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Cambridge University Press eBooks

Three experiments

Alexander E. Wendt

Published Apr 20, 2015• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Quantum theory is a mathematical formalism that allows physicists to predict the probability of observing different outcomes in experiments on sub-atomic systems. It has been tested more rigorously than any theory in science, and has never been wrong. However, strictly speaking it does not “explain” the behavior of sub-atomic systems, since it does not propose a mechanism to account for it. It tells us that they will behave in certain ways, but not why. Thus, quantum mechanics is not a theory in the sense familiar to social scientists, namely a body of laws that explains some part of reality. The explanatory question is the subject of the interpretive debates that surround the theory, not of the theory per se. That said, the literature routinely refers to quantum mechanics as a theory, and I shall use the terms interchangeably below.

DOI
10.1017/cbo9781316005163.003

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Quantum theory is a mathematical formalism that allows physicists to predict the probability of observing different outcomes in experiments on sub-atomic systems. It has been tested more rigorously than any theory in science, and has never been wrong. However, strictly speaking it does not “explain” the behavior of sub-atomic systems, since it does not propose a mechanism to account for it. It tells us that they will behave in certain ways, but not why. Thus, quantum mechanics is not a theory in the sense familiar to social scientists, namely a body of laws that explains some part of reality. The explanatory question is the subject of the interpretive debates that surround the theory, not of the theory per se. That said, the literature routinely refers to quantum mechanics as a theory, and I shall use the terms interchangeably below.
Taking its historical point of departure in Heisenberg’s work, this article offers a view of quantum mechanics as, arguably, the first truly experimental and truly mathematical physical theory, that is, a theory concerned with experimenting with nature and mathematics alike. It is truly experimental because it is not, as in classical physics, merely the independent behavior of the system considered, in other words, what happens in any event, that we track, but what kind of experiments we perform that defines what happens. By the same token, the theory is also truly mathematical because, at least in the interpretation adopted here, its mathematical formalism does not stand in the service of a mathematical description of (quantum) physical processes in space and time in the way the formalism of classical physics does, but is only used to predict the outcomes of relevant experiments. It also follows that quantum theories experiment more freely with mathematics itself, since we invent predictive mathematical schemes, rather than proceed by refining mathematically our phenomenal representations of nature, which process constrains us in classical mechanics.
Quantum mechanics is one of our most successful physical theories; its predictions agree with experimental observations to an extremely high accuracy. However, the bare formalism of quantum theory does not provide straightforward answers to seemingly simple questions: for example, how should one model systems that include agents who are themselves using quantum theory? These foundational questions may be investigated with a theorist's tool – the thought experiment. Its purpose is to turn debates about the interpretation of quantum theory into actual physics questions. In this article, we give a state-of-the-art overview on quantum thought experiments involving observers, from the basic Wigner's friend to the recent Frauchiger-Renner setup, clarifying their interpretational significance and responding to objections and criticism on the way.
Quantum mechanics is our most successful physical theory. It predicts the behavior of atoms, molecules, and light to ten decimal places. No experiment has ever contradicted it. It also contains a crack at its foundation. The theory’s central equation—the Schrodinger equation—describes a smooth, continuous, perfectly predictable evolution of the quantum state. But whenever anyone performs a measurement, they get a single, definite result. Which result they get appears to be random. The transition from smooth evolution to random outcome is called the “collapse of the wavefunction,” and after nearly a century of analysis, there is no agreed-upon explanation for what causes it, when it occurs, or whether it occurs at all. This is the measurement problem. The measurement problem is not a minor puzzle at the margins of the theory. It is a failure to explain the most basic operation in science: looking at the result of an experiment. Around it cluster other puzzles. Light behaves like a wave in some experiments and like a particle in others—two contradictory descriptions. Two particles that have interacted remain correlated across arbitrary distances, as though communicating faster than light. The probabilities that govern measurement outcomes appear as a postulate—the Born rule—inserted by hand with no deeper justification. And the theory offers no unified picture of reality: quantum mechanics, general relativity, and the standard model of particle physics speak incompatible mathematical languages. A century of effort has produced many interpretations of quantum mechanics. Copenhagen. Many-worlds. De Broglie-Bohm. Objective collapse. Quantum Bayesianism. None has achieved consensus. The measurement problem remains. This document proposes that the source of these puzzles is not quantum mechanics itself. It is a single, invisible assumption made at the very beginning of the theory in 1900—an assumption so deeply embedded that nobody noticed they were making it. Change that assumption, and the puzzles do not get solved. They dissolve. They stop being puzzles. They become predictable consequences of geometry.
