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The Thomist: A Speculative Quarterly Review

The Naturalistic Approach to Natural Science through Motion and Matter

William H. Kane

Published Jan 1, 1956• 1 citation
Publisher

Abstract

THE NATURALISTIC APPROACH TO NATURAL SCIENCE THROUGH MOTION AND MATTER THE most fundamental questions which are raised in modern science are concerned with matter and energy. which are said to be different aspects of the same reality. This reality is described in terms of particles and waves, and there is good experimental evidence for both. Particles can be recognized by their tracks in a photographic emulsion or in a cloud chamber, and they can be recorded with a Geiger counter. Diffraction and interference phenomena serve for the study of the continuous field or wave character of matter, which is manifested not only by light but also by electrons, neutrons and protons. Thus particles appear as waves and waves as particles: the two seem inseparable. Yet the difficulty of combining these two aspects of things in a unified picture is so great that it has been called the main stumbling block which prevents the formation of a stable and certain concept of matter. It has been suggested that the particles may be more or less temporary entities within the wave field whose form and behavior are determined by the laws of the waves themselves, which in certain cases permit waves to appear as if they were permanent substantial beings. Or perhaps the wa.ve field is merely a device for computing the probability of finding a particle of given properties at a given position. At any rate most theoreticians will probably admit that the individual particle is not a well-defined and permanent entity whose identity or sameness can be detected experimentally. In a word, the modern analysis of matter leaves us uncertain whether the world is a system o£ waves or particles or both. The only thing which seems certain is that there are no welldefined and permanent entities. This picture of physical reality may at first seem very dis219 WILLIAM H. KANE concerting and quite opposed to ordinary ways of thinking. For reassurance we may take hasty refuge in the common view that nothing is certain in science, nothing finaL New data will surely be uncovered, and new principles will be formulated. After all, science gives us only a tentative and partial view which is always subject to revision and revaluation. But the hypotheses of science are not opposed to previous valid findings. On the contrary, agreement with the data of experience is what validates a scientific principle. When new data exceed the limits of former principles, new hypotheses must be formulated which include as special cases the facts and correlations already established. The primary datum of our sensory experience is the fact of change in the world around us and in us. When we realize that we ourselves were born and will die; that we came into being and will cease to be in this world at least; that not only organisms of all kinds but also the chemical compounds are generated and corrupted, why is it surprising to be told by modern scientists that even the chemical atoms and the elementary particles of which they are composed are not permanent entities but transitory things? Perhaps it is because we had become accustomed to think of the atoms as indestructible building blocks out of which all bodies are made. Perhaps there is also a deeper reason for wonder. If everything is changing, how can there be anything even relatively permanent in the world? ·what are air and water, rocks and trees, animals and men? How can there even be change? Can there be a wave without something waving? How can anything come to be and cease to be in this world? To these questions there is no certain answer in modern science. Yet these are the very questions which the primary data of experience raise in our minds. If we desire a fundamental understanding of natural things we must account for change. We must explain in terms of its own proper principles what a changeable thing is and how it comes into being and ceases to be. It is not customary in modern science to look for basic prin- THE NATURALISTIC APPROACH TO NATURAL SCIENCE 221 ciples. Often we are told by philosophers of science and scientific methodology...

