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Zeitschrift für Naturforschung A

Quantum Physics and Reality

Rudolf Haag

Published Feb 1, 2001• 3 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Abstract Apparent paradoxes in Quantum Physics demand a sharp distinction between a "real part of the world" and the realm of possibilities. In the former we may distinguish individual elements (coarse events) relating to space-time, with causal connections between them respecting the relativistic locality principle. The latter, quantitatively described by probability assignments conditioned on existing facts and depending on the definition of equivalence classes of situations, cannot be subdivided in space-time categories. There are global correlations (Pauli principle...). The cut between the realms of facts and possibilities implies an evolutionary picture of the "real world" in which the (generalized) arrow of time assumes basic significance. Some deficiencies of existing theory are pointed out.

DOI
10.1515/zna-2001-0112

Related papers

What quantum mechanics is trying to tell us

Ulrich Mohrhoff

This article presents a novel interpretation of quantum mechanics. It extends the meaning of “measurement” to include all property-indicating facts. Intrinsically, space is undifferentiated: There are no points on which a world of locally instantiated physical properties could be built. Instead, reality is built on facts, in the sense that the properties of things are extrinsic, or supervenient on property-indicating facts. The actual extent to which the world is spatially and temporally differentiated (that is, the extent to which spatiotemporal relations and distinctions are warranted by the facts) is necessarily limited. Notwithstanding that the state vector does nothing but assign probabilities, quantum mechanics affords a complete understanding of the actual world. If there is anything that is incomplete, it is the actual world, but its incompleteness exists only in relation to a conceptual framework that is more detailed than the actual world. Two deep-seated misconceptions are responsible for the interpretational difficulties associated with quantum mechanics: the notion that the spatial and temporal aspects of the world are adequately represented by sets with the cardinality of the real numbers, and the notion of an instantaneous state that evolves in time. The latter is an unwarranted (in fact, incoherent) projection of our apparent “motion in time” into the world of physics. Equally unwarranted, at bottom, is the use of causal concepts. There nevertheless exists a “classical” domain in which language suggestive of nomological necessity may be used. Quantum mechanics not only is strictly consistent with the existence of this domain but also presupposes it in several ways.

arXiv:quant-ph/9903051•American Journal of Physics•Aug 1, 2000•41 citations

Mind, Matter and Quantum Mechanics (2nd edition)

