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Bell System Technical Journal

Some Contemporary Advances in Physics IX The Atom-Model, Second Part1

Karl K. Darrow

Published Oct 1, 1925• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

EVERY atom-model that is worthy of notice was designed in view of a certain limited group of facts. That is to say, every valuable atom-model is the invention of somebody who, being acquainted with certain of the ways in which matter behaves, set himself to the devising of atoms of which an assemblage should behave like matter in those ways. Of course, it would be a most wonderful achievement to conceive atoms, of which assemblages should behave like matter in all ways; but this is too exalted an ambition for this day and generation, no man of science bothers with it. Each atom-model of the present is partially valid, not universally; and nobody can rightly appreciate any one of them, unless he knows the facts for which it was designed. I might add that he should also know the relative importance, in the world and in life, of the facts for which it was designed. But this also is too exalted an ambition; we do not know much, if anything, about the relative importance of facts sub specie aternitatis, and can hardly refrain from regarding with an especial favour the facts which happen to have been successfully explained. At all events it is clear that every account of an atom-model should be preceded by an independent account of the things it is meant to explain. For the favorite atom of these days, the atom of Rutherford and Bohr, I have provided this preliminary account of the facts in the First Part of the article. Let me give a brief outline of the most important among them, before entering upon the task of constructing an atom-model to reproduce them.

DOI
10.1002/j.1538-7305.1925.tb03971.x

Related papers

Some Contemporary Advances in Physics-VIII The Atom-Model, First Part1

Karl K. Darrow

MORE than any other word of the language, the word atom is implicated with the history of human speculations concerning the nature uf things. It is introduced when people cease to content themselves with observing, and begin to philosophize. There are many of the fundamental and essential writings of the literature of physics in which it does not appear, or appears without warrant. These are the descriptions of things observed, the accounts of experiments, the records of measurements, on which the edifice of theoretical physics is founded. There are many articles of what is commonly called the “theoretical” sort in which it does not occur. Such are the papers on the motions of planets, on the vibrations of elastic solids, on the currents in electrical networks, on the courses of light-rays through optical systems-papers which are essentially descriptions, although they give the impression of being something greater and deeper because they relate to idealized cases, and are phrased in the laconic language of mathematics. When the word atom appears justifiably in a discourse, it means that the author has departed from the safe routine of describing observed and observable events, however selectively, however skilfully, however intelligently. It signifies that he has gone beyond the limits of observation, and has entered upon the audacious adventure of constructing by the side of the real universe an ideal one, which shall act as the real one does, and be intelligible through and through.

Bell System Technical Journal•Jul 1, 1925•0 citations

On a Recent Critique of Complementarity: Part II

Paul K. Feyerabend

“Bohr was primarily a philosopher, not a physicist, but he understood that natural philosophy ... carries weight only if its every detail can be subjected to the ... test of experiment” (Heisenberg in [59], p. 95). As a result his approach differed from that of theschool-philosopherswhom he regarded with a somewhat “sceptical attitude, to say the least” ([59], p. 129) and whose lack of interest in “the important viewpoint which had emerged during the development of atomic physics” he noticed with regret ([59], p. 183).But it also differed, and to a considerable degree, from the spirit of what Professor T. S. Kuhn has called a “normal science.” Looking at Bohr's method of research we see that technical problems, however remote, are always related to a philosophical point of view; they are never treated as “tiny puzzles” whose solution is valuable in itself, even if one has not the faintest idea what it means, and where it leads: “For me” Bohr writes to Sommerfeld in 1922 ([59], p. 71) “[the quantum theory] is not a matter for petty didactic details, but a serious attempt to reach ... an inner coherence.” Emphasis is put on matters of principle ([59], p. 36) and minor discrepancies, or “puzzles” in the sense of Kuhn, instead of being deemphasized, and assimilated to the older paradigm,are turned into fundamental difficultiesby looking at them from a new direction, and by testing their background “in its furthest consequences by exaggeration” ([59], p. 329). A noteworthy example of Bohr's “non-normal” and rather metaphysical approach to physics is his scepticism in the face of the success of his own atomic model.