DOI
10.1353/tho.1956.0014

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Physics Today•Jun 1, 2001•0 citations
THE NATURALISTIC APPROACH TO NATURAL SCIENCE THROUGH MOTION AND MATTER THE most fundamental questions which are raised in modern science are concerned with matter and energy. which are said to be different aspects of the same reality. This reality is described in terms of particles and waves, and there is good experimental evidence for both. Particles can be recognized by their tracks in a photographic emulsion or in a cloud chamber, and they can be recorded with a Geiger counter. Diffraction and interference phenomena serve for the study of the continuous field or wave character of matter, which is manifested not only by light but also by electrons, neutrons and protons. Thus particles appear as waves and waves as particles: the two seem inseparable. Yet the difficulty of combining these two aspects of things in a unified picture is so great that it has been called the main stumbling block which prevents the formation of a stable and certain concept of matter. It has been suggested that the particles may be more or less temporary entities within the wave field whose form and behavior are determined by the laws of the waves themselves, which in certain cases permit waves to appear as if they were permanent substantial beings. Or perhaps the wa.ve field is merely a device for computing the probability of finding a particle of given properties at a given position. At any rate most theoreticians will probably admit that the individual particle is not a well-defined and permanent entity whose identity or sameness can be detected experimentally. In a word, the modern analysis of matter leaves us uncertain whether the world is a system o£ waves or particles or both. The only thing which seems certain is that there are no welldefined and permanent entities. This picture of physical reality may at first seem very dis219 WILLIAM H. KANE concerting and quite opposed to ordinary ways of thinking. For reassurance we may take hasty refuge in the common view that nothing is certain in science, nothing finaL New data will surely be uncovered, and new principles will be formulated. After all, science gives us only a tentative and partial view which is always subject to revision and revaluation. But the hypotheses of science are not opposed to previous valid findings. On the contrary, agreement with the data of experience is what validates a scientific principle. When new data exceed the limits of former principles, new hypotheses must be formulated which include as special cases the facts and correlations already established. The primary datum of our sensory experience is the fact of change in the world around us and in us. When we realize that we ourselves were born and will die; that we came into being and will cease to be in this world at least; that not only organisms of all kinds but also the chemical compounds are generated and corrupted, why is it surprising to be told by modern scientists that even the chemical atoms and the elementary particles of which they are composed are not permanent entities but transitory things? Perhaps it is because we had become accustomed to think of the atoms as indestructible building blocks out of which all bodies are made. Perhaps there is also a deeper reason for wonder. If everything is changing, how can there be anything even relatively permanent in the world? ·what are air and water, rocks and trees, animals and men? How can there even be change? Can there be a wave without something waving? How can anything come to be and cease to be in this world? To these questions there is no certain answer in modern science. Yet these are the very questions which the primary data of experience raise in our minds. If we desire a fundamental understanding of natural things we must account for change. We must explain in terms of its own proper principles what a changeable thing is and how it comes into being and ceases to be. It is not customary in modern science to look for basic prin- THE NATURALISTIC APPROACH TO NATURAL SCIENCE 221 ciples. Often we are told by philosophers of science and scientific methodology...
INDIVIDUALAtomism in its latest form is called quantum mechanics.It has extended its range to comprise, besides ordinary matter, all kinds of radiation, including light-in brief, all forms of energy, ordinary matter being one of them.In the present form of the theoiy the "atoms" are electrons, jorotons, photons, mesons, etc.The generic name is elementary particle, or merely particle.The term "atom" has very wisely been retained for chemical atoms, though it has become a misnomer.This essay deals with the elementary particle, more particularly with a certain feature that this concept has acquired-or rather lost in quantum mechanics.I menn this : That the elementary particle is not an individual; it cannot be identified, it lacks "sameness."The fact is known to every physicist, but is rarely given any prominence in surveys readable by nonspccialists.In technical language it is covered by saying that the particles "obey" new-fangled statistics, either Einstein-Bose or Fermi-Dirac statistics.The implication, far from obvious, is that the unsuspected epithet "this" is not quite prop- erly applicable to, say, an electron, except with caution, in a restricted sense, and sometimes not at all.My objective here is to explain this point and to give it the thought it deserves.In order to create a foil for the discussion, let me summarize in sections 2-5 what we are usually told about particles and waves in the new physics.2. CURRENT VIEWS: THE AMALGAMATION OF PARTICLES AND WAVES Our image of the material world had been made up of two kinds of "fittings"-waves and particles.The former were instanced mainly, if not exclusively, by Maxwell's waves of electromagnetic energy, comprising such as are used in radio, light, X-rays, and gamma-rays.Material bodies were said to consist of particles.One
