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Lecture notes in computer science

A simple protocol for secure circuit evaluation: Extended abstract

Martín Abadi, Joan Feigenbaum

Published Jan 1, 1988• 10 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/bfb0035850

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Upper Bounds on the Communication Complexity of Optimally Resilient Cryptographic Multiparty Computation.

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Abstract. We give improved upper bounds on the communication complexity of optimally-resilient secure multiparty computation in the cryptographic model. We consider evaluating an n-party randomized function and show that if f can be computed by a circuit of size c, thenO(cn 2 κ) is an upper bound for active security with optimal resilience t<n/2and security parameter κ. This improves on the communication complexity of previous protocols by a factor of at least n. This improvement comes from the fact that in the new protocol, only O(n) messages (of size O(κ) each) are broadcast during the whole protocol execution, in contrast to previous protocols which require at least O(n) broadcasts per gate. Furthermore, we improve the upper bound on the communication complexity of passive secure multiparty computation with resilience t<n from O(cn 2 κ)toO(cnκ). This improvement is mainly due to a simple observation. 1

•Jan 1, 2004•0 citations
This work studies compilation of honest-majority semi-honest secure multi-party protocols secure up to additive attacks to maliciously secure computation with abort. Prior work concentrated on arithmetic circuits composed of addition and multiplication gates, while many practical protocols rely on additional types of elementary operations or gates to achieve good performance. In this work we revisit the notion of security up to additive attacks in the presence of additional gates such as random element generation and opening. This requires re-evaluation of functions that can be securely evaluated, extending the notion of protocols secure up to additive attacks, and re-visiting the notion of delayed verification that points to weaknesses in its prior use and designing a mitigation strategy. We transform the computation using dual execution to achieve security in the malicious model with abort and experimentally evaluate the difference in performance of semi-honest and malicious protocols to demonstrate the low cost.
Abstract. We give improved upper bounds on the communication complexity of optimally-resilient secure multiparty computation in the cryptographic model. We consider evaluating an n-party randomized function and show that if f can be computed by a circuit of size c, thenO(cn 2 κ) is an upper bound for active security with optimal resilience t<n/2and security parameter κ. This improves on the communication complexity of previous protocols by a factor of at least n. This improvement comes from the fact that in the new protocol, only O(n) messages (of size O(κ) each) are broadcast during the whole protocol execution, in contrast to previous protocols which require at least O(n) broadcasts per gate. Furthermore, we improve the upper bound on the communication complexity of passive secure multiparty computation with resilience t<n from O(cn 2 κ)toO(cnκ). This improvement is mainly due to a simple observation. 1