G. Mahler

Quantum mechanics is usually defined in terms of some loosely connected axioms and rules. Such a foundation is far from the beauty of, e.g., the `principles' underlying classical mechanics. Motivated, in addition, by notorious interpretation problems, there have been numerous attempts to modify or `complete' quantum mechanics. A first attempt was based on so-called hidden variables; its proponents essentially tried to expel the non-classical nature of quantum mechanics. More recent proposals intend to complete quantum mechanics not within mechanics proper but on a `higher (synthetic) level'; by means of a combination with gravitation theory (R Penrose), with quantum information theory (C M Caves, C A Fuchs) or with psychology and brain science (H P Stapp). I think it is fair to say that in each case the combination is with a subject that, per se , suffers from a very limited understanding that is even more severe than that of quantum mechanics. This was acceptable, though, if it could convincingly be argued that scientific progress desperately needs to join forces. Quantum mechanics of a closed system was a beautiful and well understood theory with its respective state being presented as a point on a deterministic trajectory in Liouville space---not unlike the motion of a classical N -particle system in its 6N -dimensional phase-space. Unfortunately, we need an inside and an outside view, we need an external reference frame, we need an observer. This unavoidable partition is the origin of most of the troubles we have with quantum mechanics. A pragmatic solution is introduced in the form of so-called measurement postulates: one of the various incompatible properties of the system under consideration is supposed to be realized (i.e. to become a fact, to be defined without fundamental dispersion) based on `instantaneous' projections within some externally selected measurement basis. As a result, the theory becomes essentially statistical rather than deterministic; furthermore there is an asymmetry between the observed and the observing. This is the point where consciousness may come in. Complemented by an introduction and several appendices, Henry Stapp's book consists essentially of three parts: theory, implications, and new developments. The theory part gives a very readable account of the Copenhagen interpretation, some aspects of a psychophysical theory, and, eventually, hints towards a quantum foundation of the brain--mind connection. The next part, `implications', summarizes some previous attempts to bridge the gap between the working rules of quantum mechanics and their possible consequences for our understanding of this world (Pauli, Everett, Bohm, Heisenberg). The last section, `new developments', dwells on some ideas about the conscious brain and its possible foundation on quantum mechanics. The book is an interesting and, in part, fascinating contribution to a field that continues to be a companion to `practical' quantum mechanics since its very beginning. It is doubtful whether such types of `quantum ontologies' will ever become (empirically) testable; right now one can hardly expect more than to be offered some consistent `grand picture', which the reader may find more or less acceptable or even rewarding. Many practicing quantum physicists, though, will remain unimpressed. The shift from synthetic ontology to analytic ontology is the foundation of the present work. This means that fundamental wholes are being partitioned into their ontologically subordinate components by means of `events'. The actual event, in turn, is an abrupt change in the Heisenberg state describing the quantum universe. The new state then defines the tendencies associated with the next actual event. To avoid infinite regression in terms of going from one state of tendencies to the next, consciousness is there to give these events a special `feel', to provide a status of `intrinsic actuality'. The brain of an alert human observer is similar in an important way to a quantum detection device: it can amplify small signals to large macroscopic effects. On the other hand, actual events are not postulated to occur exclusively in brains. They are more generally associated with the formation of records. Records are necessarily part of the total state of the universe: it is obvious that the state of the universe cannot undergo a Schrödinger dynamics and at the same time record its own history. `The full universe consists therefore of an exceedingly thin veneer of relatively sluggish, directly observable properties resting on a vast ocean or rapidly fluctuating unobservable ones.' The present ideas also bear on how the world should be seen to develop. While conventional cosmology encounters problems as to how to define the intial conditions, which would enter the governing equations of motion, here `the boundary conditions are set not at some initial time, but gradually by a sequence of acts that imposes a sequence of constraints. After any sequence of acts there remains a collection of possible worlds, some of which will be eliminated by the next act.' Connected with those acts is `meaning': there has always been some speculation about the special significance of local properties in our understanding of the world. One could argue that correlations (even the quantum correlations found, e.g., in the EPR-experiments) were as real as anything else. But also Stapp stresses the special role of locality: the `local observable properties, or properties similar to them are the natural, and perhaps exclusive, carriers of meaning in the quantum universe. From this point of view the quantum universe tends to create meaning.' This sounds like an absolute concept: meaning not with respect to something else, but defined intrinsically---not easy to digest. The role of consciousness in the developing quantum universe requires more attention. `The causal irrelevance of our thoughts within classical physics constitutes a serious deficiency of that theory, construed as a description of reality.' This is taken to be entirely different within quantum mechanics. `The core idea of quantum mechanics is to describe our activities as knowledge-seeking and knowledge-using agents.' `21st century science does not reduce human beings to mechanical automata. Rather it elevates human beings to agents whose free choices can, according to the known laws, actually influence their behaviour.' An example with respect to perception is discussed: `Why, when we look at a triangle, do we experience three lines joined at three points and not some pattern of neuron firings?' The brain `does not convert an actual whole triangle into some jumbled set of particle motions; rather it converts a concatenation of separate external events into the actualization of some single integrated pattern of neural activity that is congruent to the perceived whole triangle.' How convincing is this proposal? It is hard to tell. I think Henry Stapp did a good job, but there are tight limitations to any such endeavour. Quantum mechanics is often strange indeed, but it also gives rise to our classical world around us. For the emergence of classicality jumps and measurement projections (the basic phenomena connected with those fundamental events of choice) are not needed. Therefore, I doubt whether the explanation of the evolution of our world really allows (or requires) that much free choice. On the other hand, most scientist will agree that empirical science was not possible without free will: we could not ask independent questions if this asking was part of a deterministic trajectory. The fact that the result of a quantum measurement is indeterminate (within given probabilities) does certainly not explain free will. How about the type of measurment? The experimentalist will have to assume that he can select the pertinent observable within some limits. But given a certain design the so-called pointer basis (producing stable measurement results) is no longer a matter of free choice. `The main theme of classical physics is that we live in a clocklike universe.' Today it is often assumed that the universe was a big (quantum-) computer or a cellular automaton. Many would be all too happy to leave that rather restrictive picture behind. But where to go? Stapp suggests giving consciousness a prominent role: `The most profound alteration of the fundamental principles was to bring consciousness of human beings into the basic structure of the physical theory.' How far we are able to go in this direction will depend on the amount of concrete research results becoming available to support this view.

Journal of Physics A Mathematical and General•Jun 17, 2004•4 citations

Reality in Quantum Mechanics

Henry Margenau

The philosophy of quantum mechanics has often been conceived by physicists as a collection of dogmas concerning what can be measured, observed and known. To this branch of dialectics the present paper does not attempt to contribute, chiefly because it is written from the conviction that no part of science, nor any philosophy, can safely predict what may be feasible or knowable. Rather, this brief essay endeavors to expose the epistemology of quantum physics in a way which allows it to be recognized as an extension of the ordinary processes of cognition, as the continuation of a line which starts in sensory perception, leads straight through the methods of classical physics into quantum mechanics and shows no signs of terminating even there.

