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Cambridge University Press eBooks

The probability interpretation

Peter Mittelstaedt

Published Dec 4, 1997• 3 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1017/cbo9780511564260.004

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In this article I revisit the frequency interpretation of probability of von Mises, and argue that it contains the key elements of any coherent interpretation of scientific probability - notwithstanding the heavy criticisms von Mises collected from mathematicians and philosophers alike. I propose a modified definition that is not based on von Mises' "infinite collectives" but retains an essential ingredient of his interpretation, namely that probability can only quantitatively be defined for events that are, or can be, repeated in similar conditions and that exhibit frequency stabilisation. New is that the mentioned "conditions" should be "partitioned". Thus, I will partition probabilistic systems into object and environment, or in object, initiating, and probing subsystem, and show that such partitioning solves a series of classic problems. Other consistent interpretations can be unified with frequentism, e.g. Bayesianism à la Jaynes. I explore in detail the tantalising subjective or operationalist touch of probability, and argue that it can be put on objective grounds. One further upshot of the model is that several quantum puzzles can be seen as deriving from an imprecise interpretation of probability.

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In this paper, we give a frequency interpretation of negative probability, as well as of extended probability, demonstrating that to a great extent, these new types of probabilities, behave as conventional probabilities. Extended probability comprises both conventional probability and negative probability. The frequency interpretation of negative probabilities gives supportive evidence to the axiomatic system built in (Burgin, 2009; arXiv:0912.4767) for extended probability as it is demonstrated in this paper that frequency probabilities satisfy all axioms of extended probability.
There is a peculiar similarity between Probability Theory and Quantum Mechanics: both subjects are mature and successful, yet both remain subject to controversy about their foundations and interpretation. I first present a classification of the various interpretations of probability, arguing that they should not be thought of as rivals, but rather as applications of a general theory to different kinds of subject matter. An axiom system that makes conditional probability the fundamental concept is put forward as being superior to Kolmogorov's axioms. I then discuss the relevance to quantum theory of the various interpretations of probability, the applicability of classical probability theory within quantum mechanics, and the relations between the interpretation of probability and the interpretation of quantum mechanics.
The Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics is an increasingly popular alternative to the traditional Copenhagen interpretation, but there are a few major issues that prevent the widespread adoption. One of these issues is the origin of probabilities in the Everett interpretation, which this thesis will attempt to survey. The most successful resolution of the probability problem thus far is the decision-theoretic program, which attempts to frame probabilities as outcomes of rational decision making. This marks a departure from orthodox interpretations of probabilities in the physical sciences, where probabilities are thought to be objective, stemming from symmetry considerations. This thesis will attempt to offer evaluations on the decision-theoretic program.
In this article I revisit the frequency interpretation of probability of von Mises, and argue that it contains the key elements of any coherent interpretation of scientific probability - notwithstanding the heavy criticisms von Mises collected from mathematicians and philosophers alike. I propose a modified definition that is not based on von Mises' "infinite collectives" but retains an essential ingredient of his interpretation, namely that probability can only quantitatively be defined for events that are, or can be, repeated in similar conditions and that exhibit frequency stabilisation. New is that the mentioned "conditions" should be "partitioned". Thus, I will partition probabilistic systems into object and environment, or in object, initiating, and probing subsystem, and show that such partitioning solves a series of classic problems. Other consistent interpretations can be unified with frequentism, e.g. Bayesianism à la Jaynes. I explore in detail the tantalising subjective or operationalist touch of probability, and argue that it can be put on objective grounds. One further upshot of the model is that several quantum puzzles can be seen as deriving from an imprecise interpretation of probability.