Philosophy of Science•Mar 1, 1969•31 citations

Quantum revolution

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The turn of the XXth century witnessed a revolution in physics comparable to Isaac Newton’s discovery of the universal laws of mechanics and of gravitation three centuries earlier. The world required to be described in novel terms, as the immutable, deterministic view of our familiar universe had given way to a new world picture, one which featured chance, flux, and an incessant upsurge of waves of matter. Such a worldview was so radically new and counterintuitive that it gave rise to strong debates, to the effect that Albert Einstein himself tried to oppose it on the grounds that “God does not play dice”. In spite of the intense debates that accompanied its emergence, quantum mechanics quickly proved an incredibly efficacious new tool to understand and to predict a wide array of new phenomena. It was so successful that in no time it broke free from the environment of research labs to become part of daily life, making it possible, for example, to understand why some materials were conductors, while others were insulators. Along with it, came, too, the discovery of transistors, on which much of modern electronics rests. It also led to understand how novel materials known as superconductors allow the transport of electricity with no loss, thus paving the way for new developments in the fields of medical imagery or energy distribution. Other aspects of the quantum theory led to the development of atomic clocks of astounding accuracy, which would be wrong by no more than fifteen seconds, had they been set at the beginning of the universe. A hundred years later, at the turn of the XXIst century, Quantum mechanics has lost none of its astounding power. Contemporary research has undertaken the task of exploring its less immediately perceptible aspects. Groundbreaking developments have ensued, such as the teleportation of grains of light or the possibility, once predicted by the great physicist Richard Feynman, to build, one day, novel computers which, unlike the ones we are familiar with today, will be able to process innumerable numbers of operations in parallel. The Wright Colloquium will be for us the occasion to explore, in the company of five internationallyknown specialists in the field, some of the fascinating aspects of quantum mechanics. We will appraise how efficiently quantum physics can describe our world, and confront its limitation when it is faced with the infinitely small (in relation to recent experiments carried out at the CERN) as with the incommensurably large scale of sidereal spaces. We will appreciate the extent to which quantum physics already has impacted our everyday lives, and evoke the way in which novel fields such as quantum computers and quantum information will entail profound changes in the future. The quantum adventure has only just begun! Monday 15 November 2010 - 18h30 Jochen Mannhart Center for Electronic Correlations and Magnetism, University of Augsburg, Germany Quantum Physics on the Scale of Daily Life Tuesday 16 November 2010 - 18h30 Wolfgang Ketterle Nobel Laureate 2001 (Physics), Department of Physics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, U.S.A. When freezing cold is not cold enough New forms of matter close to absolute zero temperature Wednesday 17 November 2010 - 18h30 David Gross Nobel Laureate 2004 (Physics), Kavli Institute for Theoretical Physics, University of California, Santa-Barbara, U.S.A. Quantum Mechanics of the Very, Very Small and the Very, Very Large Thursday 18 November 2010 - 18h30 Alain Aspect CNRS senior scientist and Professor Institut d'Optique and Ecole Polytechnique Palaiseau, France. From Einstein’s intuition to quantum bits: a new quantum age? Vendredi 19 novembre 2010 - 18h30 Rainer Blatt Institute of Quantum Optics and Quantum Information, Austrian Academy of Sciences and University of Innsbruck, Austria The Quantum Way of Doing Computations

