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Foundations of Physics

Quantum Mechanics: Ontology Without Individuals

Newton C. A. da Costa, Olímpia Lombardi

Published Mar 21, 2014• 56 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/s10701-014-9793-1

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The non-relativistic quantum mechanics offers us conditions to consider at least two possible metaphysical packages, but incompatible between themselves: metaphysics of individuals, and metaphysics of non-individuals. In addition, the standard formalism is compatible with both the ontologies, without the theory being decided for either of them. From this particular kind of situation, the thesis of the underdetermination of metaphysics by physics can be established. Actually, it can be found, among scientists and philosophers, defenders of one, or another ontology, as well as those who do not address the issue, given that theory on its own does not decide. This means that if we make a choice for one of these packages, it will be happing in a metaphysical field, increasing a lot the philosophical discussions about individuality of quantic objects in quantum physics. From a naturalized methodological view, we present the issues from those defend the individuality of quantic objects, and from those, include us, defend non-individuality, focusing two approaches: (i) the ontological one, in which the fail of IIP as individuation principle is discussed; and, (ii) the logical one, in which non-reflexive logics, as well as a quasi-set theory became more suitable for representing the non-individuals. In this paper we stand for the choice of non-individuals ontology becomes more plausible, and should be taken in account seriously, opening up possibilities for ontological pluralism.

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Abstract Despite the successful development of quantum chemistry, the deep breakdown between the conceptual basis of standard quantum mechanics and some implicit ontological assumptions of quantum chemistry is only rarely acknowledged. In fact, in the framework of standard quantum mechanics, quantum systems are not individual objects in the philosophical sense: they cannot be individualized by their positions in space and time and, as a consequence, they have no trajectories. By contrast, the basic magnitude in quantum chemistry is the electronic density, which is commonly interpreted in terms of the definite positions occupied by the individual electron in its motion around the nucleus. In the present paper, it will be argued that Bohmian Mechanics offers an ontological picture that is much closer to the quantum chemists’ way of conceiving their research field.
The non-relativistic quantum mechanics offers us conditions to consider at least two possible metaphysical packages, but incompatible between themselves: metaphysics of individuals, and metaphysics of non-individuals. In addition, the standard formalism is compatible with both the ontologies, without the theory being decided for either of them. From this particular kind of situation, the thesis of the underdetermination of metaphysics by physics can be established. Actually, it can be found, among scientists and philosophers, defenders of one, or another ontology, as well as those who do not address the issue, given that theory on its own does not decide. This means that if we make a choice for one of these packages, it will be happing in a metaphysical field, increasing a lot the philosophical discussions about individuality of quantic objects in quantum physics. From a naturalized methodological view, we present the issues from those defend the individuality of quantic objects, and from those, include us, defend non-individuality, focusing two approaches: (i) the ontological one, in which the fail of IIP as individuation principle is discussed; and, (ii) the logical one, in which non-reflexive logics, as well as a quasi-set theory became more suitable for representing the non-individuals. In this paper we stand for the choice of non-individuals ontology becomes more plausible, and should be taken in account seriously, opening up possibilities for ontological pluralism.