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Fortschritte der Physik

On Some Consequences of the Breakdown of Counterfactual Definiteness in the Quantum World

Willy De Baere

Published Nov 1, 1998• 1 citation
Publisher

Abstract

The crucial role of counterfactual reasoning in generating inconsistencies between local subquantum theories and quantum mechanics is stressed. It is argued that the physical justification of such reasoning requires the fulfilment of a criterion of actualizability of hypothetical situations. It is demonstrated that in a subquantum framework this criterion is equivalent to the assumption of actual reproducibility of individual subquantum states. Therefore, inconsistencies between local subquantum theories and quantum mechanics disappear if a nonreproducibility property of nature, in full agreement with the empirical fact that past, present and future are basically distinct, is invoked. The proposal also leaves the universal validity of the locality principle untouched, in agreement with all existing empirical evidence.

DOI
10.1002/(sici)1521-3978(199811)46:6/8<843::aid-prop843>3.0.co;2-1

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American Journal of Physics•Dec 14, 2009•31 citations
The crucial role of counterfactual reasoning in generating inconsistencies between local subquantum theories and quantum mechanics is stressed. It is argued that the physical justification of such reasoning requires the fulfilment of a criterion of actualizability of hypothetical situations. It is demonstrated that in a subquantum framework this criterion is equivalent to the assumption of actual reproducibility of individual subquantum states. Therefore, inconsistencies between local subquantum theories and quantum mechanics disappear if a nonreproducibility property of nature, in full agreement with the empirical fact that past, present and future are basically distinct, is invoked. The proposal also leaves the universal validity of the locality principle untouched, in agreement with all existing empirical evidence.
Recent discussions by Mermin [1] and Stapp [2] in this journal on non-locality and counterfactuality are shown to contain linguistic problems that require verification. As such they can at most provide us with two subjective choices for the meaning of 'counterfactual statements' in quantum mechanics. We shall show that the word 'counterfactual' is in fact inappropriate here and should be replaced by the word 'hypothetical'. Mermin's choice imposes a strictly contextual meaning based upon an interpretation of counterfactuality which he used to refute, without proof as we shall see, Stapp's logical proof [3] of non-locality in quantum theory. In linguistic theory both authors' choices of meaning: counterfactual versus hypothetical are equally acceptable and therefore some of the issues they discussed lie outside the domain of physics. The issues they discussed are further confused by the fact that in his reply Stapp [2] seems to have adopted Mermin's counterfactual interpretation against his own original [3] hypothetical interpretation. In the rest of this paper we shall adopt the hypothetical sense of Stapp's original statements but we modify his crucial statement LOC2 appropriately, then following his argumentations, we shall show that there is no conflict between relativity and quantum mechanics. We suggest that this should be the natural (pragmatic) choice of meaning in defining the predictions of events in the Hardy experiment.
A 1997 paper by Henry Stapp attempts to achieve a definitive argument for his long-sustained thesis that quantum mechanics implies a nonlocality inconsistent with the locality of relativity theory. His argument assumes both the validity of counterfactual reasoning under certain circumstances and the free choice of performance of experiments, and it specifically refrains from any assumptions about “elements of physical reality” as understood by Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen. In Sec. I we drastically condense his argument but retain his central principle of inference, called “LOC2,” which he claims is a consequence of relativistic locality. By careful attention to counterfactual reasoning we then throw doubt upon this claim and hence upon his argument as a whole. In Sec. II we answer Stapp’s reply to our critique of the 1997 paper. Section III is a postscript, commenting briefly on Stapp’s answer to Sec. II.
Abstract Apparent paradoxes in Quantum Physics demand a sharp distinction between a "real part of the world" and the realm of possibilities. In the former we may distinguish individual elements (coarse events) relating to space-time, with causal connections between them respecting the relativistic locality principle. The latter, quantitatively described by probability assignments conditioned on existing facts and depending on the definition of equivalence classes of situations, cannot be subdivided in space-time categories. There are global correlations (Pauli principle...). The cut between the realms of facts and possibilities implies an evolutionary picture of the "real world" in which the (generalized) arrow of time assumes basic significance. Some deficiencies of existing theory are pointed out.
Blaylock argues that the derivation of Bell’s inequality requires a hidden assumption, counterfactual definiteness, of which Bell was unaware. A careful analysis of Bell’s argument shows that Bell presupposes only locality and the predictions of standard quantum mechanics. Counterfactual definiteness, insofar as it is required, is derived in the course of the argument rather than presumed. Bell’s theorem has no direct bearing on the many worlds interpretation not because that interpretation denies counterfactual definiteness but because it does not recover the predictions of standard quantum mechanics.