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Conference on the Foundations of Quantum Mechanics: Historical Analysis and Open Questions

IS QUANTUM MECHANICS CONTEXTUAL?

Claudio Garola

Published May 1, 2000• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The epistemological position underlying the standard interpretation of Quantum Mechanics (QM) can be classified as empirical verificationism (nontestable physical statements have no meaning). This position can be argued to be responsible for many puzzling features and "paradoxes" of QM. Nevertheless, it seems soundly based on the Bell-Kochen-Specker (Bell-KS) theorem, which is maintained to prove the contextuality of QM making empirical verificationism unavoidable. Actually, the proofs of the Bell-KS theorem stand on auxiliary assumptions that are criticizable from an operational viewpoint; these assumptions can be substituted with more plausible conditions, but, then, the Bell-KS theorem (hence, contextuality of QM) fails to be true. This conclusion opens the way to a non conventional interpretation of QM that is compatible with some forms of physical realism.

DOI
10.1142/9789812793560_0015

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The epistemological position underlying the standard interpretation of Quantum Mechanics (QM) can be classified as empirical verificationism (nontestable physical statements have no meaning). This position can be argued to be responsible for many puzzling features and "paradoxes" of QM. Nevertheless, it seems soundly based on the Bell-Kochen-Specker (Bell-KS) theorem, which is maintained to prove the contextuality of QM making empirical verificationism unavoidable. Actually, the proofs of the Bell-KS theorem stand on auxiliary assumptions that are criticizable from an operational viewpoint; these assumptions can be substituted with more plausible conditions, but, then, the Bell-KS theorem (hence, contextuality of QM) fails to be true. This conclusion opens the way to a non conventional interpretation of QM that is compatible with some forms of physical realism.
In this paper we attempt to analyze the physical and philosophical meaning of quantum contextuality. In the first part we will argue that a general confusion within the literature comes from the improper "scrambling" of two different meanings of quantum contextuality. The first one is related to an epistemic interpretation of contextuality, introduced by Bohr, which stresses the incompatibility (or complementarity) of quantum measurements. The second, is related to an ontic notion of contextuality, exposed through the Kochen-Specker (KS) theorem, which focuses on the constraints to discuss about actual (definite valued) properties within the orthodox formalism of QM. We will show how these two notions have been scrambled together creating an "omelette of contextuality" which has been fully widespread through a popularized "epistemic explanation" of the KS theorem according to which: The outcome of the observable A when mea- sured together with B or together with C will necessarily differ in case [A,B] = [A,C] = 0, and [B,C] ̸= 0. We will show why this statement is not only improperly scrambling epistemic and ontic perspectives, but is also physically and philosophically meaningless. In the second part of the paper, we will analyse the relation between ‘classical contexts’ and QM. We will show that three accepted presuppositions found within the orthodox literature are, in general, false. Namely: (i) that quantum contextuality does not preclude an objective description of physical reality, (ii) that the choice of a context (or basis) restores a classical description of reality, and (iii) that the choice of a (classical) context is a necessary condition for accounting for empirical statements in QM.
In this paper we attempt to analyze the physical and philosophical meaning of quantum contextuality. We will argue that there exists a general confusion within the foundational literature arising from the improper of two different meanings of quantum contextuality. While the first one, introduced by Bohr, is related to an interpretation of which stresses the incompatibility (or complementarity) of certain measurement situations described in classical terms; the second meaning of is related to a purely formal understanding of as exposed by the Kochen-Specker (KS) theorem which focuses instead on the constraints of the orthodox quantum formalism in order to interpret projection operators as preexistent or actual (definite valued) properties. We will show how these two notions have been scrambled together creating an omelette of contextuality which has been fully widespread through a popularized epistemic explanation of the KS theorem according to which: The measurement outcome of the observable A when measured together with B or together with C will necessarily differ in case [A, B] = [A, C] = 0, and [B, C] /= 0. We will show why this statement is not only improperly scrambling and formal perspectives, but is also physically and philosophically meaningless. Finally, we analyze the consequences of such widespread reading of KS theorem as related to statistical statements of measurement outcomes.
In this paper we attempt to discuss what has Kochen-Specker (KS) theorem to say about physical invariance and quantum individuality. In particular, we will discuss the impossibility of making reference to objective physical properties within the orthodox formalism of quantum mechanics. Through an analysis of the meaning of physical invariance and quantum contextuality we will derive a Corollary to KS theorem that proves that a vector in Hilbert space cannot be interpreted coherently as an object possessing (objective) physical properties. As a consequence, the notion of quantum object can be only defined in terms of nomological properties. We conclude the paper by analyzing the consequences of this Corollary to KS theorem for the ongoing debate about quantum individuality.
This paper discusses a possible resolution of the nonobjectivity-nonlocality dilemma in quantum mechanics in 'the light of experimental tests of the Bell inequality for two entangled photons and a Bell-like inequality for a single neutron. My conclusion is that these experiments show that quantum mechanics is nonobjective: that is, the values of physical observables cannot be assigned to a system before measurement. Bell's assumption of nonlocality has to be rejected as having no direct experimental confirmation, at least thus far. I also consider the relationships between nonobjectivity and contextuality. Specifically, I analyze the impact of the Kochen-Specker theorem on the problem of contextuality of quantum observables. I argue that, just as von Neumann's "no-go" theorem, the Kochen-Specker theorem is based on assumptions that do not correspond to the real physical situation. Finally, I present a theory of measurement based on a classical, purely wave model (pre-quantum classical statistical field theory), a model that reproduces quantum probabilities. In this model continuous fields are transformed into discrete clicks of detectors. While this model is classical, it is nonobjective. In this case, nonobjectivity is the result of the dependence of experimental outcomes on the context of measurement, in accordance with Bohr's view.