There is a peculiar similarity between Probability Theory and Quantum Mechanics: both subjects are mature and successful, yet both remain subject to controversy about their foundations and interpretation. I first present a classification of the various interpretations of probability, arguing that they should not be thought of as rivals, but rather as applications of a general theory to different kinds of subject matter. An axiom system that makes conditional probability the fundamental concept is put forward as being superior to Kolmogorov's axioms. I then discuss the relevance to quantum theory of the various interpretations of probability, the applicability of classical probability theory within quantum mechanics, and the relations between the interpretation of probability and the interpretation of quantum mechanics.
There is a peculiar similarity between Probability Theory and Quantum Mechanics: both subjects are mature and successful, yet both remain subject to controversy about their foundations and interpretation. I first present a classification of the various interpretations of probability, arguing that they should not be thought of as rivals, but rather as applications of a general theory to different kinds of subject matter. An axiom system that makes conditional probability the fundamental concept is put forward as being superior to Kolmogorov's axioms. I then discuss the relevance to quantum theory of the various interpretations of probability, the applicability of classical probability theory within quantum mechanics, and the relations between the interpretation of probability and the interpretation of quantum mechanics.
Quantum mechanics is usually described in the terminology of probability theory even though the properties of the probability spaces associated with it are fundamentally different from the standard ones of probability theory. For example, Kolmogorov's axioms are not general enough to encompass the non-commutative situations that arise in quantum theory. There have been many attempts to generalise these axioms to meet the needs of quantum mechanics. The focus of these attempts has been the observation, first made by Birkhoff and von Neumann (1936), that the propositions associated with a quantum-mechanical system do not form a Boolean σ-algebra. There is almost universal agreement that the probability space associated with a quantum-mechanical system is given by the set of subspaces of a separable Hilbert space, but there is disagreement over the algebraic structure that this set represents. In the most popular model for the probability space of quantum mechanics the propositions are assumed to form an orthocomplemented lattice (Mackey (1963), Jauch (1968)). The fundamental concept here is that of a partial order, that is a binary relation that is reflexive and transitive but not symmetric. The partial order is interpreted as embodying the logical concept of implication in the set of propositions associated with the physical system. Although this model provides an acceptable mathematical expression of the probabilistic structure of quantum mechanics in that the subspaces of a separable Hilbert space give a representation of an ortho-complemented lattice, it has several deficiencies which will be discussed later.
The concept of probability was prominent in the original foundations of quantum mechanics and continues to be so today. Indeed, the controversies regarding objective and subjective interpretations of probability have again become active. I argue that, although both objective and subjective probabilities have domains of relevance in QM, their roles are quite distinct. Even where both are legitimate, the objective and subjective probabilities differ, both conceptually and numerically. There are quantum probabilities that have no useful subjective interpretations, and there are subjective probabilities that cannot be realized as quantum probabilities.
Abstract By formulating the axioms of quantum mechanics, von Neumann also laid the foundations of a “quantum probability theory”. As such, it is regarded a generalization of the “classical probability theory” due to Kolmogorov. Outside of quantum physics, however, Kolmogorov’s axioms enjoy universal applicability. This raises the question of whether quantum physics indeed requires such a generalization of our conception of probability or if von Neumann’s axiomatization of quantum mechanics was contingent on the absence of a general theory of probability in the 1920s. This work argues in favor of the latter position. In particular, it shows how to construct a mathematically rigorous theory for non-relativistic N -body quantum systems subject to a time-independent scalar potential, which is based on Kolmogorov’s axioms and physically natural random variables. Though this theory is provably distinct from its quantum-mechanical analog, it nonetheless reproduces central predictions of the latter. Further work may make an empirical comparison possible. Moreover, the approach can in principle be adapted to other classes of quantum-mechanical models. Part II of this series discusses the empirical violation of Bell inequalities in the context of this approach. Part III addresses the projection postulate and the question of measurement.
Probabilities may be subjective or objective; we are concerned with both kinds of probability, and the relationship between them. The fundamental theory of objective probability is quantum mechanics: it is argued that neither Bohr's Copenhagen interpretation, nor the pilot-wave theory, nor stochastic state-reduction theories, give a satisfactory answer to the question of what objective probabilities are in quantum mechanics, or why they should satisfy the Born rule; nor do they give any reason why subjective probabilities should track objective ones. But it is shown that if probability only arises with decoherence, then they must be given by the Born rule. That further, on the Everett interpretation, we have a clear statement of what probabilities are, in terms of purely categorical physical properties; and finally, along lines laid out by Deutsch and Wallace, that there is a clear basis in the axioms of decision theory as to why subjective probabilities should track these objective ones. These results hinge critically on the absence of hidden-variables or any other mechanism (such as state-reduction) from the physical interpretation of the theory. The account of probability has traditionally been considered the principal weakness of the Everett interpretation; on the contrary it emerges as one of its principal strengths.
The aim of the article is to argue that the interpretations of quantum mechanics and of probability are much closer than usually thought. Indeed, a detailed analysis of the concept of probability (within the standard frequency theory of R. von Mises) reveals that the latter concept always refers to an observing system. The enigmatic role of the observer in the Copenhagen interpretation therefore derives from a precise understanding of probability. Besides explaining several elements of the Copenhagen interpretation, our model also allows to reinterpret recent results from 'relational quantum mechanics', and to question the premises of the 'subjective approach to quantum probabilities'.
The article discusses approaches to understanding the nature of probability in mathematics and physics with the consequences of these approaches, as well as the difficulties that arise. The ontological status of probability is discussed. It is shown that probability theory, contrary to R. Mises, should be classified as a mathematical science, using the definition formulated by A.N. Kolmogorov. The application of this definition in practice is provided within the framework of the classical approach, provided that the connection with physical reality is defined through the concept of equal opportunity. To do this, the concepts of simple and complex events are introduced, and the method of decomposing complex events into simple ones is explained. The point of view is substantiated, according to which a mathematical probability determined and related to physical reality in this way can be considered an objective probability, that is, existing independently of any tests. Various interpretations of quantum mechanics and approaches to understanding probability are also revealed. It is shown that in physics today the existing approaches to understanding the nature of probability contradict each other. In the Bohm interpretation, probability is an analogue of the classical approach – statistical objective probability, which has a mathematical formalization, and in quantum Bayesianism, probability quantifies the degree of reliability and depends on the subject conducting the experiment. The Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics tries to eliminate the difficulties associated with combining the wave and corpuscular properties of light and electron beams into a single picture by giving the ontological status of probability, which leads to the problem of understanding physical reality. The article argues for the need for a new connection between the mathematical description of probability and physical reality. The empirical (frequency) approach of R. Mises is analyzed, which causes a lot of criticism, as it does not have a clear consistent formalization. The article argues that this approach is inconsistent with quantum mechanics. The probability given by M. Born in the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics is also considered, which formulates a new definition of probability, which does not exclude the difficulties associated with the physical interpretation of probability. Born’s approach is based on the classical approach and is reduced to a formal axiomatic definition, which assumes the interpretation of probability as a mathematical construct. The connection of probability with physical reality and the consistency of the statistical method of finding probability values remain unresolved problems, which creates a dualism of understanding probability: in mathematics – one thing, in physics – another. If in the mathematical approach, the solution of these problems is carried out through the connection of probability with physical properties, then in quantum mechanics, in the Copenhagen interpretation, problems persist, which is caused by giving the wave function an ontological status.