•Jan 1, 2010•0 citations

The Great Chain of Quantum Being: What the Physicists are Telling Us

Louis Gallo

THE GREAT CHAIN OF QUANTUM BEING: WHAT THE PHYSICISTS ARE TELLING US / Louis Gallo listen: there's a hell of a good universe next door; let's go —cummings Max Planck's announcement in 1900 that energy flows in discrete bundles rather than uniformly, as energy "should," did not instantly destroy the foundations of a classical world view that had prevailed since Newton's day. It took physicists nearly a quarter of a century to grasp the full significance of quantum theory. But 1900 is too convenient a date to ignore, and without distorting the history of ideas unduly we can refer to it as the point in time when science launched its relentless assault upon reason and common sense, an assault that continues to this day. This is nothing new, of course. Everyone knows how weird quantum theory is, how it toppled the Newtonian clockwork and so on. The purpose of this essay is to explain in ordinary language, if such a thing can be done, why physicists are saying some of the outrageous things we read about in the popular media. Because new particles, along with new theories to account for them, are being created at such a prodigious rate today, it has become extraordinarily difficult for non-scientists to keep up with the latest breakthroughs. The deluge of popular books on black holes and particle physics, outmoded before they go to press, reflects this information gap. I can hardly expect to beat the popularizers at their own game, but my intention is nevertheless to present a non-technical overview of the great chain of quantum being according to current theory. It can be suggested by way of preliminary assessment that the Theater of the Absurd did not die at some point in the early 1970s; its greatest production is and may always have been our meditations on the cosmos itself. We begin, however, with some thoughts on common sense rather than absurdity. Physicists have traditionally linked common sense with the twin doctrines of causality and determinism. Given thorough enough information about prior conditions, causality guarantees the predictability of all events and states ofbeing. French mathematician Pierre Laplace actually believed that such knowledge could be used to chart the entire history of the universe. Causality, then, is a way of thinking about individual events; determinism, a way of thinking about events 264 · The Missouri Review cumulatively. Both doctrines presume the existence of an objective, quantifiable external world populated by observers (ourselves). One cannot overemphasize the importance of the term "objective." It haunts modern physics at every turn. Indeed, the crucial difference between classical and quantum physics lies in their respective acceptance or rejection of objective reality. The early giants of quantum physics had a hard time accepting the implications of their own mathematics. Max Planck and Einstein—who is not, strictly speaking, a quantum physicist but who contributed much to the theory—refused to accept them. Yet the fate of objectivity may be traced by moving from Planck's position on the subject to that of Erwin Schrödinger, whose work culminated in the late 1920s. This chronology roughly reflects the order in which quantum theory emerged. Here is what Planck had to say in his book The New Science: "A science that starts off by predicating the denial of objectivity has already passed sentence on itself"; and "the quantum hypothesis will eventually find its exact expression in certain equations which will be a more exact formulation of the law of causality." Einstein spent most of his life searching for that "exact expression" and failed. Werner Heisenberg offered a similar but highly qualified version of Planck's statement. In Across the Frontiers Heisenberg says that quantum measurements do in fact measure objective states but also intrude upon those states. "It is," he writes, "no longer the objective states but rather the probabilities for the occurrence of certain events that can be stated in mathematical formulae." Schrödinger, in Mind and Matter, comes right out with it: "Mind has erected the objective outside world of the natural philosophers out of its own stuff." He means this literally, and the equations he contributed to quantum theory imply as much. Bohr...