Philosophy of Science•Oct 1, 1949•38 citations

Emergent Causality from Decoherence: A Postulated Regime with an Explicit Conjecture

Eduardo Lorca

Emergent Causality from Decoherence: A Postulated Regime with an Explicit Conjecture An imaginary hypothesis, not a theory. This is the third revision. It corrects the definition of causality, changes the parameter, acknowledges the circularity of time, and states the conjecture explicitly. It is still a hypothesis, not a theory. ________________________________________ Abstract This manuscript proposes that classical causality is not fundamental but emergent, arising from the degree of decoherence of a system. We define causality as definite causal order between events. We choose a decoherence parameter that is basis-dependent and dimension-independent: the interference suppression factor relative to the pointer basis. We postulate (not derive) that definite causal order emerges when this parameter exceeds a critical value. We acknowledge the circularity of time, the lack of a full mathematical derivation, and the absence of experimental confirmation. We add an explicit conjecture connecting the parameter to the process-matrix formalism of Oreshkov, Costa and Brukner. The hypothesis is offered as a framework for critique and development. ________________________________________ 1. Introduction The nature of causality remains an open problem in physics. In quantum mechanics, there are correlations, not causes in the classical sense. In classical physics, causality is absolute and local. These descriptions do not obviously fit together. This manuscript proposes that classical causality is not a fundamental property of the universe, but a property of the level of description. It emerges from the degree of decoherence of a system, in a manner analogous to how temperature emerges from the collective behaviour of many particles. The hypothesis is labelled "imaginary" because it lacks full mathematical formalism, experimental confirmation, and a resolution of the circularity of time. It is offered as a framework for critique, not as a completed theory. Scope: This hypothesis addresses only the transition between the quantum regime (no definite causal order) and the classical regime (definite causal order). It does not address the relativistic regime. ________________________________________ 2. Defining "Causality" In this manuscript, "causality" means definite causal order between events. That is: for any two events A and B, either A precedes B, or B precedes A. Not intervention. Not deterministic evolution. Definite order. This definition is chosen because it is the one that can be connected to the process-matrix formalism (Oreshkov et al., 2012), and because it is the one that emerges in the classical limit. Other definitions (interventionist causation, deterministic evolution) are distinct and are not addressed here. This is a choice. Other definitions are possible. This choice is made for definiteness. ________________________________________ 3. The Parameter The central parameter is the degree of decoherence, γ. We choose a specific measure: the interference suppression factor relative to the pointer basis. This measure is: • Basis-dependent. It is defined relative to the pointer basis selected by the environment. • Dimension-independent. It is a ratio (a contrast), not an absolute quantity, so it ranges from 0 to 1 regardless of the dimension of the Hilbert space. • Explicit about the cut. It requires specifying the system, the environment, and the pointer basis. This measure is chosen over purity because purity has three defects: it depends on dimension, it is basis-independent, and it presupposes an unspecified system-environment cut. The interference suppression factor does not have these defects. This is a choice. Other measures are possible. This choice is made for definiteness, not because it is uniquely correct. ________________________________________ 4. The Postulate (Not a Derivation) With this parameter, we postulate that classical causality emerges when γ exceeds a critical value, γ_c. Below γ_c, the system is in a quantum regime: correlations without definite causal order. Above γ_c, the system is in a classical regime: definite causal order. This is not a derivation from first principles. It is a postulate. But it is a postulate with a defined parameter. And it is a starting point. The intermediate regime is not derived. It is postulated as a transition. And it is acknowledged that this placement is in tension with established physics: relativistic causal structure is a property of the spacetime metric, not of partial decoherence. This hypothesis does not address the relativistic regime. It addresses only the transition between the quantum regime (no definite causal order) and the classical regime (definite causal order). ________________________________________ 5. Co-Emergence (and the Circularity of Time) This hypothesis proposes that causality and the arrow of time co-emerge from decoherence. Neither is prior. Neither is the cause of the other. They emerge together. This is a conjecture, not a derivation. And it is acknowledged that this position is in tension with the literature: Oreshkov et al. (2012) suggest that the arrow of time produces causal order, not that they co-emerge. The difference is subtle but important: if the arrow of time is prior, then time is more fundamental than causality. If they co-emerge, neither is more fundamental. The circularity of time is not resolved. Decoherence presupposes time. The arrow of time is traced to a low-entropy initial condition, not to decoherence itself. The hypothesis does not resolve this circularity. It assumes it. ________________________________________ 6. Confrontation with the Literature The hypothesis is placed against the established literature. We do not confront as attacks, nor attempt to surpass. We use as anchors. • Zurek (2003), "Decoherence, einselection, and the quantum origins of the classical," Rev. Mod. Phys. 75, 715. Zurek shows that decoherence selects a small set of stable states (pointer states) and that the combination of einselection with dynamics leads to the emergence of classical phase-space structure. This hypothesis assumes, as an additional premise, that classical dynamics is causal. This premise is not derived from Zurek. It is an independent claim, and it is the weakest point in the argumentative chain. If the premise is true, then causality emerges from decoherence. If it is false, the hypothesis fails. • Gell-Mann and Hartle (1994, 2014), "Quasiclassical Realms in a Quantum Universe" (gr-qc/9404017) and "Adaptive Coarse Graining, Environment, Strong Decoherence, and Quasiclassical Realms" (arXiv:1312.7454). These works derive classical deterministic time-correlations and the fixed-past/open-future asymmetry from coarse-graining and strong decoherence, with no observer. The present hypothesis is close to this programme. It differs in framing the result as "emergent causality" rather than "quasiclassical realms." The substance is similar. • Oreshkov, Costa, and Brukner (2012), "Quantum correlations with no causal order," Nature Communications 3, 1092. DOI: 10.1038/ncomms2076. This work constructs correlations with no definite causal order and shows that definite order is recovered in a classical limit. The present hypothesis is consistent with this, but does not engage with the formalism. A conjecture connecting the two is offered in Section 7. • Page and Wootters (1983), "Evolution without evolution: Dynamics described by stationary observables," Phys. Rev. D 27, 2885. This work obtains time from entanglement with an internal clock. The present hypothesis does not address this. It assumes time as a parameter. • Joos and Zeh (1985), "The emergence of classical properties through interaction with the environment," Z. Phys. B 59, 223. Foundational work on decoherence in open quantum systems. • Rovelli (1996), "Relational quantum mechanics," Int. J. Theor. Phys. 35, 1637. Relational quantum mechanics holds that states are relational, not absolute. The present hypothesis extends this to causality: if states are relational, perhaps causal structure is too. But the extension is not derived. It is proposed. • Schlosshauer (2005), "Decoherence, the measurement problem, and interpretations of quantum mechanics," Rev. Mod. Phys. 76, 1267. A review of decoherence and its interpretational implications. • Allen, Barrett, Horsman, Lee, and Spekkens (2017), "Quantum Common Causes and Quantum Causal Models," Phys. Rev. X 7, 031021. This work defines interventionist causation in quantum mechanics. The present hypothesis uses a different definition (definite causal order), but acknowledges that other definitions are possible. The honest assessment: The hypothesis is not new in its intuition. It is new in its emphasis on causality as the emergent property, and in its attempt to frame the quantum-classical transition as a causal transition. But the emphasis is not a theory, and the transition is not derived. ________________________________________ 7. Conjecture: Connection with the Process-Matrix Formalism Oreshkov, Costa and Brukner (2012) have shown that, if one does not assume a global causal order, there exist quantum correlations that violate the causal inequality. These correlations are described by process matrices that are causally non-separable. In a classical limit, causal order emerges. This hypothesis proposes, as a conjecture, that the causally non-separable process matrix could correspond to γ = 0 (no decoherence, no definite causal order). The causally separable process matrix could correspond to γ > γ_c (sufficient decoherence, emergent causal order). The quantum-to-classical transition mentioned by Oreshkov et al. could be the transition in γ. This is a conjecture. It is not derived. There is no formalism that supports it. It is offered as a direction for future work: if someone with the appropriate mathematical tools wishes to attempt the connection, here is the intuition. And here is the criterion for

