysis is performed. In particular, we can specify three different situations. Firstly, when all system observables are precisely measured. In this case the complete reconstruction of an initially unknown state can be performed (we will call this the reconstruction on the complete observation level) . Secondly, when just part of the system observables is precisely measured then one cannot perform a complete reconstruction of the measured state. Nevertheless, the reconstructed density operator still uniquely determines mean values of the measured observables (we will denote this scheme as reconstruction on incomplete observation levels) . Finally, when measurement does not provide us with sufficient information to specify the exact mean values (or probability distributions) but only the frequencies of appearances of eigenstates of the measured observables, then one can perform an estimation (e.g. reconstruction based on quantum Bayesian inference) which is the "best" with respect to the given measured data and the a priori knowledge about the state of the measured system.
Applications of quantum mechanics have led to many successful predictions and explanations of puzzling phenomena, and we now apply quantum mechanics to gain, process, and communicate information in novel ways. We can understand quantum mechanics by understanding how we have applied it. We should not seek agreement on the nature of the world it represents, because this theory does not itself represent the physical world (though its applications do help us to represent it better). When applied to a quantum state, quantum mechanics yields probabiities for physical events: both state and probability are objective--not because they represent elements of phyiscal reality, but because each exerts norrmative authority over the beliefs of anyone who accepts quantum mechanics and applies it relative to a physical situation they may (but need not) occupy. These events may be described by statements that are meaningful in an appropriate environmental context, and quantum mechanics can help one to say when that is. Measurement creates an appropriate context, so here the Born rule indirectly yields probabilities of measurement outcomes. The quantum state of a system does not "collapse" on measurement: a new state must be assigned relative to a physical situation in which information about the outcome is accessible. Understood this way, there is no measurement problem, and violations of Bell inequalities does not demonstrate "spooky" non-local action. Quantum field theories have no physical ontology of their own: a quantum field is a mathematical object in a model whose application helps us to improve and extend our descriptions of the world in other terms. We cannot realise the scenario of Wigner's friend and its recent extensions: but the data that provide overwhelming evidence for quantum mechanics are objective in the same sense as the relative measurement outcomes described in those scenarios.
Chapter 1: On the existence of quantum representations for two dichotomic measurements. Under which conditions do outcome probabilities of measurements possess a quantum-mechanical model? This kind of problem is solved here for the case of two dichotomic von Neumann measurements which can be applied repeatedly to a quantum system with trivial dynamics. The solution uses methods from the theory of operator algebras and the theory of moment problems. The ensuing conditions reveal surprisingly simple relations between certain quantum-mechanical probabilities. It also shown that generally, none of these relations holds in general probabilistic models. This result might facilitate further experimental discrimination between quantum mechanics and other general probabilistic theories. Chapter 2: Possibilistic Physics. I try to outline a framework for fundamental physics where the concept of probability gets replaced by the concept of possibility. Whereas a probabilistic theory assigns a state-dependent probability value to each outcome of each measurement, a possibilistic theory merely assigns one of the state-dependent labels "possible to occur" or "impossible to occur" to each outcome of each measurement. It is argued that Spekkens' combinatorial toy theory of quantum mechanics is inconsistent in a probabilistic framework, but can be regarded as possibilistic. Then, I introduce the concept of possibilistic local hidden variable models and derive a class of possibilistic Bell inequalities which are violated for the possibilistic Popescu-Rohrlich boxes. The chapter ends with a philosophical discussion on possibilistic vs. probabilistic. It can be argued that, due to better falsifiability properties, a possibilistic theory has higher predictive power than a probabilistic one. Chapter 3: The quantum region for von Neumann measurements with postselection. It is determined under which conditions a probability distribution on a finite set can occur as the outcome distribution of a quantum-mechanical von Neumann measurement with hyphenation given that the scalar product between the initial and the final state is known as well as the success probability of the postselection. An intermediate von Neumann measurement can enhance transition probabilities between states such that the error probability shrinks by a factor of up to 2. Chapter 4: A presentation of the category of stochastic matrices. This chapter gives generators and relations for the strict monoidal category of probabilistic maps on finite cardinals (i.e., stochastic matrices). Chapter 5: Convex Spaces: Definition and Examples. We try to promote convex spaces as an abstract concept of convexity which was introduced by Stone as "barycentric calculus''. A convex space is a set where one can take convex combinations in a consistent way. By identifying the corresponding Lawvere theory as the category from chapter 4 and using the results obtained there, we give a different proof of a result of Swirszcz which shows that convex spaces can be identified with algebras of a finitary version of the Giry monad. After giving an extensive list of examples of convex sets as they appear throughout mathematics and theoretical physics, we note that there also exist convex spaces that cannot be embedded into a vector space: semilattices are a class of examples of purely combinatorial type. In an information-theoretic interpretation, convex subsets of vector spaces are probabilistic, while semilattices are possibilistic. Convex spaces unify these two concepts.
