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Oxford University Press eBooks

The Epistemology of Measurement

Emily Adlam

Published Jun 12, 2025• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Abstract This chapter discusses the measurement problem in the context of modern epistemology of science, setting out an epistemological framework which will be used throughout the book. I suggest that the literature on the measurement problem typically assumes that quantum mechanics is confirmed by the empirical evidence regardless of interpretation, and I argue that this ultimately founders for reasons similar to logical positivism. I then invoke recent work in the epistemology of measurement by van Fraassen, Chang and Tal to argue that we cannot make sense of scientific epistemology without a satisfactory understanding of what is going on during the process of measurement. Finally, I propose an approach to the epistemology of science inspired by Chang’s progressive coherentism, and argue that this is the right way of thinking about epistemic situations in which our understanding of the operation of our measuring devices depends crucially on the very physics we are trying to find out about.

DOI
10.1093/9780197808887.003.0004

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Abstract This chapter discusses the measurement problem in the context of modern epistemology of science, setting out an epistemological framework which will be used throughout the book. I suggest that the literature on the measurement problem typically assumes that quantum mechanics is confirmed by the empirical evidence regardless of interpretation, and I argue that this ultimately founders for reasons similar to logical positivism. I then invoke recent work in the epistemology of measurement by van Fraassen, Chang and Tal to argue that we cannot make sense of scientific epistemology without a satisfactory understanding of what is going on during the process of measurement. Finally, I propose an approach to the epistemology of science inspired by Chang’s progressive coherentism, and argue that this is the right way of thinking about epistemic situations in which our understanding of the operation of our measuring devices depends crucially on the very physics we are trying to find out about.
Abstract This book aims to reconceptualize the quantum measurement problem as a problem of epistemology, and to explore the epistemic problems faced by a number of popular interpretations of quantum mechanics. It argues that a number of well-known solutions to the measurement problem, including the many-worlds interpretation and the observer-relative interpretations, face potentially fatal epistemic problems. It also delves into the relationship between physics and epistemology, using the measurement problem to motivate an account of scneitifc epistemology which highlights the role of coherence in justifying the use we make of measurements and observations in the scientific process.
Abstract This chapter will discusses Bayesian confirmation in the context of the Everett interpretation and Quantum Bayesianism. I argue that the epistemic problems arising in both programs are related to an overly narrow understanding of scientific epistemology based entirely on Bayesian confirmation theory. I argue that when the holistic, coherentist nature of scientific epistemology is taken into account, it is clear that although Bayesian updating is an appropriate method in periods of ordinary science, other approaches are necessary in situations where our empirical results appear to be inconsistent with the foundational beliefs we have used for emprical confirmation, and the measurement problem is an example of such a situation.
Abstract Although much has been written about the measurement problem, there is still significant disagreement about what the problem really is and what a solution should look like. In this chapter I present a brief introduction to quantum mechanics and the measurement problem, and then I argue that the measurement problem should be understood in part a problem of epistemology: solving the problem requires telling a consistent story about how the reality underlying quantum mechanics could allow us to reliably come to know about that reality via the medium of our empirical evidence for quantum mechanics, and an interpretation of quantum mechanics which fails to achieve this is self-undermining.
In this paper, we do not try to solve the measurement problem, but rather to properly formulate it. One of the reasons why it still lacks a precise, agreed definition is that the problem may take very different aspects depending on the interpretation of quantum mechanics embraced. Inspired by the methodology of theory-independent results like Bell's theorem, we propose to identify the common root of the puzzle in an interpretation-independent way i.e. as a property of the empirical statistics only, before deriving its philosophical consequences. The key observation is that quantum matter can not be described by a Kolmogorovian probabilistic theory. Arguing that the Kolmogorov axioms of probability theory are the postulates of epistemic uncertainty leads us to reformulate the measurement problem as the impossibility to build an ontology independent of epistemology for quantum matter. Said differently, there exists no God's-eye view on quantum systems. Although it is meaningless to solve the measurement problem as defined in this way, insofar as it is a feature of the universe's statistics, such a formulation may on the other hand bring side benefits. In particular, we argue that it allows to: (i) shed a new light on the variety of interpretations; (ii) propose a fundamental reason why quantum mechanics and general relativity are so incompatible, not relying on purely mathematical or technical arguments; (iii) guide the quest for quantum gravity.
The measurement problem in quantum mechanics (QM) is related to the inability to include learning about the properties of a quantum system by an agent in the formalism of quantum theory. It includes questions about the physical processes behind the measurement, uniqueness, and randomness of obtained outcomes and an ontic or epistemic role of the state. These issues have triggered various interpretations of quantum theory. They vary from refusing any connection between physical reality and a measurement process to insisting that a collapse of the wave-function is real and possibly involves consciousness. On the other hand, the actual mechanism of a measurement is not extensively discussed in these interpretations. This essay attempts to investigate the quantum measurement problem from the position of the scientific consensus. We begin with a short overview of the development of sensing in living organisms. This is performed for the purpose of stressing the relation between reality and our experience. We then briefly present different approaches to the measurement problem in chosen interpretations. We then state three philosophical assumptions for further consideration and present a decomposition of the measurement act into four stages: transformation, conversion, amplification and broadcasting, and, finally, perception. Each of these stages provides an intuition about the physical processes contributing to it. These conclusions are then used in a discussion about, e.g., objectivity, the implausibility of reversing a measurement, or the epistemic status of the wave-function. Finally, we argue that those in favor of some of the most popular interpretations can find an overlap between their beliefs and the consequences of considerations presented here.