•Nov 7, 2026•0 citations

Quantum Mechanics and Reality

Virendra Singh

We begin by discussing ``What exists?'', i.e. ontology, in Classical Physics which provided a description of physical phenomena at the macroscopic level. The microworld however necessitates a introduction of Quantum ideas for its understanding. It is almost certain that the world is quantum mechanical at both microscopic as well as at macroscopic level. The problem of ontology of a Quantum world is a difficult one. It also depends on which interpretation is used. We first discuss some interpretations in which Quantum Mechanics does not provide a complete framework but has to be supplemented by extra ingredients e.g. (i) Copenhagen group of interpretations associated with the names of Niels Bohr, Heisenberg, von-Neumann, and (ii) de-Broglie-Bohm interpretations. We then look at some interpretations in which Quantum mechanics is supposed to provide the entire framework such as (i) Everett-deWitt many world, (ii) quantum histories interpretations. We conclude with some remarks on the rigidity of the formalism of quantum mechanics, which is sharp contrast to it's ontological fluidity.

arXiv:quant-ph/0412148•Dec 20, 2004•4 citations

The One, the Many, and the Quantum

Ulrich Mohrhoff

The problem of understanding quantum mechanics is in large measure the problem of finding appropriate ways of thinking about the spatial and temporal aspects of the physical world. The standard, substantival, set-theoretic conception of space is inconsistent with quantum mechanics, and so is the doctrine of local realism, the principle of local causality, and the mathematical physicist's golden calf, determinism. The said problem is made intractable by our obtruding onto the physical world a theoretical framework that is more detailed than the physical world. This framework portraits space and time as infinitely and intrinsically differentiated, whereas the physical world is only finitely differentiated spacewise and timewise, namely to the extent that spatiotemporal relations and distinctions are warranted by facts. This has the following consequences: (i) The contingent properties of the physical world, including the times at which they are possessed, are indefinite and extrinsic. (ii) We cannot think of reality as being built "from the bottom up", out of locally instantiated physical properties. Instead we must conceive of the physical world as being built "from the top down": By entering into a multitude of spatial relations with itself, "existence itself" takes on both the aspect of a spatially differentiated world and the aspect of a multiplicity of formless relata, the fundamental particles. At the root of our interpretational difficulties is the "cookie cutter paradigm", according to which the world's synchronic multiplicity is founded on the introduction of surfaces that carve up space in the manner of three-dimensional cookie cutters. The neurophysiological underpinnings of this insidious notion are discussed.