The behavior of classical macroscopic particles – from baseballs to planets – is governed by Newtonian mechanics as we have described in the first chapters of this book. The behavior of very small particles, on the other hand, is governed by an entirely different collection of equations and rules that go under the name of “quantum mechanics” and these particles are referred to as quantum particles. These rules have analogies to classical mechanics, but are fundamentally different and somewhat mysterious as we discussed in Chapter 8. The fundamental principles of quantum mechanics cannot be proven to be correct. They were developed based on the results of experimental observation, by analogy with classical mechanics, and through the consideration of logical implications of the formalisms used. There is no way to derive the fundamental elements of quantum mechanics, any more than one could predict from first principles that Newtonian forces should add as vectors. On the other hand, quantum mechanics is among the most rigorously tested theories in science, and the predictions of quantum mechanics have, so far, always been in agreement with experiment. In this chapter, we will present quantum mechanics as a series of postulates and examine their implications in application to simple one-dimensional systems. In the next chapter we will examine quantum effects in real systems including atoms, molecules, crystals, and artificially engineered nano-structures.
To date, the physical theory that most accurately describes the behavior of the atomic world is quantum mechanics. Since spectroscopy uses light to probe the atomic and molecular world, it should not be much of a surprise to learn that quantum mechanics is used to describe how spectroscopy works. Nobel Prize-winning physicist Richard Feynmann once said, "€œIf you think you understand quantum mechanics, you don't understand quantum mechanics." This chapter won't bring you to a complete understanding of quantum mechanics, Feynmann's quote notwithstanding. But it will try to point out the important aspects, and hopefully it will at least leave the reader with the understanding that spectroscopy is quantum-mechanically based. Science's job is to try to understand the natural universe. To do this, scientists try to generate models to describe and predict the universe's behavior. (Not the behavior of the entire universe, but small selected parts of it.) If the model and the universe do not agree, there are two choices: change the model, or change the universe. Since all attempts at changing the universe have failed, our only choice is to change the model. Since the 1600s, scientific advance has accelerated at least in part because the proposed models of the universe have been increasingly more acceptable. Perhaps the first true “scientific” investigation (by the modern definition) was Robert Boyle's investigation of gases in the 1660s. While there were some noteworthy incorrect or improper models developed (phlogiston and vitalism are two that come to mind immediately, but doubtless there are others), incorrect or improper models were ultimately replaced by more viable models. One such group of models was what we now call Newton's laws of motion. In just a few statements, verbal or mathematical, Newton's laws accurately describe the motion of matter. Further, these models withstood the test of multiple examinations, and are accepted as proper models of how matter behaves.
One of the recurrent problems in the foundations of physics is to explain why we rarely observe certain phenomena that are allowed by our theories and laws. In thermodynamics, for example, the spontaneous approach towards equilibrium is ubiquitous yet the time-reversal-invariant laws that presumably govern thermal behaviour in the microscopic level equally allow spontaneous approach away from equilibrium to occur. Why are the former processes frequently observed while the latter are almost never reported? Another example comes from quantum mechanics where the formalism, if considered complete and universally applicable, predicts the existence of macroscopic superpositions—monstrous Schrodinger cats—and these are never observed: while electrons and atoms enjoy the cloudiness of waves, macroscopic objects are always localized to definite positions. A well-known explanatory framework due to Ludwig Boltzmann traces the rarity of " abnormal" thermodynamic phenomena to the scarcity of the initial conditions that lead to it. After all, physical laws are no more than algorithms and these are expected to generate different results according to different initial conditions, hence Boltzmann's insight that violations of thermodynamic laws are possible but highly improbable. Yet Boltzmann introduces probabilities into this explanatory scheme, and since the latter is couched in terms of classical mechanics, these probabilities must be interpreted as a result of ignorance of the exact state the system is in. Quantum mechanics has taught us otherwise. Here the attempts to explain why we never observe macroscopic superpositions have led to different interpretations of the formalism and to different solutions to the quantum measurement problem. These solutions introduce additional interpretations to the meaning of probability over and above ignorance of the definite state of the physical system: quantum probabilities may result from pure chance. Notwithstanding the success of the Boltzmannian framework in explaining the thermodynamic arrow in time it leaves us with a foundational puzzle: how can ignorance play a role in scientific explanation of objective reality? In turns out that two opposing solutions to the quantum measurement problem in which probabilities arise from the stochastic character of the underlying dynamics may scratch this explanatory itch. By offering a dynamical justification to the probabilities employed in classical statistical mechanics these two interpretations complete the Boltzmannian explanatory scheme and allow us to exorcize ignorance from scientific explanations of unobserved phenomena. In this thesis I argue that the puzzle of the thermodynamic arrow in time is closely related to the problem of interpreting quantum mechanics, i.e., to the measurement problem. We may solve one by fiat and thus solve the other, but it seems unwise to try solving them independently. I substantiate this claim by presenting two possible interpretations to non-relativistic quantum mechanics. Differing as they do on the meaning of the probabilities they introduce into the otherwise deterministic dynamics, these interpretations offer alternative explanatory schemes to the standard Boltzmannian statistical mechanical explanation of thermodynamic approach to equilibrium. I then show how notwithstanding their current empirical equivalence, the two approaches diverge at the continental divide between scientific realism and anti-realism.