Taking its historical point of departure in Heisenberg’s work, this article offers a view of quantum mechanics as, arguably, the first truly experimental and truly mathematical physical theory, that is, a theory concerned with experimenting with nature and mathematics alike. It is truly experimental because it is not, as in classical physics, merely the independent behavior of the system considered, in other words, what happens in any event, that we track, but what kind of experiments we perform that defines what happens. By the same token, the theory is also truly mathematical because, at least in the interpretation adopted here, its mathematical formalism does not stand in the service of a mathematical description of (quantum) physical processes in space and time in the way the formalism of classical physics does, but is only used to predict the outcomes of relevant experiments. It also follows that quantum theories experiment more freely with mathematics itself, since we invent predictive mathematical schemes, rather than proceed by refining mathematically our phenomenal representations of nature, which process constrains us in classical mechanics.
Taking its historical point of departure in Heisenberg’s work, this article offers a view of quantum mechanics as, arguably, the first truly experimental and truly mathematical physical theory, that is, a theory concerned with experimenting with nature and mathematics alike. It is truly experimental because it is not, as in classical physics, merely the independent behavior of the system considered, in other words, what happens in any event, that we track, but what kind of experiments we perform that defines what happens. By the same token, the theory is also truly mathematical because, at least in the interpretation adopted here, its mathematical formalism does not stand in the service of a mathematical description of (quantum) physical processes in space and time in the way the formalism of classical physics does, but is only used to predict the outcomes of relevant experiments. It also follows that quantum theories experiment more freely with mathematics itself, since we invent predictive mathematical schemes, rather than proceed by refining mathematically our phenomenal representations of nature, which process constrains us in classical mechanics.
After the development of a self-consistent quantum formalism nearly a century ago, there ensued a quest to understand the often counterintuitive predictions of the theory. These endeavors invariably begin with the assumption of the "truth" of the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics and then proceed to investigate the theory's implications for the physical world. One of the outcomes has been endless discussions of the quantum measurement problem, wave/particle duality, the non-locality of entangled quantum states, Schroedinger's cat, and other philosophical conundrums. In this essay, I take the point of view that quantum mechanics is a mathematical model, a human invention, and rather than pondering what the theory implies about our world, I consider the transposed question: what is it about our world that leads us to a quantum mechanical model of it? One consequence is the realization that discrete quanta, the quantum of action in particular, leads to the wave nature and statistical behavior of matter rather than the other way around.
The concept of physical object in twentieth century's physical theories (relativity and quanta) turns from intuitive-substantial to formal-functional, that is to a relatively invariable properties system well beyond the intuitive properties “carrier” typical of classical physics (CP). Anyway, the autonomous heuristic fecundity of this formal mathematical model neither was fully shown before the twentieth century nor, moreover, is independent of the properties it correlates. In quantum mechanics (QM) the turn to such purely functional correlation, which is nevertheless irreducible to mere information related to measurements, is historically evidenced by the fact that the formalization of the theory as an operator calculus in Hilbert space came before its physical interpretation. Dirac, moreover, asserted the irreducibility of quantum properties to mere measurements, just because this simply pragmatic reduction is poor and ambiguous in front of a mathematical formulation of linguistically expressible (even though not always experimentally decidable) properties. Neither a falsificationist interpretation of scientific theories, which makes them empirically decidable even though irreducible to mere instrumental theories, fits the purpose. It is then safer, and in better agreement with historical testimony, to admit not only the existence of properties which are measurable and reducible to instrumental operations, or at least falsifiable, but also the existence of properties which are physically inaccessible or empirically untestable, since properties of this kind are described and fruitfully implied by the mathematical model.
Abstract It can easily be argued that a fully mature and complete knowledge of quantum mechanics should include historical, axiomatic, formal mathematical, and even philosophical background to the subject. However, for a student approaching quantum theory for the first time in a serious way, it can be the case that an approach utilizing his or her existing knowledge of, and intuition for, classical physics (including mechanics, wave physics, and electricity and magnetism) as well as emphasizing connections to experimental results can be the most pro- ductive. That, at least, is the point of view adopted in this text and can be illustrated by a focus on the following general topics:
After some historical remarks concerning Schroedinger's discovery of wave mechanics, we present a unified formalism for the mathematical description of classical and quantum-mechanical systems, utilizing elements of the theory of operator algebras. We then review some basic aspects of quantum mechanics and, in particular, of its interpretation. We attempt to clarify what Quantum Mechanics tells us about Nature when appropriate experiments are made. We discuss the importance of the mechanisms of "dephasing" and "decoherence" in associating "facts" with possible events and rendering complementary possible events mutually exclusive.
Beginning with its introduction by W. Heisenberg, quantum mechanics was often seen as an overly abstract theory, mathematically and physically, vis‐à‐vis classical physics or relativity. This perception was amplified by the fact that, while the quantum‐mechanical formalism provided effective predictive algorithms for the probabilistic predictions concerning quantum experiments, it appeared unable to describe, even by way idealization, quantum processes themselves in space and time, in the way classical mechanics or relativity did. The aim of the present paper is to reconsider the nature of mathematical and physical abstraction in modern physics by offering an analysis of the concept of “physical fact” and of the concept of “physical concept,” in part by following G. W. F. Hegel’s and G. Deleuze’s arguments concerning the nature of conceptual thinking. In classical physics, relativity, and quantum physics alike, I argue, physical concepts are defined by the following main features—1) their multi‐component multiplicity; 2) their essential relations to problems; 3) and the interactions between physical, mathematical, and philosophical components within each concept. It is the particular character of these interactions in quantum mechanics, as defined by its essentially predictive (rather than descriptive) nature, that distinguishes it from classical physics and relativity.
Quantum theory is a mathematical formalism that allows physicists to predict the probability of observing different outcomes in experiments on sub-atomic systems. It has been tested more rigorously than any theory in science, and has never been wrong. However, strictly speaking it does not “explain” the behavior of sub-atomic systems, since it does not propose a mechanism to account for it. It tells us that they will behave in certain ways, but not why. Thus, quantum mechanics is not a theory in the sense familiar to social scientists, namely a body of laws that explains some part of reality. The explanatory question is the subject of the interpretive debates that surround the theory, not of the theory per se. That said, the literature routinely refers to quantum mechanics as a theory, and I shall use the terms interchangeably below.