arXiv:quant-ph/0005110•May 26, 2000•3 citations
Abstract Apparent paradoxes in Quantum Physics demand a sharp distinction between a "real part of the world" and the realm of possibilities. In the former we may distinguish individual elements (coarse events) relating to space-time, with causal connections between them respecting the relativistic locality principle. The latter, quantitatively described by probability assignments conditioned on existing facts and depending on the definition of equivalence classes of situations, cannot be subdivided in space-time categories. There are global correlations (Pauli principle...). The cut between the realms of facts and possibilities implies an evolutionary picture of the "real world" in which the (generalized) arrow of time assumes basic significance. Some deficiencies of existing theory are pointed out.
This article presents a novel interpretation of quantum mechanics. It extends the meaning of “measurement” to include all property-indicating facts. Intrinsically, space is undifferentiated: There are no points on which a world of locally instantiated physical properties could be built. Instead, reality is built on facts, in the sense that the properties of things are extrinsic, or supervenient on property-indicating facts. The actual extent to which the world is spatially and temporally differentiated (that is, the extent to which spatiotemporal relations and distinctions are warranted by the facts) is necessarily limited. Notwithstanding that the state vector does nothing but assign probabilities, quantum mechanics affords a complete understanding of the actual world. If there is anything that is incomplete, it is the actual world, but its incompleteness exists only in relation to a conceptual framework that is more detailed than the actual world. Two deep-seated misconceptions are responsible for the interpretational difficulties associated with quantum mechanics: the notion that the spatial and temporal aspects of the world are adequately represented by sets with the cardinality of the real numbers, and the notion of an instantaneous state that evolves in time. The latter is an unwarranted (in fact, incoherent) projection of our apparent “motion in time” into the world of physics. Equally unwarranted, at bottom, is the use of causal concepts. There nevertheless exists a “classical” domain in which language suggestive of nomological necessity may be used. Quantum mechanics not only is strictly consistent with the existence of this domain but also presupposes it in several ways.
Quantum mechanics is usually defined in terms of some loosely connected axioms and rules. Such a foundation is far from the beauty of, e.g., the `principles' underlying classical mechanics. Motivated, in addition, by notorious interpretation problems, there have been numerous attempts to modify or `complete' quantum mechanics. A first attempt was based on so-called hidden variables; its proponents essentially tried to expel the non-classical nature of quantum mechanics. More recent proposals intend to complete quantum mechanics not within mechanics proper but on a `higher (synthetic) level'; by means of a combination with gravitation theory (R Penrose), with quantum information theory (C M Caves, C A Fuchs) or with psychology and brain science (H P Stapp). I think it is fair to say that in each case the combination is with a subject that, per se , suffers from a very limited understanding that is even more severe than that of quantum mechanics. This was acceptable, though, if it could convincingly be argued that scientific progress desperately needs to join forces. Quantum mechanics of a closed system was a beautiful and well understood theory with its respective state being presented as a point on a deterministic trajectory in Liouville space---not unlike the motion of a classical N -particle system in its 6N -dimensional phase-space. Unfortunately, we need an inside and an outside view, we need an external reference frame, we need an observer. This unavoidable partition is the origin of most of the troubles we have with quantum mechanics. A pragmatic solution is introduced in the form of so-called measurement postulates: one of the various incompatible properties of the system under consideration is supposed to be realized (i.e. to become a fact, to be defined without fundamental dispersion) based on `instantaneous' projections within some externally selected measurement basis. As a result, the theory becomes essentially statistical rather than deterministic; furthermore there is an asymmetry between the observed and the observing. This is the point where consciousness may come in. Complemented by an introduction and several appendices, Henry Stapp's book consists essentially of three parts: theory, implications, and new developments. The theory part gives a very readable account of the Copenhagen interpretation, some aspects of a psychophysical theory, and, eventually, hints towards a quantum foundation of the brain--mind connection. The next part, `implications', summarizes some previous attempts to bridge the gap between the working rules of quantum mechanics and their possible consequences for our understanding of this world (Pauli, Everett, Bohm, Heisenberg). The last section, `new developments', dwells on some ideas about the conscious brain and its possible foundation on quantum mechanics. The book is an interesting and, in part, fascinating contribution to a field that continues to be a companion to `practical' quantum mechanics since its very beginning. It is doubtful whether such types of `quantum ontologies' will ever become (empirically) testable; right now one can hardly expect more than to be offered some consistent `grand picture', which the reader may find more or less acceptable or even rewarding. Many practicing quantum physicists, though, will remain unimpressed. The shift from synthetic ontology to analytic ontology is the foundation of the present work. This means that fundamental wholes are being partitioned into their ontologically subordinate components by means of `events'. The actual event, in turn, is an abrupt change in the Heisenberg state