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Quantum nonreproducibility at the individual level as a resolution of quantum paradoxes

Willy De Baere

Published Jan 1, 1996• 1 citation
OpenAlex

Abstract

It is argued that the issue of embedding quantum mechanics in a classical frame of counterfactual reasoning in generating inconsistencies with quantum mechanics is stressed. Invoking a criterion of actualizability of hypothetical situations it is shown how a, new nonreproducibility property of individual subquantum states mag avoid the inconsistencies with QM.

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On Some Consequences of the Breakdown of Counterfactual Definiteness in the Quantum World

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The crucial role of counterfactual reasoning in generating inconsistencies between local subquantum theories and quantum mechanics is stressed. It is argued that the physical justification of such reasoning requires the fulfilment of a criterion of actualizability of hypothetical situations. It is demonstrated that in a subquantum framework this criterion is equivalent to the assumption of actual reproducibility of individual subquantum states. Therefore, inconsistencies between local subquantum theories and quantum mechanics disappear if a nonreproducibility property of nature, in full agreement with the empirical fact that past, present and future are basically distinct, is invoked. The proposal also leaves the universal validity of the locality principle untouched, in agreement with all existing empirical evidence.

Fortschritte der Physik•Nov 1, 1998•1 citation

A no-individuals account of quantum mechanics

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One of the most famous metaphysical problems in the philosophy of quantum mechanics concerns the individuality status of quantum entities: are they individuals, or non-individuals? The typical approach to the problem consists in defending one of the options by appealing directly to features of quantum mechanics with the addition, eventually, of theoretical virtues the favoured proposal may have. In this paper, we argue that this strategy is inappropriate, because the problem of individuality is ill formulated in the case of quantum mechanics. In a nutshell, our point is that considerations exclusively from quantum mechanics are too general and generic to grant the level of particularity required for providing for a principle of individuality. Problems of individuality appear only at the level of particular applications of the theory in specific contexts, and in these cases, we shall argue, search for a metaphysical notion of individuality may be substituted by an epistemic notion of individuation. The approach also has the benefits of dissolving the problems created by metaphysical underdetermination on this front. This article is part of the theme issue 'Identity, individuality and indistinguishability in physics and mathematics'.

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Consistent quantum counterfactuals

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An analysis using classical stochastic processes is used to construct a consistent system of quantum counterfactual reasoning. When applied to a counterfactual version of Hardy's paradox, it shows that the probabilistic character of quantum reasoning together with the ``one framework'' rule prevents a logical contradiction, and there is no evidence within this approach for any nonlocal influences. Counterfactual reasoning can support a realistic interpretation of standard quantum theory (measurements reveal what is actually there) under appropriate circumstances.

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Robert B. Griffiths

Quantum paradoxes The next few chapters are devoted to resolving a number of quantum paradoxes in the sense of giving a reasonable explanation of a seemingly paradoxical result in terms of the principles of quantum theory discussed earlier in this book. None of these paradoxes indicates a defect in quantum theory. Instead, when they have been properly understood, they show us that the quantum world is rather different from the world of our everyday experience and of classical physics, in a way somewhat analogous to that in which relativity theory has shown us that the laws appropriate for describing the behavior of objects moving at high speed differ in significant ways from those of pre-relativistic physics. An inadequate theory of quantum measurements is at the root of several quantum paradoxes. In particular, the notion that wave function collapse is a physical effect produced by a measurement, rather than a method of calculation, see Sec. 18.2, has given rise to a certain amount of confusion. Smuggling rules for classical reasoning into the quantum domain where they do not belong and where they give rise to logical inconsistencies is another common source of confusion. In particular, many paradoxes involve mixing the results from incompatible quantum frameworks. Certain quantum paradoxes have given rise to the idea that the quantum world is permeated by mysterious influences that propagate faster than the speed of light, in conflict with the theory of relativity. They are mysterious in that they cannot be used to transmit signals, which means that they are, at least in any direct sense, experimentally unobservable.

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Against Quantum Nonlocality

Willy De Baere, Jan De Neve

Abstract It is shown that all quantum “contradictions” disappear if one drops the assumption of unique initial conditions for a hidden variable theory for individual quantum processes. Our proposal corresponds with a deterministic world evolution such that local physical conditions are nonreproducible, in agreement with empirical observation

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Consistent resolution of some relativistic quantum paradoxes

Robert B. Griffiths

A relativistic version of the (consistent or decoherent) histories approach to quantum theory is developed on the basis of earlier work by Hartle, and used to discuss relativistic forms of the paradoxes of spherical wave packet collapse, Bohm's formulation of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox, and Hardy's paradox. It is argued that wave function collapse is not needed for introducing probabilities into relativistic quantum mechanics, and in any case should never be thought of as a physical process. Alternative approaches to stochastic time dependence can be used to construct a physical picture of the measurement process that is less misleading than collapse models. In particular, one can employ a coarse-grained but fully quantum-mechanical description in which particles move along trajectories, with behavior under Lorentz transformations the same as in classical relativistic physics, and detectors are triggered by particles reaching them along such trajectories. States entangled between spacelike separate regions are also legitimate quantum descriptions, and can be consistently handled by the formalism presented here. The paradoxes in question arise because of using modes of reasoning which, while correct for classical physics, are inconsistent with the mathematical structure of quantum theory, and are resolved (or tamed) by using a proper quantum analysis. In particular, there is no need to invoke, nor any evidence for, mysterious long-range superluminal influences, and thus no incompatibility, at least from this source, between relativity theory and quantum mechanics.