Applications of quantum mechanics have led to many successful predictions and explanations of puzzling phenomena, and we now apply quantum mechanics to gain, process, and communicate information in novel ways. We can understand quantum mechanics by understanding how we have applied it. We should not seek agreement on the nature of the world it represents, because this theory does not itself represent the physical world (though its applications do help us to represent it better). When applied to a quantum state, quantum mechanics yields probabilities for physical events: both state and probability are objective—not because they represent elements of physical reality, but because each exerts normative authority over the beliefs of anyone who accepts quantum mechanics and applies it relative to a physical situation they may (but need not) occupy. These events may be described by statements (about values of magnitudes) that are meaningful in an appropriate environmental context, and quantum mechanics can help one to say when that is. Measurement creates an appropriate context, so here the Born rule indirectly yields probabilities of measurement outcomes. The quantum state of a system does not “collapse” on measurement: a new state must be assigned relative to a physical situation in which information about the outcome is accessible. Understood this way, there is no measurement problem, and violation of Bell inequalities does not demonstrate “spooky” non-local action. Quantum field theories have no physical ontology of their own: a quantum field is a mathematical object in a model whose application helps to improve and extend our descriptions of the world in other terms. We cannot realise the scenario of Wigner’s friend and its recent extensions: but the data that provide overwhelming evidence for quantum mechanics are objective in the same sense as the relative measurement outcomes described in those scenarios.
It is a scientific truism nowadays that quantum mechanical predictions are of statistical or rather of probabilistic nature: a quantum theory assigns a probability distribution to each measurable quantity (observable) of a physical system prepared according to a given preparation prescription (state). Such sets of probability distributions represent the most general quantitative predictions of physical theories. The aim of this study is to determine all theoretical frameworks which yield such a kind of output taking the probabilistic nature of quantitative physical predictions as initial hypothesis. Astonishingly, this project succeeds with a minimal number of additional assumptions, which arise quite naturally in the course of the analysis, and which essentially amount to regularity conditions. The result is that there exist only two classes of physical theories providing quantitative probabilistic predictions: classical theories where observables are represented by real functions over a phase space and states are represented by probability measures upon the phase space, and quantum theories where observables are represented by selfadjoint operators acting on a complex Hilbert space and states are represented by state operators. On empirical grounds, classical theories cannot provide the all-encompassing, fundamental frame for the mathematical description of physical systems. Quantum theories remain, and there is no more complete formal frame for quantitative physical theories. As an additional result, it is shown that there exist physical systems which possess a quantum mechanical but no classical description; a prominent example is the spin system of two spin-1/2 particles. The classical hidden variables model, which J. Bell relates to this system in order to prove his theorem, cannot be a true description of it because no such classical model exists, and Bell's theorem loses its foundation.
I enjoyed the February 2019 issue of Physics Today on Reviews of Modern Physics at 90 but was disappointed with the article “Quantum foundations” by David DiVincenzo and Christopher Fuchs (page 50). The most useful part of that article was the reference list, which shows RMP’s diversity of papers on the subject. My 1970 article on the statistical-ensemble interpretation of quantum mechanics (QM),11. L. E. Ballentine, Rev. Mod. Phys. 42, 358 (1970). https://doi.org/10.1103/RevModPhys.42.358 which people tell me has encouraged them to continue research on quantum foundations (QF), was omitted from the list.Unfortunately, DiVincenzo and Fuchs continue to mystify measurement in QM, as if it were some deep philosophical concept that must be treated before QM has even been fully formulated. They assert that “physicists and philosophers are still debating what a ‘measurement’ really means.” What is important for QF is not the meaning of the word but an understanding of the physical process. The authors do not cite any of the published papers that provide such an understanding. And they give too much attention to two marginal interpretations: the many-worlds interpretation (MWI) and quantum Bayesianism (QBism).In QM, a measurement of an observable should yield an eigenvalue of the observable. If the initial state of the measured object is a superposition of eigenstates corresponding to different eigenvalues, then the interaction of the measurement apparatus with the object will lead to a final state of the whole system—measured object plus apparatus—that is a superposition of different measurement results. The squared amplitude of each term yields the probability of obtaining that result