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Physical Review Letters

Curious New Statistical Prediction of Quantum Mechanics

David Z. Albert, Yakir Aharonov, Susan S. D’Amato

Published Jan 7, 1985• 70 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Whether quantum mechanical systems, within the interval between two measurements, can be assigned definite, simultaneous values of noncommuting observables has been the subject of a very old dispute. A certain widely held assumption about such systems has been crucial to that dispute. That assumption turns out to be wrong: A previously unknown prediction of quantum mechanics, which fails to satisfy that assumption, is described here, and the consequences of that failure are considered.

DOI
10.1103/physrevlett.54.5

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Whether quantum mechanical systems, within the interval between two measurements, can be assigned definite, simultaneous values of noncommuting observables has been the subject of a very old dispute. A certain widely held assumption about such systems has been crucial to that dispute. That assumption turns out to be wrong: A previously unknown prediction of quantum mechanics, which fails to satisfy that assumption, is described here, and the consequences of that failure are considered.
One of the aspects of quantum theory which has attracted the most general attention, is the novelty of the logical notions which it presupposes. It asserts that even a complete mathematical description of a physical system S does not in general enable one to predict with certainty the result of an experiment on S, and that in particular one can never predict with certainty both the position and the momentum of S, (Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle). It further asserts that most pairs of observations are incompatible, and cannot be made on S, simultaneously (Principle of Non-commutativity of Observations).
A recent result concerning the assignment of well-defined values to certain noncommuting observables in quantum ensembles which have been both preselected and post-selected appears to show that quantum mechanics is "contextual." Extending the argument to the case of measurements on two separated spin-\textonehalf{} systems suggests that quantum mechanics is nonlocal. The significance of these phenomena is evaluated, and it is shown that they have no bearing on the question of contextuality or nonlocality.
Should we doubt the exactness of the predictive quantum rules of calculation? Although this question is sometimes raised in connection with the one on how to physically understand quantum mechanics, these two questions should not be mixed up. It is recalled here that even the first one is stil an object of controversy, and it is shown (a) that in one specific case the arguments put forward in support of such doubts are hardly cogent but (b) that, nevertheless, at least in one specific other context, the question is worth attention. This is the problem of repeated imperfect measurements. Relative to it, a theoretical possibility is shown of discriminating between the thesis that the quantum rules are exact and a powerful theory of which it is proved that it cannot be reconciled with the assumption.
The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen argument for the incompleteness of quantum mechanics involves two assumptions: one about locality and the other about when it is legitimate to infer the existence of an element-of-reality. Using one simple thought experiment, we argue that quantum predictions and the relativity of simultaneity require that both these assumptions fail, whether or not quantum mechanics is complete. EPR’s (1935) argument for the incompleteness of QM turns upon the following sufficient condition: “If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty (i.e., with probability equal to unity) the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an element of physical reality corresponding to this physical quantity.“ EPR apply this condition in a case where knowledge gained from measuring one quantum system allows one to predict with certainty a value for a physical quantity on another.
Born's rule is the recipe for calculating probabilities from quantum mechanical amplitudes. There is no generally accepted derivation of Born's rule from first principles. In this paper, it is motivated from assumptions that link the ontological content of a proper physical model to the epistemic conditions of the experimental context. More precisely, it is assumed that all knowable distinctions should correspond to distinctions in a proper model. This principle of "ontological completeness" means, for example, that the probabilistic treatment of the double slit experiment with and without path information should differ. Further, it is assumed that the model should rely only on knowable ontological elements, and that failure to fulfill this principle of "ontological minimalism" gives rise to wrong predictions. Consequently, probabilities should be assigned only to observable experimental outcomes. Also, the method to calculate such probabilities should not rely on the existence of a precise path of the observed object if this path is not knowable. A similar principle was promoted by Born, even though he did not apply it to probability. Another crucial assumption is that the proper rule to calculate probabilities should be generally valid. It should be applicable in all experimental contexts, regardless the setup that determines which attributes of the studied object are observed, together with the probability to observe each of the associated attribute values. There is no need to refer to the Hilbert space structure of quantum mechanics in the present treatment. Rather, some elements of this structure emerge from the analysis.