arXiv:quant-ph/0207015•Physical Review A•Dec 5, 2002•18 citations
It is argued that the issue of embedding quantum mechanics in a classical frame of counterfactual reasoning in generating inconsistencies with quantum mechanics is stressed. Invoking a criterion of actualizability of hypothetical situations it is shown how a, new nonreproducibility property of individual subquantum states mag avoid the inconsistencies with QM.
The crucial role of counterfactual reasoning in generating inconsistencies between local subquantum theories and quantum mechanics is stressed. It is argued that the physical justification of such reasoning requires the fulfilment of a criterion of actualizability of hypothetical situations. It is demonstrated that in a subquantum framework this criterion is equivalent to the assumption of actual reproducibility of individual subquantum states. Therefore, inconsistencies between local subquantum theories and quantum mechanics disappear if a nonreproducibility property of nature, in full agreement with the empirical fact that past, present and future are basically distinct, is invoked. The proposal also leaves the universal validity of the locality principle untouched, in agreement with all existing empirical evidence.
One of the most famous metaphysical problems in the philosophy of quantum mechanics concerns the individuality status of quantum entities: are they individuals, or non-individuals? The typical approach to the problem consists in defending one of the options by appealing directly to features of quantum mechanics with the addition, eventually, of theoretical virtues the favoured proposal may have. In this paper, we argue that this strategy is inappropriate, because the problem of individuality is ill formulated in the case of quantum mechanics. In a nutshell, our point is that considerations exclusively from quantum mechanics are too general and generic to grant the level of particularity required for providing for a principle of individuality. Problems of individuality appear only at the level of particular applications of the theory in specific contexts, and in these cases, we shall argue, search for a metaphysical notion of individuality may be substituted by an epistemic notion of individuation. The approach also has the benefits of dissolving the problems created by metaphysical underdetermination on this front. This article is part of the theme issue 'Identity, individuality and indistinguishability in physics and mathematics'.
An analysis using classical stochastic processes is used to construct a consistent system of quantum counterfactual reasoning. When applied to a counterfactual version of Hardy's paradox, it shows that the probabilistic character of quantum reasoning together with the ``one framework'' rule prevents a logical contradiction, and there is no evidence within this approach for any nonlocal influences. Counterfactual reasoning can support a realistic interpretation of standard quantum theory (measurements reveal what is actually there) under appropriate circumstances.
Quantum paradoxes The next few chapters are devoted to resolving a number of quantum paradoxes in the sense of giving a reasonable explanation of a seemingly paradoxical result in terms of the principles of quantum theory discussed earlier in this book. None of these paradoxes indicates a defect in quantum theory. Instead, when they have been properly understood, they show us that the quantum world is rather different from the world of our everyday experience and of classical physics, in a way somewhat analogous to that in which relativity theory has shown us that the laws appropriate for describing the behavior of objects moving at high speed differ in significant ways from those of pre-relativistic physics. An inadequate theory of quantum measurements is at the root of several quantum paradoxes. In particular, the notion that wave function collapse is a physical effect produced by a measurement, rather than a method of calculation, see Sec. 18.2, has given rise to a certain amount of confusion. Smuggling rules for classical reasoning into the quantum domain where they do not belong and where they give rise to logical inconsistencies is another common source of confusion. In particular, many paradoxes involve mixing the results from incompatible quantum frameworks. Certain quantum paradoxes have given rise to the idea that the quantum world is permeated by mysterious influences that propagate faster than the speed of light, in conflict with the theory of relativity. They are mysterious in that they cannot be used to transmit signals, which means that they are, at least in any direct sense, experimentally unobservable.
A relativistic version of the (consistent or decoherent) histories approach to quantum theory is developed on the basis of earlier work by Hartle, and used to discuss relativistic forms of the paradoxes of spherical wave packet collapse, Bohm's formulation of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox, and Hardy's paradox. It is argued that wave function collapse is not needed for introducing probabilities into relativistic quantum mechanics, and in any case should never be thought of as a physical process. Alternative approaches to stochastic time dependence can be used to construct a physical picture of the measurement process that is less misleading than collapse models. In particular, one can employ a coarse-grained but fully quantum-mechanical description in which particles move along trajectories, with behavior under Lorentz transformations the same as in classical relativistic physics, and detectors are triggered by particles reaching them along such trajectories. States entangled between spacelike separate regions are also legitimate quantum descriptions, and can be consistently handled by the formalism presented here. The paradoxes in question arise because of using modes of reasoning which, while correct for classical physics, are inconsistent with the mathematical structure of quantum theory, and are resolved (or tamed) by using a proper quantum analysis. In particular, there is no need to invoke, nor any evidence for, mysterious long-range superluminal influences, and thus no incompatibility, at least from this source, between relativity theory and quantum mechanics.