in an individual measurement. That statistical prediction, the Born rule, is common to the Copenhagen and statistical-ensemble interpretations. But the MWI takes a radically different turn. It postulates that the universe branches into several parallel worlds, with each term of the superposition corresponding to the unique result of the measurement in one branch world.The usual role of an interpretation of QM is to begin with the established mathematical formalism and provide an intuitively comprehensible idea of the physical process that the math describes. The MWI does not do that. Instead, it adds a mysterious process of world-splitting, a strange new cosmology that is alien to the mathematics of QM and not really an interpretation of QM at all. A typical QM measurement, such as that of a spin component in the Stern–Gerlach experiment, is a local and very low energy event. It is not credible that the measurement could have the huge cosmological effect of bifurcating the universe.When I first heard of the world-splitting assumed in the MWI, I went back to Hugh Everett’s paper22. H. Everett III, Rev. Mod. Phys. 29, 454 (1957). https://doi.org/10.1103/RevModPhys.29.454 to see if he had really said anything so absurd. I found that he had not said so explicitly, but he sometimes used words that could be interpreted in more than one way. The MWI is a possible interpretation of them, but not the most natural one, so I thought. And Everett’s framework still has value even without resorting to the MWI’s world-splitting. His concept of a “relative state” is useful, for instance, and he is correct in rejecting the notion of the quantum state “collapsing” after a measurement.QBism begins with the assumption that all kinds of probability can be regarded as subjective Bayesian probabilities. That assumption can be maintained only by ignoring the literature on interpretations of probability, from which it is clear that several different kinds—or interpretations—of probability exist. DiVincenzo and Fuchs may have ignored the classic philosophical writings on the subject because they were written by philosophers for philosophers and so do not address the needs of physicists.I have published a paper on the foundations of probability theory, written from the point of view of a quantum physicist.33. L. E. Ballentine, Found. Phys. 46, 973 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10701-016-9991-0 I classify the main kinds or interpretations of probability into three groups: inferential probability, of which Bayesian theory is an example; frequency or ensemble probability, commonly used in Gibbsian statistical mechanics and in QM; and propensity theory. Propensity, a degree of causality that is weaker than determinism, is not merely another interpretation of probability. Its mathematical theory must also differ from that of probability theory, as Paul Humphreys showed44. P. Humphreys, Philos. Rev. 94, 557 (1985). https://doi.org/10.2307/2185246 in 1985. Although the axioms of propensity33. L. E. Ballentine, Found. Phys. 46, 973 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10701-016-9991-0 differ from those of probability, the two axiom sets overlap. Both support the law of large numbers, so propensity theory is compatible with the most useful part of the frequency interpretation of probability.In general, QM states do not determine the results of a measurement, only the probabilities of the possible results. That a state’s influence on the results is not deterministic suggests strongly that the quantum probabilities given by the Born rule should be interpreted as propensities. They refer objectively to the physical system and its environment, not to any agent’s knowledge, so they are not naturally interpreted as subjective Bayesian probabilities.Interpretations of probability may differ not only in philosophy but also in substance. As I discuss in reference 33. L. E. Ballentine, Found. Phys. 46, 973 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10701-016-9991-0, John Bell’s theorem illustrates how local hidden-variable theories are incompatible with QM. E. T. Jaynes was a well-known supporter of the Bayesian theory of probability. In 1989 he repeated Bell’s derivation of inequality but carefully treated all instances of probability as Bayesian. He found that the derivation could not be completed without invoking an extra assumption that was not justifiable in the Bayesian theory. Bell’s theorem involves questions about causality, so it is natural to use propensity theory to treat it. That method is successful in deriving Bell’s inequality.33. L. E. Ballentine, Found. Phys. 46, 973 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10701-016-9991-0Not all probabilities occurring in QM can be treated as subjective Bayesian probabilities. That limitation disqualifies QBism, a Bayesian-based theory, as an interpretation of QM that can succeed in quantum foundations. The initial assumption of QBism is not valid.ReferencesSection:ChooseTop of pageReferences <<CITING ARTICLES1. L. E. Ballentine, Rev. Mod. Phys. 42, 358 (1970). https://doi.org/10.1103/RevModPhys.42.358, Google ScholarCrossref2. H. Everett III, Rev. Mod. Phys. 29, 454 (1957). https://doi.org/10.1103/RevModPhys.29.454, Google ScholarCrossref3. L. E. Ballentine, Found. Phys. 46, 973 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10701-016-9991-0, Google ScholarCrossref4. P. Humphreys, Philos. Rev. 94, 557 (1985). https://doi.org/10.2307/2185246, Google ScholarCrossref© 2020 American Institute of Physics.