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Probability in Quantum Mechanics: The Everett Interpretation and the Decision-Theoretic Program

Meng Shuen Chua

Published Jan 1, 2015• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics is an increasingly popular alternative to the traditional Copenhagen interpretation, but there are a few major issues that prevent the widespread adoption. One of these issues is the origin of probabilities in the Everett interpretation, which this thesis will attempt to survey. The most successful resolution of the probability problem thus far is the decision-theoretic program, which attempts to frame probabilities as outcomes of rational decision making. This marks a departure from orthodox interpretations of probabilities in the physical sciences, where probabilities are thought to be objective, stemming from symmetry considerations. This thesis will attempt to offer evaluations on the decision-theoretic program.

DOI
10.7907/5yr6-v715

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The Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics is an increasingly popular alternative to the traditional Copenhagen interpretation, but there are a few major issues that prevent the widespread adoption. One of these issues is the origin of probabilities in the Everett interpretation, which this thesis will attempt to survey. The most successful resolution of the probability problem thus far is the decision-theoretic program, which attempts to frame probabilities as outcomes of rational decision making. This marks a departure from orthodox interpretations of probabilities in the physical sciences, where probabilities are thought to be objective, stemming from symmetry considerations. This thesis will attempt to offer evaluations on the decision-theoretic program.
I consider exactly what is involved in a solution to the probability problem of the Everett interpretation, in the light of recent work on applying considerations from decision theory to that problem. I suggest an overall framework for understanding probability in a physical theory, and conclude that this framework, when applied to the Everett interpretation, yields the result that that interpretation satisfactorily solves the measurement problem. 1. Introduction 2. What is probability? 2.1Objective probability and the Principal Principle 2.2Three ways of satisfying the functional definition 2.3Cautious functionalism 2.4Is the functional definition complete? 3. The Everett interpretation and subjective uncertainty 3.1Interpreting quantum mechanics 3.2The need for subjective uncertainty 3.3Saunders' argument for subjective uncertainty 3.4Objections to Saunders' argument 3.5Subjective uncertainty again: arguments from interpretative charity 3.6Quantum weights and the functional definition of probability 4. Rejecting subjective uncertainty 4.1The fission program 4.2Against the fission program 5. Justifying the axioms of decision theory 5.1The primitive status of the decision-theoretic axioms 5.2Holistic scepticism 5.3The role of an explanation of decision theory 6. Conclusion
An extended analysis is given of the program, originally suggested by Deutsch, of solving the probability problem in the Everett interpretation by means of decision theory. Deutsch's own proof is discussed, and alternatives are presented which are based upon different decision theories and upon Gleason's Theorem. It is argued that decision theory gives Everettians most or all of what they need from `probability'. Some consequences of (Everettian) quantum mechanics for decision theory itself are also discussed.
Probabilities may be subjective or objective; we are concerned with both kinds of probability, and the relationship between them. The fundamental theory of objective probability is quantum mechanics: it is argued that neither Bohr's Copenhagen interpretation, nor the pilot-wave theory, nor stochastic state-reduction theories, give a satisfactory answer to the question of what objective probabilities are in quantum mechanics, or why they should satisfy the Born rule; nor do they give any reason why subjective probabilities should track objective ones. But it is shown that if probability only arises with decoherence, then they must be given by the Born rule. That further, on the Everett interpretation, we have a clear statement of what probabilities are, in terms of purely categorical physical properties; and finally, along lines laid out by Deutsch and Wallace, that there is a clear basis in the axioms of decision theory as to why subjective probabilities should track these objective ones. These results hinge critically on the absence of hidden-variables or any other mechanism (such as state-reduction) from the physical interpretation of the theory. The account of probability has traditionally been considered the principal weakness of the Everett interpretation; on the contrary it emerges as one of its principal strengths.
Quantum Mechanics notoriously faces a measurement problem, the problem that the unitary time evolution, encoded in its dynamical equations, together with the kinematical structure of the theory generally implies the non-existence \nof definite measurement outcomes. There have been multiple suggestions to solve this problem, among them the so called many worlds interpretation that originated with the work of Hugh Everett III. According to it, the quantum state and time evolution fully and accurately describe nature as it is, implying that under certain conditions multiple measurement outcomes that are seemingly mutually exclusive can be realized at the same time – but as different 'worlds' contained in a global, quantum mechanical structure, sometimes referred to as 'the multiverse'. The many worlds interpretation has, however, been confronted with serious difficulties over the course of its development, some of which were solved by the advent of decoherence theory. The present thesis critically investi- \ngates the state of play on a key remaining problem of the many worlds interpretation, the problem of the meaning and quantification of probabilities in a quantum multiverse. Recent attempts of deriving the pivotal statistical ingredient of quantum mechanics, Born’s rule, from either principles of decision theory or from quantum mechanics alone, supplemented with a few general premises about \nprobability are analyzed and their premises are scrutinized. It will be argued that, though both approaches yield promising results, they both ultimately fail \nto clearly establish the validity of Born’s rule in the context of the many worlds interpretation. It is hence suggested that further research on this problem is indicated.