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Quantum mechanics is usually defined in terms of some loosely connected axioms and rules. Such a foundation is far from the beauty of, e.g., the `principles' underlying classical mechanics. Motivated, in addition, by notorious interpretation problems, there have been numerous attempts to modify or `complete' quantum mechanics. A first attempt was based on so-called hidden variables; its proponents essentially tried to expel the non-classical nature of quantum mechanics. More recent proposals intend to complete quantum mechanics not within mechanics proper but on a `higher (synthetic) level'; by means of a combination with gravitation theory (R Penrose), with quantum information theory (C M Caves, C A Fuchs) or with psychology and brain science (H P Stapp). I think it is fair to say that in each case the combination is with a subject that, per se , suffers from a very limited understanding that is even more severe than that of quantum mechanics. This was acceptable, though, if it could convincingly be argued that scientific progress desperately needs to join forces. Quantum mechanics of a closed system was a beautiful and well understood theory with its respective state being presented as a point on a deterministic trajectory in Liouville space---not unlike the motion of a classical N -particle system in its 6N -dimensional phase-space. Unfortunately, we need an inside and an outside view, we need an external reference frame, we need an observer. This unavoidable partition is the origin of most of the troubles we have with quantum mechanics. A pragmatic solution is introduced in the form of so-called measurement postulates: one of the various incompatible properties of the system under consideration is supposed to be realized (i.e. to become a fact, to be defined without fundamental dispersion) based on `instantaneous' projections within some externally selected measurement basis. As a result, the theory becomes essentially statistical rather than deterministic; furthermore there is an asymmetry between the observed and the observing. This is the point where consciousness may come in. Complemented by an introduction and several appendices, Henry Stapp's book consists essentially of three parts: theory, implications, and new developments. The theory part gives a very readable account of the Copenhagen interpretation, some aspects of a psychophysical theory, and, eventually, hints towards a quantum foundation of the brain--mind connection. The next part, `implications', summarizes some previous attempts to bridge the gap between the working rules of quantum mechanics and their possible consequences for our understanding of this world (Pauli, Everett, Bohm, Heisenberg). The last section, `new developments', dwells on some ideas about the conscious brain and its possible foundation on quantum mechanics. The book is an interesting and, in part, fascinating contribution to a field that continues to be a companion to `practical' quantum mechanics since its very beginning. It is doubtful whether such types of `quantum ontologies' will ever become (empirically) testable; right now one can hardly expect more than to be offered some consistent `grand picture', which the reader may find more or less acceptable or even rewarding. Many practicing quantum physicists, though, will remain unimpressed. The shift from synthetic ontology to analytic ontology is the foundation of the present work. This means that fundamental wholes are being partitioned into their ontologically subordinate components by means of `events'. The actual event, in turn, is an abrupt change in the Heisenberg state describing the quantum universe. The new state then defines the tendencies associated with the next actual event. To avoid infinite regression in terms of going from one state of tendencies to the next, consciousness is there to give these events a special `feel', to provide a status of `intrinsic actuality'. The brain of an alert human observer is similar in an important way to a quantum detection device: it can amplify small signals to large macroscopic effects. On the other hand, actual events are not postulated to occur exclusively in brains. They are more generally associated with the formation of records. Records are necessarily part of the total state of the universe: it is obvious that the state of the universe cannot undergo a Schrödinger dynamics and at the same time record its own history. `The full universe consists therefore of an exceedingly thin veneer of relatively sluggish, directly observable properties resting on a vast ocean or rapidly fluctuating unobservable ones.' The present ideas also bear on how the world should be seen to develop. While conventional cosmology encounters problems as to how to define the intial conditions, which would enter the governing equations of motion, here `the boundary conditions are set not at some initial time, but gradually by a sequence of acts that imposes a sequence of constraints. After any sequence of acts there remains a collection of possible worlds, some of which will be eliminated by the next act.' Connected with those acts is `meaning': there has always been some speculation about the special significance of local properties in our understanding of the world. One could argue that correlations (even the quantum correlations found, e.g., in the EPR-experiments) were as real as anything else. But also Stapp stresses the special role of locality: the `local observable properties, or properties similar to them are the natural, and perhaps exclusive, carriers of meaning in the quantum universe. From this point of view the quantum universe tends to create meaning.' This sounds like an absolute concept: meaning not with respect to something else, but defined intrinsically---not easy to digest. The role of consciousness in the developing quantum universe requires more attention. `The causal irrelevance of our thoughts within classical physics constitutes a serious deficiency of that theory, construed as a description of reality.' This is taken to be entirely different within quantum mechanics. `The core idea of quantum mechanics is to describe our activities as knowledge-seeking and knowledge-using agents.' `21st century science does not reduce human beings to mechanical automata. Rather it elevates human beings to agents whose free choices can, according to the known laws, actually influence their behaviour.' An example with respect to perception is discussed: `Why, when we look at a triangle, do we experience three lines joined at three points and not some pattern of neuron firings?' The brain `does not convert an actual whole triangle into some jumbled set of particle