arXiv:2610.10702
Combining Error Verification and Privacy Amplification in Quantum Key Distribution
Devashish Tupkary, Zhiyao Wang, Ernest Y. -Z. Tan
Abstract
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocols typically involve two separate steps of error-verification and privacy amplification. Both steps involve the application of a hash function sampled from a suitable hash family to classical data. A potentially simpler alternative is to implement a single-step hashing procedure, announce and compare a fixed number of bits of its output for error-verification, and retain the remaining bits as the final output key. This reduces the complexity of classical postprocessing, the amount of classical communication, and the amount of randomness needed in the protocol. While this construction has appeared in the literature, a suitable mathematical justification is lacking. In this work, we show that the security of such protocols, under certain simple conditions, follows from a slightly modified notion of secrecy of the protocol without the final error-verification step. In particular, we show that for most entropy-based proofs, the combined protocol can be implemented with no change to the key rate, and a minor change to the security parameter.
AI Summary
QKD normally uses separate hashes for error verification (EV) and privacy amplification (PA). This paper analyzes a combined procedure: hash the error-corrected strings once, publicly compare $t$ output bits, and retain the remaining $\ell$ bits if verification passes. The question is whether this simplification preserves composable security, since acceptance can itself reveal information about the retained key. The main theorem gives security parameter $2\varepsilon+\delta$ under two conditions. First, the full $\ell+t$-bit hash output must be $\varepsilon$-close to uniform in a modified secrecy statement evaluated on subnormalized states restricted to the event that Alice’s and Bob’s pre-amplification strings agree. Second, the compared $t$ bits must have collision probability at most $\delta$ for every pair of distinct inputs. The proof separates matching inputs from mismatching inputs, bounds accepted mismatches by $\delta$, and uses trace-distance inequalities on the matching branch. Random Toeplitz hashing satisfies the required truncated collision bound with $\delta=2^{-t}$. For standard entropy-based proofs using leftover hashing, the paper explains how to obtain the modified secrecy statement without changing key-length expressions, yielding security $2\varepsilon_{\mathrm{PA}}+\varepsilon_{\mathrm{EV}}$. This adaptation is presented schematically rather than as a full treatment of each proof framework. A counterexample shows that ordinary secrecy before verification alone is insufficient. Compatibility with proofs based directly on virtual phase-error correction remains unclear. The analysis assumes authenticated communication and agreement on output length and abort status.
Written by gpt-6.1-sol from the paper's full text. Automated: it can be wrong.