describing the quantum universe. The new state then defines the tendencies associated with the next actual event. To avoid infinite regression in terms of going from one state of tendencies to the next, consciousness is there to give these events a special `feel', to provide a status of `intrinsic actuality'. The brain of an alert human observer is similar in an important way to a quantum detection device: it can amplify small signals to large macroscopic effects. On the other hand, actual events are not postulated to occur exclusively in brains. They are more generally associated with the formation of records. Records are necessarily part of the total state of the universe: it is obvious that the state of the universe cannot undergo a Schrödinger dynamics and at the same time record its own history. `The full universe consists therefore of an exceedingly thin veneer of relatively sluggish, directly observable properties resting on a vast ocean or rapidly fluctuating unobservable ones.' The present ideas also bear on how the world should be seen to develop. While conventional cosmology encounters problems as to how to define the intial conditions, which would enter the governing equations of motion, here `the boundary conditions are set not at some initial time, but gradually by a sequence of acts that imposes a sequence of constraints. After any sequence of acts there remains a collection of possible worlds, some of which will be eliminated by the next act.' Connected with those acts is `meaning': there has always been some speculation about the special significance of local properties in our understanding of the world. One could argue that correlations (even the quantum correlations found, e.g., in the EPR-experiments) were as real as anything else. But also Stapp stresses the special role of locality: the `local observable properties, or properties similar to them are the natural, and perhaps exclusive, carriers of meaning in the quantum universe. From this point of view the quantum universe tends to create meaning.' This sounds like an absolute concept: meaning not with respect to something else, but defined intrinsically---not easy to digest. The role of consciousness in the developing quantum universe requires more attention. `The causal irrelevance of our thoughts within classical physics constitutes a serious deficiency of that theory, construed as a description of reality.' This is taken to be entirely different within quantum mechanics. `The core idea of quantum mechanics is to describe our activities as knowledge-seeking and knowledge-using agents.' `21st century science does not reduce human beings to mechanical automata. Rather it elevates human beings to agents whose free choices can, according to the known laws, actually influence their behaviour.' An example with respect to perception is discussed: `Why, when we look at a triangle, do we experience three lines joined at three points and not some pattern of neuron firings?' The brain `does not convert an actual whole triangle into some jumbled set of particle motions; rather it converts a concatenation of separate external events into the actualization of some single integrated pattern of neural activity that is congruent to the perceived whole triangle.' How convincing is this proposal? It is hard to tell. I think Henry Stapp did a good job, but there are tight limitations to any such endeavour. Quantum mechanics is often strange indeed, but it also gives rise to our classical world around us. For the emergence of classicality jumps and measurement projections (the basic phenomena connected with those fundamental events of choice) are not needed. Therefore, I doubt whether the explanation of the evolution of our world really allows (or requires) that much free choice. On the other hand, most scientist will agree that empirical science was not possible without free will: we could not ask independent questions if this asking was part of a deterministic trajectory. The fact that the result of a quantum measurement is indeterminate (within given probabilities) does certainly not explain free will. How about the type of measurment? The experimentalist will have to assume that he can select the pertinent observable within some limits. But given a certain design the so-called pointer basis (producing stable measurement results) is no longer a matter of free choice. `The main theme of classical physics is that we live in a clocklike universe.' Today it is often assumed that the universe was a big (quantum-) computer or a cellular automaton. Many would be all too happy to leave that rather restrictive picture behind. But where to go? Stapp suggests giving consciousness a prominent role: `The most profound alteration of the fundamental principles was to bring consciousness of human beings into the basic structure of the physical theory.' How far we are able to go in this direction will depend on the amount of concrete research results becoming available to support this view.
The philosophy of quantum mechanics has often been conceived by physicists as a collection of dogmas concerning what can be measured, observed and known. To this branch of dialectics the present paper does not attempt to contribute, chiefly because it is written from the conviction that no part of science, nor any philosophy, can safely predict what may be feasible or knowable. Rather, this brief essay endeavors to expose the epistemology of quantum physics in a way which allows it to be recognized as an extension of the ordinary processes of cognition, as the continuation of a line which starts in sensory perception, leads straight through the methods of classical physics into quantum mechanics and shows no signs of terminating even there.
