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arXiv:1604.01016

The Quantum Mechanics of Being and Its Manifestation

Ulrich Mohrhoff

Published Apr 4, 2016• 1 citation
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

How can quantum mechanics be (i) the fundamental theoretical framework of contemporary physics and (ii) a probability calculus that presupposes the events to which, and on the basis of which, it assigns probabilities? The question is answered without invoking knowledge or observers, by interpreting the necessary distinction between two kinds of physical quantities - unconditionally definite quantities and quantities that have values only if they are measured - as a distinction between the manifested world and its manifestation.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.1604.01016

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How can quantum mechanics be (i) the fundamental theoretical framework of contemporary physics and (ii) a probability calculus that presupposes the events to which, and on the basis of which, it assigns probabilities? The question is answered without invoking knowledge or observers, by interpreting the necessary distinction between two kinds of physical quantities - unconditionally definite quantities and quantities that have values only if they are measured - as a distinction between the manifested world and its manifestation.
The mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics is a probability calculus. The probability algorithms it places at our disposal—state vectors, wave functions, density matrices, statistical operators—all serve the same purpose, which is to assign probabilities to the possible outcomes of measurements, on the basis of the actual outcomes of other (not necessarily earlier) measurements. In other words, the general theoretical framework of contemporary physics is essentially a calculus of correlations between measurement outcomes. This is reason enough to begin by putting together what we already know, and what we need to know, about probabilities.
Philosophers concerned with making physical sense of the mathematical apparatus of quantum mechanics tend to distinguish between interpretations of the theory that aim to present a coherent picture of reality, and anti-realist (empiricist, operationalist, instrumentalist,…) interpretations, which content themselves with looking upon the theory’s formal apparatus as a tool for making predictions. It is rarely appreciated that these alternatives are not exclusive. There are other ways of presenting a coherent picture of reality than to invest with physical reality a calculational tool such as the wave function. In what follows we shall present a coherent picture of reality that explains why the formal apparatus of quantum mechanics is a probability calculus, and why the events to which it serves to assign probabilities are the possible outcomes of measurements.
Zurek's existential interpretation of quantum mechanics suffers from three classical prejudices, including the belief that space and time are intrinsically and infinitely differentiated. These compel him to relativize the concept of objective existence in two ways. The elimination of these prejudices makes it possible to recognize the quantum formalism's ontological implications — the relative and contingent reality of spatiotemporal distinctions and the extrinsic and finite spatiotemporal differentiation of the physical world — which in turn makes it possible to arrive at an unqualified objective existence. Contrary to a widespread misconception, viewing the quantum formalism as being fundamentally a probability algorithm does not imply that quantum mechanics is concerned with states of knowledge rather than states of Nature. On the contrary, it makes possible a complete and strongly objective description of the physical world that requires no reference to observers. What objectively exists, in a sense that requires no qualification, is (i) the trajectories of macroscopic objects, whose fuzziness is empirically irrelevant, (ii) the properties and values of whose possession these trajectories provide indelible records, and (iii) the fuzzy and temporally undifferentiated states of affairs that obtain between measurements and are described by counterfactual probability assignments.
Despite its power as the conceptual basis for a huge range of physical phenomena in atomic and subatomic physics, quantum mechanics still suffers from a lack of clarity regarding the physical meaning of its fundamental theoretical concepts, such as those of quantum state and of quantum theoretical quantities or variables , dealt with by the known mathematical-theoretical rules. These concepts have generally been considered as not giving a direct description of physical systems, for they do not correspond to what is usually understood by `physical states' or `physical properties', notably characterized by definite numerical values such as those obtained from measurement. The situation has been tentatively expressed in terms of various `interpretations', conceived not only with regard to the physical meanings of mathematical quantities, but also in connection with philosophical statements about `physical reality'. The question of whether or not quantum theoretical quantities describe definite physical systems existing in nature has therefore generally been considered as beyond the possibilities of physics, because of the definitions that are commonly taken for `physical state' and `physical quantity'. We sketch the main ideas on this problem and propose a possible way out of the puzzle, in terms of an extension of the meaning given to the concepts of the physical state and physical quantity of a system, which would allow one, without any theoretical change in quantum mechanics, to speak consistently of real quantum systems as having definite physical properties .
The general view is that all fundamental physical laws should be formulated within the framework given by quantum mechanics (QM). In a sense, QM therefore has the character of a metaphysical theory. Consequently, if it is possible to derive QM from more basic principles, these principles should be of general, philosophical nature. Here, we derive the formalism of QM from well-motivated epistemic principles. A key assumption is that a physical theory that relies on entities or distinctions that are unknowable in principle gives rise to wrong predictions. First, an epistemic formalism is developed, using concepts like knowledge and potential knowledge, identifying a physical state SSS with the potential knowledge of the physical world. It is demonstrated that QM emerges from this formalism. However, Hilbert spaces, wave functions and probabilities are defined in certain well-defined observational contexts only. This means that the epistemic formalism is broader than QM. In the fundamental layer of description, the physical state SSS is a subset of a state space S={Z}\mathcal{S}=\{Z\}S={Z}, such that SSS always contains many elements ZZZ. These elements correspond to unattainable states of complete knowledge of the world. The evolution of SSS cannot be determined in terms of the individual evolution of the elements ZZZ, unlike the evolution of an ensemble in classical phase space. The evolution of SSS is described in terms of sequential time n∈Nn\in \mathbf{\mathbb{N}}n∈N, which is updated according to n→n+1n\rightarrow n+1n→n+1 each time an event occurs, each time potential knowledge changes. Sequential time nnn can be separated from relational time ttt, which describes distances between events in space-time. There is an entire space-time associated with each nnn, in which ttt represents the knowledge at sequential time nnn about the temporal relations between present and past events.
The interpretative principle proposed by Bub in 1211.3062v1 [quant-ph] is justified only for all practical purposes (Bell's "FAPP trap"). An alternative interpretative principle is proposed. It brings to light those features of the quantum world because of which the fundamental theoretical framework of physics is a "mere" probability calculus, and it amply justifies Bohr's insistence that quantum-mechanical observables cannot be defined without reference to the experimental conditions in which they are measured. It implies that the spatial distinctions we make cannot be intrinsic to space, that regions "of space" must be realized by macroscopic objects, that the spatiotemporal differentiation of the physical world is incomplete, that the positions of macroscopic objects (suitably defined) are definite in a nonclassical sense, and that unconditional factuality can be consistently attributed to them.