The Missouri Review•Jan 1, 1984•0 citations

The Naturalistic Approach to Natural Science through Motion and Matter

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THE NATURALISTIC APPROACH TO NATURAL SCIENCE THROUGH MOTION AND MATTER THE most fundamental questions which are raised in modern science are concerned with matter and energy. which are said to be different aspects of the same reality. This reality is described in terms of particles and waves, and there is good experimental evidence for both. Particles can be recognized by their tracks in a photographic emulsion or in a cloud chamber, and they can be recorded with a Geiger counter. Diffraction and interference phenomena serve for the study of the continuous field or wave character of matter, which is manifested not only by light but also by electrons, neutrons and protons. Thus particles appear as waves and waves as particles: the two seem inseparable. Yet the difficulty of combining these two aspects of things in a unified picture is so great that it has been called the main stumbling block which prevents the formation of a stable and certain concept of matter. It has been suggested that the particles may be more or less temporary entities within the wave field whose form and behavior are determined by the laws of the waves themselves, which in certain cases permit waves to appear as if they were permanent substantial beings. Or perhaps the wa.ve field is merely a device for computing the probability of finding a particle of given properties at a given position. At any rate most theoreticians will probably admit that the individual particle is not a well-defined and permanent entity whose identity or sameness can be detected experimentally. In a word, the modern analysis of matter leaves us uncertain whether the world is a system o£ waves or particles or both. The only thing which seems certain is that there are no welldefined and permanent entities. This picture of physical reality may at first seem very dis219 WILLIAM H. KANE concerting and quite opposed to ordinary ways of thinking. For reassurance we may take hasty refuge in the common view that nothing is certain in science, nothing finaL New data will surely be uncovered, and new principles will be formulated. After all, science gives us only a tentative and partial view which is always subject to revision and revaluation. But the hypotheses of science are not opposed to previous valid findings. On the contrary, agreement with the data of experience is what validates a scientific principle. When new data exceed the limits of former principles, new hypotheses must be formulated which include as special cases the facts and correlations already established. The primary datum of our sensory experience is the fact of change in the world around us and in us. When we realize that we ourselves were born and will die; that we came into being and will cease to be in this world at least; that not only organisms of all kinds but also the chemical compounds are generated and corrupted, why is it surprising to be told by modern scientists that even the chemical atoms and the elementary particles of which they are composed are not permanent entities but transitory things? Perhaps it is because we had become accustomed to think of the atoms as indestructible building blocks out of which all bodies are made. Perhaps there is also a deeper reason for wonder. If everything is changing, how can there be anything even relatively permanent in the world? ·what are air and water, rocks and trees, animals and men? How can there even be change? Can there be a wave without something waving? How can anything come to be and cease to be in this world? To these questions there is no certain answer in modern science. Yet these are the very questions which the primary data of experience raise in our minds. If we desire a fundamental understanding of natural things we must account for change. We must explain in terms of its own proper principles what a changeable thing is and how it comes into being and ceases to be. It is not customary in modern science to look for basic prin- THE NATURALISTIC APPROACH TO NATURAL SCIENCE 221 ciples. Often we are told by philosophers of science and scientific methodology...

The Thomist: A Speculative Quarterly Review•Jan 1, 1956•1 citation

Atomic Electron Configuration

David E. Pressler

In this work I suggest that early twentieth century theoretical physicists did not have enough facts or experimental data to formulate a consistent atomic model and as a result the concept of the atom needs revised. I conclude that the new atomic model presented is based only on first principles, is easy to understand and visualize, and provides such a significant theoretical advance as to be a final theory.

