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Logos & Episteme

Semantic Epistemology Redux: Proof and Validity in Quantum Mechanics

Arnold Cusmariu

Published Jan 1, 2016• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Definitions I presented in a previous article as part of a semantic approach in epistemology assumed that the concept of derivability from standard logic held across all mathematical and scientific disciplines. The present article argues that this assumption is not true for quantum mechanics (QM) by showing that concepts of validity applicable to proofs in mathematics and in classical mechanics are inapplicable to proofs in QM. Because semantic epistemology must include this important theory, revision is necessary. The one I propose also extends semantic epistemology beyond the ‘hard’ sciences. The article ends by presenting and then refuting some responses QM theorists might make to my arguments.

DOI
10.5840/logos-episteme20167329

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Definitions I presented in a previous article as part of a semantic approach in epistemology assumed that the concept of derivability from standard logic held across all mathematical and scientific disciplines. The present article argues that this assumption is not true for quantum mechanics (QM) by showing that concepts of validity applicable to proofs in mathematics and in classical mechanics are inapplicable to proofs in QM. Because semantic epistemology must include this important theory, revision is necessary. The one I propose also extends semantic epistemology beyond the ‘hard’ sciences. The article ends by presenting and then refuting some responses QM theorists might make to my arguments.
The Einstein, Podolski and Rosen (EPR) argument aiming to prove the incompleteness of quantum mechanics (QM) was opposed by most EPR's contemporary physicists and is not accepted within the standard interpretation of QM, which maintains that QM is a complete theory. An analysis of the semantic implications of the opponent positions shows that they imply different notions of truth. The introduction of a nonclassical notion of truth within the standard interpretation is usually justified by referring to known theorems that should prove that QM is a contextual and nonlocal theory. However, these theorems are based on a doubtful implicit epistemological assumption. If one renounces it, one can provide an alternative interpretation of QM that it realistic in a semantic sense. Within this interpretation the EPR viewpoint is recovered and QM is considered a (semantically) incomplete, noncontextual and local theory. Furthermore, the new interpretation provides several suggestions for constructing a more general theory embedding QM and for connecting QM with classical physics and relativity.
In this paper I will provide the beginnings of a nominalization of quantum mechanics, or QM. I will not completely nominalize QM, but I will pro-vide what I think is the most important part of such a nominalization, namely, a nominalistic recovery of the algebraic structure of Hilbert spaces. To nominalize QM is to reformulate it so that it no longer contains any reference to, or quantification over, abstract objects, i.e., objects which are aspatial, atemporal, acausal, mind-independent, etc. The reason for want-ing to do this is to show that we can be realists about QM without believ-ing in abstract objects. To argue that our physical theories can be nominalized is not to argue that nominalism—i.e., the view that there are no abstract objects—is true. It is merely to rebut a certain argument against nominalism, viz., the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument. I do not think there are any good arguments for nominalism, and I have elsewhere (1995) responded to what is widely regarded as the best such argument, viz., Benacerraf's (1973) epistemological argument against the existence of abstract objects. And I should also note here that even if it turns out that empirical science cannot be nominalized, it will not necessarily mean that nominalism is false, because it may be that nominalists can admit that empirical science contains indispensable abstract-object talk, and simply account for this fact; indeed, in another paper (forthcoming) I have tried to do just that. 1. How Field nominalizes The program of nominalization was initiated by Hartry Field (1980), who tried to nominalize Newtonian Gravitation Theory, a classical flat-space-time theory. David Malament has argued (1982) that Field's method can-not be extended to cover QM. I think Malament is wrong, and below, I will explain why. The first thing to do, however, is explain Field's method. I will concentrate on Field's nominalization of physical quantities, such as temperature and length (Field 1980, Ch. 7). For the sake of simplicity, my presentation will differ somewhat from Field's. For example, I concen-
When a physical theory is in its early stages of development, it presents many concepts and constructs that may not be necessary for its interpretation, or may simply be equivocal. As the theory is developed by the physics community, it hopefully passes through a depuration process that washes away many of these constructs and introduces others not initially devised. This process can be viewed, and modeled, as a semiotic process by which the suggested interpretations of the theory, initially dispersed in the space of concepts, taper off in a way that leaves only a small number of possibilities, ideally only one. However, to qualify this process and impose semiotic and epistemological constraints on the depuration process, it seems natural to consider a physical theory as an excerpt of a language and its suggested interpretations as texts, endowed with syntactics and semantics. In this paper we present this framing of general physical theories and apply the resulting semiotic and epistemological constraints we uphold to the special case of quantum mechanics, which shows particular resistance to interpretation tapering. We then show that the findings of this paper are especially important for allowing one to form a hierarchy of interpretations of the same formal structure of a physical theory, even in the case of an experimental underdetermination of these interpretations, which is precisely the case for quantum mechanics. This result is particularly important for more modern physical theories, which are becoming increasingly more abstract and difficult to interpret.
The epistemological position underlying the standard interpretation of Quantum Mechanics (QM) can be classified as empirical verificationism (nontestable physical statements have no meaning). This position can be argued to be responsible for many puzzling features and "paradoxes" of QM. Nevertheless, it seems soundly based on the Bell-Kochen-Specker (Bell-KS) theorem, which is maintained to prove the contextuality of QM making empirical verificationism unavoidable. Actually, the proofs of the Bell-KS theorem stand on auxiliary assumptions that are criticizable from an operational viewpoint; these assumptions can be substituted with more plausible conditions, but, then, the Bell-KS theorem (hence, contextuality of QM) fails to be true. This conclusion opens the way to a non conventional interpretation of QM that is compatible with some forms of physical realism.
Abstract This chapter discusses the measurement problem in the context of modern epistemology of science, setting out an epistemological framework which will be used throughout the book. I suggest that the literature on the measurement problem typically assumes that quantum mechanics is confirmed by the empirical evidence regardless of interpretation, and I argue that this ultimately founders for reasons similar to logical positivism. I then invoke recent work in the epistemology of measurement by van Fraassen, Chang and Tal to argue that we cannot make sense of scientific epistemology without a satisfactory understanding of what is going on during the process of measurement. Finally, I propose an approach to the epistemology of science inspired by Chang’s progressive coherentism, and argue that this is the right way of thinking about epistemic situations in which our understanding of the operation of our measuring devices depends crucially on the very physics we are trying to find out about.
This article considers a rarely discussed aspect, the no-cloning principle or postulate, recast as the uniqueness postulate, of the mathematical modeling known as quantum-like, Q-L, modeling (vs. classical-like, C-L, modeling, based in the mathematics adopted from classical physics) and the corresponding Q-L theories beyond physics. The principle is a transfer of the no-cloning principle (arising from the no-cloning theorem) in quantum mechanics (QM) to Q-L theories. My interest in this principle, to be related to several other key features of QM and Q-L theories, such as the irreducible role of observation, complementarity, and probabilistic causality, is connected to a more general question: What are the ontological and epistemological reasons for using Q-L models vs. C-L ones? I shall argue that adopting the uniqueness postulate is justified in Q-L theories and adds an important new motivation for doing so and a new venue for considering this question. In order to properly ground this argument, the article also offers a discussion along similar lines of QM, providing a new angle on Bohr's concept of complementarity via the uniqueness postulate.