Emergent Causality from Decoherence: A Postulated Regime with an Explicit Conjecture An imaginary hypothesis, not a theory. This is the third revision. It corrects the definition of causality, changes the parameter, acknowledges the circularity of time, and states the conjecture explicitly. It is still a hypothesis, not a theory. ________________________________________ Abstract This manuscript proposes that classical causality is not fundamental but emergent, arising from the degree of decoherence of a system. We define causality as definite causal order between events. We choose a decoherence parameter that is basis-dependent and dimension-independent: the interference suppression factor relative to the pointer basis. We postulate (not derive) that definite causal order emerges when this parameter exceeds a critical value. We acknowledge the circularity of time, the lack of a full mathematical derivation, and the absence of experimental confirmation. We add an explicit conjecture connecting the parameter to the process-matrix formalism of Oreshkov, Costa and Brukner. The hypothesis is offered as a framework for critique and development. ________________________________________ 1. Introduction The nature of causality remains an open problem in physics. In quantum mechanics, there are correlations, not causes in the classical sense. In classical physics, causality is absolute and local. These descriptions do not obviously fit together. This manuscript proposes that classical causality is not a fundamental property of the universe, but a property of the level of description. It emerges from the degree of decoherence of a system, in a manner analogous to how temperature emerges from the collective behaviour of many particles. The hypothesis is labelled "imaginary" because it lacks full mathematical formalism, experimental confirmation, and a resolution of the circularity of time. It is offered as a framework for critique, not as a completed theory. Scope: This hypothesis addresses only the transition between the quantum regime (no definite causal order) and the classical regime (definite causal order). It does not address the relativistic regime. ________________________________________ 2. Defining "Causality" In this manuscript, "causality" means definite causal order between events. That is: for any two events A and B, either A precedes B, or B precedes A. Not intervention. Not deterministic evolution. Definite order. This definition is chosen because it is the one that can be connected to the process-matrix formalism (Oreshkov et al., 2012), and because it is the one that emerges in the classical limit. Other definitions (interventionist causation, deterministic evolution) are distinct and are not addressed here. This is a choice. Other definitions are possible. This choice is made for definiteness. ________________________________________ 3. The Parameter The central parameter is the degree of decoherence, γ. We choose a specific measure: the interference suppression factor relative to the pointer basis. This measure is: • Basis-dependent. It is defined relative to the pointer basis selected by the environment. • Dimension-independent. It is a ratio (a contrast), not an absolute quantity, so it ranges from 0 to 1 regardless of the dimension of the Hilbert space. • Explicit about the cut. It requires specifying the system, the environment, and the pointer basis. This measure is chosen over purity because purity has three defects: it depends on dimension, it is basis-independent, and it presupposes an unspecified system-environment cut. The interference suppression factor does not have these defects. This is a choice. Other measures are possible. This choice is made for definiteness, not because it is uniquely correct. ________________________________________ 4. The Postulate (Not a Derivation) With this parameter, we postulate that classical causality emerges when γ exceeds a critical value, γ_c. Below γ_c, the system is in a quantum regime: correlations without definite causal order. Above γ_c, the system is in a classical regime: definite causal order. This is not a derivation from first principles. It is a postulate. But it is a postulate with a defined parameter. And it is a starting point. The intermediate regime is not derived. It is postulated as a transition. And it is acknowledged that this placement is in tension with established physics: relativistic causal structure is a property of the spacetime metric, not of partial decoherence. This hypothesis does not address the relativistic regime. It addresses only the transition between the quantum regime (no definite causal order) and the classical regime (definite causal order). ________________________________________ 5. Co-Emergence (and the Circularity of Time) This hypothesis proposes that causality and the arrow of time co-emerge from decoherence. Neither is prior. Neither is the cause of the other. They emerge together. This is a conjecture, not a derivation. And it is acknowledged that this position is in tension with the literature: Oreshkov et al. (2012) suggest that the arrow of time produces causal order, not that they co-emerge. The difference is subtle but important: if the arrow of time is prior, then time is more fundamental than causality. If they co-emerge, neither is more fundamental. The circularity of time is not resolved. Decoherence presupposes time. The arrow of time is traced to a low-entropy initial condition, not to decoherence itself. The hypothesis does not resolve this circularity. It assumes it. ________________________________________ 6. Confrontation with the Literature The hypothesis is placed against the established literature. We do not confront as attacks, nor attempt to surpass. We use as anchors. • Zurek (2003), "Decoherence, einselection, and the quantum origins of the classical," Rev. Mod. Phys. 75, 715. Zurek shows that decoherence selects a small set of stable states (pointer states) and that the combination of einselection with dynamics leads to the emergence of classical phase-space structure. This hypothesis assumes, as an additional premise, that classical dynamics is causal. This premise is not derived from Zurek. It is an independent claim, and it is the weakest point in the argumentative chain. If the premise is true, then causality emerges from decoherence. If it is false, the hypothesis fails. • Gell-Mann and Hartle (1994, 2014), "Quasiclassical Realms in a Quantum Universe" (gr-qc/9404017) and "Adaptive Coarse Graining, Environment, Strong Decoherence, and Quasiclassical Realms" (arXiv:1312.7454). These