Information-theoretic MPC among
n parties with
t corruptions can securely evaluate a circuit
C with
O(∣C∣⋅t/(n−t)) online communication in the preprocessing model and
O(∣C∣⋅t/(n−2t)) communication in the honest majority setting. Damgård, Larsen and Nielsen (CRYPTO 2019) showed that both communication bounds are tight for inner products. Fully homomorphic encryption and other assumptions known to imply public-key cryptography beat both communication bounds, but the communication complexity with symmetric-key cryptography alone is less understood. For MPC with preprocessing, we prove that the same
Ω(∣C∣⋅t/(n−t)) lower bound holds in the random oracle model, so a random oracle cannot reduce the online communication. For honest majority MPC relative to a random oracle, we present an
Ω(∣C∣) communication lower bound that is matched by a new construction for degree-2 polynomials (including inner products) when
n=O(logλ), beating the information-theoretic bound. We also study quantum MPC. First, we prove that information-theoretic protocols with quantum communication (and preprocessing) cannot reduce communication compared to their classical counterparts. Furthermore, we extend our lower bound for MPC with preprocessing to protocols with a quantum-accessible random oracle, but use only classical communication. In contrast, with both quantum communication and a post-quantum one-way function, we present a simple two-party protocol that evaluates the two-party instance of these circuits with
poly(λ,log∣C∣) communication, beating these lower bounds. Finally, such communication savings do not come for free. We prove that there exist circuits
C such that every blackbox protocol with
o(∣C∣) quantum communication must perform
Ω(∣C∣) cryptographic operations.
We study the round complexity of various cryptographic protocols. Our main result is a tight lower bound on the round complexity of any fully-black-box construction of a statistically-hiding commitment scheme from oneway permutations, and even front trapdoor permutations. This lower bound matches the round complexity of the statistically-hiding commitment scheme due to Naor, Ostrovsky, Venkatesan and Yung (CRYPTO '92). As a corollary, we derive similar tight lower bounds for several other ctyptographicprotocols, such as single-server private information retrieval, interactive hashing, and oblivious transfer that guarantees statistical security for one of the parties. Our techniques extend the collision-finding oracle due to Simon (EUROCRYPT '98) to the setting of interactive protocols (our extension also implies an alternative proof for the main property of the original oracle). In addition, we substantially extend the reconstruction paradigm of Gennaro and Trevisan (FOCS '00). In both cases, our extensions are quite delicate and may be found useful in proving additional black-box separation results.
Oblivious polynomial evaluation is a protocol involving two parties: a sender whose input is a polynomial and a receiver whose input is a value a .Most of existing Oblivious Polynomial Evaluation protocols were built based on some cryptographically intractable problems which made them a higher computation complexity.By using some random and hiding secure information in them, this paper presents an unconditionally secure oblivious polynomial evaluation protocol.It does not rely on any cryptographic assumption and involves only simple computation.Further, our protocol does not include any third party and is more practice.