motions; rather it converts a concatenation of separate external events into the actualization of some single integrated pattern of neural activity that is congruent to the perceived whole triangle.' How convincing is this proposal? It is hard to tell. I think Henry Stapp did a good job, but there are tight limitations to any such endeavour. Quantum mechanics is often strange indeed, but it also gives rise to our classical world around us. For the emergence of classicality jumps and measurement projections (the basic phenomena connected with those fundamental events of choice) are not needed. Therefore, I doubt whether the explanation of the evolution of our world really allows (or requires) that much free choice. On the other hand, most scientist will agree that empirical science was not possible without free will: we could not ask independent questions if this asking was part of a deterministic trajectory. The fact that the result of a quantum measurement is indeterminate (within given probabilities) does certainly not explain free will. How about the type of measurment? The experimentalist will have to assume that he can select the pertinent observable within some limits. But given a certain design the so-called pointer basis (producing stable measurement results) is no longer a matter of free choice. `The main theme of classical physics is that we live in a clocklike universe.' Today it is often assumed that the universe was a big (quantum-) computer or a cellular automaton. Many would be all too happy to leave that rather restrictive picture behind. But where to go? Stapp suggests giving consciousness a prominent role: `The most profound alteration of the fundamental principles was to bring consciousness of human beings into the basic structure of the physical theory.' How far we are able to go in this direction will depend on the amount of concrete research results becoming available to support this view.
More than a hundred years ago, a series of discoveries, especially in physics, began to subtly (or maybe not) reveal some mysterious properties of matter, properties that in some fashion or other were not acceptable to our established way of perceiving Reality. Strangely enough, these properties were not taken seriously by science because they pointed to a reality that seemed too fantastical to be true, a reality that seemed to have no substance or permanence. These so called mysterious properties matter, for lack of a better word, turn out to be fundamentally related to the following discoveries: The ambiguous wave-particle duality. As in de Broglie matter-waves and the Compton properties of particles. The ubiquitous appearance of the cycle constant (τ=2π=C⁄r) in physical mathematical relations. The general applicability of the Fourier Transform to represent/model physical motion and other natural processes. The Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle and its mysterious constraint between conjugate variables, momentum and position for example. Quantum Mechanics and its collapse of the wavefunction. The surprising mass-energy equivalence. As in Einstein’s E=mc^2. The perplexing isotropy of the speed of light. The mind boggling time dilation and length contraction of Einstein’s Special Relativity (SR). The contradictory fabric of SR/GR’s spacetime and its assignment of properties to the void. The surprisingly discrete nature of atomic properties. As in Quantum Mechanics (QM). Needless to say, no matter what science has tried in order to fit the above discoveries into our physical world, their implications continue to elude an intuitively acceptable explanation in material terms. This monograph, although not necessarily in chronological order, is a recapitulation of previous monographs written by the author in an attempt at a single-source theoretical explanation/clarification for the above mentioned list of “mysterious” properties of matter, in terms of one fundamental set of properties, the motional geometry of matter.
Certainly there is no unique answer to Frank Wilczek’s question, “What Is Quantum Theory?” (Physics Today, June 2000, page 11). I was not certain that a pragmatic answer, which I proposed for a course in applied quantum mechanics, 1 1. W. A. Harrison, Applied Quantum Mechanics, World Scientific, River Edge, N.J. (2000). would be sustainable for the entire course, but it seems that it was. That answer was the assertion that everything is both a particle and a wave, and that everything else would follow from that one assertion. Planck’s constant arose when the velocity of a wave (the derivative of the frequency with respect to wavenumber) was equated to the velocity of a particle (the derivative of the energy with respect to momentum), so that energy is proportional to frequency and momentum to wavenumber, with the same proportionality constant ħ. When Hamiltonian mechanics was introduced, “everything” became anything that can be described by such mechanics, or anything that satisfies a wave equation. Quantum theory does not say what nature gives, only how to predict the behavior of what is given. If nature serves up particles with half-integral angular momentum, the wavefunction that describes them must go into its negative when they are interchanged, and they therefore obey the Pauli principle.Such principles, which historically arose as independent conjectures, now follow from the one assertion. It is a matter of seeing how this peculiar assertion can turn out to be absolutely true.The relation between quantum theory and the physical world was seen as follows: Quantum theory tells what future scenarios are consistent with some initial information, and what the relative probability of each scenario is. Quantum theory cannot tell more than that, but neither can any other theory.My pragmatic approach may not satisfy everyone’s philosophical needs. But the aim of an applied quantum course is to see how to use the theory and to introduce the many approximations that have made the theory accessible to physicists and engineers. If some basic consequences are difficult to accept, the problem must lie with the initial assertion from which the consequences follow.REFERENCESection:ChooseTop of pageREFERENCE <<1. W. A. Harrison, Applied Quantum Mechanics, World Scientific, River Edge, N.J. (2000). Google ScholarCrossref© 2001 American Institute of Physics.