works derive classical deterministic time-correlations and the fixed-past/open-future asymmetry from coarse-graining and strong decoherence, with no observer. The present hypothesis is close to this programme. It differs in framing the result as "emergent causality" rather than "quasiclassical realms." The substance is similar. • Oreshkov, Costa, and Brukner (2012), "Quantum correlations with no causal order," Nature Communications 3, 1092. DOI: 10.1038/ncomms2076. This work constructs correlations with no definite causal order and shows that definite order is recovered in a classical limit. The present hypothesis is consistent with this, but does not engage with the formalism. A conjecture connecting the two is offered in Section 7. • Page and Wootters (1983), "Evolution without evolution: Dynamics described by stationary observables," Phys. Rev. D 27, 2885. This work obtains time from entanglement with an internal clock. The present hypothesis does not address this. It assumes time as a parameter. • Joos and Zeh (1985), "The emergence of classical properties through interaction with the environment," Z. Phys. B 59, 223. Foundational work on decoherence in open quantum systems. • Rovelli (1996), "Relational quantum mechanics," Int. J. Theor. Phys. 35, 1637. Relational quantum mechanics holds that states are relational, not absolute. The present hypothesis extends this to causality: if states are relational, perhaps causal structure is too. But the extension is not derived. It is proposed. • Schlosshauer (2005), "Decoherence, the measurement problem, and interpretations of quantum mechanics," Rev. Mod. Phys. 76, 1267. A review of decoherence and its interpretational implications. • Allen, Barrett, Horsman, Lee, and Spekkens (2017), "Quantum Common Causes and Quantum Causal Models," Phys. Rev. X 7, 031021. This work defines interventionist causation in quantum mechanics. The present hypothesis uses a different definition (definite causal order), but acknowledges that other definitions are possible. The honest assessment: The hypothesis is not new in its intuition. It is new in its emphasis on causality as the emergent property, and in its attempt to frame the quantum-classical transition as a causal transition. But the emphasis is not a theory, and the transition is not derived. ________________________________________ 7. Conjecture: Connection with the Process-Matrix Formalism Oreshkov, Costa and Brukner (2012) have shown that, if one does not assume a global causal order, there exist quantum correlations that violate the causal inequality. These correlations are described by process matrices that are causally non-separable. In a classical limit, causal order emerges. This hypothesis proposes, as a conjecture, that the causally non-separable process matrix could correspond to γ = 0 (no decoherence, no definite causal order). The causally separable process matrix could correspond to γ > γ_c (sufficient decoherence, emergent causal order). The quantum-to-classical transition mentioned by Oreshkov et al. could be the transition in γ. This is a conjecture. It is not derived. There is no formalism that supports it. It is offered as a direction for future work: if someone with the appropriate mathematical tools wishes to attempt the connection, here is the intuition. And here is the criterion for
We begin by discussing ``What exists?'', i.e. ontology, in Classical Physics which provided a description of physical phenomena at the macroscopic level. The microworld however necessitates a introduction of Quantum ideas for its understanding. It is almost certain that the world is quantum mechanical at both microscopic as well as at macroscopic level. The problem of ontology of a Quantum world is a difficult one. It also depends on which interpretation is used. We first discuss some interpretations in which Quantum Mechanics does not provide a complete framework but has to be supplemented by extra ingredients e.g. (i) Copenhagen group of interpretations associated with the names of Niels Bohr, Heisenberg, von-Neumann, and (ii) de-Broglie-Bohm interpretations. We then look at some interpretations in which Quantum mechanics is supposed to provide the entire framework such as (i) Everett-deWitt many world, (ii) quantum histories interpretations. We conclude with some remarks on the rigidity of the formalism of quantum mechanics, which is sharp contrast to it's ontological fluidity.
The problem of understanding quantum mechanics is in large measure the problem of finding appropriate ways of thinking about the spatial and temporal aspects of the physical world. The standard, substantival, set-theoretic conception of space is inconsistent with quantum mechanics, and so is the doctrine of local realism, the principle of local causality, and the mathematical physicist's golden calf, determinism. The said problem is made intractable by our obtruding onto the physical world a theoretical framework that is more detailed than the physical world. This framework portraits space and time as infinitely and intrinsically differentiated, whereas the physical world is only finitely differentiated spacewise and timewise, namely to the extent that spatiotemporal relations and distinctions are warranted by facts. This has the following consequences: (i) The contingent properties of the physical world, including the times at which they are possessed, are indefinite and extrinsic. (ii) We cannot think of reality as being built "from the bottom up", out of locally instantiated physical properties. Instead we must conceive of the physical world as being built "from the top down": By entering into a multitude of spatial relations with itself, "existence itself" takes on both the aspect of a spatially differentiated world and the aspect of a multiplicity of formless relata, the fundamental particles. At the root of our interpretational difficulties is the "cookie cutter paradigm", according to which the world's synchronic multiplicity is founded on the introduction of surfaces that carve up space in the manner of three-dimensional cookie cutters. The neurophysiological underpinnings of this insidious notion are discussed.