International Journal of Modern Physics A•Sep 1, 2001•0 citations
EVERY atom-model that is worthy of notice was designed in view of a certain limited group of facts. That is to say, every valuable atom-model is the invention of somebody who, being acquainted with certain of the ways in which matter behaves, set himself to the devising of atoms of which an assemblage should behave like matter in those ways. Of course, it would be a most wonderful achievement to conceive atoms, of which assemblages should behave like matter in all ways; but this is too exalted an ambition for this day and generation, no man of science bothers with it. Each atom-model of the present is partially valid, not universally; and nobody can rightly appreciate any one of them, unless he knows the facts for which it was designed. I might add that he should also know the relative importance, in the world and in life, of the facts for which it was designed. But this also is too exalted an ambition; we do not know much, if anything, about the relative importance of facts sub specie aternitatis, and can hardly refrain from regarding with an especial favour the facts which happen to have been successfully explained. At all events it is clear that every account of an atom-model should be preceded by an independent account of the things it is meant to explain. For the favorite atom of these days, the atom of Rutherford and Bohr, I have provided this preliminary account of the facts in the First Part of the article. Let me give a brief outline of the most important among them, before entering upon the task of constructing an atom-model to reproduce them.
MORE than any other word of the language, the word atom is implicated with the history of human speculations concerning the nature uf things. It is introduced when people cease to content themselves with observing, and begin to philosophize. There are many of the fundamental and essential writings of the literature of physics in which it does not appear, or appears without warrant. These are the descriptions of things observed, the accounts of experiments, the records of measurements, on which the edifice of theoretical physics is founded. There are many articles of what is commonly called the “theoretical” sort in which it does not occur. Such are the papers on the motions of planets, on the vibrations of elastic solids, on the currents in electrical networks, on the courses of light-rays through optical systems-papers which are essentially descriptions, although they give the impression of being something greater and deeper because they relate to idealized cases, and are phrased in the laconic language of mathematics. When the word atom appears justifiably in a discourse, it means that the author has departed from the safe routine of describing observed and observable events, however selectively, however skilfully, however intelligently. It signifies that he has gone beyond the limits of observation, and has entered upon the audacious adventure of constructing by the side of the real universe an ideal one, which shall act as the real one does, and be intelligible through and through.
“Bohr was primarily a philosopher, not a physicist, but he understood that natural philosophy ... carries weight only if its every detail can be subjected to the ... test of experiment” (Heisenberg in [59], p. 95). As a result his approach differed from that of theschool-philosopherswhom he regarded with a somewhat “sceptical attitude, to say the least” ([59], p. 129) and whose lack of interest in “the important viewpoint which had emerged during the development of atomic physics” he noticed with regret ([59], p. 183).But it also differed, and to a considerable degree, from the spirit of what Professor T. S. Kuhn has called a “normal science.” Looking at Bohr's method of research we see that technical problems, however remote, are always related to a philosophical point of view; they are never treated as “tiny puzzles” whose solution is valuable in itself, even if one has not the faintest idea what it means, and where it leads: “For me” Bohr writes to Sommerfeld in 1922 ([59], p. 71) “[the quantum theory] is not a matter for petty didactic details, but a serious attempt to reach ... an inner coherence.” Emphasis is put on matters of principle ([59], p. 36) and minor discrepancies, or “puzzles” in the sense of Kuhn, instead of being deemphasized, and assimilated to the older paradigm,are turned into fundamental difficultiesby looking at them from a new direction, and by testing their background “in its furthest consequences by exaggeration” ([59], p. 329). A noteworthy example of Bohr's “non-normal” and rather metaphysical approach to physics is his scepticism in the face of the success of his own atomic model.
The turn of the XXth century witnessed a revolution in physics comparable to Isaac Newton’s discovery of the universal laws of mechanics and of gravitation three centuries earlier. The world required to be described in novel terms, as the immutable, deterministic view of our familiar universe had given way to a new world picture, one which featured chance, flux, and an incessant upsurge of waves of matter. Such a worldview was so radically new and counterintuitive that it gave rise to strong debates, to the effect that Albert Einstein himself tried to oppose it on the grounds that “God does not play dice”. In spite of the intense debates that accompanied its emergence, quantum mechanics quickly proved an incredibly efficacious new tool to understand and to predict a wide array of new phenomena. It was so successful that in no time it broke free from the environment of research labs to become part of daily life, making it possible, for example, to understand why some materials were conductors, while others were insulators. Along with it, came, too, the discovery of transistors, on which much of modern electronics rests. It also led to understand how novel materials known as superconductors allow the transport of electricity with no loss, thus paving the way for new developments in the fields of medical imagery or energy distribution. Other aspects of the quantum theory led to the development of atomic clocks of astounding accuracy, which would be wrong by no more than fifteen seconds, had they been set at the beginning of the universe. A hundred years later, at the turn of the XXIst century, Quantum mechanics has lost none of its astounding power. Contemporary research has undertaken the task of exploring its less immediately perceptible aspects. Groundbreaking developments have ensued, such as the teleportation of grains of light or the possibility, once predicted by the great physicist Richard Feynman, to build, one day, novel computers which, unlike the ones we are familiar with today, will be able to process innumerable numbers of operations in parallel. The Wright Colloquium will be for us the occasion to explore, in the company of five internationallyknown specialists in the field, some of the fascinating aspects of quantum mechanics. We will appraise how efficiently quantum physics can describe our world, and confront its limitation when it is faced with the infinitely small (in relation to recent experiments carried out at the CERN) as with the incommensurably large scale of sidereal spaces. We will appreciate the extent to which quantum physics already has impacted our everyday lives, and evoke the way in which novel fields such as quantum computers and quantum information will entail profound changes in the future. The quantum adventure has only just begun! Monday 15 November 2010 - 18h30 Jochen Mannhart Center for Electronic Correlations and Magnetism, University of Augsburg, Germany Quantum Physics on the Scale of Daily Life Tuesday 16 November 2010 - 18h30 Wolfgang Ketterle Nobel Laureate 2001 (Physics), Department of Physics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, U.S.A. When freezing cold is not cold enough New forms of matter close to absolute zero temperature Wednesday 17 November 2010 - 18h30 David Gross Nobel Laureate 2004 (Physics), Kavli Institute for Theoretical Physics, University of California, Santa-Barbara, U.S.A. Quantum Mechanics of the Very, Very Small and the Very, Very Large Thursday 18 November 2010 - 18h30 Alain Aspect CNRS senior scientist and Professor Institut d'Optique and Ecole Polytechnique Palaiseau, France. From Einstein’s intuition to quantum bits: a new quantum age? Vendredi 19 novembre 2010 - 18h30 Rainer Blatt Institute of Quantum Optics and Quantum Information, Austrian Academy of Sciences and University of Innsbruck, Austria The Quantum Way of Doing Computations
THE GREAT CHAIN OF QUANTUM BEING: WHAT THE PHYSICISTS ARE TELLING US / Louis Gallo listen: there's a hell of a good universe next door; let's go —cummings Max Planck's announcement in 1900 that energy flows in discrete bundles rather than uniformly, as energy "should," did not instantly destroy the foundations of a classical world view that had prevailed since Newton's day. It took physicists nearly a quarter of a century to grasp the full significance of quantum theory. But 1900 is too convenient a date to ignore, and without distorting the history of ideas unduly we can refer to it as the point in time when science launched its relentless assault upon reason and common sense, an assault that continues to this day. This is nothing new, of course. Everyone knows how weird quantum theory is, how it toppled the Newtonian clockwork and so on. The purpose of this essay is to explain in ordinary language, if such a thing can be done, why physicists are saying some of the outrageous things we read about in the popular media. Because new particles, along with new theories to account for them, are being created at such a prodigious rate today, it has become extraordinarily difficult for non-scientists to keep up with the latest breakthroughs. The deluge of popular books on black holes and particle physics, outmoded before they go to press, reflects this information gap. I can hardly expect to beat the popularizers at their own game, but my intention is nevertheless to present a non-technical overview of the great chain of quantum being according to current theory. It can be suggested by way of preliminary assessment that the Theater of the Absurd did not die at some point in the early 1970s; its greatest production is and may always have been our meditations on the cosmos itself. We begin, however, with some thoughts on common sense rather than absurdity. Physicists have traditionally linked common sense with the twin doctrines of causality and determinism. Given thorough enough information about prior conditions, causality guarantees the predictability of all events and states ofbeing. French mathematician Pierre Laplace actually believed that such knowledge could be used to chart the entire history of the universe. Causality, then, is a way of thinking about individual events; determinism, a way of thinking about events 264 · The Missouri Review cumulatively. Both doctrines presume the existence of an objective, quantifiable external world populated by observers (ourselves). One cannot overemphasize the importance of the term "objective." It haunts modern physics at every turn. Indeed, the crucial difference between classical and quantum physics lies in their respective acceptance or rejection of objective reality. The early giants of quantum physics had a hard time accepting the implications of their own mathematics. Max Planck and Einstein—who is not, strictly speaking, a quantum physicist but who contributed much to the theory—refused to accept them. Yet the fate of objectivity may be traced by moving from Planck's position on the subject to that of Erwin Schrödinger, whose work culminated in the late 1920s. This chronology roughly reflects the order in which quantum theory emerged. Here is what Planck had to say in his book The New Science: "A science that starts off by predicating the denial of objectivity has already passed sentence on itself"; and "the quantum hypothesis will eventually find its exact expression in certain equations which will be a more exact formulation of the law of causality." Einstein spent most of his life searching for that "exact expression" and failed. Werner Heisenberg offered a similar but highly qualified version of Planck's statement. In Across the Frontiers Heisenberg says that quantum measurements do in fact measure objective states but also intrude upon those states. "It is," he writes, "no longer the objective states but rather the probabilities for the occurrence of certain events that can be stated in mathematical formulae." Schrödinger, in Mind and Matter, comes right out with it: "Mind has erected the objective outside world of the natural philosophers out of its own stuff." He means this literally, and the equations he contributed to quantum theory imply as much. Bohr...
THE NATURALISTIC APPROACH TO NATURAL SCIENCE THROUGH MOTION AND MATTER THE most fundamental questions which are raised in modern science are concerned with matter and energy. which are said to be different aspects of the same reality. This reality is described in terms of particles and waves, and there is good experimental evidence for both. Particles can be recognized by their tracks in a photographic emulsion or in a cloud chamber, and they can be recorded with a Geiger counter. Diffraction and interference phenomena serve for the study of the continuous field or wave character of matter, which is manifested not only by light but also by electrons, neutrons and protons. Thus particles appear as waves and waves as particles: the two seem inseparable. Yet the difficulty of combining these two aspects of things in a unified picture is so great that it has been called the main stumbling block which prevents the formation of a stable and certain concept of matter. It has been suggested that the particles may be more or less temporary entities within the wave field whose form and behavior are determined by the laws of the waves themselves, which in certain cases permit waves to appear as if they were permanent substantial beings. Or perhaps the wa.ve field is merely a device for computing the probability of finding a particle of given properties at a given position. At any rate most theoreticians will probably admit that the individual particle is not a well-defined and permanent entity whose identity or sameness can be detected experimentally. In a word, the modern analysis of matter leaves us uncertain whether the world is a system o£ waves or particles or both. The only thing which seems certain is that there are no welldefined and permanent entities. This picture of physical reality may at first seem very dis219 WILLIAM H. KANE concerting and quite opposed to ordinary ways of thinking. For reassurance we may take hasty refuge in the common view that nothing is certain in science, nothing finaL New data will surely be uncovered, and new principles will be formulated. After all, science gives us only a tentative and partial view which is always subject to revision and revaluation. But the hypotheses of science are not opposed to previous valid findings. On the contrary, agreement with the data of experience is what validates a scientific principle. When new data exceed the limits of former principles, new hypotheses must be formulated which include as special cases the facts and correlations already established. The primary datum of our sensory experience is the fact of change in the world around us and in us. When we realize that we ourselves were born and will die; that we came into being and will cease to be in this world at least; that not only organisms of all kinds but also the chemical compounds are generated and corrupted, why is it surprising to be told by modern scientists that even the chemical atoms and the elementary particles of which they are composed are not permanent entities but transitory things? Perhaps it is because we had become accustomed to think of the atoms as indestructible building blocks out of which all bodies are made. Perhaps there is also a deeper reason for wonder. If everything is changing, how can there be anything even relatively permanent in the world? ·what are air and water, rocks and trees, animals and men? How can there even be change? Can there be a wave without something waving? How can anything come to be and cease to be in this world? To these questions there is no certain answer in modern science. Yet these are the very questions which the primary data of experience raise in our minds. If we desire a fundamental understanding of natural things we must account for change. We must explain in terms of its own proper principles what a changeable thing is and how it comes into being and ceases to be. It is not customary in modern science to look for basic prin- THE NATURALISTIC APPROACH TO NATURAL SCIENCE 221 ciples. Often we are told by philosophers of science and scientific methodology...